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“This edited collection constitutes a landmark in helping a wider audience
appreciate the challenges in assuming a ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ when it comes
to rape and sexual violence. The chapters in this book demonstrate the continu-
ities and differences within Nordic countries and places elsewhere in the world
in making sense of what counts as rape and sexual violence, how to count these
experiences, and how to make sense of the perpetrators both ‘real’ and ‘digital’.
It is a collection which is remarkable in its nuance and its wider contribution to
the literature. No matter how much you might think you know about rape and
sexual violence, you will deﬁnitely beneﬁt from reading the excellent and
thought provoking contributions found here.”
– Sandra Walklate, Eleanor Rathbone Chair of Sociology,
University of Liverpool, UK, and Conjoint Chair of Criminology,
Monash University, Australia
“This is a truly exceptional volume on how to study, make sense of, and address
rape and sexual harm. Focusing on the Nordic region, it provides rich new research
on perpetration, victimization, criminal justice, and prevention. The chapters also
develop theoretical frameworks that can and should be engaged well beyond this
context. It is necessary reading for all those interested in the Nordic region, and to
all those interested sexual assault, gender, and public policy.”
– Shamus Khan, Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology,
Columbia University, USA

Rape in the Nordic Countries
While the Nordic countries are listed at the top in most international rankings of
gender equality and citizens’ feelings of security, studies on the prevalence of
sexual victimisation present a different picture, suggesting that the very countries
that have invested much in establishing gender equality actually see a high preva-
lence of sexual violence. This book sheds light on the phenomenon and construc-
tion of rape and other forms of sexual violence within the Nordic region,
exploring the ways in which rape and sexual violence are dealt with through
criminal law and considering governmental policies aimed at combatting it, with
a special focus on legal regulations and developments. Thematically organised, it
offers new research on perpetrators, victimhood, criminal justice and prevention.
Multi-disciplinary in approach, it brings together the latest work from a range of
scholars to offer insights into the situation in the ﬁve Nordic countries, asking
how and why rape and other forms of sexual violence occur, whilst also address-
ing the timely issues of online sexual cultures, BDSM and the grey areas of
sexual offences. As such, it will appeal to scholars of sociology, criminology and
law with interests in gender and sexual violence.
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Preface
This book has been made with an aim to both strengthen Nordic conversations
about rape and other forms of sexual harm and strengthen international conver-
sations about the Nordic region. The idea for the book grew out of collabor-
ations and events organised by the Nordic Network for Research on Sexual
Violence and we were lucky to receive economic support for organising
a writer’s workshop, language editing and open access by the Scandinavian
Research Council for Criminology and Oslo Metropolitan University, and
administrative support from the Department of Criminology and Sociology of
Law at the University of Oslo.

1 A Nordic research agenda on rape
and sexual violence
May-Len Skilbrei, Kari Stefansen and
Marie Bruvik Heinskou
Introduction
How best to prevent and prosecute rape, and to protect its victims, is debated in
countries across the world. Rape has also become a central topic in supranational
forums such as the United Nations and the European Union and is something that
mobilises transnational civil society organisations such as Amnesty International
and Equality Now. The issue has also spurred engagement on an individual level,
as is evident in how the #MeToo movement that gained momentum in 2017
brought the world’s attention to rape and other forms of sexual harm.
This high level of attention reﬂects both an increasing awareness of the harm
of rape throughout the last few decades and real or perceived changes in
the extent and characteristics of the phenomenon of rape. Several countries are
currently experiencing an increase in reported cases of rape. Since increased
attention towards and understanding of the phenomenon affect identiﬁcation and
people’s willingness to report, this increase does not necessarily mean that more
people are victimised than earlier. But it does make rape into a phenomenon
that policy-makers have to address. The large numbers of reported cases and
the notable gap between these cases and convictions are something that,
together with the visibility of personal experiences of violation found in social
media, are key to the current debates and to opportunities for action.
That rape and other forms of sexual harm are taken seriously is not only
something that has arisen from current developments. This story has been
a long time in the making. Following the publication of Susan Brownmiller’s
radical interpretation of rape in her 1975 book Against Our Will and other inter-
ventions at the time, women’s movements throughout the world have directed
our attention towards female victimisation and have offered a gendered analysis
of the reason such victimisation exists and why governments have not done
more to combat such victimisation. Since the book’s publication, rape and other
forms of sexual harm have become thoroughly associated with male perpetra-
tion and female victimisation; such acts have been interpreted not only as
attacks on individual women but also as attacks on women as women. Most of
the chapters in the present book are inﬂuenced by such understandings of rape
as a social phenomenon, with causes and effects which reach far beyond the
people who are directly affected by such acts.
Female perpetration and male victimisation continue to be less debated and
researched than other forms of rape. Police statistics continue to represent rape
mainly as something that men subject women to. Now that we are aware of the
problems of building our understanding of the phenomenon on ﬁgures that
easily reproduce what is already taken to be true (and therefore are more easily
identiﬁed and reported), calls to open debates and research to cover male vic-
timisation have grown stronger (see Javaid, 2018; United Nations, 2018). While
most of the examples covered in this book offer analyses of various aspects of
male perpetration and female victimisation, some of the chapters also present
discussions of the consequences gender has for how we understand rape.
While rape in many countries is deﬁned as a physical assault and is often
seen as a particularly harmful form of sexual violence, research in many
contexts has demonstrated that treating rape as separate from other acts is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, sexual harm is represented along a continuum,
where the severity of the acts differs but shares key factors and consequences
(Basile, 1999; Salfati & Taylor, 2006). Second, research demonstrates that to
separate rape from other acts and crimes is difﬁcult for the people involved,
including witnesses and police, which means that to sharply separate rape from
‘rape-like’ or ‘grey zone’ acts means that we miss a great deal of information
about why and how rape occurs.
Following this notion, the present book is about rape in the wider context of
other types of sexual harm. The need to understand rape in a wider context,
where other sexual and violent acts are not easily separated from rape, is also
important in light of how rape itself is a highly contested issue (Conaghan,
2018; Reitan, 2001). The meaning of the concept has changed historically and
varies across and within countries. Different and conﬂicting conceptualisations
may co-exist and cause confusion about the boundaries of the phenomenon, for
instance, when legal and lay understandings are different. Rather than departing
from one authoritative deﬁnition of rape, the authors in this book explore rape
as a contextually and historically situated occurrence and offer insight into the
complexities of addressing the issue for those affected, both in research and at
the societal level. This approach also means that we include other forms of
sexual violence or assault than rape in the book, including phenomena located
in the ‘grey area’ between rape and sex (Gavey, 2013).
These developments and controversies create a need for research. Because
debates feed on numbers, a key topic of research to date has been the develop-
ment of better tools to assess the scale of the problem and to understand more
about who is affected, and why. The fact that those in the ﬁeld have difﬁculties
in agreeing on deﬁnitions and perspectives implies that we also require the
discursive means to understand the problem and those affected, as well as the
responsibilities of societies to confront the problem. At the same time, these
same characteristics place great responsibility on researchers to be very clear
about their theoretical positions and the limitations of their ﬁndings, and to
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ensure that their ﬁndings are not misrepresented in ongoing debates. While clear
transnational and global trends exist in how rape is understood, approached, and
researched, we argue that the necessary methodological, theoretical, and epistemo-
logical development of the rape literature needs to be grounded in national and
regional manifestations in the form of concrete empirical studies. This book is an
attempt to explore methodological, theoretical, and epistemological issues, using
the case of rape in the Nordic countries as a starting point. In this way, the
book’s authors offer insights into the literature and on continuities and change in
the Nordic context.
The Nordic context
The Nordic region is a particularly interesting case for the exploration of rape
and other forms of sexual harm as both a personal and a socio-political issue. For
several decades, the region has often been portrayed as being ‘best in its class’ in
ensuring equality and social protection to its population. The Nordic countries are
generally associated with a strong welfare state – what Gøsta Esping-Andersen in
1990 termed the ‘social democratic welfare regime’ – and the merits of this way
of organising society and state–citizen relations continue to attract international
attention (McKowen, 2018). As mentioned above, women’s movements in the
last few decades have offered an analysis of rape as something that is caused by
and has consequences for much more than the people who are directly involved
in a given case of rape. This situation has meant that policies that were designed
to assure greater gender equality are also widely thought to serve to prevent rape
and other forms of sexual harm. This link has also been made in the Nordic
countries, and the institutionalisation and success of the region’s gender-equality
policies have received international praise (Borchorst, 1999). The Global Gender
Gap Report (World Economic Forum, 2018) from 2018 places Iceland, Norway,
Sweden, and Finland in the top four positions (in that order), while Denmark is
in 13th place. Not only is gender equality something that the individual Nordic
countries have strongly emphasised over the last few decades; ensuring gender
equality has also been prioritised and harmonised at the regional level, through
strong collaborations between the various countries on several platforms. The
Nordic Council of Ministers, for instance, sees gender equality as a ‘key area of
co-operation for the Nordic countries’.1
The fact that the Nordic countries are generally, but not uniformly, oriented
towards gender equality is often presented as the result of an alliance between
feminism and the state and as an alignment of the concerns of civil society and
the state. The alliance and alignment between feminism and the state are
expressed by Helga Hernes’s term ‘state feminism’, from her 1987 book Welfare
State and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism. This link secures support
and disciplines the state into mainstreaming gender into the state’s various
policy areas and governmental branches. This situation is often considered
a feminist victory, but what is less often discussed is how this alliance and
alignment have also disciplined feminist activists in how they prioritise causes
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and protest. A central aspect of Nordic feminism is that it has very explicitly
turned to criminal law as an instrument for achieving gender equality (Burman,
2010), and acts such as rape are commonly viewed as the result and expression
of gender inequality but also as an attack on and something that is detrimental
to gender equality.
To investigate rape in the Nordic countries is thus also to investigate the
foundation and consequences of Nordic gender equality. The Nordic countries
are often presented as a coherent region in terms of welfare orientation, state–
citizen relations, and gender equality. At the same time, great differences exist
between the ﬁve Nordic countries, both in the centrality of gender equality as
a stated goal and in how the individual countries approach rape and other forms
of sexual harm. To draw together analyses from all the Nordic countries there-
fore invites a comparison between contexts that, from the outset and from the
outside, look very similar, but when looked at more closely, they have several
important differences.
There are also other reasons to problematise the imagery of the Nordic coun-
tries as being uniform and consistent in their prioritisation of gender equality.
Researchers have questioned whether the region really is special, or at least if it
is still special (see Liinason, 2018; Witoszek & Midttun, 2018). While the
Nordic countries may not be as exceptional and uniform as they are often pre-
sented, ideas about Nordic coherence and the continuing prioritisation of gender
equality are central to national identities in the region (de Los Reyes, 2017;
Tham, Rönneling, & Rytterbro, 2011). The Nordic Council of Ministers, for instance,
presents gender equality as one of the aims of its collaborative efforts: ‘Successful
Nordic co-operation on gender equality can not only help us increase gender equality
in our own region, but also help to ensure the strong proﬁle of the Nordic region
internationally on gender equality’ (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019, p. 5).
Gender equality policies are not the only internationally acknowledged side
of the priorities and orientations of the Nordic welfare states. These nations are
also known for humanitarian penal policies that stand in contrast to develop-
ments in many other Western countries in the last few decades. Low levels of
punishment, penal innovations designed to protect vulnerable groups from the
negative consequences of imprisonment, the widespread use of ‘open’ prisons,
the existence of humane prison conditions, and an elaborate system of transition
from prison to ordinary society have all earned the region a reputation for
‘penal exceptionalism’ (Pratt, 2008). While some (e.g. Ugelvik & Dullum,
2011) have critiqued the conclusion that Nordic societies are less punitive and
that punishments are more humane, the levels of punishment are low in relation
to other European countries – with one notable exception, the punishment for
sex crimes. In the last two decades, several of the Nordic countries have
changed their rape legislation and punishment levels considerably. Denmark,
Finland and Norway currently have similar formulations of the crime of rape in
their penal codes, as they all emphasise violence and coercion (Jacobsen, 2019,
p. 48), while Iceland and Sweden both revised their respective acts in 2018 to
criminalise the lack of consent rather than the presence of violence or coercion.
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The willingness to punish sex crimes seems to make such crimes an excep-
tion to the Nordic or Scandinavian penal exceptionalism (Tham, 2001). The
position of the women’s movements in the region and the strength of women’s
political mobilisation and representation (for an analysis, see Borchorst & Siim,
2008) are also relevant sides of the context. In their priorities, the women’s
movements have expressed what the criminologist Kristin Skjørten (1996) has
called ‘legal optimism’, i.e. an overly strong belief in what criminal law can
accomplish. One could argue that the low thresholds of sex-crime legislation
and the breadth of acts that are criminalised as sexual harm were enabled by
decades of feminist investment in changing understandings of the relationship
between public and private and between the state and its citizens. Matters that
are typically considered private elsewhere are more often treated as being
within the scope of the state in the Nordic countries (Borchorst & Siim, 2008).
Bearing in mind the great investments that have been made in the Nordic
countries to counteract sexual harm and to establish gender equality, it appears
paradoxical that phenomena such as rape continue to pose a challenge to
policy-makers. Figures of police-reported rape and ﬁgures from population-
based surveys indicate that rape affects a considerable part of the population in
the Nordic region (Heinskou, Schierff, Ejbye-Ernst, Friis, & Liebst, 2017;
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2017; Thoresen & Hjemdal,
2014). The number of cases of rapes reported to the police has increased in the
region, with the increase particularly evident in Sweden. Because Sweden, in
many areas, has what is often considered the most progressive policies
on gender equality, but also on sexual violence, in the region, it also appears
paradoxical that the nation consistently shows higher ﬁgures for reported sexual
victimisation than the other Nordic countries (Tham et al., 2011, p. 587). While
this situation does not mean that levels of victimisation in society are higher or
increasing, the increase in registered numbers of rape in the Nordic region has
attracted attention internationally (see, for example, Fox News, 2017).
The Nordic approach to rape also shows other paradoxes. While people in
the region have paid attention to the power and role of law in combatting rape,
they have paid less attention to the issue of which other steps can be taken to
prevent rape and to promote desistance among perpetrators. Services are avail-
able for both victims and perpetrators that may also serve to prevent trauma,
revictimisation, and re-perpetration, but such services are not comprehensive
and systematic throughout the region or within each country. One may suspect
that this is a case where criminal justice approaches have been prioritised and
that they often overshadow other policies.
For these and other reasons, rape and other forms of sexual violence are
currently high on public agendas throughout the Nordic region, especially in
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Fears over high ﬁgures and high levels of attri-
tion through the criminal justice process are often debated in terms of a need
for legislative revisions. Overall, ideas about rape and sexual violence and the
appropriate responses to these issues seem to be changing in interesting ways in
this region. While changes are also happening elsewhere in Europe, there are
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reasons to consider the ongoing changes within the Nordic region as being
related to each other and linked to broader developments in terms of penal
cultures, welfare state retraction and expansion, gender equality policies, and
public–private partnerships.
These factors make this a particularly important time to look at rape in the
Nordic countries from different angles. Based on this background, the authors
in this book illuminate the phenomenon and construction of rape and other
forms of sexual harm within the Nordic region, as well as on how they are
addressed through social policies and in legal systems. The aim is to fertilise
both the international scholarship on sexual violence and the scholarship on the
Nordic region. The chapters in this book have been arranged based on our
ambition to cover a broad area. The structure and content of the book will be
described in greater detail below; ﬁrst, a note on terminology.
A note on the ‘victim’ label
In a recent article on the social risks of labelling, telling and reporting sexual
assault among college students in the USA, Khan, Hirsch, Wamboldt, and
Mellins (2018) caution against understandings of rape that are organised
around identity categories such as ‘survivor’ and ‘perpetrator’, as ‘such words
suggest a kind of person rather than an act or experience’ (p. 453). And fur-
ther, because these words encompass so much they ‘may serve as impediments
to people making sense of their experiences or getting the kinds of help that
they need’ (p. 453). Their point is that there is not a one-to-one relationship
between experiencing rape and taking up a survivor or victim identity; rather,
people who experience rape will often shy away from these labels and associ-
ated identities. We can infer from this idea that researchers should focus on
the experience of rape rather than on the person who has been raped. The
authors draw a parallel to how the phrase ‘men who have sex with men’,
which was coined by HIV activists two decades ago, makes no assumptions
about the sexual identity among this group of men but simply describes
a sexual practice. This line of argument also points to the political aspect of
labels and concepts, and to how labels that describe experiences rather than
identities may contribute to the removal of stigma. Another example could be
the shift from talking about crippled or disabled people to talking about
people with disabilities.
Khan et al.’s (2018) position could be viewed as being rather radical in the
general rejection of what they see as identity labels. Other researchers (for an
overview, see Hockett & Saucier, 2015) do not problematise identity labels as
such but do favour one over the other: most often the ‘survivor’ label or the com-
bined ‘survivor/victim’ construction over the ‘victim’ label. These researchers’
argument is that the ‘victim’ label, as an identity label, signiﬁes something weak,
fundamentally broken and powerless. The term ‘survivor’ is typically applied to
encompass the serious ramiﬁcations of sexual violence but also to empower those
who are affected (see, for example, Williamson & Serna, 2018).
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Labels matter, of course, not only in the sense that they are problematic to
their holders but also by how they have implications for problem understandings
and decision-making related to solutions. The editors of this book have not
instructed the authors to apply a particular terminology; the authors have applied
concepts and labels that ﬁt with the aims and materials of their particular chap-
ters. In the chapters on law and the penal process, the parties involved are thus
labelled according to their status in the case, for example, as the ‘complainant’
and the ‘assailant’ or ‘accused’. In other chapters, the authors use different labels,
and in some chapters, they avoid labels altogether.
Taken together, the chapters demonstrate that default political and perhaps
ethically motivated positions on labelling people who are involved in rape and
other forms of sexual assault are problematic. The victim label may mean and
do different things within different frameworks. From some perspectives, the
victim label makes sense and is productive, while from other perspectives, it is
problematic. Researchers should therefore be mindful of the broader framework
and positioning of their studies and how different labels ﬁt their particular scholarly
projects.
The content of the book
This book is designed to represent the whole Nordic region and to take up
topics that are particularly timely in the region and beyond. The speciﬁc context
of the Nordic region needs to be taken seriously. At the same time, the authors
also demonstrate that Nordic experiences have shown that some themes and
developments are more general, rather than being particularly Nordic. We
believe the readers of the book will be struck by the similarities between the
region and elsewhere in terms of the manifestations, policies and debates on
sexual violence. The book offers new research on perpetrators, victims, criminal
justice and prevention, and at the core of the theoretical discussions in the book
are issues such as consent, power, sexual ethics, boundary making and victim-
hood and perpetrator constructions. The chapters speak to the great interest in
delineations and deﬁnitions (and therefore also in attempts to estimate the
extent of victimisation) as well as the challenges that digitalisation poses to
efforts to prevent, detect and prosecute rape and other forms of sexual harm.
The book addresses four key sets of questions related to rape and other forms
of sexual harm. The ﬁrst is theoretical and methodological questions related to
how we can understand and study rape; the second is the role of criminal law;
the third how we can best understand perpetrators; and the fourth is the role,
character and consequences of the digitalisation of rape and other types of
sexual harm.
Part 1: understanding, delineating and studying rape
The ﬁrst part consists of four chapters that in different ways address questions
of how rape is studied. A key question in both political debates and scholarship
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is how rape can be appropriately deﬁned and delineated from other acts and
situations. Ideas about rape have never been constant. Reconceptualisations of
rape have a long history, from rape being a property crime that men commit
against other men – i.e. the theft of their women’s sexuality or honour
(McGlynn & Munro, 2010, p. 1) – to an affront to women’s modesty, to the
sexual integrity and freedom arguments that today are central in international
fora but also within many other jurisdictions. The deﬁnition of rape as an attack
on the person is thus a rather new construction.
Based on this background, Conaghan (2018) has argued that the manifold ideas
about what rape is, why it happens and the harm it causes make it impossible to
talk about an essence of rape, a constant across time and space. Other scholars
have taken a different position, arguing that rape can be distinguished from other
sexual acts by different normative criteria, most commonly by referring to rape as
an undermining of sexual autonomy or integrity (see, for example, Cahill, 2001).
This notion means that the improvement of our capacity to study rape is also
a thoroughly theoretical endeavour when addressing questions that initially appear
practical in nature. The chapters in this part of the book offer inroads to further
our understanding of how rape and other forms of sexual harm can be understood
as being produced by and located in the social – in relations, situations, and
cultures.
The ﬁrst chapter in this part of the book investigates how theories of gender
are applied in the study of sexual violence within intimate relations. Margunn
Bjørnholt is the author of the chapter ‘Theorising sexual violence in intimate
relations in Scandinavia: A literature review’, which focusses on the theoretical
frameworks that have informed empirical research on sexual violence in
the Scandinavian countries to date, with the aim of mapping out a landscape of
theoretical positions. Her starting point is that although a given research ﬁeld
may be international, theorisation also occurs in the national and regional contexts
where scholars live, work, and think. The chapter provides analyses of ﬁve recent
publications by Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish authors representing different
key positions. The review reveals the theoretical diversity and innovation in
making sense of sexual violence among Scandinavian scholars, as well as the
continued relevance and theoretical potential of a renewed involvement with
different strands of feminist theorisation.
The theoretical exploration in Bjørnholt’s chapter is followed by a chapter by
Monika Rosten titled ‘Cultivating ethical negotiations or fetishising consent in
BDSM?’, which addresses bondage, discipline (or domination), sadism and
masochism. In this chapter, Rosten explores negotiations about consent in the
BDSM context. Ideal BDSM play is based on consent. The parties establish
agreements about roles and transgressions and their absolute boundaries. Rosten
analyses a case that started out this way, but where the dominance play escal-
ated to encompass most of the everyday life of the submissive partner, Tina.
Tina was conﬂicted about the relationship and how she had consented to being
dominated in ways that were impossible to escape, and she wondered if she had
been exposed to partner violence rather than BDSM play. This case led Rosten
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to further investigate the boundaries of consent as she interviewed other BDSM
practitioners. Her analysis reveals how consent is fetishised in the BDSM com-
munity in ways that make it possible to see how unequal power relations play
into seemingly sound negotiations and relationships.
The difﬁculties in delineating between sexual violence and legitimate sexual
acts are followed up in Chapter 4, ‘Understanding unwanted sexual touching: A
situational approach’. In this chapter, Kari Stefansen explores the phenomenon
of unwanted sexual touching, arguing that the topic provides insight into the
boundaries of sexual violence. Using written descriptions of unwanted sexual
touching from young women (18- to 19-year olds) drawn from a survey study,
she demonstrates the unstable and ﬂeeting character of unwanted sexual touch-
ing. Such touching takes on different meanings in different social situations and
is also dependent on the relationship between the people involved: sometimes
an aggressive act, at other times unwanted. Stefansen argues that incidents of
unwanted touching are problematic even when they are not experienced as
being sexual intrusions, as they may contribute to a diffuse ‘phenomenology of
fear’ among girls and women: the embodied knowledge that their right to
bodily integrity is less protected than that of boys and men.
The three chapters taken together illustrate well the instability of the term
‘rape’ and the difﬁculties involved in separating rape from the characteristics of
relationships, situations, and contexts. This instability makes empirical research
very difﬁcult, not least when depending on people’s own deﬁnitions and delin-
eations when undertaking surveys to produce knowledge on the extent of rape.
In Chapter 5, ‘Making the case for ‘good enough’ rape-prevalence estimates:
Insights from a school-based survey experiment among Norwegian youths’,
Kari Stefansen, Mette Løvgren and Lars Roar Frøyland illustrate some of
the difﬁculties in measuring rape in population surveys. As Krebs (2014) has
done, they argue for a dual approach to rape-prevalence estimates: that
researchers should pursue both ‘best’ and ‘good enough’ procedures. Their own
analysis addresses rape estimates based on survey studies among youths in the
school setting. Drawing on a survey experiment that was set up within
a Norwegian school-based study, they conclude, in line with international schol-
arship, that wording is crucial and that the asking of behaviourally speciﬁc
questions leads to higher rates of rape than the use of general questions, which
holds for both genders and for different social groups. They argue that among
youths and for the purpose of tracking developments in the prevalence of rape
over time, simpler ‘good enough’ measures are indeed useful.
Part 2: the formulation and role of criminal law
Changes over time in how rape is delineated, explained and discussed shift
which approaches seem just and sustainable. If rape is seen as something that
exists due to a combination of male sexual drive and lack of self-discipline,
then doing something about either or both of these factors may seem like
a viable solution. If one instead regards rape as an act that is committed due to
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a perpetrator’s own psychological trauma or disposition, then therapy will appear
to be a sound way forward. Criminal law operates at the nexus of both explan-
ations. The law deﬁnes the conditions under which an individual is culpable, but
the reasoning behind something being deﬁned as a crime may still be built on an
understanding of the act being premised on particular ideas about sexuality,
gender and power inequalities. Several of the chapters in this book address legal
responses to rape in the Nordic countries, which is an important strand of Nordic
scholarship on rape: something that perhaps reﬂects that legal strategies have
long been the priority of both Nordic governments and of women’s movements.
But how criminal law deﬁnes and penalises rape and other forms of sexual harm
has been a key focus for political and scholarly debates in many European coun-
tries, as is evident in ongoing discussions about whether the harm of rape is best
expressed by criminalising the presence of violence and coercion or the lack of
consent. Several authors address how criminal law addresses rape and other
forms of sexual harm. While criminal law typically positions the perpetrator in
the centre of the criminal justice process, the last few decades have seen powerful
protests against the invisibilisation of the victim. As a result, victims’ rights in
the criminal justice process have changed substantially since the 1990s, both in
the Nordic countries and in many other contexts.
Part of the question of how to deﬁne rape is the question of who can be
raped. In many countries, sexual violations that take place within marriage are
exempt from the deﬁnition of rape, either in the law itself or in practice. One
priority of 1970s feminism was to bring violations that take place in the home
to the attention of politicians and to make sure that such crimes were illegal, on
par with physical and sexual crimes that take place between strangers (Skjørten,
1996). Riikka Kotanen’s chapter, ‘From the protection of marriage to the
defence of equality: The Finnish debate over the sexual autonomy of wives’,
addresses this issue by investigating the process and debates that led to
a universal rape prohibition in Finland in 1994. She looks particularly at how
debates emerged and played out and then places these debates in the larger
Nordic context, concluding that Finland was particularly late in recognising the
sexual autonomy of wives. Kotanen discusses possible reasons that a marriage
exemption in rape law was widely seen as legitimate in Finland, and she points
to how feminist campaigners in the end managed to shift this understanding.
This chapter thus explores a legal reform two decades in the making and looks
at the interaction between the law-revision process, ongoing public debates and
the role of the sanctity of family and home in Finnish culture.
At the end of Kotanen’s chapter, she points to emerging debates in Finland
about the revision of rape law to criminalise the lack of consent. Such revisions
have been debated throughout the region, not least after Sweden revised its own
act on the subject in 2018. The Nordic countries frequently collaborate on
gender-equality issues and often look to each other when designing their own
national approaches. In the chapter ‘Towards voluntariness in Swedish rape law:
Hyper-medialised group rape cases and the shift in the legal discourse’,
Gabriella Nilsson analyses the trajectory of Swedish debates on rape law in the
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period 1990–2015. This was a period in which rape law underwent major revi-
sions designed to solve problems in prosecuting rape as well as in expressing
understandings of the harm of rape. A long line of revisions has also taken
place in several of the other Nordic countries, which demonstrates both
a political willingness to look for better solutions and uncertainty in how to
best deﬁne rape. In Nilsson’s analysis of the particular case of Sweden, she
ﬁnds that the debates that have followed after particularly attention-grabbing
cases of rape seem to have affected debates about rape legislation, and later
reform, throughout the period. The chapter therefore highlights the role of the
media and how concerns about rape have been energised by fear of migrants
and by the future of a sustainable welfare state.
Over the last few years, Sweden and other countries have witnessed several
debates about the question of which deﬁnition of rape is most appropriate, both
in the practical and symbolic senses. The Nordic countries have all signed the
Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women and domestic violence, which explicitly describes rape as a situation
with a lack of consent. Current debates revolve around whether consent-based
laws or coercion-based laws can better encompass how power affects sexuality
and personal relations. Helena Jokila and Joanna Niemi discuss this debate in
their chapter ‘Rape law and coercive circumstances’, in which they problematise
the assumption that consent-based rape law will solve the current problem
many countries face in their ability to prosecute rape. Jokila and Niemi analyse
selected rape cases from the Finnish Courts of Appeal and compare them with
Canadian convictions; in doing so, they demonstrate that evidentiary questions
and considerations for the most part are the same across jurisdictions. The
authors argue that attention should be directed towards ways of making rape
laws include contextual factors, and they point to how rape laws can be thor-
oughly revised by looking to deﬁnitions applied in the International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia.
Paying attention to law not only involves looking at how the perpetrator in
cases of rape is investigated and punished; such attention also entails looking
at how the injured party, the victim, is treated throughout the criminal justice
process. Hildur Fjóla Antonsdóttir’s chapter in this book, ‘Empowered or
protected?: The ‘problem’ of complainants’ rights in Danish and Norwegian
preparatory works on criminal procedure’, analyses how victims and victims’
rights are represented in Danish and Norwegian preparatory work, including
hearing procedures. As mentioned above, the victim’s role in the criminal just-
ice process is mainly to serve as a witness for the prosecution. The last two
decades, however, have seen victims gaining more rights to be active parts of
the process. This change has been received differently in various contexts, and
Antonsdóttir demonstrates that such differences in views have also been
expressed within the Nordic region. She ﬁnds that while Norwegian preparatory
documents’ discussions of increasing rights to participation and inclusion for
victims have mainly been framed as empowering victims (and thus realising their
citizenship rights), the Danish documents frame such discussions as a threat to
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the rule of law and to the victim. Antonsdóttir argues that one reason for this
situation is that the injured party is mainly treated as a citizen in the Norwegian
documents but mainly as a victim in the Danish documents. In this case, being
deﬁned as vulnerable and in need of the state’s protection makes the receipt of
full inclusion difﬁcult for victims.
Part 3: perpetrator and perpetration constructions
Research on rape often focusses on the people who are subjected to rape and
investigates the phenomenon from their perspective. While there are good
reasons for considering what rape entails for victims to be a key topic in
research (Alcoff, 2018), we argue that the ﬁeld needs more investigations of
the perspectives of perpetrators. For long periods in history, and in diverse geo-
graphical places, rape has been deﬁned as a matter of male sexual urges (see,
for example, Fradella & Fahmy, 2016). In this understanding, rape is a matter
of men acting on a biological disposition. This understanding does not mean
that, in such periods, rape has been deﬁned and treated as inevitable, in the
sense that perpetrators have been exempt from blame and punishment. During
such periods, the reactions from others and from the authorities are typically
based on condemnation of the lack of ability to control one’s urges in the
perpetrator, having committed a crime due to lack of self-discipline.
More psychologically based explanations became important at the end of the
19th century. In this perspective, rape and other forms of sexual violations came
to look like crimes linked to psychological trauma and disposition; treatment and
incapacitation, depending on how deterministic the diagnoses were, appeared to
be the most viable solutions. Not least as a result of various feminist campaigns,
the last four decades have seen rape turned into a matter for sociological inter-
pretation, where the reasons are sought in gender relations, power dynamics, and
sexuality constructs. This change does not mean that biological and psychological
explanations have disappeared but that they are complementary and competing,
depending on the characteristics of the crime and on the context.
This book includes several chapters that speciﬁcally discuss situations where
sexual violations, including rape, occur. Two of these chapters are included in
part 3, as they address norms that inform how perpetrators reason. The shifts in
interpretative frameworks described above also inform more lay reasoning on
how committing rape and other forms of sexual harm is related to existing
norms and other acts. Individualistic psychological explanations easily end up
positioning the rapist as someone who is in breach of normative masculinity
and sexuality, while more sociological understandings frame rape differently. It
is easy to see that such shifts in our understanding of why someone commits rape
mean that during some periods, the act looks like a continuation of normative mas-
culinity and social relations, while during other periods, such acts constitute
a breach with the norms and practices of masculinity.
In Chapter 10, ‘Othering the rapist: Rurality, sexual violence and the Bjästa
case’, Lucas Gottzén and Anna Franzén explore such normativity based on
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an empirical study of the implementation of a school-based preventive pro-
gramme. In this programme, students were presented with a concrete case of
sexual violence that they then discussed with their teachers in class: the Bjästa
case. The programme that Gottzén and Franzén studied particularly thematised
gender and bystander responsibility. The authors found that the meanings the
students drew from the programme were different from what it was designed
to do. Instead of utilising the case presented in the programme to reﬂect upon
normative sexuality and gender, they instead distanced themselves from the
case. This distance was possible due to how rurality holds a particular meaning,
and the students explained what happened in the case by how, in the rural com-
munity in question, the perpetrator and the community were different from what
the students considered to be the norm. This outlook meant that the programme
reinforced the students’ stereotypes about places and people rather than enabling
them to reﬂect on rape and individual responsibility in the face of rape.
While sociological explanations of why rape occurs often emphasise how
the act of rape is best understood if we relate rape to acts that are legal and
legitimate, it is easy to understand resistance to an association between one’s
own actions and relations with rape. In Chapter 11, ‘Sexual transgressing:
Situational and narrative perspectives’, Laura Marie Schierff and Marie
Bruvik Heinskou investigate situational descriptions of sexual transgressions
from the perspective of the transgressor. The authors conducted qualitative
interviews with young men who, in their own words, had committed sexual
transgressions. Based on the men’s descriptions of the situations where these
acts had occurred, the authors discern situational logics or patterns that may
help us understand why these acts occurred. Schierff and Heinskou present
accounts of situations and explore what these accounts, or narratives, do for
how the transgression is understood. The ﬁrst account is a framing of the
transgression as the result of alcohol intoxication, which means that the men
positioned themselves as not being themselves in the situation. The second
narrative explains the transgression by misunderstandings of the signals of
consent and the absence of consent.
While both explanatory narratives are also excuses, it is valuable to take them
seriously as narratives that enabled the men to integrate what they had done with-
out such integration necessarily changing how they looked at themselves. Under-
standing such mechanisms is important if we are to understand why rape and
other types of sexual harm are committed, but also why perpetrators, victims, and
bystanders do not necessarily acknowledge such transgressions as something that
should be acted upon.
Part 4: the digital dimension
The fact that more and more areas and aspects of life have become digitalised
poses challenges to the deﬁnition, detection, and prosecution of sexual violations,
including rape. The book includes three chapters that illustrate this development.
The ﬁrst chapter in part 4 examines how online abuses challenge traditional ideas
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and approaches to the phenomenon of rape, the second analyses the importance
of digital arenas for perpetrator dynamics, and the third explores the role and
structure of online disclosures of rape and other types of sexual harm. All three
chapters address thresholds in one way or another: thresholds for how society,
perpetrators and victims recognise acts as problematic.
Acts of sexual exploitation and abuse that happen online and via mobile
phones have gained a great deal of attention in recent years. Such cases are also
beginning to reach European courtrooms. Chapter 12 presents one such case.
In the chapter ‘Rape in the age of the Internet’, Elisabeth Fransson, Trond
Martinsen and Elisabeth Staksrud analyse a case where a young man named
Alex is convicted of over one hundred counts of rape that took place via the
Internet and mobile phones. He manipulated, and later threatened, young people
into sharing pictures and engaging in sexual acts in front of a camera that they
themselves controlled. The fact that the perpetrator and the victims did not meet
and that the acts did not physically involve Alex was challenging to handle
within the scope of existing law and case law, but this case entailed a careful
translation of meaning and consequences from more traditional accounts of rape
to digital arenas. Alex, his victims, and the court all struggled with how to
understand and react to what had happened, and while Alex acknowledged that
his acts were problematic, he was unable to free himself from an understanding
of rape as something that involves direct physical threats and sexual encounters.
This chapter thus adds to the literature on rape both by presenting an analysis
of a development that is quite new and by illuminating something that also
happens in other cases: namely that the situations and relations in which
abuses occur may look very different for the various people involved.
The fact that situational factors affect how rape and other forms of sexual
harm are interpreted and reacted upon is not surprising, but what mechanisms are
involved? In Chapter 13, ‘Digital sexual violence: Image-based sexual abuse
among Danish youth’, Sidsel Kirstine Harder, Katrine Elmose Jørgensen,
Jonathan Priesholm Gårdshus and Jakob Demant analyse the mechanisms
behind the non-consensual sharing of sexual images by building on
a combination of survey and qualitative data among young Danes. Image-based
sexual abuse has been the subject of much attention in the last few years, and the
laws, technologies and understandings of the subject are changing. Few empirical
investigations into the phenomenon have been conducted to date, however. The
authors look to criminological theory to investigate what creates the likelihood of
sharing such pictures. They ﬁnd that poorer self-control is associated with
a higher risk of committing image-based sexual abuse, although the effect is mod-
erate and partly mediated through digital, sexual and social opportunities. The
chapter offers insights that are important for understanding why such picture shar-
ing takes place, which may help to prevent such activities in the future.
Digitalisation thus may lower thresholds for committing violations and could
transform the expression of such crimes. Digitalisation is also a development
that affects victims’ courses of action. A key theme in the literature on victim-
isation is that there are many barriers to self-identiﬁcation as a victim of rape
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and other forms of sexual harm and to disclosing such experiences to others. In
Chapter 14, ‘Breaking the silence: Social media disclosures of sexual violence
in Iceland’, Rannveig Sigurvinsdóttir, Bryndís Björk Ásgeirsdóttir and Sara
Arnalds explore how online disclosures of rape and other forms of sexual harm
play out. They empirically studied the trajectory and content of particular
exchanges that took place on online platforms at the same time that particular
events and debates were also taking place and being presented in traditional
media. The authors analyse this scenario in relation both to what was being dis-
closed and what reactions these disclosures attracted from other participants
within these arenas. They ﬁnd that patterns of disclosure followed public debate
and that those who disclosed received much support, but often the support was
of little substance. It is important to understand how the characteristics of
online platforms affect disclosure and the relationship between such disclosures
and those that take place face-to-face. Does online disclosure serve a similar
purpose, or should it instead be understood as a political act of participation in
an event? This chapter contributes knowledge to the development of online
arenas that can serve as platforms for sharing experiences with violations as
well as to the mechanisms that hinder and facilitate disclosure more generally.
We invite readers to delve into these chapters with an open mind in order to
understand the various implications that rape has in our modern society, both in
the Nordic context and abroad.
Note
1 www.norden.org/en/information/nordic-co-operation-gender-equality.
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2 Theorising sexual violence in
intimate relations in Scandinavia
A literature review
Margunn Bjørnholt
Introduction
Theories and concepts are crucial to all academic thinking, and the literature
review is a mandatory element in academic writing. The theory is usually
presented in the introduction and ideally is used as a tool for analysis. But it is
also not unusual to use theories as stepping stones only by presenting them in
superﬁcial and often caricatured ways as a means of rendering them obsolete,
irrelevant and in need of replacement. As Clare Hemmings (2005, 2011)
has argued, such has been the fate of second-wave feminist work by successive
generations of feminist scholars. Theories and concepts are rarely studied in
their own right, despite their importance to academic thinking. Studying theories
and theorisations is crucial to understanding particular phenomena and ﬁelds of
study as well as for academic self-reﬂection.
This chapter contributes to such academic self-reﬂection within the Nordic con-
text by providing an analytic review of how selected Scandinavian1 scholars use
gender theories and gender perspectives in their theorisations of sexual violence.
The chapter, which is a conceptual piece, describes different strands of thinking
about gender in relation to sexual violence and explores the relationship between
these strands, with a particular focus on their relevance for theorising sexual
violence within intimate relations.
Studies of violence and sexual violence are characterised by increasing
theoretical diversity and methodological sophistication (Hester & Donovan, 2009;
Brown & Walklate, 2011; Walby et al., 2015; Walby & Towers, 2017). Neverthe-
less, in contrast to the growing literature on the history of concepts and theory in
the social sciences (Somers, 1995; Doucet, 2015), theories of violence and sexual
violence have seldom been the object of study. In the Scandinavian context,
Anne-Lie Steen’s study (2003) of discursive struggles in the ﬁeld of violence
studies in Sweden is, to my knowledge, the only Nordic study to date to have
focussed exclusively on theories in this ﬁeld.
In this chapter, I analyse contemporary theorisations of rape and sexual violence
found in a small sample of recent publications by Scandinavian scholars. Searches
were made for works published between 2012 and 2017 in the following Norwe-
gian, Swedish, Danish and general Nordic databases: Idunn, sociological abstracts
from ProQuest (for Norway, Sweden and Denmark), Norart, Den danske
forskningsbase and Swepub. The ﬁnal selection of publications also relied on my
general reading and prior knowledge of relevant authors and publications.
The main criteria of selection included having a gender perspective and being
involved with theories of gender and violence. Because of my choice of recent con-
tributions only, the chapter presents a snapshot rather than tracing the genealogy
and development of theories over time and generations. Five publications (by
Norwegian, Danish and Swedish authors), representing four different theoretical
approaches, were eventually selected for the present analysis. The four approaches
include the continuum approach, a structural-intersectional approach, a dialectic
approach and an institutional, complex-systems approach. The anthropologist Bo
Wagner Sørensen’s (2013) study, which uses the continuum approach, is the only
contribution presented in this chapter to speciﬁcally address sexual violence as part
of domestic violence.
In their article on young girls’ experiences of unwanted sexual touching, Kari
Stefansen, Ingrid Smette and Dagmara Bossy (2014) also draw on the continuum
approach to link the experiences of unwanted touching by acquaintances, friends
and strangers to a normative theory of gender freedom; their approach is also
potentially relevant for studying sexual violence in intimate relations.
Ulrika Andersson, Monika Edgren, Lena Karlsson and Gabriella Nilsson (2016),
in their research project on genres of rape narratives in Sweden, study how stories
of rape are told in three different contexts: in the legal system, in the media and in
autobiographic material within social media. Using a structural-intersectional
approach that invokes the early feminist conceptualisations of victimisation and
agency, the authors draw on narrative theory and theories of genres to examine
how rape is discursively produced in these three contexts.
Lena Gunnarsson (2018) suggests a dialectic approach inspired by critical
realism, with a focus on the relations between experiences and discourses. She
develops her argument by exploring the tensions between hegemonic discourses
on rape and the more ambiguous experiences found in autobiographic stories by
victims of different genders. The approaches represented by Andersson et al.
(2016) and Gunnarsson (2018) are related, in that both in different ways com-
bine cultural perspectives and different strands of radical feminist perspectives.
I have still chosen to treat them separately, however, as they take as starting
points two different strands of radical feminist thought.
In their book Stopping Rape, Sylvia Walby and co-authors (2015) develop
a new holistic approach in which they argue that using a broad, institutional,
complex-systems approach is necessary in theorising about and preventing rape.
This approach most clearly differs from the other approaches in its focus on the
macro level.
The ﬁrst part of this chapter presents the four approaches. The analysis
focusses on the authors’ use of core concepts such as victimhood and agency as
well as how the authors apply gender perspectives and integrate gender theories
in their analyses. The different theoretical approaches are analysed in the latter
part of the chapter, with the aim of identifying common themes and differences
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and discussing how using various approaches might be useful in making sense
of sexual violence within intimate relations as a gendered phenomenon.
The continuum approach
Sexual violence as part of intimate partner violence
In his article on sexual violence within the narratives of victims of domestic
violence in the Danish context, Sørensen (2013) found that the victims of
domestic violence in his study did not necessarily distinguish between sexual
violence and violence in general. Rather, for some ‘it was just part of the
whole’ (69). Sørensen discusses this ﬁnding in relation to the general perception
among researchers and practitioners of rape as being a particularly vicious form
of violence; he argues that the analytic distinction between different forms of
violence that researchers and practitioners typically make does not necessarily
correspond to victims’ experiences of intimate partner violence (IPV) as a total
‘package’ (2013).
Sørensen (2013) argues that the continuum approach is suitable for studying
violence as a lived experience. The continuum approach, originally formulated
by Liz Kelly (1987, 1988a, 1988b), starts with the idea that violence is present
in all women’s lives, while differences exist in the forms the violence takes and
how different women deﬁne particular incidents. The concept is not a matter of
a degree of seriousness; rather, Kelly argues that establishing hierarchies of
forms of violence is problematic (1987, p. 49). Kelly uses the term ‘sexual vio-
lence’ for all forms of violence because of the difﬁculty in distinguishing
between physical violence and sexual violence (1987, p. 59, footnote 1).
In his theoretical framing of the article, Sørensen (2013) places the continuum
approach in a feminist understanding of violence as being rooted in power rela-
tions between men and women in which violence is linked to gendered identities
and cultural perceptions of gender and gendered privileges. Sørensen argues that
while several researchers have used the continuum approach, they have mainly
used it on a descriptive level and have not fully utilised the approach’s analytical
potential (2013). Kelly (1988b) proposes two possible uses of the continuum. The
ﬁrst use is on a more abstract level, as a continuum of different means of male
power and control over women; different incidents and topics are linked, thereby
recognising their interconnectedness. The second use is the continuum’s applica-
tion on an empirical level by establishing links between everyday sexist male
behaviours and the less frequent forms of abuse deﬁned as crimes.
In deﬁning violence, Sørensen (2013) draws on David Riches’s (1986) tripartite
deﬁnition of interpersonal violence as always involving a victim, a perpetrator
and one or more witnesses. In Sørensen’s conceptualisation, witnesses can be
understood as all actors who may have an effect on the interpretation of the vio-
lent act (2013). The general social climate towards violence and the recognition
over the last ﬁfty years of violence as a social problem – both a result of the
international and national women’s movements – have changed the relationship
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between victim and perpetrator and have reduced perpetrators’ power of interpret-
ation. Inspired also by Sally Engle Merry’s work (2003, 2009), Sørensen (2013)
suggests that victims of violence are legitimate victims, in the sense of legal sub-
jects who have had their human rights violated. This understanding avoids the
futile discussions of the problems with attributing or claiming a victim identity,
which is associated with stigmatisation, passivity and lack of agency. In contrast,
Sørensen (2013) argues, no antagonism exists between the position of a violated
legal subject and agency, as illustrated in the concept of ‘survivor’ used by vic-
tims of rape and sexual abuse. Rather, recognition of the experience of being
a victim is the prerequisite of being a survivor. Sørensen’s (2013) main contribu-
tion is to reintegrate sexual violence into the understanding of IPV by theorising
from victims’ experiences and drawing on the concept of a continuum of violence
that links other acts of IPV and sexual violence.
Unwanted touching on a continuum of sexual violence
In their article on young girls’ experiences of unwanted sexual touching from
acquaintances and strangers, Stefansen et al. (2014) also use the continuum
approach; they see mild sexual violations as (1) being different from severe
sexual violations, (2) connected at an experiential level and (3) linked to an
underlying gender–power dimension. They view the approach as useful in eluci-
dating differences within the same form of violation. The authors refer to the two
different lexical deﬁnitions of a ‘continuum’ that Kelly (1988a, p. 76) refers to:
what is common to different incidents versus a series of incidents that may be
difﬁcult to separate. Stefansen et al. (2014) use the latter deﬁnition as an oppor-
tunity to identify different forms of unwanted touching and to create a typology
of such sexual violations.
Stefansen et al. (2014) also draw on Carol Smart’s work (1995) on the ‘discip-
lining’ effects on all women of accumulated minor sexual offences and the
importance of studying minor sexual offences as constitutive of gender–power
relations, in that they conﬁrm the lack of bodily protection and women’s lack of
the right to be left alone, in contrast to men. Both unwanted sexual touching and
rape are ‘demonstrations of the same problem of women being constituted
as sexualized’ bodies (Smart, 1995, p. 223, cited in Stefansen et al., 2014, p. 6).
Stefansen et al. (2014) argue that minor assaults – such as in Smart’s (1995)
example of a woman who had her breast squeezed in public by a stranger – not
only affect the particular woman but also serve as a reminder to all women of their
vulnerability, hence contributing to a diffuse, latent fear (Shefﬁeld, 1989) that then
blurs the boundary between normal male aggression and more rare forms that
‘shade into one another’ (Kelly, 1988a, p. 75, cited in Stefansen et al., 2014, p. 6).
Still drawing on Smart (1995), however, the authors argue that it is also important
to recognise the potential ambiguity of such experiences, since the same incident
may simultaneously make a woman feel attractive and incite fear within her.
Finally, Stefansen et al. (2014) draw on the Norwegian legal scholar Tove
Stang Dahl’s (1994) deﬁnition of sexual violence as a violation of gender
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freedom. Dahl (1994) argued that the strong focus on violence and the use of
physical force in rape cases may overshadow other aspects of force preceding
the rape act, such as conﬁnement. Using rape in the context of hitchhiking as
an example, Dahl argued that the crime in this particular case started when the
driver took the victim to a different destination than agreed upon, did not let
her out when she asked and locked the doors to prevent her from escaping. Ste-
fansen et al., too, focus on situations in which the unwanted touching is related
to other violations of the freedom of movement and elements of force, such as
being locked up, restrained or violated while in a particularly vulnerable state
(2014). Based on descriptions of unwanted touching, Stefansen et al. distinguish
between three different forms of unwanted touching: sexual invasion, explorative
touching and aggressive touching (2014).
Like Sørensen (2013), Stefansen et al. (2014) theorise from victims’ experiences
by drawing on the concept of a continuum of sexual violence. They both take
as their starting point the misﬁt between victims’ experiences and the available con-
cepts. While Sørensen (2013) focusses on reintegrating sexual violence with other
forms of severe IPV and the level of experience, Stefansen et al. (2014) focus on
the distinctions between different forms of ‘mild’ sexual violations outside of
couple relationships. By developing a typology of different forms of unwanted
touching, Stefansen et al. (2014) contribute to recognising and naming such experi-
ences. Introducing Dahl’s (1994) concept of gender freedom as a normative stand-
ard against which to measure these experiences, the new typology becomes an
important tool for recognising, naming and resisting unwanted touching, thereby
clarifying and reducing the ambiguity of the victim position.
The structural intersectional approach
Andersson et al. (2016), a multidisciplinary research group, based on law, gender
studies, ethnology and history, present in their paper a research project on Swedish
discourses on rape since 1990. The project focusses on the production of hegemony
and truth by an examination of three kinds of sources and the relations between
them: (1) legal texts on rape (with a focus on discussions of force and consent) and
the intersections of power and subordination in such texts; (2) rape narratives in
the media and the consequences for political mobilisation of the separation of rape
narratives into different types/genres, depending on the relation to the perpetrator
or the context; and (3) biographical stories in the response to social media cam-
paigns, with a focus on the role of personal experience in political mobilisation.
Andersson et al. (2016) draw on feminist critiques of ‘linking rape to sexuality,
which in turn is constructed as the basis for the inner (core) of human beings’
(p. 88). Following Carine Mardorossian’s work (2014), Andersson et al. (2016)
draw on Susan Brownmiller’s (1975) and Michel Foucault’s work on the sexual-
isation of bodies in Western culture (1979, 1990, 1992). Brownmiller problem-
atised the concept of consent from a radical feminist perspective (1975, p. 384,
cited in Andersson et al., 2016, p. 87), arguing that the idea of consent was based
on a liberal view of women’s bodies as autonomous and rape as a violation of
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individual integrity. This view is at odds with the radical feminist theoretical
position that rape is a question of gender and power at the societal level.
Second-wave feminists framed rape as violence against women and intro-
duced the concept of power at the system level (i.e. through patriarchy) into the
public debate on rape. They also widened the understanding of what rape is and
who can be raped. According to Brownmiller (1975), rape is a political act, the
purpose of which is to frighten and degrade women as a group. Andersson
et al. (2016) argue that the beneﬁt of this perspective, which separated rape
from sexuality, was to make the question of consent irrelevant; thus, issues of
shame and guilt, and the related victim role, are also irrelevant. If we think
of rape as being related to sex, then the victim is made complicit via the notion
of consent, which then leads to personal shame and guilt. In contrast, Brownmiller
(1975) argued that women were victims only of patriarchal power, thus offering
a victim position linked to agency and resistance.
Andersson et al. (2016) also refer to the work of Ann Cahill (2001), who argues
from a phenomenological feminist perspective that draws on feminist theorisations
of the body as the basis of gender difference and the inscription of power. Follow-
ing Mardorossian (2002, 2014), Andersson et al. (2016) also refer to Foucault’s
(1979, 1990, 1992) work on the perpetual reproduction of the body as sexual
(speciﬁcally heterosexual) and the reduction of human existence to the use of
the body’s reproductive organs. Foucault (1977) argued that resistance should be
directed against the discursive power that describes sexuality as the core of being
human; this discourse underpins the perception that rape is the worst that can
happen to a woman, since it robs her of her worth as a human being.
With Mardorossian (2002, 2014), Andersson et al. (2016) want to return to
the second-wave feminist view on rape victims as active subjects rather than
what they see as the prevailing view: as objects to be acted on by victimologist
help agencies. Emphasising structural-intersectional positions and the decoupling
of rape from erotic sexuality, Andersson et al. (2016) contribute to the ongoing
theoretical endeavours to synthesise radical feminist thinking, feminist theories of
the body and poststructuralist thinking. Focussing on power relations and political
mobilisation, they invoke the legacy of radical feminist theorisations in which
sexual violence was viewed as an expression of gendered power relations.
The dialectic critical-realist approach
Gunnarsson (2018) explores the tensions between dominant popular understand-
ings that discursively juxtapose sex and rape and the more continuum-like and
ambiguous realm of experience in women’s and non-binary people’s narratives of
sexual encounters in the ‘grey zone’ between sex and abuse. She then analyses
narratives of men who do not want sex and male victims of sexual abuse, as
a contrast to discourses that presume men always want sex and that ignore men’s
vulnerability and victimisation. Related to the lack of ﬁt between discourse and
experience, she argues that experiences and gendered subjectivities are shaped by
discourses.
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Gunnarsson (2018) aims to reconcile discursive constructions of sexual violence
and experiences of sexual violence by suggesting a dialectic approach inspired by
critical realism (Bhaskar, 2008). Scholars of feminist theory have hotly debated the
relationship between experience and discourse (Scott, 1992; Alcoff, 2000). And, in
research on sexual violence and victimisation, poststructuralist scholars have
argued that the concepts and discourses typically used to name sexual violence
may perpetuate the problem they describe by locking women in a powerless
position of rapability (Marcus, 2002). Others see this argument as a trivialisation of
women’s experiences and have argued that rape is not a discursive problem
(Hawkesworth, 1989; Mardorossian, 2002). Gunnarsson (2018) carves a path
through this polarisation between the realist and discursive approaches by exploring
the dialectic between dominant discourses on sex and people’s reported experiences
in the grey zone between sex and sexual violence. Referring to the work of Linda
Alcoff (2000, 2014)), among others, Gunnarsson argues that experiences and dis-
courses mutually inﬂuence each other (2018).
In her analysis of this grey area between sex and rape, Gunnarsson (2018),
too, draws on a continuum perspective. She refers to Gavey (1999, 2005), who
argues that it is difﬁcult to draw a line between ‘just sex’ and sexual violence,
and to scholars who have pointed to the similarities and overlap in the scripting
of heterosexual romance/sexual pursuit and rape (Gilbert & Webster, 1982,
cited in Kelly, 1988a, p. 74; Gunnarsson, 2018, p. 7). This notion was most rad-
ically formulated by Catharine MacKinnon (1989), who questioned how to tell
the difference between normal sex and violence in a culture and a sexual and
gendered reality that eroticises male power and female submission. In a less
reductionist form of this insight, Gunnarsson (2018) also refers to the observa-
tion that normative heterosexuality is infused with violent dynamics and can be
thought of as a continuum in which typical male behaviours and ‘aberrant’
male behaviours shade into one another, as formulated in Kelly’s continuum
concept (1988a, p. 75). MacKinnon’s (1989) and Kelly’s (1987, 1988a, 1988b)
ideas have been taken up and reworked in later explorations of the ambiguous
grey area between the categories of sex and sexual violence (Gavey, 1999,
2005; cf. Powell, 2008; Cunniff Gilson, 2016).
With Gavey, Gunnarsson also argues that scholars who endorse a ‘dimensional’
view of sexual violence generally operate on two levels, which they normally do
not explicitly distinguish: (1) sex and violence are often difﬁcult to distinguish
within the experience, and (2) the discursive scripting of heterosexual sex and
sexual violence overlaps (Gavey, 1999, p. 60, cited in Gunnarsson, 2018, p. 7).
This tension between discourse and experience was what fuelled the
#prataomdet (‘talkaboutit’) campaign in Sweden. An important framing of
the campaign was the need for a new language to map nuances in people’s
experiences of sex and violence. In her analysis of women’s narratives from the
campaign, Gunnarsson (2018) found that the grey area was in the difﬁculty in
discerning the boundary between sex and violence. In analysing these narra-
tives, Gunnarsson (2018) draws on feminist scholarship on rape and ‘rape
scripts’, referring to Kathryn Ryan’s work (2011): if rape is constructed as
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something monstrous and removed from everyday life, while in reality it shades
into common sexual affairs, then this discourse makes it difﬁcult to identify,
both at an individual and societal level.
Gunnarsson (2018) ﬁnds that the rape script makes it difﬁcult both to name
experiences of sexual violence and to stop acts of sexual violence. In one #pra-
taomdet story, that lends her article its title, a woman woke up in pain, realising
her boyfriend had done things to her that she had not consented to, but she had
not intervened or tried to stop him. The woman asked in retrospect, ‘What was
I supposed to say? “Excuse me, but are you raping me now?”’ The rape script
also makes it difﬁcult to confront the perpetrator. In another #prataomdet story,
the victim ended up comforting the perpetrator: after confronting her boyfriend
that he had raped her in her sleep, he started to cry and made her take it back,
as he could not bear being a rapist, thus illustrating the risks involved in ren-
dering one’s partner a ‘psychopathic monster’.
In analysing the male-authored narratives in the #prataomdet campaign, Gun-
narsson (2018) refers to the shared foundation of both sex and rape in the dis-
course on the ‘male sex drive’. A man who does not want sex not only violates
the social expectation of men always wanting sex but also violates his mascu-
line identity that was formed by this discourse. Exploring the gap between his
experience of not wanting sex while at the same time wanting or claiming to
want it, Gunnarsson (2018) explores how discourses may simultaneously shape
expectations and subjectivities and produce tensions at an individual level.
Like Andersson et al. (2016), Gunnarsson, too, can be seen as synthesising
different strands and different generations of feminist theorisations of rape by
exploring the gaps in accounts of grey-zone experiences between discourses and
experiences (2018). In involving theorisations of grey zones that draw on femin-
ist theorisations in which rape is viewed as being related to ‘just sex’ in the
MacKinnon (1989) tradition, Gunnarsson (2018) explores the ambiguities of the
victim position. Her contribution illustrates the need to empirically study and to
critically discuss the discursive framings of experience as well as the role of
discourses in shaping gendered subjectivities and interactions.
The institutional approach
In Stopping Rape (2015), Walby and co-authors – among them Soﬁa Strid, who
is a Swedish scholar, which is why this general work on rape is included in the
present volume on rape in the Nordic countries – argue that the theorisation and
prevention of rape requires a broad, institutional approach and a theoretical
model that will account for the complex, causal pathways to rape. Taking
a holistic, complex-systems approach, the authors argue that the production and
prevention of rape can be understood to occur at three levels of analysis: (1)
societal-level systems (gender regimes and overall violence); (2) social institu-
tions (planning/political, health, conﬂict/military, civil society, economics, and
law and criminal justice); and (3) the level of individual victims and rapists.
Looking not only at individuals but also at the effects of other institutions
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relevant to rape, the authors emphasise how both the understanding of causal
pathways to rape and rape prevention may be affected by changes at all these
levels; they also discuss how changes at one level may affect the other levels
via feedback systems.
Support services for victims are one example: better-supported victims (i.e. the
individual level) may be empowered to endure the criminal justice process, thus
leading to more convictions (i.e. the institutional level). Further, empowered
victims will be capable of speaking out and educating the public and politicians
on the reality of rape, which will challenge rape myths and contribute to the pre-
vention of rape. In this conceptualisation, the mutual relations between experience
and discourse, theorised in several of the previous contributions, are thought of as
part of possible feedback systems in a complex system. Further, the general level
of gender inequality/equality policies and the social systems of violence in
particular societies shape the institutions that are relevant to rape.
The authors develop their model by detailing six institutional ﬁelds: (1) strat-
egy, planning and coordination; (2) victim and healthcare systems; (3) law and
criminal justice systems; (4) conﬂict zones (speciﬁcally rape in such zones); (5)
culture, media and education; and (6) economics. They present their research
ﬁndings as well as selected successful interventions within each ﬁeld. This broad
scope is enabled by the book’s co-authorship by a large, interdisciplinary and
international team of scholars who provide a broad overview, combined with
deep insights into the particular issues they cover. For instance, the authors argue
that economic gender inequality is related to rape; indeed, previous studies have
found that unemployed women are more often exposed to rape (Walby & Allen,
2004; Kelly, Horvarth, Uzelac, & Lovett, 2007). Riger, Staggs, and Schewe
(2004) found an inverse relationship between work stability and rape, which
might be an important ﬁnding in the context of the increasing precariousness of
the labour market. Research by one of the Stopping Rape co-authors, Bina Agar-
wal, shows how in India, purported employment may take the form of unpaid
work in the family business, which often provides neither a decent income nor
autonomy (Agarwal & Panda, 2007). Rather than such positions providing
employment as such, Agarwal and Panda found that having access to property
and other tangible economic means had a protective effect (2007). This scenario
illustrates that strategies of women’s economic empowerment as part of prevent-
ing rape must be well researched and speciﬁc.
The holistic-systemic approach, which emphasises the interplay between dif-
ferent systems at different levels, calls for research at different levels as well as
at an overall systems level. Walby et al. (2015) argue that understanding the
causal pathways to rape requires theoretically and empirically determining the
interactions between different institutional ﬁelds and the working of feedback
systems. Some of the other approaches’ theoretical concerns are also present in
Walby et al.’s (2015) contribution, such as the importance of discourses and
that victims speak up. In their approach, however, the focus is not predomin-
antly on the internal relationship between discourse and experience but on how
these factors interact with other elements in the social system. Further, the use
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of this approach also implies an ambition and a need to theorise and understand
the operation of combined systems at a macro level. By introducing the concept
of violence regimes and linking them to gendered welfare-state regimes, Strid
(the Swedish co-author mentioned earlier) has proceeded in this direction in
a new study on ‘Gendered violence regimes’ (Delaunay & Strid, 2018).
Theoretical diversity and innovation
This review, although far from exhaustive, has revealed some of the theoretical
diversity and innovation found in making sense of sexual violence among Scandi-
navian scholars and mirrors the growth in-depth and sophistication notable in
theoretical approaches in the ﬁeld internationally (Brown & Walklate, 2011). The
contributions also demonstrate the continued relevance and theoretical potential
of renewed and continued involvement with different strands of second-wave
feminist theorisations of sexual violence.
The four approaches presented in this chapter explicitly draw on or involve
earlier feminist work while also reﬂecting and reproducing some of the controver-
sies between different strands of early feminist theorisations on core issues such
as the relation between sex and violence. Andersson et al. (2016), for example,
drawing on the work of Brownmiller (1975) and Foucault (1977, 1979, 1990,
1992), position themselves against linking sex and rape, while Gunnarsson (2018)
explores the grey zone between sex and rape and takes as her starting point that
sex and rape can be understood as a continuum – a position most radically
formulated by MacKinnon (1989) and reworked and nuanced by others such as
Gavey (2005). The continuum concept (Kelly, 1987, 1988a, 1988b) features
prominently in three of the contributions. The widespread and different ways in
which the authors use the continuum concept illustrate the idea’s continued rele-
vance and analytical usefulness, as well as how the concept can be employed in
various – and not necessarily compatible – ways.
Different uses of the continuum concept
Sørensen (2013) draws on the continuum concept to explore the relations
between sexual violence and other forms of violence (such as domestic vio-
lence) from intimate partners. He argues that sexual violence may well be part
of a more general picture of violence and that victims of domestic violence
(which often includes sexual violence) do not necessarily distinguish between
different forms of violence at the experiential level. In their use of the concept,
Stefansen et al. (2014) hope to coin new concepts for sexual experiences in the
grey zone between sex and violence. They also draw on the concept of
a continuum at an experiential level by linking acts of sexual violence to other
acts of force and the violation of freedom of movement; in addition, they refer
to the wider cultural level and link minor sexual offences by acquaintances to
sexualised micro-aggression in the public sphere, both of which limit girls’ and
women’s gender freedom.
Theorising sexual violence 27
Gunnarsson (2018), who also explores grey-zone experiences, focusses on the
continuum between sex and rape. Walby et al. develop a wider institutional
approach that transcends the continuum approach, which they refer to only brieﬂy
as a way of capturing ‘the way in which small events are connected to create
a context that is more threatening than the sum of its parts’ (2015, p. 12).
Conceptualisations of the victim
One common denominator among these studies is a general concern for working
out concepts of victimisation that will leave room for agency, hence challenging
notions of victimisation that imply passivity. Andersson et al. (2016) explicitly
draw on second-wave feminist theorisations, in particular Brownmiller’s (1975),
to revitalise the link between victimhood and agency. So does Sørensen (2013),
who draws on feminist conceptualisations (Merry, 2003) in which the victim is
viewed as a violated legal subject – a position from which to act and
a prerequisite for agency (Kelly, Burton, & Regan, 1996), in contrast to being
a ‘broken subject’ – as well as drawing on Riches’s (1986) tripartite model of
victimhood. In this model, which involves the victim, the perpetrator, and one or
more witnesses, the broader culture and general attitudes to rape are included in
the deﬁnition of the witness and the role witnesses play in the model.
Walby et al. (2015) explicitly limit their investigation to rape; in their contri-
bution, victims of rape are victims of criminal acts. In their discussion of feed-
back systems that might inﬂuence understandings and social and legal responses
to rape, Walby et al. also use as an example the possible effects of changes in
the legal and social responses to rape for victims who speak up.
This strong emphasis on the victim’s agency may be seen as part of an effort
to repoliticise the ﬁeld and to mobilise rape victims’ voices in the political strug-
gle against rape. This focus on agency and voice may be problematic, however,
in that it may produce new normative expectations as to how victims should act.
For instance, the imperative to be strong and agentic, to speak out and to report,
may be felt as a moral norm but may not be in an individual victim’s interest. In
a recent master thesis, Marie Louise Hansen (2018) highlights how rape victims
negotiate these norms in order to avoid the personal and social costs of reporting.
Gunnarsson (2018) discusses the ambiguity of the victim position and how
hegemonic discourses may make it difﬁcult to identify sexual violence or to
harbour non-typical victims’ experiences and vulnerabilities. Sørensen (2013)
and Stefansen et al. (2014) also highlight the lack of ﬁt between the available
concepts and the experiences of sexual violence.
Gender theory
All the contributions analysed so far have explicitly drawn on and engaged
with theories of gender and sexual violence, and some have also drawn on
more general gender theories. Sørensen (2013) and Stefansen et al. (2014), who
use the continuum approach, analyse empirical material and contribute to new
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conceptualisations and theorisations of sexual abuse while also discussing such
abuse’s link to gender hierarchies (Sørensen, 2013) and gender cultures that
limit women’s and girls’ gender freedom (Stefansen et al., 2014). Sørensen
(2013) mainly refers to theories of gender violence and argues for including
sexual violence in general studies of domestic violence/IPV.
Andersson et al. (2016) also employ more general feminist and poststructural
theories, including feminist theories of the body, and focus on gendered power
relations and political mobilisation related to gender and violence. Gunnarsson
(2018) combines second-wave feminist theorisations of sexual violence and
poststructural approaches with critical realism, with the aim of theorising the
gap between discourses and experiences. Walby et al. (2015) cite gender theor-
ies and policies at the international and national levels to develop a holistic
model of the social production and prevention of rape.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this review has been to map various theorisations of sexual violence
that are potentially relevant for understanding sexual violence in intimate rela-
tions as a gendered phenomenon. The contributions presented in this chapter
differ both in terms of which acts of sexual violence they address and in which
kinds of relationships and perpetrators they include and exclude. Only one con-
tribution (Sørensen, 2013) addresses sexual violence from partners alone (as
part of domestic violence); the other contributions address sexual violence
per se and in different relations.
A comprehensive approach to sexual violence as a gendered phenomenon
needs to draw on and synthesise a variety of perspectives in order to explain
the co-production of gender and sexual violence that results in this gendered
pattern of victimisation and perpetration. Such an approach also needs to
explain how this gendered phenomenon is linked to broader processes in con-
temporary societies that produce and facilitate sexual violence – in ways that
will not exclude the experiences of victims and perpetrators who do not ﬁt with
the general gendered pattern of sexual violence. This goal demands
a multidimensional and multilevel approach – in line with what Walby et al.
(2015) propose – that will take into consideration different institutional levels,
from particular institutions to national regimes, of gender and violence. The
individual and interactional levels are still important, however, and we need to
be able to recognise and name grey-zone experiences. With their typology of
unwanted touching, Stefansen et al. (2014) have provided tools for recognising,
naming, and potentially resisting such events. In line with Gunnarsson’s (2018)
dialectic critical-realist approach, I would add the need to further explore
gendered subjectivities and discourses (and the tensions between them) as well
as ontological sex differences. Finally, and in line with Sørensen (2013), we
must explore how sexual violence from intimate partners is part of the broader
picture of IPV and discuss the gains and potential problems of singling out
sexual violence as a particular ﬁeld of study, separate from IPV studies.
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The recent rapprochement of poststructuralist and radical feminist theories
(which is also visible in the Scandinavian context) may be seen as part of an
ongoing process of theorising from the experiences of new generations who are
trying to understand sexual violence in the context of the uneven process of
changing gender structures, gender discourses, gender relations, and gendered
subjectivities. The continued relevance and engagement with radical feminist
theorising in recent theorisations of sexual violence may be thought of as
arising from the need to theorise gender–power relations. We must study the
experiential continuum of sexual violence in different contexts and relationships in
order to understand, recognise and name such experiences and to construct categor-
ies that will represent victims’ lived experiences. Theorisations of rape, sexual
harassment and grey zones in other-than-intimate relationships may also be helpful
in making sense of sexual violence in intimate relations (see Bjørnholt & Helseth,
2019). Nevertheless, we must further explore sexual violence in intimate relation-
ships, speciﬁcally within the relational dynamics of couple relationships.
Note
1 The choice to select only publications from the Scandinavian countries is a pragmatic
one. As a Norwegian, the author also reads languages Danish and Swedish, but not
the languages of the other Nordic countries.
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3 Cultivating ethical negotiations or
fetishising consent in BDSM?
Monika Grønli Rosten
Introduction
By the end of 2015, I had begun to recruit participants for a research project on
exposure to intimate partner violence (IPV) and help-seeking as part of the
domestic-violence research programme (2014–2019) at the Norwegian Centre
for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies. One day I received an email from
Tina (26):
I think I might be in the target group for your study, but I’m struggling to
explain why. A few years ago, I was in a relationship with a woman, and
I’ve realised since then that I’ve been manipulated, forced into situations
where I was uncomfortable, and it feels like I’ve lost myself somehow along
the way. She performed a kind of ‘voluntary’ violence against me, as we
both consented to it (BDSM). Since the relationship ended, I’ve struggled
with severe anxiety and depression, and I haven’t been able to seek help.
Tina had engaged in an intimate relationship involving the practice of BDSM
(bondage/discipline, dominance/submission, sadism/masochism). As an acronym
for bondage/discipline, dominance/submission and sadism/masochism, the term
‘BDSM’ is used to distinguish a wide range of erotic practices from mainstream
normative sexuality. BDSM community members often juxtapose their own
various alternative practices with the duller ‘vanilla sex’ practised by outsiders
(Newmahr, 2011).
When the relationship ended, Tina found herself hurt, confused and frightened.
In her own words, she had been exposed to violence ‘kind of voluntarily’ (i.e.
BDSM), which made her wonder whether she was in the target group for a study
on IPV. Had she been subjected to physical or sexual violence at all? Had she
instead experienced psychological abuse from a manipulative girlfriend? Or could
what happened between them simply be labelled ‘bad BDSM’, in the popular
sense of ‘bad sex’? She asked herself these questions as she deliberated whether
she was entitled to professional help for a ‘self-inﬂicted’ trauma.
This chapter, using the complex relationship between sexuality and power
exchanges in BDSM as a backdrop, will address what has been referred to as
the ‘grey area’ (Gavey, 2005) and the ‘murky interface of consent and coercion’
(Gunnarsson, 2018, p. 3). The World Health Organization (WHO, 2002) deﬁnes
violence as ‘the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual,
against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results
in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-
development or deprivation’. In this deﬁnition, violence is understood as an actual
fact: both an intention and a set of real-life consequences. In the following analysis,
we will instead understand violence as a social construct that emerges from
struggles of legitimacy in a particular cultural and historical context.
In this chapter, I refer to illegitimate BDSM as ‘sexual violence’, as BDSM in
my understanding is strongly related but at the same time encompasses sexuality.
What differentiates BDSM from sexual violence, as a socially constructed category,
is ﬁrst the prerequisite of consent (or not) to participate, and second the fact that
the BDSM practice itself is seen as a game of make-believe, as opposed to real
violence (McClintock, 1993; Newmahr, 2010). But how do participants in BDSM
draw this line in actual practice, and what role does the idea of consent play?
Throughout this chapter, we will explore the social construction of sexual
violence in BDSM from different angles, all revolving around the question of con-
sent. I will problematise the idea of consent as a way of properly distinguishing
BDSM from sexual violence by drawing on interviews with Tina and other BDSM
practitioners. Towards the end of the chapter, I will reﬂect on what we can learn
about IPVand consent from this particular context.
The consent problem
The concept of consent tends to mean different things to different people, both in
academic discourse and in everyday life. In relation to sexuality, ‘consent’ can be
deﬁned as the ‘the freely given verbal or non-verbal communication of a feeling
of willingness’ (Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999, p. 259). In sexual-violence pre-
vention in the Western world, according to Beres (2014, p. 373), the message ‘no
means no’ has gradually been replaced by ‘yes means yes’. The same discursive
shift is visible in online BDSM communities and the blogosphere (Barker, 2013).
Encouraging explicit rather than implicit communication of consent is often seen
as a way of avoiding misunderstandings.
Insisting on the importance of afﬁrmative consent is also useful in ﬁghting
sexual violence. Rape is wrong, Cahill states (2001, p. 170), precisely because
‘it undermines the integrity of the personhood of the victim by denying their
right of consent over that property that is most personally, most intensely held:
the body’. In Cahill’s discussion of rape and the problem of consent (2001), the
author further explains how rape in the traditional Western understanding was
deﬁned as a crime against primarily male property. In this logic, women did not
possess their sexuality, so the question of consent was irrelevant. In liberal
theory, in contrast, rape is a violation of personal autonomy, where lack of con-
sent is the very deﬁnition of the crime. An obvious challenge in this approach
is that the communication of consent is not necessarily the same as actually
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wanting to participate (Beres, 2014; West, 2008). In the classic ‘Women and
Consent’, Pateman deﬁnes the consent problem as an ideal in liberal societies:
‘consent is central to liberal democracy, because it is essential to maintain indi-
vidual freedom and equality; but it is a problem for liberal democracy, because
individual freedom and equality is also a precondition for the practice of con-
sent’ (1980, p. 162). In other words, consent is never given in a social vacuum
and therefore should be discussed with reference to the ethical negotiations
related to consent, since it occurs within a social context of unequally distrib-
uted opportunity for freedom and equality.
The following problematisation of consent as negotiated within the subcultural
social context of BDSM is inspired by Pateman’s (1980, p. 162) insistence on
taking into account these ‘realities of power and domination in sexual and political
lives’. Ethnographic studies of sadomasochism (SM) have problematised the limits
of conceptualising the individual by demonstrating how ritual practices within such
communities seem to be articulated precisely in the language of individualism
(Martin, 2011). The act of consent/non-consent is often seen as an individual
responsibility. Against this modern conception of an essential self stands the post-
modern deconstruction of the individual subject. Using a Foucauldian understand-
ing, ethical work on the self as part of the governing of souls in modern societies
(‘governmentality’) involves both caring for the self and for others (Foucault,
2003, 2009). Foucault deﬁnes this self-formation of the ethical subject as
a constant process of acting, monitoring and transforming oneself in relation to par-
ticular moral goals and ideals (Foucault, 2001, 1985 [2014]). Carmody (2003,
p. 201) builds on Foucault’s work when arguing for a discourse on sexual-violence
prevention that would acknowledge precisely the ability to ethically negotiate and
to establish an ‘erotics of consent’ across gender and power differences.
Method
The work in this chapter resembles the process of ‘abduction’, which Timmer-
mans and Tavory (2012, p. 169) describe as ‘the cultivation of anomalous and
surprising empirical ﬁndings’. As a researcher of IPV with little knowledge of
the practice of BDSM, I welcomed the opportunity Tina offered to be led astray,
since I hoped to be able to develop novel theoretical insights from her story. In
order to understand Tina’s attempts to carve out the sexual violence from the
BDSM context in her story, I had to expand my initial research project on IPV.
Via colleagues and friends, I managed to be introduced to people with an interest
in BDSM; through their network, I then recruited seven informants for interviews,
in addition to Tina.
These informants were experienced in practising BDSM with life-partners or
play partners, and they all had overlapping social networks within local, national
and even international BDSM communities. Since the number of interviews had
to be limited, I tried to recruit male and female informants with different role
preferences in order to analytically explore issues of power exchange from differ-
ent angles; these roles included ‘dominant’, ‘submissive’ (or ‘sub’) and ‘switch’,
Negotiating consent in BDSM? 35
a subcultural term for those who sometimes like to dominate and sometimes
prefer the role of sub. All informants identiﬁed themselves as heterosexual;
I found this analytically fruitful, as Tina herself was clear that her story was
about abuse in a BDSM relationship, rather than abuse in an LGBTQ relation-
ship. Unlike Tina, the other informants had higher education. Several had aca-
demic or even political interest in BDSM: they had read extensively on the
subject and had engaged in activism and identity politics to create a more tolerant
and ‘kink-friendly’ society.
I conducted three additional individual interviews with two women (Linda
and Mari) and one man (Lukas), all in their 30s. These were qualitative semi-
structured interviews lasting about two hours, where the informants were asked
to describe their personal practice and to explain the role BDSM played in their
social lives and as part of their identities. They were also invited, throughout
the interview, to reﬂect on how to draw the line between BDSM and abuse. In
addition, three men and one woman (ages 25–40) were interviewed in a group,
as friends and fellow members of a BDSM club. Before the group interview,
the four participants were asked to read an anonymised short version of Tina’s
story. In the interview, the story could then serve as a starting point for discus-
sions about how BDSM and sexual violence can be separated. During the inter-
view, I tried to remain passive and not offer my point of view; instead,
I listened to their discussions.
The individual interviews were transcribed and analysed. After the group inter-
view, the ﬁeld notes from the session (and later, an early draft of the chapter)
were shared with and commented on by the participants in order to avoid misun-
derstandings and misinterpretations on my part. I also conducted a follow-up
interview with Tina about a year after the ﬁrst one to get her opinion about my
interpretation and analysis of her story. The informants insisted on the importance
of their preferred positions (dominant, sub or switch) as well as their gender and
sexuality (homo/hetero) for their perspectives on BDSM and sexual violence.
At the same time, I was fascinated by the similarities in perspective across such
dividing lines as I carved out a shared understanding of the difference between
BDSM and sexual violence in the analysis. I understand these similarities from
different standpoints as being indicative of high-level social/cultural integration in
the larger BDSM community.
In addition to conducting interviews, I observed the participants at BDSM-
related events, such as public lectures during the 2017 Oslo Pride festival, where
I engaged in more informal conversations with practitioners. I also searched
Norwegian and international BDSM community websites for relevant information
on the phenomenon of sexual violence in the BDSM context.
Anonymity is crucial in this project, as the informants most often kept their
BDSM practice secret at work or with certain friends and family members.
I discussed the issue of anonymity with each interviewee. In addition to using
pseudonyms, I have changed several details in their personal stories and quotations.
The following includes an analysis of what BDSM essentially is before discussing
(through the analysis of Tina’s story) what separates BDSM from sexual violence.
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BDSM as perversion, alternative sexuality or lifestyle
Outsiders often understand BDSM to be either an alternative sexual practice or
a form of role-play between consenting adults who suspend their individual lived
realities for the sake of erotic enjoyment (Newmahr, 2010). In Foucault’s The
History of Sexuality (1984), the author describes how sexuality throughout history
has become a domain of regulation and social control. According to Foucault,
this transformation of sex into discourse endeavours ‘to expel from reality the
forms of sexuality that were not amenable to the strict economy of reproduction’
(1984, p. 36). In a Foucauldian understanding, the ‘perversions’ included in the
BDSM category are products of society’s efforts to suppress them. These prac-
tices are included in socially constructed hierarchies of sexual value, where some
forms of sexuality are valued as ‘good’, ‘normal’ and ‘natural’, whereas others
are singled out as ‘bad’, ‘abnormal’ and ‘unnatural’ (Rubin, 1984, pp. 280–281).
In an interview about sex, power and the politics of identity, Foucault discusses
sadomasochism (SM) as an attempt to ‘de-sexualise pleasure’ in a society where
traditional understandings of physical pleasure seem limited to eating, drinking
and sex (2001, p. 1557). In Foucault’s analysis, SM is neither simply a form of
alternative sexuality nor a way of releasing suppressed aggression and violence
(2001) but rather an alternative way of seeking pleasure. This view seems to
agree with the general understanding expressed by the BDSM practitioners
I interviewed. A woman I met at a BDSM lecture referred to herself as a ‘sadist’
in the BDSM context. She told me that over the years, she had concluded that
sex for her was about penetration or the touching of genitals. Whether or not sex
is included in BDSM play thus depends on the practice, in her understanding. As
she explained, ‘I actually stopped having sex with my boyfriend many years ago,
but I love playing with him’.
There is a growing body of literature on sadomasochism and fetishism in the
social sciences that I will not be able to engage with here; see Weinberg (2006)
for an extensive review. Practices now often referred to as BDSM have become
more visible in the mainstream since the Fifty Shades series (Deller, Harman &
Jones, 2013) and thus more accepted as a way of ‘spicing up’ one’s sex life.
Still, from my informants’ points of view, BDSM is not reducible to the practice
of ‘kinky sex’. One of them, Linda, has been part of a BDSM community since
she was a teenager and characterises her fellow ‘BDSMers’ as ‘a bunch of
friendly geeks’. Linda practices BDSM both in private with her husband and with
playing partners at the local club. She identiﬁes herself as switch. ‘Please don’t
get me started on the Fifty Shades hype’, she says, implying that her community’s
BDSM is something else. For Linda, BDSM is a crucial part of her identity as
well as an interest she has in common with most of her ‘geek’ friends and thus
not simply a ‘practice’ or a ‘sexual/relational orientation’. Linda’s description res-
onates with Newmahr’s ﬁndings from an ethnographic study of a US-based SM
community that it is: ‘an all-encompassing lifestyle that represents liberation from
the oppressive plight of the everyman and nurtures identities of marginality’
(2011, p. 9).
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From an outsider’s perspective, BDSM practices might appear as obeying
conventions of power (such as the largely gendered patterns of male dominance
and female submission) and perhaps even violence, such as the acceptance of
physical pain and bloodshed. The difference lies in the meanings the partici-
pants apply (Carlström, 2018). Based on her studies of commercial fetishism
and gender power, McClintock (1993, p. 89) argues that despite its apparent ser-
vility to traditional power, SM ‘performs social power as scripted, and hence as
permanently subject to change’. But this opening for change is often understated
when insiders draw the line between play and abuse, as if this boundary were
ﬁxed and non-negotiable (Wiseman, 1996). People often explicitly refer to the
commonly accepted ground rules that BDSM practice should always be ‘safe,
sane and consensual’, or SSC.
SSC and ethical BDSM
David Stein ﬁrst introduced the SSC ground rules at an SM-community conference
in Washington, DC, in 2000; they have since become a litmus test for ‘proper’
BDSM. Newmahr (2011, p. 147) expands on this point in her ethnographical studies
of SM practices: ‘“safe, sane and consensual” is what makes SM morally accept-
able. The concept thus has come to constitute SM; what is not safe and sane and
consensual is not SM, and therefore does not belong in the community’. SSC works
as a conceptual tool for acceptance and understanding outside the communities, as
well as a way of protecting oneself and each other on the inside. Practitioners
consider consent to be crucial. As Newmahr (2011, p. 149) states,
the most serious of the boundaries with which to play, from the perspective of
the community, is not the line between life and death, but the edge between
consent and non-consent. In the consciousness of the community, deference
for a sharply drawn line here separates SM from criminal behavior.
Newmahr’s description here illustrates Fanghanels point (2019) that consent in
BDSM, the negotiation between risk and trust, must be understood as a practice
of community-building, relying on the neoliberal constructions of the autono-
mous self.
In an interview with Lukas, an experienced sub, he admits that the SSC guide-
lines do not solve all problems in all situations, but as rules of thumb he ﬁnds them
‘good to think with’. First, consent to engage in BDSM, according to Lukas, means
an enthusiastic expression of free will. In Lukas’s understanding, however, the rela-
tive health risk in BDSM practice actually implies that consent in itself is not
necessarily enough. Accordingly, Lukas deﬁnes spanking of the head, stomach, or
neck, even if enthusiastically requested, as not safe and therefore not a proper
BDSM. He also stresses that BDSM should be practised with a sane mind so that
the participants will be able to give their enthusiastic consent. Combining alcohol
or drugs with play is not a proper BDSM in his view. In the same logic, Lukas
claims that keeping partners socially isolated as part of dominance/submission
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relationships, in a way that hinders them from growing as people, is potentially
unhealthy and therefore not a proper BDSM.
Lucas is an idealist and an activist on behalf of his community. The implica-
tion of what he says is that ideal BDSM is practised by caring and responsible
adults with good social skills and basic knowledge about the human psyche and
anatomy. BDSM should be practised with the well-informed intention to please
rather than to hurt, within a relational rather than an egotistical logic. Incompe-
tent BDSM playing – or worse, abuse, may be the result when this is not the
case. At stake is the boundary between legal, morally acceptable and playful
BDSM and illegal, immoral and hurtful sexual violence. Strict, black-and-white
dichotomisation between sexual violence and ideal BDSM becomes a way of
addressing what outsiders perceive as practices in shades of grey.
Linda, just like Lukas, stresses the importance of belonging to a network of
fellow BDSMers so that this clear boundary will not become blurred in practice.
When experimenting with technically or psychologically advanced BDSM, people
need a place to learn the proper ethics, social rules and language for negotiation
and evaluation, and how to take safety precautions and provide proper aftercare. As
Linda explains, no matter what role people play (dominant, sub, or switch), they
must ﬁnd what SSC means in their current practice. They must also explore
whether their partners’ and their own personal boundaries represent ‘hard’ or ‘soft’
boundaries: respectively, those that people will not consent to cross at all and those
they might cross, from the safe place they have created through negotiations. This
distinction between hard and soft boundaries is a way of addressing consent as
a question of free will in a ﬂoating landscape of explorative pleasure-seeking.
Linda insists on open communication between the parties before, during and
after play-sessions, where timing is crucial. When she plays the dominant role
with a male sub newcomer at the BDSM club, she never breaks his skin, touches
his genitals, or introduces advanced techniques such as breath play without dis-
cussing it in advance. An occasion when she has him tied up, hanging upside
down, and aroused by the scene is not a good time to ask for permission to touch
his genitals. In Linda’s understanding, bad timing like this would indeed deprive
him of the opportunity to provide consent, in the sense of a conscious expression
of free will. She describes how she insists on discussing the details with her play-
ing partners before each session by systematically mapping out each other’s hard
and soft boundaries, likes and dislikes, and discussing any relevant allergies or
other physical conditions. Negotiating BDSM practice at home with her husband
is a different situation: they trust each other and can communicate well.
As Carmody argues, much academic discourse on sexual violence has focussed
on essentialist ideas about masculinity and femininity, as well as on what is often
perceived as ‘abnormal’ unethical subjects, rather than considering ‘how women
and men of diverse sexualities do behave as ethical subjects’ (2003, p. 211). I see
Linda and Lukas as examples of such women and men; in a Foucauldian sense,
they seem to include conscious ethical work on the self as part of their BDSM
practice. From their point of view, mutual enthusiastic consent is a necessary but
insufﬁcient prerequisite for the practice of ‘ethical BDSM’.
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Troublesome BDSM
The tendency among insiders to present BDSM and sexual violence as mutually
exclusive is understandable, given the potential social stigma in identifying with
BDSM outside of the community. The International Classiﬁcation of Diseases
and Related Health Problems (ICD-11) is a good illustration of existing hierarch-
ies of sexual practices in society (Rubin, 1984). Until June 2018, ‘fetishism’,
‘sadism’ and ‘masochism’ were included in chapter F65 of ICD-11 as forms of
‘mental disorders of sexual preference’. According to a revision based on current
scientiﬁc evidence (Reed et al., 2016, p. 213), these diagnoses were removed, and
the new category ‘coercive sexual sadism disorder’ was introduced ‘to clearly dis-
tinguish this disorder from consensual sadomasochistic behaviors that do not
involve substantial harm or risk’. WHO’s recent decision to follow the Nordic
countries in removing the diagnoses implies that ‘consensual sadomasochism’ (or
BDSM) will now be considered a sexual practice; ‘sexual sadism’ aimed at
a non-consenting person, in contrast, will still be considered a form of mental
disease. The key concept in this distinction between an acceptable sexual prefer-
ence and a mental disorder is consent.
According to Conly (2004, p. 98), the legal concept of rape traditionally
involves two elements: the perpetrator’s use of force and the victim’s lack
of consent. Because use of force is often part of the game in BDSM, mutual
consent given by healthy adults has become a major distinction between
BDSM (as a legal sexual practice) and illegal sexual violence; see Smart
(1995) for a problematisation of earlier jurisprudence in the UK. In
a Norwegian court case from 2013 (LH-2012–160658), a man was acquitted
for charges of ‘grossly negligent sexual assault’ in a case where BDSM ‘rape
play’ had resulted in an indictment of rape on the part of a male dominant.
The actual play session had been ﬁlmed and thus was able to be used as evidence
in court. The male dominant/offender asked the female submissive/victim to con-
ﬁrm that she had agreed to be part of a role-play where she was to be raped
(including being hit in the face and held down). The woman consented on
tape, and during the ﬁlmed play session/rape, she screamed ‘No’, sobbed and
asked the man repeatedly to stop. Their mutual agreement beforehand had
included the use of a safe word (‘red’) in case either wanted to end the play
session. Because the woman never uttered ‘red’ on tape, the court could not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that she had withdrawn her consent or
that the man had understood that she wanted him to stop. In other words, the
court could not prove that it was dealing with ‘non-consensual sexual sadism’
rather than ‘consensual sadomasochism’; therefore, the male dominant/
offender was free to go.
The international BDSM social movement insists on free mutual consent as
the signature of ‘healthy BDSM’, regardless of gender, class or ethnicity. In
actual practice, however, gender is often a crucial factor, as shown in Carl-
ström’s studies (2017) among Swedish practitioners who work hard to reconcile
gender equality with the power structures of BDSM. As Carlström shows,
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radical feminist theorists tend to see BDSM practices as fundamentally mis-
ogynistic products of patriarchy that eroticise power differences of gender,
regardless of who dominates whom on the individual level. The BDSM move-
ment, in contrast, is inspired by more ‘sex-positive’ queer theory, with
a different approach to power and consent.
West (2008) makes a point of how both feminist and queer perspectives can
be used in obscuring the distinction between consenting and non-consenting
sex, pushed to extremes: ‘from either perspective, then, consent fades in signiﬁ-
cance as power looms: for radical feminists, sexual power is coercive with or
without consent, and for queer theorists, sexual power is transgressive and
pleasure-enhancing, with or without it’ (2009, p. 19). In sex crime legislation,
the concept of consent strictly means giving permission (and thus is under the
inﬂuence of speciﬁc circumstances), whereas a feminist understanding of the
concept looks at consent as ‘an aspect of relational sexual integrity and auton-
omy’ (Larcombe, Fileborn, Powell, Hanley & Henry, 2016, p. 614). A common
feminist critique of legal deﬁnitions of rape has precisely been that these deﬁn-
itions do not always consider the structural inequalities and particular contexts
that shape all sexual encounters.
Mari, a woman in her 30s who practises BDSM exclusively in her private
home, provided a similar explanation for why she tries to keep her distance from
her former BDSM community. To her, the ideals of gender-equal BDSM between
consenting adults are not always reﬂected in actual practice. She uses the example
of respect for a stop-word as a way of withdrawing consent: an imperative social
norm in BDSM. Mari has experienced how esteemed male dominants get away
with breaking this rule because it is up to his female sub to prove that he has
indeed disrespected her attempt to stop him. As Mari says:
As a feminist, I ﬁnd this community problematic, and that’s partly why I wish
not to be part of it: because so many pretty words are spoken about consent
and all that, but in reality, my experience is that these boundaries are ﬂuid. If
you go to [a BDSM club] and sit there in the bar, and someone comes up to
you and pulls your hair, for instance, then you haven’t given your consent.
And people say, ‘That’s just ﬂirting’.
In BDSM, just as in life in general, consent becomes a problematic issue in prac-
tice precisely because the consent depends on the particular social context of
unequal power relations. BDSM communities often frown upon drawing attention
to problematic experiences related to consent. According to Mari, people who
speak out against fellow BDSM community members’ disrespect of the ideal of
mutual and enthusiastic consent tend to experience being ‘frozen out’ as a result
(see also Barker, 2013). There is no reason to believe that feminist attitudes dif-
ferentiate signiﬁcantly between sadomasochists and non-sadomasochists (Cross &
Matheson, 2006). That is precisely Mari’s point: BDSM takes place within
a larger social context characterised by gendered power differences.
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When BDSM becomes violent: Tina’s story
Tina’s story is a good example of how the problem of consent encompasses
both BDSM ideals and the performative act of giving permission or saying
‘yes’. At the age of 23, Tina contacted ‘Emma’ (10 years older) on Fetlife, the
BDSM equivalent of Facebook. Tina was interested in sex rather than some-
thing more serious, and Emma was already in a relationship with another
woman who accepted her wish to have a playing-partner/girlfriend on the side.
During the following year, Tina spent most of her spare time at the couple’s
house and with their friends, as well as with Emma on her own.
Within the BDSM framework, Tina and her former girlfriend seemed to take
their negotiations over practice to ensure mutual consent seriously. Tina explains:
When you’re doing something that outside of this framework is basically vio-
lence, it’s important that you make agreements … BDSM has a lot of rules:
both the general ground rules saying that it has to be safe, sane, and consen-
sual, and … the personal preferences – your own boundaries. If you’re to
beneﬁt from pushing your boundaries – something that many people take
pleasure in – you have to do it based on mutual trust and communication.
Tina points to a fundamental dilemma in BDSM: between control obtained
through the establishment of general rules (SSC) and personal boundaries
and the willingness to push these boundaries. This situation is a matter of ﬁnding
the right balance between taking precautions and taking risks; for many people,
the element of risk seems to be precisely what makes BDSM more interesting
than ‘vanilla’ sex. Consent in this context is a way of solving this dilemma. Con-
sent then operates at different levels: as part of the negotiation of rules and
boundaries in each situation and in the negotiated willingness to engage with
a particular partner (or with BDSM play in general).
Although both Tina and Emma preferred domination to submission, Tina
agreed to let Emma teach her how to become a proper dominant through the
submissive role. Emma suggested that they discuss sexual preferences and
boundaries in writing ‘so that we both know what we want’, she said. During
the ﬁrst few months, Tina and Emma mostly engaged in physical and sexual
BDSM play and spent time working out compromises so that both would bene-
ﬁt. After a few months, Tina agreed to try more extensive psychological domin-
ance during her everyday life. In the beginning, Tina found these more
boundless and ﬂuid mental aspects of BDSM exciting. As Emma’s servant, Tina
was to address her as ‘Mistress’ and could not touch her without permission.
Emma particularly liked when Tina showed off her bruises and scars as signs of
Emma’s ownership of her. Other ways for Tina to make Emma happy included
wearing ‘butt plugs’ at work, wetting herself in public, or drinking her own
urine as ways of proving her willingness to please her ‘domina’. Eventually
these tasks, all seemingly common in BDSM, started to make Tina more and
more uncomfortable. It became increasingly difﬁcult for her to do her job
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properly or to spend time with her own friends – people whom Emma often
told her were a bad inﬂuence.
As a dominant, Emma expected Tina to email her a description of her tasks for
the coming day every night before going to sleep, including sexual activities.
One evening about a year after they had ﬁrst met, Tina fell asleep on the couch
without sending this mandatory email to her mistress. When they met the
following day, Emma was ‘cold as stone’, as Tina describes her, and she horse-
whipped Tina. Tina was terriﬁed, as she felt the boundary between play and real-
ity was collapsing and that she had lost control of the situation. As is common in
BDSM practice, Tina and Emma had agreed on a safe-word for each to use to
revoke their consent if things went too far. Looking back at what happened that
particular morning, Tina says:
Of course, I could’ve used the safe-word, and then she would’ve stopped.
But then again, I was convinced that if I’d said ‘red’, our relationship would
have ended there. She felt that she did all this to me as a favour. Or at least
that’s what she would’ve said afterwards.
Shortly after this incident, Tina admitted to herself and to Emma that she had
fallen in love with her. Because Emma was unwilling to leave her partner, they
decided to end their relationship. During the three years that have passed since
that time, they have had no contact other than a few messages on social media.
But Tina is convinced that Emma is stalking her through anonymous proﬁles on
social media by sending disturbing messages and vague threats. During the ﬁrst
few months after the breakup, Tina became increasingly confused, anxious and
depressed. Suddenly she was afraid to leave her apartment without doing
a proper risk analysis: which streets were safe and which social venues would
put her at risk of bumping into Emma, or her girlfriend or friends.
Drawing the line through shades of grey
Even before Tina met Emma, BDSM had become a fundamental trait of her per-
sonal and social identity; their relationship was deﬁned within this framework.
BDSM is still part of who Tina is and wants to be, and therefore, it is crucial for
her to deﬁne what happened between her and Emma as ‘something else’. The
overarching problem in Tina’s struggle to make sense of what happened to her
appears to be the disparity between black-and-white BDSM ideals and the grey
areas of actual practice. This situation has led Tina into a constant dichotomisation
between legitimate BDSM and illegitimate sexual violence. The BDSM play that
she was part of – at least from her own understanding in retrospect – did not feel
safe, sane and consensual and therefore could not have been BDSM. But beyond
BDSM, Tina has difﬁculty ﬁnding the right words to describe what happened.
Was this violence? If so, was the violence physical, sexual or psychological? At
what time did the violence start, and is it in fact still going on?
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At the time of the ﬁrst interview, Tina seemed to have made up her mind,
more or less: she claimed to have been exposed to violence by intent in an
intimate relationship. It was the consequences of what had happened – the anx-
iety and depression she had suffered in the period after the relationship ended –
that made Tina question Emma’s moral character and intentions:
I’ve realised since then that she never did this for me. All that talk about
teaching me … I think she did it to put me in a situation where she could
take advantage of me. Where she was allowed… allowed to hit me.
The idea of Emma exploiting the BDSM framework for her own purposes was not
helpful for Tina, as she still had to live with her own ‘consent’ to the actions whose
aftermath later caused her so much pain. Using a safe-word essentially means
revoking one’s consent, and she never used it; she never said ‘red’. In Tina’s story,
consent was a state of mind and was the constant as her initial BDSM experiences
over time turned into experiences of sexual violence. The burning question in her
story that she constantly returned to was: ‘How could I have put myself in such
a situation?’ She repeatedly accepted and normalised Emma’s dominance out of
love or fear, constantly pushing her own boundaries until they no longer existed.
What exactly does consent mean under such circumstances?
Consent and responsibility
While power and domination are central aspects of all social relations (Foucault,
1984 [2001]), we may understand violence as a particular kind of power and
domination where legitimacy is contested. As Riches notes (1986, p. 10):
the main ambiguities, and therefore misunderstandings, will certainly come
from people’s inability always to spot acts of hurt which are primarily meant
as playful or ritualized, as opposed to those which are directly serious in
intent’.
During the interview with several friends from a BDSM club, they debated the
question of legitimacy related to intent in relation to the anonymised version of
Tina’s story.
Just as in my conversations with Tina, the discussion in the group interview
was coloured by the participants’ insistence on responsibility related to the
issue of consent in the story. One of them, a male dominant, described the rela-
tionship in the story presented as ‘clearly abusive’, and claimed that he would
never let his sub consent to play on such premises. He particularly questioned
Emma’s apparent lack of interest in checking in on Tina, ensuring that she was
ok emotionally. In his view, Emma had been responsible for creating a coercive
context in which free consent had become impossible. Because safe BDSM
does not actually exist, this man argued, all participants – and the dominant in
particular – must take the issue of risk seriously to avoid people getting hurt.
44 Monika Grønli Rosten
Another participant, a submissive male, disagreed with his friend; he claimed
that Tina herself had been responsible for this situation and referred to it as
‘self-abuse, plain and simple’. As a fellow sub, he insisted on Tina’s responsi-
bility for protecting her own boundaries and integrity during BDSM play.
Whenever she found that she was unable to do so – for instance because she
had unintentionally fallen in love with her mistress – he felt that she should
have stopped practising.
The question that all the informants in their different ways tried to answer was
one that I never asked them myself: Whose responsibility is it when someone
consents to unwanted BDSM play? This is not an issue that can easily be agreed
upon based on BDSM moral codes alone. In general, the informants seemed
fairly ambiguous when talking about the risks related to BDSM: they drew strict
lines between BDSM and sexual violence based on the general SSC guidelines
while also engaging in a nuanced problematisation of the same distinctions. They
also explained that fellow BDSMers frequently talk about their practice in terms
of violence; they even claimed that BDSM is indeed a form of violence. They all
seemed to understand the practice of BDSM as ‘playing with ﬁre’, where the risk
of harm is inevitable. They explicitly shared my understanding of risk assessment
and safety precautions in BDSM as being more often aimed at physical rather
than mental aspects. They explained that, because of the stigmatisation from out-
side BDSM as a former psychiatric diagnosis, psychological troubles related to
the practice tend to become taboo on the inside.
Conclusion: fetishising consent to manage stigma?
In conclusion, based on the above discussion, Tina’s difﬁcult situation is not only
related to what happened between her and Emma but also to the general social
context and the internal and external mechanism of the stigmatisation of a sexual
minority. The social construction of sexual violence in the context of BDSM
somehow turns ‘abusive BDSM’ into an anomaly (Douglas, 1984): a phenomenon
that falls between cultural categories and is a potential threat to the social order.
Tina’s story represents such a threat, both to her and to her fellow BDSMers,
since she claims to have been exposed to BDSM as ‘consensual violence’.
West addresses the phenomenon of consensual sexual harm: ‘at most, the
consensuality of the transaction implies only that if the transaction is harmful,
or bad, it is so for reasons other than the harmful consequences that ﬂow from
the exercise of coercion or force’ (2009, p. 20). Because consent has never
been a good proxy for well-being, West argues, we should not treat it as such.
We should indeed ‘quit fetishising consent’ (2008, p. 15), she points out, when
exploring the frontiers of sex and violence within academic discourse.
The verb ‘to fetishise’ has two meanings. First, it refers to making something
the object of a sexual fetish; second, it refers to having an excessive and irrational
commitment to something. During the process of analysing BDSM as ideal and
practice, I have come to think of consent as something that could easily be fetish-
ised in the latter sense within this distinct subculture in which sexual fetishism is
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encouraged. I ﬁnd that people’s commitment to consent in BDSM communities
might cause serious blind spots concerning their common responsibility in pre-
venting BDSM play from becoming abusive. According to the above-mentioned
shift in sexual violence prevention discourse, this fetishising of consent within
BDSM seems to be part of a much larger trend in societies and political ﬁelds
where individualist ideologies dominate, to the point that they are taken for
granted. Within such logics, because of the insistence on personal responsibility,
the individual tends to be held responsible for consenting to unwanted sex.
Because of the risk related to the potentially coercive circumstances of
BDSM, the necessity for nuanced ethical negotiation in practice – particularly
in relation to consent – is perhaps more urgent than elsewhere. This study has
shown that BDSM as a subculture is indeed characterised by particularly
sophisticated ethical negotiations over issues concerning sexual practices and
consent: likely much more so than in mainstream sexual practice. People who
practise BDSM as part of a community appear to be aware of the risk and
social responsibility involved; the widely accepted ground rules – safe, sane and
consensual – are precisely meant to prevent people from turning pleasure into
abuse. Alongside the rather problematic fetishising of consent, I sense
a cultivation of skilful risk management for the beneﬁt of both the group and
the individual. The political and academic ﬁeld of sexual violence might ﬁnd
the potential for several new insights within this universe of rigid obedience to
rules alongside the simultaneous pursuit of creative ﬂexibility.
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4 Understanding unwanted
sexual touching
A situational approach
Kari Stefansen
Introduction
Situations involving unwanted sexual touching are analysed in this chapter in an
effort to enhance our understanding of the social dynamics of this particular form
of invading behaviour against girls and young women. The analysis is grounded
in a situational perspective (which I will expand on later) that draws on Collins’s
(2009) micro-sociological approach to the study of violence. On the background
of that analysis, I will discuss some of the wider ramiﬁcations or cultural conse-
quences of the phenomenon of unwanted touching, with a focus on the harm
such behaviour causes at the collective level. The starting point for this discussion
is the idea that unwanted sexual touching, like rape and other forms of sexual
violence, represents both ‘a personal and systemic attack’ (Munro, 2010, p. 26).
The relevance of an analysis of unwanted sexual touching in a book about
rape is that such an analysis contributes to our understanding of the boundar-
ies and harm of sexual violence – issues that are high on the agenda among
numerous socio-legal studies on rape law (e.g. McGlynn & Munro, 2010). It
is important to explore the harm and boundaries of sexual violence more
generally, however, and not exclusively from a penal perspective, where phe-
nomena such as intent and culpability are often placed in the foreground. My
interest in this chapter is instead to draw our attention to the social aspect of
unwanted sexual touching, particularly the way it unfolds in different inter-
actional settings. The analysis highlights how context shapes sexual behaviour,
an issue that is understudied in relation to sexual violence (Khan, Hirsch,
Wamboldt, & Mellins, 2018).
The situations I explore involve acts that in common parlance are referred to
as groping, fondling, feeling up and similar terms. These are forms of unwanted
and unsettling sexualised touching that may happen everywhere – on the bus, at
school, at work and during parties and other social events. Viewed from a penal
or hierarchical perspective on sexual violence, such acts may represent ‘minor
events’ (Smart, 1995, p. 222) compared to violent rape, but they are prevalent
and part of the everyday sexism that many girls and women encounter and must
handle. Nationally representative studies among youths in Norway (the empir-
ical context of my analysis) indeed conﬁrm that unwanted touching is
widespread in the Nordic context, despite increasing efforts in recent years to pre-
vent sexual violence among the youth population (for example, see Skilbrei &
Stefansen, 2018). The lifetime prevalence rates for 18–19-year olds are around
25% among girls and 6–7% among boys (Mossige & Stefansen, 2007, 2016); the
annual rates are correspondingly high. In a study among 16–18-year olds, 21% of
girls and 9% of boys reported having experienced unwanted sexual touching in
the past 12 months (Bakken, 2017). The referred-to studies among older youths
were conducted eight years apart but showed similar rates, thus indicating that
unwanted sexual touching (and sexual violence in general) is stable and frequent
among youths in Norway. The consistently higher numbers for girls serve as
a reminder that sexual violence is highly gendered, even if it also affects boys.
The analysis in this chapter is restricted to girls’ experiences of unwanted
touching, for the simple reason that the empirical material I analyse contains
too few descriptions from boys to allow for a meaningful exploration. I analyse
descriptions of unwanted touching that happened to girls after the age of 13
and that involved boys or young men of the same age as the girl or a few
years older. Hence, the focus of attention is youth-related incidents of
unwanted sexual touching, not childhood sexual abuse. The descriptions were
gathered as part of a large-scale survey study conducted among students in
the ﬁnal year of upper secondary school (18–19-year olds). The descriptions
are short and typically comprise two or three sentences, which means that
the data are ‘thin’ compared to other types of qualitative data (such as inter-
views or ﬁeldwork) that yield more complex and ‘thick’ data on the object
of inquiry.
Other researchers have used this type of data to gain knowledge about dif-
ferent aspects of sexual encounters and transgressions. Examples include gen-
dered patterns in regretting consensual sex (Krange & Pedersen, 1999),
women’s labelling of rape and sexual assault (Kahn, 2004; Kahn, Jackson,
Kully, Badger, & Halvorsen, 2003; Stefansen & Smette, 2006) and gendered
aspects of incapacitated sexual assault (Stefansen, Överlien, & Frøyland, in
preparation). These studies, much as I do in the current chapter, simultan-
eously acknowledge the limitations of this type of data and make the epis-
temological claim that short descriptions of sexual and sexualising encounters
that offer only glimpses of social interactions and contexts nevertheless can pro-
vide possibilities for the theorisation of the phenomenon in question. The poten-
tial of short descriptions in this respect relates to the fact that they are gathered
as part of large-scale and often representative surveys; thus, they likely capture
close to the full range of experiences related to the phenomenon of interest. The
underlying idea of the analysis in this chapter is that a careful empirical pattern-
ing of unwanted sexual touching can contribute to an understanding of the social
and situational dynamics involved in producing such incidents, which in turn can
further scholarly discussions on the boundaries of sexual violence and the cultural
effect of minor transgressions. In this sense, I follow up on the call from Fileborn
(2016, p. 7) to reignite scholarly discussion on ‘the broader spectrum of sexually
violent and unwanted behaviours’.
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The starting point for my analysis is that unwanted touching needs to be
unpacked before we can understand its social dynamics, which means taking
into account that unwanted sexual touching is and does different things in dif-
ferent situations. In the current literature, unwanted sexual touching is often
understood in terms of unwanted sexual attention or sexual harassment. Within
this strand of research, the spatial dimension of such transgressions has been
the most common subject of attention. Specialised studies in the literature have
focussed on sexual harassment on the street (Vera-Gray, 2016), in bars and
other social-drinking venues (Graham, Bernards, Abbey, Dumas, & Wells,
2017; Kavanaugh, 2013; Tinkler, Becker, & Clayton, 2018), in schools and
university campuses (Gillander Gådin & Stein, 2017; LeMaire, Oswald, &
Russell, 2016) and online (Megarry, 2014; Thompson, 2018). Very few
researchers have looked into the relational aspect of unwanted sexual attention
in combination with spatiality, i.e. the socio-spatial contexts of unwanted sexual
touching. In the current chapter, I take such contexts to represent different
situational circumstances for unwanted sexual touching. I situate my analysis
within the scholarship on sexual violence, to be discussed next.
Theorisations of sexual violence
To explore unwanted sexual touching means to explore the boundaries of sexual
violence (cf. Fileborn, 2016). But what counts as sexual violence? Two main
approaches to this question are the ‘conceptual’ and ‘cataloguing’ approaches
(Munro, 2010, p. 17). Rather than listing speciﬁc behaviours that constitute
sexual violence, the focus of the conceptual approach, which guides my ana-
lysis, is on what acts of sexual violence harm (Skilbrei & Stefansen, 2018).
Stang Dahl (1994), for instance, deﬁnes sexual violence as acts that violate
a person’s ‘gender freedom’, i.e. the right to decide for oneself when and how
to engage in sexual interactions and how far these interactions can go. Kelly
articulates a similar position, seeing sexual violence as acts that take away
someone’s ‘ability to control intimate contact’ (1988, p. 41). Both conceptual-
isations depart from a normative theory of sexual integrity or self-determination
and agency as that which is harmed or compromised by sexual attacks (and
which legal regulations today aim to protect). The same is the case in Cahill’s
sexual-ethics perspective (2014, 2016). Cahill’s theorisation (to which I will
return shortly) is especially relevant for my purposes because it also offers con-
ceptual tools that encompass the ‘grey area’ of sexual or sexualised encounters –
those encounters that represent neither sexual violence nor reciprocal or wanted
interactions but are located somewhere between the two.
So far, I have dealt with theorisations of acts of sexual violence. To facilitate
discussion on the wider ramiﬁcations of unwanted sexual touching, I will also
draw on theorisations of the collective aspect of sexual violence. One idea is
that sexual violence can be understood as compromising what Cornell (2007,
p. 230) calls the ‘imaginary domain’, meaning ‘the moral and psychic space we
all need in order to come to terms with who we are as sexuate beings and to
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have the chance to claim our own person as a sexuate being’.1 The implication,
which I draw from Bjørnholt and Helseth’s reading (2019) of Cornell (1995), is
that sexual violence compromises women’s imaginary domain through the gen-
dered power structures such violence upholds. Their interpretation echoes
Munro’s point (2010, p. 26), mentioned earlier, that rape (and sexual violence
in general) simultaneously represents an attack on the personal and the cultural/
systemic levels. The systemic dimension of sexual violence implies that sexual
violence may cause harm that transcends the harm experienced by those who
are directly affected. When I later discuss the concept of a gendered ‘phenom-
enology of fear’ (Cahill, 2001, p. 143), I will draw on this line of thought.
Below I expand on the situational perspective that has guided the empirical
analysis.
Analytical approach: the situational perspective
The analysis in this chapter draws inspiration from Collins’s (2009) micro-
sociological approach to the study of violence. Collins claims that in order to
understand the dynamics of violence, researchers should not study violent indi-
viduals, but violent situations. As Collins argues, ‘we [must] seek the contours
of situations, which shape the emotions and acts of individuals who step inside
them’, which means to ‘put the interaction in the center of analysis, not the
individual, the social background, the culture or even the motivation: that is to
say, look for the characteristics of violent situations’ (p. 1). Thus, researchers
must look for the situations that occur within forms of violence, and compare
them. I aim to do this in my analysis by identifying and comparing the socio-
spatial contexts in which unwanted touching occurs. Socio-spatial contexts,
then, are deﬁned by their normal ﬂow of meaning or underlying social contract.
It makes a difference, for instance, if the touching has happened in
a ‘sexualised space’ (Fileborn, 2016; Kavanaugh, 2013) or in a more ‘neutral’
zone, for example at school or work. Hence, the use of the situational perspec-
tive allows for sensitivity towards the ﬂuidity of unwanted sexual touching.
This is an important consideration, since situations involving unwanted touching
may shift rapidly from something wanted to unwanted, and vice versa (Demant &
Heinskou, 2011). The same act of unwanted touching may also be fundamentally
ambiguous – wanted and unwanted at the same time. It may, for instance, both
ignite feelings of devaluation and fear and work as a conﬁrmation of a girl’s
sexual attractiveness and social standing (Stefansen, Smette, & Bossy, 2014).
With this background, I understand unwanted sexual touching as acts that
can potentially disrupt some of the normal ﬂow of meaning that takes place
in a given situation. The focus of the analysis will be on how such disrup-
tions happen or are actualised and how they can be understood in terms of
sexual violence. To that end, I will apply Cahill’s sexual-ethics framework
(2014, 2016). Cahill argues that sexual situations can be differentiated
according to the degree of agency and possibility to affect the situation that
the interaction allows for those involved. She identiﬁes two main situations:
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ethically acceptable sex (or ‘just sex’) and ethically problematic sex, or ‘unjust
sex’. In ethically acceptable sex, both parties have agency, meaning that they both
have recognised will in the situation, while in ethically problematic sex, the agency
of one person is compromised. Unethical sexual acts do not necessarily represent
a total undermining of the victim’s agency, however, as some unethical acts allow
for some form of agency. In these cases, the act does not constitute sexual violence.
I will discuss how the different situations in which unwanted touching occurs can
be understood, in light of Cahill’s conceptual tools.
In the next section, I turn to the empirical basis of my analysis. Collins (2009,
p. 2) argues that to ‘see the patterns of confrontation, tension and emotional ﬂow,
which are at the heart of the situation where violence is carried out’, researchers
need data that will capture the details of the situation, preferably via direct obser-
vation. Given that such observation is seldom possible, video, reconstructions or
observations of violent events are valid options. My data are a form of observa-
tion – from the perspective of the affected girl. Because they lack depth and
detail, the analysis is explorative rather than comprehensive. This means that
I can only sketch out the contours of situations in which unwanted touching
occurs and infer the meaning for those involved and the dynamics related to the
disruptive act.
Methods, data and categorisations
The short written descriptions I analyse were gathered through a large-scale
survey study conducted among students in their ﬁnal year of upper secondary
school, aged 18–19 years. A representative sample of 67 upper secondary
schools across Norway were recruited. The sample of schools was provided by
Statistics Norway following a two-stage sampling procedure. All eligible upper
secondary schools were allocated to ﬁve geographical regions to ensure partici-
pation from the whole country and then stratiﬁed within each region into three
categories: academic track only, vocational track only and combined. The
participating schools were drawn according to strata size to ensure proportional
allocation. All ﬁnal-year students in each school were invited to participate.
A total of 7,033 students accepted, giving a response rate of 77%.
The participants answered a questionnaire about different types of victimisa-
tion, including sexual victimisation, broadly deﬁned. The questionnaire was
administered in the classroom and with a teacher present. The participants
answered yes or no to a set of questions about unwanted touching, attempted
rape and rape before and after the age of 13. Any participants who indicated at
least one such experience were asked to describe in their own words what had
happened and the people involved (without providing names) for the ﬁrst and
last incidents. This material consisted of approximately 1,000 short, written
descriptions. Among these descriptions, 164 were relevant for the analysis pre-
sented in this chapter. Among these descriptions, 97 were related to assailants
whom the girl had deﬁned as either a friend or an acquaintance; 10 were related
to a boyfriend and 57 to a stranger.
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The aim of the analysis was to identify situations of unwanted touching. To
that end, I ﬁrst grouped the descriptions according to the girl’s relation to the
assailant: whether he was a friend or acquaintance, a boyfriend or a stranger.
Within these categories of relations, I identiﬁed where and how the unwanted
touching had occurred. Taken together, these elements provide insights into the
different interactional dynamics of unwanted touching. The labelling of each
type of unwanted sexual touching is intended to capture the meaning of the dif-
ferent acts and to also enable analysis of the ﬂuidity of the phenomenon. The
forms of unwanted touching from friends and acquaintances that I conceptualise
in this chapter are also described in Stefansen et al. (2014).
Situations involving friends/acquaintances and boyfriends
Friends and acquaintances were the most frequently occurring type of relation
in the material. One distinct type of unwanted sexual touching from friends and
acquaintances happens in public or semi-public places with other youths pre-
sent. I use the label performative touching for these instances because the
phrase highlights the relationship between the act of unwanted touching and the
ﬂow of meaning in a given situation. I interpret the acts as representing a form
of role-play related to heterosexual stereotypes.
The typical scenario for this type of performative touching is the public space of
schoolyards or hallways in lower secondary school, and situations where a boy sud-
denly reaches out and touches a sexualised area of a girl’s body, for instance her
breasts or thighs. The quotes below are illustrative:
He touched my boobs in recess, which I didn’t want.
A group of boys our age touched the girls in middle school against our will –
especially one person, who was a year older than us. He held us really hard
while he touched us.
Fondling by people my age and maybe a bit older at a youth club.
A classmate touched my breasts, and it was pretty obvious: right in the
middle of the school hall.
These acts may be understood as being directed towards an audience of other
boys as much as towards the girl; hence, the interaction in the situation is more
between the boys than between the particular boy and girl involved in the sexual-
touching incident. On this premise, these acts can be understood as representing
performances of a sexualised form of male aggressiveness that reproduce ideas
about masculinity and gendered hierarchies (Lahelma, 2002; Robinson, 2005).
The data include descriptions of similar behaviours from friends and acquaint-
ances at parties or clubs, i.e. in arenas associated with romantic or sexual initiatives.
I see these advances as being different from performative touching. Because they
happened in sexualised spaces, they have a more explorative quality. The typical
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scenario is of a boy reaching out and signalling interest but being rejected by a girl.
The premise for this interpretation is that while the particular act is unwanted (and
may come as a surprise to the girl), sexual or romantic advances are to be expected
in these situations, and they therefore represent part of the normal ﬂow of meaning
or general social energy or ‘vibe’. I label these acts explorative touching. The
following quotes describe typical situations:
He made a pass at me; it wasn’t much. He stopped right away when I told
him off.
He touched my thighs and sat down next to me. Before he had a chance to
embrace me, I stood up. I was with my friends the rest of the evening.
I was at a birthday party. We were alone outside, so he made a pass at me.
In a sense, this form of unwanted sexual touching resembles what Kavanaugh
(2013) describes as transgressions that stem from ‘competing deﬁnitions of the situ-
ation’ (p. 26). The situations represent a form of ‘scorned sexual advance’ (p. 26) that
follows from a boy’s misinterpretation of a girl’s behaviour as signalling openness to
some kind of contact. Kavanaugh’s description is perhaps too simplistic, however.
The notion of explorative touching highlights how such advances, while out of sync
with the person they are directed against, at the same time are spurred by and in sync
with the ﬂow of meaning and interaction that deﬁnes the situation.
But some of the descriptions from parties or clubs in my data challenge the inter-
pretation of all acts of unwanted touching in sexualised spaces as being explorative or
inviting. Some acts of unwanted touching in these spaces seem to be more impulsive
and random, and they happen in situations with other people present, as the following
quotes show:
I was on the dance ﬂoor at a club when a guy came up behind me and
touched me. I pushed him away.
Nothing serious, but sometimes people pass you and touch you at parties and
so on.
[I was] felt up at a club on the dance ﬂoor (my breasts, between the legs, and
my hips) despite me saying no.
Kavanaugh (2013, p. 28) labels such acts of unwanted sexual contact as ‘opportun-
istic predation’, referring to the fact that the assailant takes advantage of a complex
situation, typically a crowded dance ﬂoor. In these situations, unlike the situations he
labels ‘competing deﬁnitions’, no prior personal interaction has taken place between
victim and assailant. Hence, while people may acknowledge this form of unwanted
touching as a possibility or risk, they are perplexing when they happen. One might
wonder whether these incidents are performative, since they happen when other
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people are present, but the ﬂeeting and in-passing nature of the incidents suggests
otherwise. As Kavanaugh (2013) has described, girls will often not know who the
assailant was because the touching happened in a crowd, with the actual act hidden
from view. Rather than being performative – a display of sexualised masculinity
aimed at an audience – such incidents could be interpreted as spurred by (and with
the potential of adding to) the sexualised atmosphere and liminal quality of a party or
club. The situational backdrop in this case is hence the ﬂow of meaning that deﬁnes
such spaces, and not a prior exchange of signals between individuals.
While incidents of opportunistic predation are unwanted and in some cases fright-
ening for the girl, they are different from a third form of unwanted touching that
I label aggressive touching. These are acts where the boy takes advantage of a girl
while she is sleeping or heavily intoxicated, or where the boy uses physical force or
other forms of coercion and constraint, such as by locking her in a room or car. Inci-
dents where the boy had followed the girl – i.e. persistently stalked her – for a whole
evening are also included in this category. Such incidents often involve what Stang
Dahl (1994) refers to as ‘series of acts of force’.2 This category of acts challenges the
idea of unwanted touching as being minor events and underlines the importance of
looking at the interaction involved in order to understand how unwanted touching
comes about in different situations.
Aggressive touching from friends and acquaintances happened in a range of con-
texts – at parties and after-parties, in cars, outdoors and at home or at a friend’s house.
Most of the incidents took place in a private space or away from other youths.
I was held hard and not allowed to go home; he touched me.
[I] was taken advantage of the ﬁrst time I drank alcohol, by the boy next
door. He locked us in a restroom.
The boy was stalking me the whole evening; we were sitting with others, but
he still tried to touch my breasts and kiss me, even after I pushed him away.
He was suddenly on top of me [and] pressed me down against the ﬂoor.
I could hardly move; he made me touch him and masturbate him against my
will. He knew it was against my will.
Some of the descriptions illustrate how unwanted touching can shift from being
explorative to becoming aggressive, thus illustrating the point about the ﬂuidity of the
phenomenon described above. The quote below is an apt illustration:
We sat next to each other, relaxing. He liked me and wanted to touch me.
He tried, but he took no for an answer. Eventually.
The word ‘eventually’ in the quote above suggests that the boy ignored her ﬁrst
‘no’ or rejection. This situation had thus seemingly started out as a form of invitation
but then developed into a more insistent and aggressive approach. These situations
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may be understood as being linked to the same heterosexual ‘hooking-up’ logic as
explorative touching, which underlines the boy’s responsibility to make the ﬁrst
move. The difference in this case is that he ignores her initial rejection and continues
to touch her, which also means that these situations are different from the ‘competing
deﬁnitions of the situation’ scenarios that Kavanaugh (2013) describes. Like attacks
on drunk and sleeping girls, these incidents could be interpreted as displays of male
entitlement. The same would be the case for other incidents of aggressive touching
that take the form of ‘blitz’ attacks – sudden and violent and seemingly random.
Very few descriptions of unwanted sexual touching from boyfriends appeared in
the material; among the ten descriptions, all could be labelled as aggressive touching.
Four descriptions were related to situations where the girl was young – 13 or 14 years
old. In two of these cases, the boy was equally young, while in the other two cases,
the boy was three to four years older. A commonality seems to be that he wanted her
to engage in a sexual activity that she felt she was not ready for – either because of
her age or because the relationship was very new. He either applied pressure or force
or took advantage of her being younger and more vulnerable.
My boyfriend touched my breasts and down there; I didn’t want to, but
I didn’t dare say anything.
Girl 13, boy 17
He forced me to masturbate him, and he touched my upper body. He
locked me in because he wanted to ﬁnger me. This happened twice, but
I kicked him in the groin. Everything happened at practice: either in the
boys’ locker room or in the back room.
Girl 13, boy 16
He absolutely wanted to do something sexual with me. I didn’t want to,
because it was too early [in the relationship]. We’d been together a week. It
ended with me masturbating him, and then he was angry because I didn’t
want to do anything more.
Both 14
The other incidents involved sexual touching after the girl had explicitly said
no, or she woke up being touched.
He touched me even if I said no.
I woke up because my boyfriend was ﬁngering me. Earlier that evening, I’d
made it clear that I didn’t want to have sex.
Given the few descriptions, we cannot draw clear conclusions from this material.
Still, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that unwanted sexual touching within teen-
age romantic relationships is primarily a risk for young girls who, because of their
age, are less experienced sexually than their partners. Such touching is also indicative
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of how very young boys may act out a form of male entitlement to sex in romantic
relationships. In some cases, the touching is also facilitated by acts of force.
Situations involving strangers
In the descriptions involving strangers, performative touching as described
above was not common. Descriptions of unwanted sexual touching in public or
semi-public spaces were mentioned, but they were of a different quality. These
descriptions portrayed behaviour that was unlikely to produce acclaim from
peers or any other audience, because it deviated too much from the standard
script for sexual or romantic advances. They had a bizarre quality and had asso-
ciations with something out of control akin to episodic madness, sometimes
related to intoxication, as illustrated below:
I was at a party; someone came up to me and started to talk. Then he took
his clothes off. I ran away terriﬁed and said I had a boyfriend. Then he put
a stranglehold on my boyfriend. I and a few others managed to pull him
away, and I cried for a long time. We went home right after.
I was sitting on a bench; someone I didn’t know moved closer and closer to
me without me noticing before he started to touch me. I ran away, and he
didn’t follow.
He pursued me on my way home from practice and exposed himself twice on
the road, and he wanted me to touch him. He touched my breasts and put his
ﬁnger against my bum. He was reported to the police and was given a ﬁne.
Public touching from strangers also happens in covert ways: for instance, in
a crowd of people. In these situations, the others present are not positioned as
an audience, as in performative touching, but represent a facilitating context, as
shown in the following quotes:
It happened on the bus when it was crowded, and it happened naturally that
people bumped into each other. After a while I realised that someone had
touched my bum and that it wasn’t an accident. I tried to move but couldn’t
get away. I heard later that it was a group that did this systematically.
We were at a concert, my friends and I. When we were standing in the
middle of a crowd of people, I felt a hand stroking me from the front and
back between my legs. I turned around, and a boy was standing there grin-
ning. I asked him, ‘What the fuck are you doing?’ I slapped him and walked
away.
He started to touch me when I was standing in the streetcar. I screamed and
hit him, and he left.
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[He was] just someone who passed me and put his hand between my legs and
tried to touch me, but he walked away so that no one could see what he’d
done. I felt nauseous and lost, but I didn’t do anything about it.
These forms of public touching do not seem to ﬁt the three initial categories
of acts involving friends/acquaintances and boyfriends (performative, explora-
tive and aggressive touching). What they have in common is a total break with
the social contract of the situation. They are acts that are ‘out of place’ and
therefore disturbing. The ﬁrst cluster of acts are clearly deviant and outside the
normal. The second cluster is associated with immature forms of rule-breaking
behaviour, sexualised pranks or stunts with a sexual content. The notion of
‘opportunistic predation’ developed by Kavanaugh (2013) is perhaps relevant;
they could also be labelled as ‘random predation’ – the affected girls just
happened to be there when the impulse to reach out occurred. In this sense,
these acts could be thought of as a gendered parallel to what has been called
meaningless or ‘blind’ violence between men, typically in urban areas and late
at night and committed for no apparent reason. Following this idea, we could con-
sider these random acts of unwanted touching as a form of ‘blind sexual violence’:
blind in the sense that they neither follow from any prior personal interaction nor
are sparked by any social energy or shared deﬁnition of the situation.
In addition to these disturbing and apparently random forms of unwanted
touching, girls described unwanted touching from strangers at pubs, clubs,
parties and other social-drinking arenas. These incidents resemble the inci-
dents involving friends and acquaintances from the same social contexts.
They seem to be related to displaying or living up to a sexually charged
party atmosphere, which I infer from the difference in reactions to the same
type of in-passing sexualised touching within other types of public arenas,
described above. In these situations, the girls reacted by screaming, slapping the
offender or by feeling nauseous and lost. In comparison, girls could describe in-
passing sexual touching at nightclubs and parties as ‘a minor thing’, ‘nothing
severe’ and ‘not serious’. One possibility is that in these situations, the girls did not
want to be touched – in the sense that they did not want to be touched by a speciﬁc
person – but they also acknowledged that the touching had been spurred on by the
general atmosphere and that they added to the general sexual vibe of the situation.
Hence, the girls could think of these acts as being objectifying in a positive sense.
It was nothing severe – just a club where boys are a bit eager to touch you.
Boys who are the grabby type at clubs, but nothing serious.
Me and my friends were out on the town, dancing. We [often] dance with
others we meet and with each other, and some of the boys and men out there
are a bit creepy. [The girl used a Norwegian term for men who touch women
in a sexual way without their permission: ‘klåﬁngret’.]
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In his discussion of the literature on the affective dimensions of nightlife,
Tutenges (2012, p. 133) points to how such environments ‘may be understood
as force ﬁelds of emotional energy where individuals can be assisted in the
difﬁcult task of transgressing the conﬁnes of their ordinary selves and becoming
more wild and adventurous’ (see also Pedersen, Tutenges, & Sandberg, 2017;
Tutenges, 2013). Drawing on Williams (2008), Fileborn (2016, p. 18) contends
that ‘the un-known nature of night-time spaces … give[s] rise to the possibility
of experiences that are not available in day-time spaces’; according to Williams
(2008, p. 519), ‘the potential for “non-normalised” behaviours’ are therefore
present. Fileborn (2016, p. 36) uses the word ‘downplaying’ for situations
where her interviewees talked about incidents of unwanted sexual attention in
such situations as being ‘harmless’, or when they described themselves as being
able to handle the unwanted attention. An alternative interpretation – one that
does not exclude Fileborn’s interpretation – is that these incidents are at the
same time part of what makes spaces sexually laden and dangerous in the
positive sense. Rather than treating them as serious transgressions that are
downplayed, this perspective highlights how the situations are open to alterna-
tive interpretations and hence may be experienced as being less intrusive. The
premise is that incidents that are linked to the underlying social contract – even
if they represent transgressions – are less disturbing than incidents that more
clearly are out of sync with this contract.
At the same time, a form of ambivalence exists related to incidents like those
portrayed above. They are not very severe incidents, and they seem to be part
of the normal ﬂow of interaction or meaning – but the line between acknow-
ledging/positive objectifying touching and degrading/objectifying touching is
very ﬁne. In some situations, this type of touching is more problematic and is
felt as a clear invasion of one’s private space.
[I] was out dancing at a club when a boy came over to dance. After
a while, he put his hands on my boobs. I removed his hands and told him
off. He was offended and left.
I was at a club when this guy came over and put his arms around me from
behind outside of my sweater and touched my boobs. He was thrown out of the
club later.
It was at a party. Everybody was really drunk. [I’d] ﬂirted a little but didn’t
mean anything serious. He started to be way too intense and touched me
uncomfortably. A male friend ‘saved’ me.
The last quote above also illustrates how a situation involving a stranger can
shift from one mode to the other – from an explorative interaction to the cross-
ing of boundaries and changing of the atmosphere.
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Conclusion
Mindful that my analysis is based on empirical material that is limited in terms of
depth and context, I have described and conceptualised distinct forms of unwanted
touching that are distinguishable by their socio-spatial dynamics. As Fileborn (2016,
p. 5) has noted, I have also explored experiences that ‘sit “on the margins” of our
current understanding of sexual violence’ – the implication being that unwanted
sexual attention, and touching, only sometimes fall within our concept of sexual vio-
lence. In the following, I discuss how we can meaningfully differentiate between the
two situations: those that fall within the concept of sexual violence that has guided
my analysis, and those that do not. To that end, I apply Cahill’s sexual-ethics frame-
work (2014, 2016). Her idea, as outlined in the introduction to this chapter, is that for
an act to qualify as sexual violence, it must represent a nulliﬁcation of the victim’s
agency or interest in the situation. This means that situations that grant the victim
some form of leeway or agency fall short of sexual violence. If the victim’s agency
nevertheless is compromised, then such situations are unethical and often problematic
(and in some cases traumatic), but they do not constitute sexual violence.
How can we then understand the different forms of unwanted sexual touching that
girls experience if we read them through this particular lens? Two of the situations
seem rather clear-cut in terms of the leeway allowed for the affected girl: unwanted
touching from friends and acquaintances at school (performative touching) and public
unwanted touching from strangers in non-sexualised spaces (random predation). In
these situations, the sexual act is meant for the thrill or amusement of the collective of
spectators or the individual assailant; it is not an act that follows from a prior or
ongoing interaction between the girl and the assailant. The level of reciprocity in the
interaction is low or non-existent. The act is unrelated to her interest in the situation:
what she says or does has no implication in the situation. Her presence is that of an
object; it is not a social presence. The act therefore represents sexual violence.
The same is the case for the aggressive sexual touching that happens both
within teenage romantic relationships and other social relations. These situations
portray nulliﬁcation of her agency: in a sense, he has performed the sexual or
sexualised acts on her (Hansen, 2018). Hence, her interest in the situation of
not engaging with him at all or in a speciﬁc way is not allowed to inﬂuence his
acts. In these situations, acts of unwanted sexual touching ‘ﬁxate a gendered
and embodied experience’ (Gottzén, 2018, p. 116) on the part of the victim –
and hence represent a complete closure of the potentiality for rejection and
control that the idea of gender freedom (Stang Dahl, 1994) presupposes.
For the three remaining situations – explorative touching from friends/acquaint-
ances that signals romantic or sexual interest, and in-passing touching by both
friends/acquaintances, and strangers in party and club settings – the picture is less
clear-cut. These situations are linked to more or less sexualised spaces, i.e. spaces
with an affective atmosphere that suggests that they are places for sexual advances
and possibly contact. For the ﬁrst type of touching (the making-a-pass type of
touching), her reaction and his ensuing response of retreat – the instant backing
off – demonstrate that she has agency in the situation and that it is put to productive
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use: he quickly changes his behaviour. Hence, such situations fall short of the def-
inition of sexual violence as the eradication of self-determination or loss of control
relating to sex and sexual encounters and relations. Because such incidents happen
in public or semi-public places, they could also be interpreted as having
a performative dimension. What separates these incidents from clear cases of per-
formative touching is, as described above, the leeway for her agency or will.
For the latter types of unwanted touching – the types that happen on the dance
ﬂoor, or in other spaces within drinking venues or parties – the question of the scope
of the affected girl’s interest or will is more complicated. If her interest or will is
related to becoming absorbed in the sexualised atmosphere, then his transgression in
a sense is in line with her interest. Her reaction – as well as her classiﬁcation of the
incident as unwanted sexual touching – indicates that this is not the whole story; that
his actions do not totally align with her interest but are off-balance or badly timed.
I take a cue in this case from Heinskou (2010), who refers to discomfort and unease
in sexual or sexualised situations as being related to shifts in temporality: ‘the rhythm
of the social relation has perhaps jumped a step or a heartbeat, and this can be experi-
enced as a physical form of discomfort’ (p. 141). Hence, discomfort may relate not
so much to the sexualised act itself but to a lack of synchronisation.
Demant and Heinskou (2011) offer an interesting perspective on transgressions
in sexualised party settings. They argue that in order to understand sexual assault
among young people, the standard risk perspective should be combined with
a perspective on chance: ‘analytically, it is suggested that young men and women
go to parties and drink in an attempt to take a chance, but the chance, in some
cases, backﬁres’ (p. 398; italics in the original). This interpretation is related to the
fact that parties also are gendered contexts, with social norms that affect young
girls’ and boys’ sexual expressions and ability to resist sexual advances. Because
the ‘backﬁring’ in this case only represents a partial break of the ﬂow of meaning
in the situation – i.e. to experience what Demant and Heinskou (2011), drawing on
Vance (1984), refer to as the ‘pleasures of the dangers’ of drinking and partying –
in my interpretation, the act rests within the realm of the unethical but does not by
default cross the border into sexual violence. The premise is that situations of asyn-
chronicity in interests are different from situations totally dominated by the interest
of one party in the interaction. As described earlier, in-passing touching in party
contexts can also represent cases of opportunistic predation. In these situations the
girl’s will is undermined in a different way – the touching more clearly demon-
strates the domination of the boy’s will over hers; the danger involved in touching
a more or less random person adds to his thrill only, not hers.
What further complicates the understanding of unwanted sexual touching is the
way in which acts that remain outside the boundary of sexual violence work on the
cultural or symbolic level, what Fileborn (2016, p. 6) calls the ‘background’ experi-
ences of sexualised violence. Cahill (2001) makes a similar point. She writes about
how her knowledge of girls’ vulnerability to sexual violence and of her female
friends’ experiences combine to affect her own self-understanding as being ‘rape-
able’ and therefore as someone who must be careful: ‘the possibility of rape shapes
the space I inhabit’ (p. 1).
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My point is that the minor transgressions that do not cross the boundary of
sexual violence also feed into the ‘phenomenology of fear’ among girls and
women that Cahill (2001, p. 143) describes. In this sense, unethical sexual
acts are far from innocent or ‘minor’. As Stefansen et al. (2014) have com-
mented, such incidents may work as a form of implied gendered violence (cf.
Shefﬁeld, 1987) that affects girls in general. Cornell’s (1995, 2007) notion of
the ‘imaginary domain’ is helpful to explain this point. The imaginary
domain is the psychic space that allows people the freedom to think about
who they want to be as sexuate and sexual beings. The micro-transgressions
that girls encounter on a regular basis shrink this space for girls and women
in general. They work as constant reminders that girls must take into account
that their right to bodily integrity is less protected than it is for boys. Such
acts may therefore spur girls to adjust what their interest in a situation can
be: to the possibility of sexual assault. Some girls, for example, may refrain
from engaging in the sexualised energy of party and night-time spaces, which not
only deprives them of the possibility for positive transgressions – of letting go of
their controlled, everyday selves (Tutenges, 2012) – but may also leave them more
vulnerable to experiencing sexual violence. Those absorbed in the party vibe may
feel or treat micro-transgressions on the dance ﬂoor or at the bar as minor; for those
who are not, the same acts are more likely to be experienced as a violent attack that
demands a response, such as anger, disgust, shame or fear. Hence, what is intended
as protective or preventive behaviour may paradoxically become a risk factor.
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Notes
1 As Patosalmi (2009) has discussed, Cornell’s (2007) theory of the imaginary domain is com-
plex and is founded on ideas of subjectivity and the person from psychoanalytic thinking. In
this chapter, I use the notion of the imaginary domain as a metaphor in order to draw our
attention to the collective or systemic aspect of sexual violence.
2 In Norwegian: ‘Serier av tvangshandlinger’.
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5 Making the case for ‘good enough’
rape-prevalence estimates
Insights from a school-based survey
experiment among Norwegian youths
Kari Stefansen, Mette Løvgren and
Lars Roar Frøyland
Introduction
How to measure rape precisely has been a key topic in feminist research on
violence against women since the 1980s. The issue of rape estimates is cur-
rently high on the agenda among jurisdictions that seek to develop prevention
policies towards rape and other forms of sexual violence – such as Norway, the
empirical context of this chapter. In national policy documents, prevalence esti-
mates are held to be important because they shed light on the ‘dark ﬁgure’ of
rape, i.e. the gap between incidents reported to the police and the real scope of
the problem (e.g. Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2012). States’ respon-
sibilities to monitor the prevalence of rape are also incorporated in supra-
national policies, such as the 2011 Council of Europe Convention on preventing
and combating violence against women and domestic violence (known as the
Istanbul Convention), which all the Nordic countries have ratiﬁed.
In Norway, the study of rape prevalence is still in the early stages. In 2008,
when the ﬁrst governmental committee was appointed to outline new directions
for rape prevention (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2008), no nationally
representative surveys were available. The committee therefore estimated the
national prevalence based on a survey conducted in Oslo, the capital city (Pape &
Stefansen, 2004). The prevalence from Oslo is not necessarily representative for
the whole country, however, due to the city’s signiﬁcantly higher proportion of
inhabitants from migration backgrounds and a larger dispersion of economic and
cultural resources than is the case among the general Norwegian population.
Since 2010, two studies have been conducted on nationally representative
samples of the adult population (Steine, Milde, Bjorvatn, Grønli, & Nord-
hus, 2012; Thoresen & Hjemdal, 2014). Both departed from the legal deﬁn-
ition of rape and used behaviourally speciﬁc questions to measure the
prevalence of acts that fall within this deﬁnition. Norwegian law deﬁnes
rape as an act of penetration by the use of force or threats, as well as
sexual assault against a person who is unable to consent (penal code
section 191; see Skilbrei & Stefansen, 2018). The deﬁnition further
includes incidents where direct contact has occurred between the sex organ
or ﬁnger of the accused (or an object or someone acting on the accused’s
behalf) and the victim’s vagina or anus, as well as the insertion of a penis
into the victim’s mouth (Haugen & Efjestad, 2015, p. 344). The code also
extends to incidents involving masturbation. The threshold for what counts
as force is generally considered very low and is in line with legislation
elsewhere with a focus on non-consent (Ot. prp. nr. 22 [2008–2009]).
The two studies mentioned above had different samples and used different
methodologies, but they reported similar rates of rape prevalence. One study
(Steine et al., 2012) used a six-item measure that included incapacitated sexual
assault and the experience of feeling pressured to have intercourse without the
use of threats or force, as well as forced or threatened penetration of bodily ori-
ﬁces by a sex organ, ﬁnger or object. In comparison, Thoresen and Hjemdal
(2014) used a four-item measure covering different forms of penetration by the
use of force or threats (against the victim or someone close to the victim), and
they did not ask about pressure (which in most cases would not qualify as rape
in the legal sense). They also excluded an item on incapacitated sexual assault.
Steine et al. (2012) reported a total prevalence of rape experiences after the age
of 16 to be 16.3% for women and 1.6% for men. The item on pressure revealed
the highest number by far for women: 11.6% had experienced being pressured
to have intercourse. For the other items, the numbers varied from 1.6% to 4.1%
(see Steine et al., 2012, Table 5.3, p. 954). Thoresen and Hjemdal (2014)
reported somewhat lower lifetime rates for rape: 9.4% for women and 1.1%
for men.
Although very similar in their results, the two studies illustrate a general point:
that to measure rape is also to construct rape. What we include and what we
exclude speaks to and contributes to speciﬁc understandings of a given phenom-
enon. While this might be a rather banal insight, it is a fundamental one if we are
to construct reliable measures of the prevalence of rape across time and context.
Given this background, the aim of this chapter is twofold: ﬁrst, to introduce
ongoing discussions about rape measurement in the international literature,
and second, to present and discuss results from a large-scale school-based survey
among Norwegian youth that featured an experiment in which two different rape
measures were presented to the participants. We ask: What can we learn from
comparing the two measures, and how can we assess the quality of the ‘better’
measure? In what sense is it ‘good enough’ as a prevalence measure?
Rape measurement: the international debate
The development of methodology for the measurement of rape is intimately
connected to the 1980s work of the US psychologist Mary P. Koss in develop-
ing the Sexual Experiences Survey (SES), a set of behaviourally speciﬁc
questions about rape and other forms of sexual assault that were ﬁrst published
in Koss and Oros (1982) and later revised in Koss, Abbey, Campbell, Cook,
and Norris (2007). The original aim of the SES was to capture all acts that had
been criminalised as rape. It therefore included both less violent attacks and
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rape in intimate relationships, such as date rape and marital rape. During the
eighties and nineties, studies based on the SES found rape and other forms of
sexual assault to be much more prevalent than estimates from general crime sur-
veys and police statistics had indicated (Koss, 1992, 1993; Koss, Gidycz, &
Wisniewski, 1987). These studies were also the subject of criticism, however.
Gilbert (1993), for example, argued that their deﬁnition of rape was too broad
and that the questions that were posed captured incidents that did not meet the
legal criteria for rape. In essence, Gilbert critiqued Koss and the SES for casting
the net too wide.
In a comprehensive report about rape measurement, Fisher and Cullen (2000)
described the situation at the end of the 1990s as being characterised by contro-
versy. Their report, which reviewed research to date on rape measurement and
aimed to outline directions for future research, then sparked new debates. Fisher
and Cullen followed Koss in the rejection of stand-alone questions that ask
directly about exposure to rape, forced intercourse or similar formulations. Such
questions cast the net too narrowly and have poor validity, because most
respondents will respond in accordance with stereotypical ideas about rape. The
result, most often, is massive underreporting of rape, especially of rapes
committed by partners and acquaintances and of date rape (Kahn, 2004; Kahn,
Jackson, Kully, Badger, & Halvorsen, 2003; Stefansen & Smette, 2006).
Fisher and Cullen (2000) acknowledged Koss and colleagues’ important
contributions to rape measurement, especially the shift from general to behav-
iourally speciﬁc questions. The latter approach offers a way around cultural
beliefs about rape and rapists because it focusses on speciﬁc acts – which
researchers can then calculate into rape measures – although they also criticised
the one-step model that the SES represents. Fisher and Cullen’s reservation was
that not all the recorded incidents would likely meet the legal criteria of rape
had the researchers followed up with more detailed questions. Hence, the one
step-model may lead to exaggerated estimates of rape. As the authors argue,
the risk of this one-step approach – that is, of not having an incident report –
is that it may include reports of victimization that, on closer scrutiny, would
not qualify legally as a rape or other types of sexual victimization.
(Fisher & Cullen, 2000, p. 324)
They instead argue that a two-step model would yield more accurate estimates.
In this model, the respondents are ﬁrst presented with a list of screening ques-
tions about different forms of sexual assault that are intended to trigger the
respondents’ memory about relevant incidents. Respondents who answer yes to
one or more of the ﬁrst set of questions are then asked a new set of questions
related to each incident. Prevalence estimates are based on the information from
the second step and will only include incidents that meet the legal criteria for rape.
According to Fisher (2009), this model ensures both that incidents that are mis-
takenly included in the material as rape through the ﬁrst step can be excluded and
that other forms of sexual assault can be reclassiﬁed as rape through the second
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step and subsequently used in the prevalence estimate. Hence, the model solves
two problems: it avoids both casting the net too wide (by excluding ‘false’ rapes)
and casting it too narrowly (by including ‘false’ non-rapes).
Fisher (2009) has further shown that asking more questions and using
behaviourally descriptive questions in the ﬁrst step includes a higher number
of respondents in the incident report and yields a higher percentage of rape
victims in the second step. Koss and colleagues (in Cook, Gidycz, Koss, &
Murphy, 2011) have responded to Fisher and Cullen’s (2000) critique and
the two-step model’s potential for more accurate measurements. They
contend that it is ethically problematic to exclude respondents who have
indicated that they have been raped, even if they respond differently later in
the questionnaire. They refer to the two-step method Fisher (2009) used as
‘confrontational’ (p. 210) because the interviewer asks the respondent about
what ‘actually’ happened during the reported incident. This critique is
a reminder that concerns other than accuracy – such as the potential for
psychological distress – must be taken into account when assessing the use-
fulness of rape-measurement models.
A pragmatic approach to rape measurement
While these authors disagree on the merits of the two-step model compared to
the one-step model, what they have in common is a commitment to work
towards establishing best practice for rape-measurement research. These meth-
odological debates may give the impression that it is possible to design an
instrument that will capture all incidents of rape in a surveyed sample. Fisher
and Cullen, however, comments that researchers now acknowledge that it is
unlikely that any model can avoid all sources of error:
In particular, researchers have come to realize that conceptually deﬁning and
then operationalizing sexual victimization are complicated and, to a degree,
imperfect enterprises – especially when deciding when an unwanted sexual
advance crosses the line from imprudence to criminal behaviour.
(Fisher & Cullen, 2000, p. 320)
Fisher and Cullen (2000) also stress that the issues of deﬁnitions and opera-
tionalisations of rape and other forms of sexual violence are epistemological,
since ‘they raise critical issues about what we know and how we know it’
(p. 340).
In a review article, Krebs (2014) summarised the debate on rape measures
and argued for a pragmatic approach. The key issue, according to the author, is
to understand when different models are suitable and how they can be
improved. In his view, it is more fruitful to establish consensus on areas that
different models have in common rather than to continue debating which model
is best. This consensus would include the fact that instruments that use behav-
iourally speciﬁc questions within self-administrating surveys seem to work well.
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His approach, which we follow here, represents a call for establishing consensus
on ‘good enough’ instruments. In our opinion, doing so does not necessarily
conﬂict with a quest for better or ideal instruments for population estimates of
rape but represents a complementary approach. In the next section, we describe
the study that our analyses are based on.
The study
Sample and participants
Our data are drawn from a school-based study among students aged 18–20
years in Norway in the last year of upper secondary school. The data were
collected in 2015. The students answered a comprehensive electronic
questionnaire about different types of victimisation, including questions
about sexual assault and rape. The study was a follow-up to a similar
study conducted in 2007 (Mossige & Stefansen, 2007) and therefore used
the same sample of schools. For the 2007 study, a representative sample of
schools was provided by Statistics Norway following a two-stage proced-
ure. The schools were ﬁrst allocated to ﬁve geographical regions to ensure
participation from the whole country and then stratiﬁed within each region
into three categories: vocational track only, academic track only and
combined. The 67 participating schools were then selected to ensure
proportional allocation. These schools were contacted again and asked to
participate in the 2015 study. A total of 41 schools from the 2007 study
participated; in addition, eight replacement schools were selected to ﬁt the
relevant strata, yielding a total sample of 49 schools. From these schools,
4,530 students participated, resulting in a response rate of 66.2%. Schools
and groups within schools with a response rate below 10% were excluded
from the material. In these cases, the survey had not been administered
according to instructions.
The students completed the survey during two consecutive school sessions
with a teacher present in the classroom. The mean age of the respondents
was 18.4 years; 1,766 respondents were male, and 2,580 were female. The
gender difference in the sample was caused by a larger proportion of aca-
demic-track schools (in which girls are overrepresented). The gender was
missing for 65 respondents. The analyses discussed in this chapter are
restricted to students between 18 and 20 years old with non-missing
responses to the question of gender. For the rape items, we included students
with non-missing responses on at least one item of the multi-item measure
(described below). The ﬁnal sample for the analyses presented in this chapter
consisted of 4,346 participants.
Because we recruited respondents through schools, dropouts were not part of
the sample, which may have affected the results – those who drop out differ
from those who do not in terms of risk and protective factors associated with
rape (Mossige & Stefansen, 2007, 2016).
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Questions and variables
The items about rape were part of a survey instrument in which a range of
sexual-victimisation experiences were mapped, including unwanted touching
and attempted rape. Those items that were designed to capture experiences with
rape followed items about other forms of sexual victimisation. The latter items
could therefore work as memory cues for unwanted sexual experiences, includ-
ing rape.
Using a survey-experiment design, we randomly assigned the respondents to
different versions of the instrument: one with a single question about rape and
the other with ﬁve behaviourally speciﬁc items. In the questionnaire, both
versions had the following introductory phrase: Before/after the age of 13, have
you been subjected to any of the following against your will? Alternative 1
read: ‘You have been raped’. Alternative 2 consisted of the following items:
someone ‘forced or threatened you to have intercourse’, ‘forced or threatened
you to have oral sex’, ‘forced or threatened you to have anal sex’, ‘injected
ﬁngers or objects into your vagina or anus’, and ‘has had sex with you while
you were asleep or too drunk to object’. The answer options for both versions
were ‘No, never’, ‘Yes, once’, and ‘Yes, several times’. As expected, the ran-
domisation achieved balance across variables such as gender, age, parents’
socioeconomic status and school track (academic or vocational). Hence, all
observed differences in reported prevalence rates are attributable to being asked
either broad or behaviourally speciﬁc questions (cf. Løvgren, Stefansen, Smette, &
Mossige, 2017).
In the following, we investigate how the behaviourally speciﬁc questions
compare to the broad one-item question. First, we compare the responses from
girls and boys; we then compare the responses between girls within different
subgroups to test if different wordings had greater or lesser impact within
certain groups compared to others. This part of the study is exploratory, mean-
ing that we do not have existing research on which to form hypotheses on the
impact of different wording between subgroups, although we do expect that the
behaviourally speciﬁc instrument will yield signiﬁcantly higher prevalence rates
compared to the one-item question, and that this result will hold for both
genders and across different subsamples. Because the sample size was reduced
when we analysed subgroups, the lower prevalence rates of rape experiences
among boys compared to girls led to problems with statistical power; therefore,
these analyses were only conducted for girls.
We do not distinguish between experiences before and after the age of 13.
Most of the reported experiences of rape took place after the age of 13 (analysis
not shown). We used dummy variables in all analyses. For the one-item
question (labelled ‘Rape1’ in this chapter), a value of 1 was given to those who
reported having been raped at least once, either before or after the age of 13.
We constructed two different dummy variables based on the ﬁve-item alterna-
tive, with a value of 1 indicating at least one positive answer. The ‘Rape4’
measure consists of the four items that specify different forms of penetration
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with the use of force or threats, excluding the item on incapacitated sexual
assault. The ‘Rape5’ measure includes all ﬁve items.
We had two reasons for constructing two variables rather than one. First, we
wanted to compare our results with those of another Norwegian study in which
incapacitated sexual assault was not included in the reporting of the results
(Myhre, Thoresen, & Hjemdal, 2015). Second, the ‘incapacitated sexual assault’
item used the general term ‘sex’ rather than specifying an act of penetration.
We address possible implications of this choice of wording in the discussion
section below.
In addition to the questions about rape, we use variables on family economy,
parents’ work-life participation and choice of academic track in upper secondary
school in the analyses. Family economy is measured by a single question:
‘Over the last two years, has the economic situation of your family been good
or bad?’ The response options were ‘Good all of the time’, ‘Mostly good’, ‘Nei-
ther good nor bad’, ‘Mostly bad’, and ‘Bad all of the time’. The measure was
dichotomised into two dummy variables: good economy (‘good all of the time’
and ‘mostly good’), and poor economy (‘mostly bad’ and ‘bad all of the time’).
Two variables measure whether the respondents’ fathers and mothers were cur-
rently working (either full time or part time), and two variables measure if
either parent received social beneﬁts. Finally, a single question measures
whether the respondents followed the academic or vocational track in upper sec-
ondary school. All these variables were coded into dummy variables (1 for
afﬁrmative answers; otherwise 0).
We tested for mean differences across groups using t-testing. Because we have
tested multiple hypotheses and have thus increased the chances of test results dis-
playing as signiﬁcant when they are in fact not, we advise caution in interpreting
the results. Speciﬁcally, with a signiﬁcance level of p = 0.05, one out of every 20
analyses could, out of statistical necessity, be expected to return a signiﬁcant
result, more commonly known as a false positive ﬁnding (type I error).
Results
As demonstrated in Table 5.1, very few male students reported being sub-
jected to sexual assault, by either measure. The absolute numbers as well as
the rates are higher among female students. The differences between males
and females are signiﬁcant for all items except the one on anal penetration.
Both for boys and girls, incapacitated sexual assault is the more common
experience. Among girls, being subjected to enforced penetration of a ﬁnger
or object and by a penis are more common than enforced oral and anal
penetration. Among boys, about 1% reported all the different forms of
penetration.
Interestingly, among girls, the one-item question about rape and the item on
forced or threatened intercourse had very similar rates, only differing by half
a percentage point. This ﬁnding could suggest that what the subsample which
received the one-item measure had reported as rape were incidents of forced or
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threatened intercourse. This situation would correspond with the common ﬁnd-
ing that assaults involving intimidation or the explicit use of physical power
more often are considered rape (Ryan, 2011; Stefansen & Smette, 2006).
Because the items were distributed to different subsamples and not the same
respondents, we cannot test the degree of overlap.
How do the different measures of rape compare? Table 5.2 shows the results for
the dummy variables Rape1, Rape4 and Rape5. Because each variable is
a dummy, the mean reads as a percentage; a mean of 0.05 means a 5% prevalence.
Table 5.2 demonstrates – as expected – that the measures based on behav-
iourally speciﬁc questions elicited higher rates of sexual assault among both
boys (p < 0.001) and girls (p < 0.001). Further, the gender differences are not-
able. For girls, the prevalence rate increases from 5% to 14% from the one-
item to the ﬁve-item measure, and for boys, the rate increases from 1% to 3%.
Table 5.2 also demonstrates that the difference in victimisation rates between
boys and girls increases as more items are included in the measure. The differ-
ence is four percentage points for the one-item question, seven percentage
points for the four-item measure and eleven percentage points for the ﬁve-
item measure.
The analyses so far relate to the whole sample. We also investigated if the
measures based on the behaviourally speciﬁc questions would increase the
prevalence of rape to a similar degree within different subgroups of girls. This
would strengthen the evidence for the instrument if so. For these analyses, we
Table 5.1 All items. Prevalence of positive responses. By gender. Frequency and percent.
Boys Girls
Percent Freq. N Percent Freq. N T-test p-value
Broad question
You have been raped 1.1 9 832 5 62 1259 <0.001
Behaviourally speciﬁc questions
Forced or threatened you 0.9 8 872 4.5 57 1275 <0.001
to have intercourse
Forced or threatened you 0.9 8 873 2.9 37 1271 <0.01
to have oral sex
Forced or threatened you 0.8 7 870 1.7 21 1271 >0.05
to have anal sex
Injected ﬁngers or objects into 0.9 8 873 6 76 1273 <0.001
your vagina or anus
Someone has had sex with you 2.2 19 868 7.6 96 1270 <0.001
while you were asleep
or too drunk to object
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chose a set of sociodemographic variables known to affect levels of sexual
assault. Research in Norway has consistently shown that the risk of sexual vic-
timisation is signiﬁcantly higher among those with low socioeconomic status
compared to those with high socioeconomic status (Mossige & Stefansen, 2007,
2016; Pape & Stefansen, 2004). The same pattern has been documented in inter-
national research (e.g. Phipps, 2009). For this study, we use indicators related to
family economy, parents’ labour-market status and choice of academic track in
upper secondary school.
In the following analyses, we focus only on differences between two meas-
ures (Rape1 and Rape4) because we are uncertain about the types of experi-
ences reported in the ﬁfth item, on incapacitated sexual assault. The use of the
general concept ‘sex’ in this item means that it is unclear if the reported inci-
dents involved acts that are criminalised as rape in the Norwegian penal code,
or if they represent cases of sexual assault that do not involve penetration (or
penetration-like acts). We draw on Myhre et al. (2015), who found that around
50% of reported incidents on a similar item did not involve penetration. In
order to ensure internal validity, we therefore proceeded with the four-item
measure, given that all the acts covered align with the legal deﬁnition of rape
(Table 5.3).
The group differences in rape prevalence are large but as expected. For
example, the rate of rape is considerably lower among girls with a good family
economy in the last two years compared to girls with a poor family economy in
the same period. For the Rape1 measure, the prevalence is 4% for the former
group and 12% for the latter group; for Rape4, the respective numbers are 8%
and 19%. Not surprisingly, we see a nearly identical pattern for girls with par-
ents who work or receive social beneﬁts (variables that are indicative of the
economic conditions of the family). We see corresponding but lower differences
between the other groups. The difference for Rape1 between girls in academic
and non-academic tracks is close to three percentage points, and for Rape4, the
difference is around nine percentage points.
For most of the groups included in the study, the prevalence of rape was
signiﬁcantly higher when we used the four-item measure compared to the
single-item measure. The non-signiﬁcant result for having a poor family
Table 5.2 Three measures of rape. Boys and girls. Between-group mean comparison.
t-Test.
Boys Girls
N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev t-Test, p-value
Rape1 832 0.01 0.1 1259 0.05 0.22 <0.001
Rape4 872 0.02 0.12 1276 0.09 0.29 <0.001
Rape5 873 0.03 0.17 1276 0.14 0.34 <0.001
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economy is most likely ascribable to the low n, as the t-test is a function of
the magnitude of the observed differences and the sample size. In larger
groups (e.g., the non-academic-track group), similar differences returned sig-
niﬁcant results at the 0.05 level. In general, the Rape4 measure resulted in
approximately twice the rate of rape compared to the Rape1 measure. Follow-
ing an academic track resulted in a somewhat smaller discrepancy between the
two measures. But logistic regression analyses (not shown), with an interaction
term between the different background characteristics and the given rape
instrument, showed no signiﬁcant results. As such, the relative difference in
the proportion of rape measured by the two rape instruments does not differ
signiﬁcantly according to background characteristics.
Overall, the measures provide comparable differences in rape rates for all the
groups we included, even though the total prevalence varied greatly according
to the given instrument and among the different groups. We may thus conclude
that the four-item measure works as intended. It captures a signiﬁcantly higher
number of rape experiences across different groups of girls compared to the
one-item measure, thereby reducing underreporting. The measure hence
provides an estimate of rape that is more in accordance with the penal deﬁnition
of rape. Does this mean that it can be considered ‘good enough’? This would
depend on the criteria for deﬁning what is good enough – to be discussed next.
Discussion
We have shown that the four-item measure works as intended and performs
well across different groups. The measure, which is based on recommenda-
tions in the international literature, is part of a broader instrument that also sur-
veys other forms of sexual assault (which then triggers participants’ memory of
unwanted sexual experience), and the items are behaviourally descriptive. The
Table 5.3 Rape measures and socio-economic characteristics. Girls. Between-group mean
comparison. t-Test.
Rape1 Rape4
N Mean St. dev. N Mean St. dev. T-test
Poor family economy 67 0.12 0.33 58 0.19 0.4 n.s.
Good family economy 925 0.04 0.2 953 0.08 0.27 ***
Father working 1058 0.043 0.20 1093 0.09 0.28 ***
Father social beneﬁts 64 0.13 0.33 58 0.14 0.35 n.s.
Mother working 1059 0.046 0.21 1081 0.088 0.28 ***
Mother social beneﬁts 91 0.044 0.21 98 0.13 0.34 *
Academic track 892 0.043 0.2 940 0.076 0.26 **
Non-academic track 94 0.043 0.2 78 0.13 0.34 *
‘Good enough’ rape-prevalence estimates 75
items also cover acts that have been criminalised as rape in the Norwegian
penal code. We would add that the measure has important advantages for exam-
ining the population in question (students in upper secondary school) and for
the chosen methodology (i.e. a more general victimisation survey administered
at school).
First, the measure is relatively short, meaning that it can be integrated into
surveys on a wider range of topics, including other aspects related to sexual
assault such as background characteristics, risk factors and health outcomes.
The use of a short instrument also prevents exhaustion on the part of the
respondents and subsequently reduces the number of missing answers on later
items in the instrument. We found this to be the case in the present study,
where 98% of those who had answered the ﬁrst question in the instrument also
answered the remaining questions. While the length of questionnaires and
instruments is important for all samples, it is likely that the length is even more
critical when conducting surveys among young people. A related point is that
asking less detailed and probing questions may be less emotionally draining for
students who have experienced rape – and therefore would be more suitable for
use in classroom settings with other students and a teacher present, where an
emotional reaction would be noticed.
Second, the items themselves are short and entail few elements; the aim of
this approach is to limit the possibility for misunderstandings or differing inter-
pretations. In formulating the items, we were inspired by Thoresen and Hjem-
dal’s (2014) study, although the phrasing used in their study was much more
complex. To exemplify, while we asked, ‘Has someone forced or threatened
you to have intercourse?’, they asked, ‘Has someone at any time forced you to
have intercourse by the use of physical power or by threatening to harm you or
someone you have a close relationship with?’ While the ﬁrst item is related to
force or threats and the nature of the sexual act, the latter also speciﬁes that the
timeframe is unlimited, and the type of force and threats.
These advantages aside, what are the relevant criteria to assess the instrument
as being ‘good enough’ for the production of rape estimates in a youth
population?
As a ﬁrst step, we would look at the rates of rape produced by this and simi-
lar instruments in different studies. Studies that produce similar results would
speak to the validity of the instrument. In the introduction to this chapter, we
detailed the results from two previous studies conducted among the adult popu-
lation in Norway. Both used sets of behaviourally speciﬁc questions, and the
results were very similar to what we have found in our study. Based on our
four-item measure, close to 9% of the girls had experienced rape; the corres-
ponding number in the adult study in which a four-item measure was used
(Thoresen & Hjemdal, 2014) was only slightly higher. If we compare our ﬁve-
item measure with the adult study that included incapacitated sexual assault,
then the numbers are also quite similar. Among the girls in our study, the preva-
lence rate was 14%; among the women in the adult study, the rate was around
16% (Steine et al., 2012). Given that adults have had more time to accumulate
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rape experiences, these higher rates among adults are as expected. We would
also expect that the difference would be quite low, given that young people are
considerably more at risk than adults and older people (see Kruse, Strandmoen,
& Skjørten, 2013). But our results differ markedly from the results in Myhre
et al.’s (2015) study among 16- and 17-year olds, which used the same four-
item measure as Thoresen and Hjemdal (2014). The prevalence of rape was as
low as 3.5% among girls and 0.2% among boys. The two-year age span
between the respondents in Thoresen and Hjemdal’s (2014) study and our study
complicates comparisons. These two years of a young person’s life most likely
see a disproportionate number of sexual assaults compared to previous years.
We suspect, however, that the marked difference in part is caused by the com-
position of the sample in Myhre et al.’s (2015) study. They drew their sample
from the telephone directory and reached only 10.4% of the original sample,
from which 66.2% chose to participate (p. 50), thus making it unlikely that the
ﬁnal sample was representative of the youth population. In addition to the low
response rate, the study was not based on a self-completion questionnaire but
on telephone interviewing, which involves personal contact between the partici-
pant and interviewer. The choice of methods is known to affect people’s will-
ingness to disclose sensitive issues, with self-administered methods yielding
higher rates compared to methods that involve personal contact, either face-to-
face or on the telephone (Krumpal, 2013).
A second – and perhaps the most important – step would be to evaluate
the degree to which the measure covers the legal deﬁnition of rape. We have
already commented on why we have excluded the item on involuntary incap-
acitated sex from the ﬁnal analysis. Given the high percentage among both
girls and boys who reported involuntary incapacitated sex in our study, we
would expect that the inclusion of incapacitated rape (penetration or similar)
would result in higher prevalence rates for both genders. How an item on
incapacitated rape should be phrased is not a straightforward matter. The crime
of incapacitated rape covers all forms of penetration by different means – and
hence captures a broader set of acts than incapacitated penal–vaginal penetra-
tion. It is clear that our four-item measure is too narrow to capture all acts of
incapacitated rape. By including the involuntary incapacitated-sex item, we
would solve this problem but would at the same time capture a wider set of
acts, thus leading to an overly high rape estimate. The solution for future
research is to reformulate this item in a manner that would accord with the
legal provision on incapacitated rape, or to apply the follow-up method that
Thoresen and Hjemdal (2014) used and include conﬁrmed incidents of incapaci-
tated rape in the rape estimate.
What about the broad understanding of rape in the penal code? Rape in
the penal code is not limited to ‘completed’ penetration but also covers inci-
dents of direct contact between sex organs or sex organs and ﬁngers; it also
includes masturbation by force or threats of the accused as well as of the
victim. The items on rape in our study are all focussed on incidents of rape
in a more narrow sense – completed penetration – and hence set the bar
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higher than the legal code does. Also, these items do not include acts of
masturbation by the use of force or threat. How the rape code is to be inter-
preted is not spelled out in the code itself but is instead to be found in
preparatory works and jurisprudence; hence, current law cannot be read dir-
ectly from the letter of the law. Our instrument is ﬂawed, in the sense that it
is an operationalisation of the concrete paragraph on rape and not of current
law in action. On the other hand, one could argue that the items we have
included cover the main acts that legislators would wish to criminalise (i.e.
that they are operationalisations of legislators’ intent, so to speak), given, of
course, that legislators intend to capture acts of a certain degree of serious-
ness that would represent more invasive intrusions than unwanted touching
and the like. The more general point is that how we should interpret the
general notion that population studies should depart from the penal deﬁnition
of rape is not particularly clear (cf. Fisher & Cullen, 2000).
Another issue related to operationalisation concerns gender. In line with pre-
vious research, our behaviourally speciﬁc measures document a clear gendered
pattern in the exposure to rape. These measures were intended to capture all
acts considered rape under the Norwegian penal code. But the items we have
included all address the experience of being penetrated, while the penal code
also covers incidents of forcing someone to penetrate someone else, including
the assailant.1 In the literature, this type of sexual assault is labelled ‘made to
penetrate’, ‘forced to penetrate’ and ‘compelled penetration’ (Hlavka, 2017;
Stemple & Meyer, 2014; Weiss, 2010). None of the Norwegian prevalence stud-
ies have included questions about ‘forced-to-penetrate’ rapes, so the prevalence
is unknown. Referring to studies from different countries and using different
methods and questions, Weare (2018) concluded that 3–5% of the male popula-
tion might have experienced rape in this sense.
We do not know how the inclusion of one or more items on ‘forced-to-
penetrate’ incidents would have affected the results in our study and the
gender difference in rape exposure we found, but such an inclusion would
likely mean a higher prevalence among boys than we have reported in this
study. The general point is that the use of rape measures that do not include
those speciﬁc forms of rape that only men and boys experience contributes to
constructing rape as the act of being penetrated, and therefore as a predomin-
antly female experience. As for the evaluation of our measure, we would con-
clude that it is biased, and that the measure should be expanded with items
that cover compelled penetration. For girls, however, the instrument most
likely yields a more accurate estimate, even if it excludes certain incidents of
incapacitated rape.
Conclusion
Our work in this chapter is inspired by Krebs (2014) and his call to work sim-
ultaneously to improve the one- and two-step approaches to the measurement of
rape in population studies. We have detailed our experiences from using a one-
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step model based on only ﬁve items in a school-based survey among youths.
The aim of using these items was to capture rape as it is deﬁned in the Norwe-
gian penal code. Our analyses revealed that those measures that were based on
behaviourally speciﬁc items yielded higher rates than the one-item general
measure did, which held for both genders and for different subgroups of girls.
Due to the low N, within-group differences could not be tested for boys –
hence we do not know if the results are the same for boys. The possibility of
including the measure in a school-based survey meant that the response rate
was high and that the rape estimates were based on nationally representative
data from youths (at least those who were still in school).
Our conclusion is that the measure in some senses is ‘good enough’. For
girls, it does capture most incidents of rape, according to the legal concept
of rape; for boys, it is too narrow and needs to be reworked to include com-
pelled penetration. As an operationalisation of current law on rape in
Norway, the measure is probably too strict – given that it is based on the
letter of the law and not on how it is interpreted in preparatory works and
legal practice. We would caution against including more acts and less clear
experiences, however, as the net then could be cast too wide and could
include offences that are located in the grey area between rape and other
forms of sexual violence.
We would also welcome critical debate of the idea that societies need exact
numbers on rape prevalence. There is much to be learned from the good-
enough measures used in studies that can provide representative data, especially
from studies that monitor developments in rape prevalence over time. We
would also caution against the idea that the higher the prevalence, the more
trustworthy or useful the study: a high prevalence may be the result of asking
overly general questions. In our study, the inclusion of an item about involun-
tary incapacitated sex (which is not necessarily rape in Norwegian law) had
a dramatic effect, for instance, by doubling the percentage of affected boys.
On this note, we will make two ﬁnal points. First, the one-item general
approach has been heavily criticised in international scholarship because it leads
to underreporting and a skewed description of who is affected by rape. This cri-
tique is well substantiated. The value of general questions is seldom explored or
explicated, however. In our study, this question made for an interesting
comparison with the behaviourally speciﬁc measures. We also believe that it
can be very fruitful to follow developments over time in both the prevalence of
self-deﬁned rape and the difference between self-deﬁned rape and rape as measured
by behaviourally speciﬁc questions. One hypothesis concerning the latter would be
that the difference will decrease over time because of the heightened attention to
the issue of what counts as rape in prevention campaigns and public debate.
Second, the value of prevalence research for monitoring purposes and for
prevention efforts needs to be discussed. Prevalence estimates need to be com-
plemented by research that aims to understand the aetiology of rape on the
population level. For example, one recent study (Heinskou, Friis, Ejbye-Ernst, &
Liebst, 2017) has illustrated how prevalence studies can be used to identify how
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rape is located in time, space and relations. In Heinskou et al.’s analyses, the
authors examine exposure to rape in relation to a range of factors, including who
the assailant was, when it happened and what the consequences of the incident
were, both during the situation and afterwards. Such analyses may be developed
further to monitor where different forms of rape are socially located and how
they decrease or increase over time in different groups. Doing so would then
pave the way for more ambitious theoretical work on the social patterns of rape
in modern societies.
Note
1 Penal code section 291, letter c, deﬁnes an act to be rape if ‘through violence or
threatening conduct [someone] makes a person engage in sexual activity with another
person, or perform[s] acts corresponding to sexual activity on himself/herself’. The
code applies the same maximum penalty as committing forceful penetration or similar
types as well as incapacitated rape. See https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2005-05-
20-28/KAPITTEL_2#KAPITTEL_2.
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6 From the protection of marriage to
the defence of equality
The Finnish debate over the sexual
autonomy of wives
Riikka Kotanen
Introduction
Intimate relationships are the most common context for rape (UN Women,
2011), and there is a strong correlation between physical and sexual violence
within them: the majority of victims of intimate partner violence (IPV) are also
victims of rape within the same relationship (e.g. Black et al., 2011). Wider
societal awareness of rape in marriage rose gradually alongside second-wave
feminism, the growing criticism of violence against women and the lack of
state intervention in both the private sphere and in intimate relations (Gavey,
2005). The ﬁrst empirical research on the topic, conducted in the United States
in the early 1980s, revealed the extent of the problem and described its charac-
teristics as well as giving voice to the victims (Russel, 1982; Finkelhorn &
Yllö, 1985). Feminist activism and pioneering research raised awareness, which
consequently led a number of countries to criminalise rape in marriage during
the 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, marital rape, or rape in intimate
relationships more generally, is still legally and socially condoned in many
countries: more than 2.6 billion women still live in nations that have not crimin-
alised rape in marriage, either legislatively or judicially,1 or where a marital
exemption exists allowing husbands to have sexual intercourse regardless of
their wives’ consent (UN Women, 2011).
The intertwined effects of the social and legal inequality of genders have
manifested differently in legislation regulating sex crimes. From the perspective
of wives, the most persistent restrictions on their sexual autonomy, in general,
relate to the position of women in society. More speciﬁcally, these restrictions
are connected to the unequal legal position of men and women in the context of
marriage resulting in the subordination of wives. The change in legal thinking
concerning wives’ sexual autonomy is thus connected to the shift in meanings
and norms attached to marriage as a social institution. According to a wealth of
international comparisons, the Nordic countries rank highest in gender equality
from the social and legal perspective. Historically, gender equality was recog-
nised signiﬁcantly earlier in Nordic countries than elsewhere in Europe, which
included the modernisation of legislation (e.g. Pylkkänen, 2009). For example,
in 1906, Finnish women were among the ﬁrst to acquire the vote, and they
were the ﬁrst to be able to run for Parliament. Moreover, the marriage acts
were completely transformed in the Nordic countries from 1909 to 1929. This
was a joint Nordic process in which women’s movement took an active part
(Melby et al., 2006).
The process resulted in progressive modern regulations that emancipated
married women, particularly economically; sexuality and issues related to
personal integrity, however, were not addressed within the context of the
marriage acts (Melby et al., 2006). But a concurrent process of the revision
concerning sexual crimes did take place, where statutes based on religious
moral perceptions, such as illicit intercourse, were abolished (e.g. Kotanen,
2010). The revised marriage legislation aimed for a union of equal partners
both seen as responsible, independent individuals contributing to the shared
marital economy. Moreover, securing women and children economically, even
in cases of divorce, was seen as important in terms of ensuring a thriving
population; equality was a key feature in the struggle against social problems.
According to Melby, Pylkkänen, Rosenbeck and Carlsson Wetterberg (2006),
the Nordic marriage reform indicated the growing inﬂuence of state responsi-
bility and intervention – the rise of the Nordic welfare state – at the expense
of religious views. Yet, they point out that the normative climate in Finland
at the time was more conservative than in other Nordic countries, especially
in the liberalisation of divorce.
Given the early equalisation in legislation in terms of gender, it comes as no
surprise that the Nordic countries were also in the forefront of criminalising
rape in marriage. Sweden and Denmark removed a marital exemption from
their respective legislations in the early 1960s. In Norway, although its legisla-
tion lacked a marital exemption, a 1974 Supreme Court verdict conﬁrmed that
rape in marriage was a criminal act. In other Western countries, the wider wave
of legal changes securing wives’ sexual autonomy started later, during the
1980s (e.g. Yllö, 2016). In Europe, the development was spurred on by the
European Parliament’s Resolution on Violence against Women of 1986, which
urged member states to criminalise rape in marriage. The Finnish case is an
interesting exception in the Nordic context: the marital exemption was removed
from the Criminal Act in 1994. Finland was following several European juris-
dictions that had repealed the marital exemption or had explicitly criminalised
rape in marriage in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
Although Finland provided for the legal equality of spouses within marriage
in the 1920s, gaining physical and sexual autonomy took a surprisingly long
time, especially in comparison to the other Nordic countries. Using this incon-
sistency as a starting point, this chapter explores this particular delay in the
Finnish legislation by analysing (1) how and why wives’ sexual autonomy was
rejected in the early 1970s, (2) what motivated the later criminalisation of mari-
tal rape in 1994, and (3) what kind of role the interaction between law and
wider societal values played during the legal processes analysed in this chapter
(cf. Pylkkänen, 2009).
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The Nordic myth of equality and wives’ sexual autonomy
Because of the Nordic countries’ strong egalitarian tendencies, gender equality
there has traditionally been understood as a fairly symmetrical balance between
men and women (e.g. Pylkkänen, 2009; Julkunen, 2010). Formal equality has
long been a valued social and legal element, and the genders have been gener-
ally perceived as ‘different but equal’. This has been explained by the Nordic
emphasis on mutual solidarity and individual responsibility to the state and to
the universalism and inclusiveness of the Nordic welfare state model (Nousiai-
nen & Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 2001). Despite its gender neutrality, the Nordic
welfare state has largely been characterised as women-friendly (Hernes, 1987),
particularly because the welfare state has created a social environment where
the boundaries between public and private have been comparatively easy to
cross for women. This has allowed them to enjoy economic independence,
resulting in widespread possibilities for self-determination in most areas of life
(Kantola, 2006).
Feminist scholars have pointed out a certain lack of polarisation in terms of
gender-related issues in the Nordic countries, particularly in comparison to
social class. According to this feminist critique, the hegemony of sameness –
visible, for example, in the way gender differences are often downplayed in the
Nordic countries – has created a myth of equality. Such a myth captures situ-
ations where equality is understood in society as something that is already
realised and complete, as opposed to a future, yet-to-be achieved goal (Nousiai-
nen & Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 2001). Among the negative consequences of this
myth are equality-blind spots such as personal integrity, sexuality and anti-
discrimination issues, all of which garnered wider attention only in the late 20th
century (Pylkkänen, 2009). The case study from Finland presented in the
current chapter highlights not just the above-mentioned difﬁculties in acknow-
ledging gender differences and women’s bodily rights but also the importance
of equality as a collective concept and value.
The historical acceptability of marital rape can be explained by a combination
of socio-legal ideologies and attitudes to marriage, sexuality and gender
inequality. Globally, the widespread acceptance of marital rape has been based
on three overlapping ways of reasoning. The ﬁrst of these justiﬁcations is the
idea of women as property, particularly in terms of sexuality (Brownmiller,
1975; Schelong, 1994; Yllö, 2016). Thus, rape in marriage was perceived to
be as impossible as a husband robbing himself. Early rape laws were enacted
to protect men’s property interests. For a long time, the complainant was
hence either the family or father of an unmarried woman, or the husband of
a married woman (Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 2000).
Second, until the modernisation of marriage acts in the early 20th century,
a wife was not considered to be a competent legal person within the Western
legal tradition. Generally, after entering into a marriage, husband and wife were
seen to ‘become one’. Due to women’s societal and legal position, however,
this meant that a wife’s legal person was subsumed within that of her husband
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(Pylkkänen, 2009). The idea of marriage as a unity was justiﬁed as a way of
protecting a harmonious symbiosis within the family; yet in practice, this
continued to legitimise husbands’ control over their wives (Schelong, 1994).
The third justiﬁcation relates to the idea of marriage as a contract, and the
subsequent interpretation that entering into a marital contract presupposes
consent to fulﬁl a husband’s sexual demands under any circumstances (Pateman,
1980; Russel, 1982). The intertwining of the common legal deﬁnition of rape as
sexual intercourse without the consent of the victim and the idea of continuous
marital consent has had a considerable effect on how legally and socially
unimaginable rape by a husband has been in many countries until the last
decades of the 20th century.
Socio-legal studies on more recent debates concerning marital exemption
have shown that the retention of the exemption is often justiﬁed by appealing to
various ominous scenarios, commonly related to wives’ alleged vindictive
misuse of rape charges or from difﬁculties in providing evidence (e.g. Brooks,
1989). But these debates also demonstrate the long-reaching effect of the histor-
ical and cultural understandings of marriage discussed above. For example,
Mandal (2014) has pointed out that the protection of marriage as a culturally
unique and valuable institution was a key concern in India in 2013 when,
despite intense debate, the marital exemption was not repealed. Moreover, the
understanding that marital rape is not real rape – and thus should be addressed
by measures that are considered more suitable, given the private and intimate
context – is a widely used justiﬁcation for retaining the marital exemption and
is also ﬁrmly connected to historical understandings of marriage (e.g. William-
son, 2017).
From a wider perspective, the historical impact has not been restricted to
legislation or wives’ sexual autonomy. Because of the presumption of irrevoc-
able marital consent, the courts have used previous (or even potential) consen-
sual sexual intercourse in other contexts, such as current or former intimate
partners, cohabitees, or dates, as evidence of ongoing consent, hence making
sexual violence accepted or less condemned and the victim less credible (e.g.
Jokila, 2010; Lazar, 2010).
Data and method
The following sections provide an empirical analysis of two legislative
processes related to the criminalisation of rape within marriage in Finland. The
data were collected as part of a broader study (Kotanen, 2013) and comprise
primary and secondary data sets. The primary data set contains all legislative
documents from two legal processes: (1) the unsuccessful proposal to criminal-
ise rape within marriage between 1965 and 1970 and (2) the criminalisation of
rape within marriage between 1991 and 1994.
Despite the more than two decades that elapsed between the processes analysed
in this chapter, the legal procedure for enacting legislation was very similar. In
Finland, a governmental proposal (GP), which represents the key document of
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a legislative process, is prepared by Ministry of Justice ofﬁcials and generally
provides an account of the present state of the legislation in question; GPs typic-
ally also include an international overview. The proposed legislative revision, its
importance, aims and desired effects of implementation are also justiﬁed in GPs.
The largest difference in terms of the procedure and the documents produced
during it is related to the GPs’ preparatory process that took place before the pro-
posals were passed to Parliament. In the ﬁrst process, the GP 52/1970 was based
on two preparatory documents: the report of the Committee of Sex Crimes (CSC
report 1967: A12) and the Statement of the Supreme Court (SSC, 1969) for the
CSC’s report. The second process proceeded in two phases: Members of Parlia-
ment (MPs) put forward two legislative initiatives (25/1991 and 28/1991) in
1991, which were handled in subsequent parliamentary hearings. During the fol-
lowing two years, Ministry of Justice ofﬁcials formed the latter initiative into
a GP 365/1992, which they then handed to Parliament in early 1993.
In addition to the above-mentioned documents prepared for GPs, the legislative
material includes documents related to the following legislative work of Parliament
presented with the GP, including committee reports, written expert statements from
committee hearings2 and transcriptions of the plenum discussions of Parliament.
The legislative data covered in the present study amount to 205 pages.
In order to trace the interaction between law and societal values related to the
criminalisation of rape in marriage, a secondary data set was collected to
supplement the legislative data. This data set consists of all news articles on
IPV published in the largest Finnish newspaper in terms of circulation, Helsin-
gin Sanomat (HS), between 1990 and 1994. In addition, the secondary data
include all available written materials related to campaigns and initiatives
against IPV by different social actors and government organisations during the
same timeframe. The secondary data consist of approximately 450 pages. It is
important to note, however, that most documents in the secondary data relate to
the latter legislative process, mainly because of the lack of public debate about
rape in marriage in the late 1960s.
The focus of the current qualitative analysis is on legal and social change,
and their mutual dynamics, in relation to wives’ sexual autonomy. The starting
point of the analysis is the Finnish legal historian Anu Pylkkänen’s (2009,
p. 19) notion that the law has never actually offered protection for women as
‘owners of their selves’; instead of integrity, the perspective of the legal regula-
tion of institutions and relations has often been based on the protection of other
values, such as economic interests and societal morals. Neither legislative
documents nor their ultimate outcomes – legal statutes – are disconnected from the
society they are legislated for. Despite the pursuit of neutral objectivity, legal
norms and extralegal values tend to interact and intermingle, particularly with
topics such as sexuality, reproduction, family issues and personal integrity (Pylkkä-
nen, 2009). As Ngaire Nafﬁne (2007) has stated, the dominant understandings of
rape, often implicitly presented as universal and natural, are constructed on
a heterosexual male conception of sexuality rather than on women’s perceptions
and experiences. This becomes visible not only in historical understandings, such
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as the supposed impossibility of raping an unchaste woman, but also more currently
in discussions of whether qualiﬁcations of rape as a crime should be based on the
lack of consent rather than the use of violence or the threat of violence.
The two legal processes analysed in this chapter represent potential moments
of legal change. Keeping in mind the intertwining and interacting of legal and
social values and understandings, the documents of the legislative data are per-
ceived as a negotiation through which legally and socially acceptable sexuality
and sexual acts are deﬁned and through which sexual autonomy is either
granted, restricted or denied. The secondary data capture some of the key
moments of the social change that has taken place outside the legal realm. The
data thus enable the locating of legislators’ actions in a wider context: for
example, by tracing the moments, measures and/or groups that created pressure
for legal change.
The analysis focusses on the justiﬁcations provided for the proposed enact-
ment during the legal processes, for example, by examining what kinds of pro-
tected interests and societal values these justiﬁcations entailed, or what kinds of
legal or extralegal understandings of sexuality, marriage and rape as a crime
these justiﬁcations were based on. Moreover, how the justiﬁcations, and the
values and interests connected to them, assumed or denied wives’ sexual auton-
omy. The focus is not just on the change in legislation and society but also on
the resistance to the change, particularly in the ﬁrst legal process. A speciﬁc
point of interest is whether the change, or resistance to it, seems to have been
connected to legal culture and tradition or to the wider societal environment.
Pylkkänen (2009) has argued that even though the law typically describes the
history of winners, spaces of resistance and challenge are always to be found,
and that it is equally important to pay attention to the silences: the lack of
voices and any unexplained breaks in legal reasoning and conceptualisation.
Following this, the present analysis also aims to pinpoint possible missing per-
spectives and speaks to these silences.
Sexual autonomy in Finnish legislation in the late 1960s: husband’s
right, wife’s duty
The sexual norms that guided the legal regulation of sex crimes in the 19th cen-
tury were largely based on religious understandings and beliefs. Accepted and
chaste sexual activity was legally and socially institutionalised within the conﬁnes
of marriage and procreation. This understanding was gradually abandoned during
the early 20th century. For example, illicit intercourse was decriminalised in 1926
in Finland, followed by adultery in 1948. Despite the modernisation of the legal
regulation of marriage and the repeal of these statutes, when preparations for the
revision process began in the mid-1960s, Finnish law on sex crimes was still
mainly based on religious-led sexual morals; the legislation on ‘chastity crimes’3
that was in force at the time had been enacted in 1889. According to the law,
forced sexual intercourse could only be interpreted as rape if the perpetrator had
been someone other than the husband of the particular woman. A husband could
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only be charged for raping his own wife if he had aided and abetted another man
in committing the act. In theory, other statutes, which regulated physical violence
instead of sex crimes, allowed for a husband who had committed an act equiva-
lent to rape against his wife to be charged for an assault or coercion. The penal
scales for both offences were considerably more lenient compared to rape.4
While Sweden and Denmark had abolished marital exemptions in the 1960s,
other European countries did not proceed with the matter despite the activity
of second-wave feminists. Although social activism for women’s rights and
gender equality began in Finland later than in the Anglo-Saxon countries and
the other Nordic countries, there was emerging activism for sexual liberation
and reproductive rights for women as part of protests against restricting sexual
norms and gendered double standards (Julkunen, 2010). This activism was
connected to a critical, yet somewhat gender-neutral, organisation called
Yhdistys 9.5 Within the organisation, both women and men campaigned for
equality; their actions led to the establishment of the governmental Advisory
Board for Equality (TANE6) in 1972.
In general, contemporary legal scholars considered the legal position of men
and women to be fairly equal, even though it was acknowledged that the legis-
lation still consisted of certain unequal statutes. For example, it was criticised
that a wife was obliged to take her husband’s surname upon marriage under
Finnish law (Mickwitz, von Essen & Nordgren, 2008). None of the deﬁciencies
highlighted at the time were related to women’s physical or sexual integrity;
instead, questions related to economic and labour rights were the priority. While
this was a joint Nordic blind spot, one speciﬁc reason for the invisibility of
physical and sexual integrity, particularly in Finland, has been the comparatively
late modernisation of Finnish legislation and society that has hindered the
acknowledgement of individual rights (Pylkkänen, 2009). The shift from an
agrarian society to a Nordic welfare state was largely delayed due to the
destructive wars in the earlier half of the last century. From the legal perspec-
tive, apart from the protection of property and rights related to ownership, fun-
damental rights were largely absent in Finnish legal discussions before the
1970s (Pylkkänen, 2012). The ﬁrst actual listing of fundamental rights was
introduced only in 1995 after a long revision process of the constitution. The
Nordic culture of sameness, and the tendency to avoid open conﬂict between
genders, has also been particularly strong in Finland. One indicator of this was
the channelling of social activism through Yhdistys 9 rather than through
a women’s movement (Jallinoja, 1983).
The preparatory work for the new Sex Crime Act began in December 1966,
when the Finnish government appointed the Committee of Sex Crimes. After
a year, the CSC handed its report to the government which then requested
a statement from the Supreme Court. Following the Supreme Court’s sugges-
tions, the report was revised by Ministry of Justice ofﬁcials into GP 52/1970,
which was eventually handed to Parliament in 1970. The CSC report (1967:
A12) stated that the current criminal justice system was based on conceptions
connected to religiously based morality, and hence heterosexual marriage had
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been seen as the only lawful context for sexual relations. However, the CSC
estimated in its report that during the 20th century, gender equality had devel-
oped to the point that ‘almost all differences between the genders have disap-
peared within society’. This highlights how long-lived the Nordic ethos of
‘already-achieved equality’ is.
The general justiﬁcations for the revision of the regulation of sex crimes rep-
resented a clear separation from the previous regulation. In other words, instead
of protecting chastity and other religious-based moral sentiments related to sex
and sexuality, the focus of the justiﬁcations was on the protection of individual
autonomy, especially in situations where one’s autonomy had been denied due
to ‘intimidation or violence’. According to the report (CSC 1967: A12), instead
of protecting only sexual morals and the chastity of society, the Criminal Law
should prioritise the protection of individual autonomy. The CSC utilised the
revised Swedish Sex Crime Act from 1962, which included the criminalisation
of rape in marriage, as a model for its proposal. The Swedish example was also
one of the key justiﬁcations for initiating the criminalisation of marital rape in
Finland. Despite proposing the removal of the marital exemption, the CSC’s
attitude towards the potential criminalisation remained ambivalent. In its report,
the modern idea about individual autonomy as the core protected interest of law
was intermingled with the understanding that marriage was meant to provide
ongoing consent:
… marriage can no longer be considered to establish sexual authority for
a husband over his wife; sexual intercourse requires mutual consent even
within a marriage: although getting married justiﬁes an assumption that
such consent has been given.
(CSC, 1967: A12)
The Supreme Court was solicited for a written statement to the committee’s
report. In its statement (SSC, 1969), the Supreme Court opposed the proposal for
criminalising rape in marriage. It was considered too modern and unsuitable for
Finland (Kotanen, 2013). When GP 52/1970 was ﬁnally handed to Parliament,
the Supreme Court’s position was straightforwardly adopted into the proposal.
Several justiﬁcations, such as that ‘criminalisation would be against the Finnish
people’s sense of justice’, were replicated word for word from the Supreme
Court’s statement.
The most signiﬁcant impediments to criminalisation found in the data are (1)
the denial and questioning of the occurrence of marital rapes, (2) the conceptual
inextricability of marriage and sexual intercourse, and (3) the deﬁnition of rape
as a chastity crime in the legislation (in force at the time) and governmental
proposal. The justiﬁcation for the opposition to criminalisation referred to the
conception that such acts are not committed ‘in practice between spouses living
in a normal marriage’, and also the possible harm was assessed as being so
minor that it did not require any intervention. Marriage and sexual intercourse
were connected to each other so closely in the legal documents that they appear
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indivisible. Only two addresses held in Parliamentary hearings challenged the
‘marital duties’ of a wife to resign herself to sexual intercourse with her hus-
band, even against her will. These addresses represented modern ideas about
gender equality and women’s human rights, which were more characteristic of
the latter part of the data. In them, wives were also acknowledged as victims of
sexual violence – a perspective that is missing elsewhere in the data from the
1960s (Kotanen, 2013).
Even though the marital exemption is explicitly relational by deﬁnition, in
the data, the exemption also has spatial restrictions. According to GP 52/1970
and the Supreme Court’s statement (SSC, 1969), wives’ marital duties will
cease only in cases where spouses are separated due to an approaching divorce.
Only living in separate households is considered a sufﬁcient indicator for
the withdrawal of ongoing consent. The Supreme Court’s statement highlights
the discontinuation of sexual duties due to physical and spatial separation. The
withdrawal of the marital exemption is justiﬁed because merely forcing oneself
into another person’s private sphere is a criminal offence in such situations. The
interpretation of who a speciﬁc space belongs to thus becomes an important
qualiﬁer of rape. From a spatial perspective, the private sphere becomes
a protector of wives’ sexual autonomy:
In cases of separation, one cannot assume without question that consent to
sexual intercourse related to marriage would exist. … It would be unfair to
exclude wives from legal protection in these cases …
(SSC, 1969)
Discussion about how the section on sexual crimes should be named within
the Criminal Act illustrated how ﬁrmly rooted religiously based sexual
morality and conservative attitudes remained in the late 1960s in the context
of Finnish legislation. The CSC suggested that the heading of the particular
section should be updated from ‘Chastity crimes’ to ‘Sex crimes’, which it
regarded as more suitable and modern. The Supreme Court opposed this
proposal and this was adopted into GP 52/1970. The understanding of rape,
and other sex crimes, as unchaste is one of the key explanations for the
incongruity of marriage and rape. From the point of view of marital rape,
this understanding proved to be a signiﬁcant obstacle to its criminalisation.
According to these two documents, a chastity-crime charge would be
‘inappropriate’ and ‘shameful’ in the context of marriage. Classifying marital
intercourse as a crime against sexual morals and chastity would thus be
impossible, as doing so would be contradictory to the idea of marriage as
the only legitimate context for intercourse. In the data, this contradiction
was regarded as so signiﬁcant that not even the most grievous violation of
a wife’s sexual autonomy could be considered to be penalised as a chastity
crime, as that would imply that these acts, and consequently the marriage
they were committed within, were immoral:
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In other cases [i.e. when spouses are not separated], not even sexual acts
that violate the autonomy and freedom of the other spouse in an aggravated
manner should be penalised as chastity crimes …
(SSC, 1969)
The quote above is important from two perspectives. First, its gender-neutral
articulation, particularly in a legal context where rape can only be inﬂicted on
a woman, is a good example of the tendency to downplay gender
differences. Second, the quote reveals how inconsistent and contradictory atti-
tudes towards marital rape were at the time. The same action is deﬁned within
one sentence, ﬁrst, neutrally as a sexual act, and immediately after as a gross
violation of rights. The statement hence seems to include a clear awareness of
the problematic nature of, and the possibly serious consequences connected to,
rapes inﬂicted on wives. Nevertheless, wives’ sexual autonomy was consciously
deﬁned more narrowly in comparison to other women; within marriage, sexual
autonomy was seen speciﬁcally as the right of the husband.
In the late1960s, the violation of a woman’s sexual autonomy qualiﬁed as
a crime only if the act could be interpreted as unchaste; in other words, if it simul-
taneously violated conservative, religion-based sexual morals. Since forced inter-
course with one’s own wife was not regarded as such a violation at the time, these
moral norms were, in practice, more valued as an interest of legal protection than
was married women’s sexual autonomy. Moreover, the idea of a woman’s ongoing
consent was not applied only to married women in subsequent criminal law enact-
ment. Other types of relationships between ‘the offender and the woman’ were also
considered as extenuating circumstances, and thus a possible remission of sentence.
This view was not questioned at all in the data. However, in addition to the CSC’s
original suggestion to remove the marital exemption, the close result of the parlia-
mentary vote – 77 in favour versus 86 opposed to criminalisation – implies that the
legal and social understandings of marital rape had already started to diverge.
Criminalising rape in marriage in 1994: in defence of equality
The understandings attached to rape slowly began to change in Western
countries from the 1970s onwards. Anglo-American feminist activists, followed
by feminist researchers, were at the forefront of raising awareness about rape as
a social and structural problem by emphasising the position and rights of
victims (e.g. Millet, 1970; Connel & Wilson, 1974). Instead of involuntary sex,
rape was deﬁned not just as a crime but as an exercise of gendered power
(Brownmiller, 1975). General attitudes towards marital rape, however, did not
change considerably until the late 1980s and early 1990s (Gavey, 2005). The
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, which was
instituted in 1981. Internationally, the UN and CEDAW had an important role
in expediting legislative changes on marital rape in Europe in the late 1980s
and early 1990s (Utriainen, 2010; van Leeuwen, 2013).
92 Riikka Kotanen
In Finland, marital rape was publicly acknowledged after it became the sub-
ject of critical attention in the late 1970s as part of the book Violence within
Marriage (Germain et al., 1978). Nevertheless, no legislative initiatives were
undertaken for criminalisation until the early 1990s, even though the social
atmosphere and attitudes had changed considerably in Finland during these two
decades. International obligations spurred on gender equality and the legitim-
ation of women’s rights; for example, the ﬁrst Equality Act (609/1986) was
enacted in 1986 largely due to legal preparations for the pending ratiﬁcation of
CEDAW. The status of marriage as an institution had begun to diminish from
the 1970s, and societal changes inﬂuenced attitudes to marital rape. According
to a survey published in 1993, only 10% of men and 8% of women were in
favour of the idea that rape should be punished differently when committed
within marriage (Haavio-Mannila & Kontula, 1993). Still, in the early 1990s,
Finland remained among the few Western countries not to have criminalised
rape within marriage.
In this legislative process, the interaction of law and societal values occurs in
the form of extralegal social activity and pressure directed towards legislators.
The contradiction between the changed societal attitudes and the extant legisla-
tion induced critical public discussion. In particular, the members of TANE’s
recently established division of gendered violence actively promoted the cause
against gendered violence (e.g. Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, 1991). It was not
just the feminist activists who were raising critical awareness, however. For
example, two editorials in Helsingin Sanomat pressed for the criminalisation of
marital rape (HS 13.6.1991; HS 29.11.1991), and MPs prepared two separate
legislative initiatives on criminalisation. The ﬁrst initiative 25/1991 was made
by a group of MPs who all were representatives of the Left Alliance.7 At the
time, the initiative appeared rather radical in the Finnish context, suggesting not
only criminalising rape in marriage but also, for example, subjecting assault in
the private sphere to public prosecution as well as a change in the legal deﬁn-
ition of rape to redeﬁne it as gender-neutral regarding rape victims.8
The second legal initiative 28/1991 was signed by a group of MPs from several
political parties; the initiative’s more moderate aim was to criminalise marital
rape by removing the marital exemption and eliminating from the statute the
sentence deﬁning the relationship between the offender and victim as a possible
mitigating circumstance.
After Parliamentary hearings addressed the initiatives, the cause progressed
slowly. According to Pirjo Pehkonen (2003), who has analysed anti-violence
activism within the Finnish women’s movement, members of TANE who
actively worked to promote the cause pointed out that there was clear reluc-
tance on the part of the Ministry of Justice to make any progress in the
matter. However, the TANE members eventually managed to convince the
then Minister of Justice of the importance of criminalisation. GP 365/1992,
based on the latter legal initiative 28/1991, was handed to Parliament in Jan-
uary 1993. Similar reluctance by the Ministry of Justice also appeared later
in the 1990s in relation to the increasing demands for legal regulation of
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IPV. For example, for several years before the enactment of legislation to
introduce the restraining order in 1998, feminist activists, the media and
MPs had pressured the Ministry of Justice to act (Kotanen, 2018). The min-
istry’s reluctance seems to have been based largely on a lack of recognition
of the scale and prevalence of IPV as well as an understanding that such
violence was a problem of social rather than criminal justice policy (Niemi-
Kiesiläinen, 2004; Kotanen, 2013).
In GP 365/1992, the explicit justiﬁcation for legislative alterations was to
strengthen the individual’s right to sexual integrity and autonomy. A closer
analysis of the data, however, shows that sexual autonomy was not the only
protected interest: such autonomy was only one of several elements of equal-
ity, which was the key interest to be protected. This was particularly related
to the Parliamentary hearings. In their addresses, the MPs presented Finnish
equality as incomplete, particularly due to the marital exemption, as though
the Criminal Law was calling Finnish equality into question. The proposed
legal changes would provide a means for rectifying the situation and pursu-
ing more comprehensive equality within legislation and society. Equality has
three dimensions in the data: (1) equality between spouses, (2) equality
among women, and more generally, (3) equality between genders.
This initiative is aimed as a part of actions to promote gender equality.
(LI 25/1991)
… The aim has been, as it has been in the legislation in general, to
increase equality between spouses, and their independent right to decide
whether to stay married or to end the marriage has been vitally reas-
serted …. The alteration of this statute is important, above all, with
respect to principles.
(GP 365/1992)
Particularly in GP 365/1992, prepared by the Ministry of Justice, criminalisation
appears as a ‘principled revision’; in other words, as a legislative alteration
whose importance lies in its principles. This is consistent with the lack of refer-
ences to the real people who are affected by marital rape despite the research
and statistics that by then had provided substantial information about these acts.
In terms of missing perspectives, neither victims of rape nor offenders are
mentioned at all in the GP.
The most weighty and concrete motivations for criminalisation are the
international demands and agreements connected to Finland’s approaching
EU membership. Finnish feminist researchers have pointed out that the inter-
national agreements, as well as EU membership in general, have been the
most signiﬁcant reasons for promoting women’s rights in Finland, particu-
larly in terms of gendered violence (Kantola, 2006; Nousiainen & Pentikäi-
nen, 2013). In the GP, however, the binding force of these agreements is
explicitly deﬁned as having an effect ‘in principle’:
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The assembly [against violence towards women consisted of 16 ministers
from Western European countries] passed a declaration that was signed by
Finland … in April 1991. In terms of legislation, the declaration states
that physical violence against women is a crime within and outside mar-
riage … and that, in principle, physical and sexual violence has to be
punished as severely when it is committed within marriage …
(GP 365/1992)
In addition to the international agreements, another tangible international
motivation for criminalisation was Finland’s international reputation, especially
vis-à-vis other Nordic countries and EU member countries. GP 365/1992
includes a comprehensive cross-European legal review in terms of marital
rape. The partial revision, limited to the one statute that included the marital
exemption, was validated by the pressure created by the European example in
the situation where comprehensive revision of the Criminal Act was already in
progress. The MPs emphasised in the Parliamentary hearings how harmful the
current situation was to Finland’s reputation. They highlighted criminalisation
as an advantage not just for women but especially for Finland as a nation:
… we are enacting this [statute] separately so that we are not the only
Western European country … to not fulﬁl the international agreements we
have concluded in this respect. This is the reason for handing this partial
revision over to Parliament.
(Minister of Justice in a parliamentary hearing, 16 February1993)
Framing the criminalisation of marital rape as a national question of Finland’s
international image is not entirely exceptional. Highlighting gender-neutral
national interests, such as the national economy, labour policy, or public health,
has been a tradition in Finland within legal revisions for improving the societal
position of women. This has been interpreted as a national strategy to avoid open
conﬂict between genders (Rantalaiho, 1994; Julkunen, 2010). A marginal group
of male MPs displayed an objection to criminalisation during the Parliamentary
hearings; their addresses defended values based on the conservative sexual
morals that dominated legal discussion in the 1960s (Kotanen, 2013). Similarly to
other countries, they justiﬁed retaining the marital exemption through
a presumption of potential misuse (e.g. Mandal, 2014; Williamson, 2017).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to analyse justiﬁcations for the late criminalisa-
tion of marital rape in Finland by asking (1) how and why wives’ sexual auton-
omy was rejected in the early 1970s, (2) what motivated the later
criminalisation of marital rape in 1994 and (3) what kind of role the interaction
between law and wider societal values played during the legal processes ana-
lysed in this chapter. The analysis has examined what kinds of legal or
From the protection of marriage 95
extralegal values, as well as understandings of sexuality, marriage and rape as
a crime, these justiﬁcations were based on.
When the joint Nordic reform of marriage acts took place in the 1920s, the
equalisation of marriage at the expense of religious views provoked more oppos-
ition in Finland than in the other Nordic countries due to Finland’s conservative
normative climate (Melby et al., 2006). According to the present study, conserva-
tive views still held a strong hold in the legal realm of marriage four decades
later. The key justiﬁcations for the decision not to repeal the marital exemption
were a mixture of historical understandings of marriage as a husband-led unity
and as ongoing sexual consent on the part of the wife, combined with religious-
based moral views that mainly protected the moral reputation of marriage as an
institution. Sexuality appears as a husband’s right, a privilege guaranteed by his
wife’s marital agreement. From the female perspective, sexuality is a submissive
duty. Wives’ sexual autonomy is weighed against the chastity of marriage,
which becomes crystallised in a conﬂict between the contemporary understand-
ing of rape as an unchaste act and marriage as the solely appropriate and legit-
imate unity, even in cases of sexual violence.
The strong resistance to change within the legal realm highlights how inappropri-
ate and alien the initiative, inspired by other Nordic countries, was seen in Finland.
In some respects, this reﬂects Indians’ objection to repealing the marital exemption;
Mandal (2014) refers to this type of situation as ‘cultural nationalism’. Marriage as
an institution was perceived as a culturally unique part of society’s morality, whereas
the criminalisation of marital rape represented something that came from outside the
familiar, cultural values. The prioritisation of conservative views, in terms of
marriage as an institution, and the acceptance of wives’ lack of sexual autonomy are
particularly striking because, at the time, the Nordic countries had a well-established
tradition of mutually revising and harmonising their legislation. One reason that the
resistance to the change appeared fairly unanimous was the lack of social debate
about the issue. Although sexual double standards were criticised, sexual integrity
was not yet on the agenda (Pylkkänen, 2009). The close parliamentary vote, however,
indicated that despite the silence and lack of discussion in the social and legal con-
texts, many considered the unequal position of wives to be unjust.
In the early 1990s, the change arose mainly through extralegal social activity
aiming to bring the legal understanding of equality in line with societal understand-
ing. Contrary to the situation in the late 1960s, criminal law, and the old-fashioned
and unequal values it embodied in terms of the regulation of sex crimes, were
widely perceived as alien. They uncomfortably challenged something socially and
culturally important: that is, the myth of equality (cf. Nousiainen & Niemi-
Kiesiläinen, 2001). In general, sexuality was only incidentally touched upon, and
when it was, sexuality appeared as an equal right of men and women. Similarly to
the late 1960s, resistance to change occurred on the part of legislators. The Ministry
of Justice’s reluctance hindered the legal process; they were later primarily motiv-
ated by the demands of Finland’s recent EU membership.
The Nordic way of downplaying gender differences appeared in the 1990s as
a calculated, traditional way of political argumentation for women’s rights in
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Finland (cf. Rantalaiho, 1994; Julkunen, 2010). But this tendency to downplay
was also a probable cause for the invisibility of female victims of sexual vio-
lence as well as the male perpetrators in GP 365/1992, the key document of the
legal process. This tendency also presents an interesting contrast to the feminist
social activism towards violence against women that started at the beginning of
the 1990s, which was the main domestic motivation behind the legal change
that consequently launched a wider process of legal reforms, particularly in
relation to IPV (e.g. Kotanen, 2013, 2018). In general, however, this feminist
redeﬁnition of gender-neutral domestic violence to gender-based violence
clearly had some inﬂuence on legal argumentation at the time.
The legal regulation of sexual crimes has been reformed in Finland on multiple
occasions after revoking the marital exemption. The Act on Sexual Crimes was
completely revised in 1999 to reinforce victims’ individual autonomy and sexual
self-determination as the main objects of protection. After a critical social debate
and intensive campaigning by the Finnish section of Amnesty International, the
legislative subsections on rape were further revised in 2011 and 2014 by widening
the range of the punishability of rape (Kotanen & Kronsteadt, 2019). As of 2019,
legislators are yet again under extralegal pressure to change the Act on Sex Crimes
following Sweden’s 2018 reform. The citizens’ initiative called ‘Suostumus2018’9
demands that the current deﬁnition of rape, based on the use of physical force or
the threat of violence, be changed to one based on lack of consent.
Notes
1 Different countries have criminalised rape in marriage either by changing the legisla-
tion regulating sex crimes or by changing the judicial customs, such that these acts
are dealt with in courts in a similar manner to rape committed outside marriage.
2 The expert statements related to the attempt to criminalise rape in marriage in the late
1960s were not as comprehensively documented in literal form as the expert state-
ments in the early 1990s and hence offer very little additional information.
3 All quotes from the research data have been translated from Finnish to English by the
author.
4 At the time, the maximum sentence for rape was 10 years in prison, while the max-
imum penalties for assault and coercion were two years and one year, respectively.
The maximum penalty was a ﬁne for cases of minor assaults.
5 ‘Association 9’ in English.
6 From the Finnish for Tasa-arvoasiain neuvottelukunta.
7 A left-wing political party in Finland.
8 According to the legislation in force in 1991, rape could only be inﬂicted on women.
9 ‘Consent 2018’ in English; see http://suostumus2018.ﬁ/.
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Original sources
Eduskunnan täysistuntokeskustelu HE 365/1992 Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle
laiksi rikoslain väkisinmakaamista ja vapautta loukkaavaa haureutta koskevien
säännösten muuttamisesta, 16.2.1993. (Parliamentary hearing, 16 February 1993).
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7 Towards voluntariness in Swedish
rape law
Hyper-medialised group rape cases and
the shift in the legal discourse
Gabriella Nilsson
Introduction and aim
In December 2017, the then Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven
demanded, ‘Sex should be voluntary. If it is not voluntary, then it is
illegal’ (Aftonbladet, 17/12 2017).1 The background of his statement was
the recommendation made already in 2016 by the Sexual Offences Commit-
tee to introduce a consent-based regulation in the sexual offences legisla-
tion instead of the force-based existing legislation (SOU, 2016:60). Already
prior to the inquiry by the Sexual Offences Committee, the legislation had
been subjected to two recent reviews, resulting in an extensive reform in
2005 and legislative amendments in 2013. On both occasions, consideration
was given to amending the legislation to base criminal liability on the
absence of consent, but it was decided against such a proposition. In 2016,
however, the conclusion was the reverse:
Even though several amendments have been made to sexual offences legis-
lation in the past decade, there are still situations where sexual integrity
and self-determination are violated and where it is doubtful whether there
is sufﬁciently strong protection from the violation under criminal law. […]
In the choice between supplementing the present legislation and changing it
completely, we have concluded that the law has to be changed.
(SOU, 2016:60)
Thus, the committee proposed that ‘criminal responsibility is borne by a person
who performs sexual intercourse or another sexual act that, with regard to the
seriousness of the violation, is comparable to sexual intercourse, with a person
who is not participating voluntarily’ (SOU, 2016:60, p. 43). Additionally the
punishable area was expanded by the introduction of a liability for negligence,
including both cases where the perpetrator actually realised that it might be the
case that participation in a sexual act was not voluntary, but still chose to
perform the sexual act, and the cases where the perpetrator could and really
ought to have done something to come to a realisation of whether the participa-
tion was voluntary or not (SOU, 2016:60, p. 53).
The Swedish government chose to propose the change that was recommended
by the committee and, on 23 May 2018, the parliament voted for a legislation
based on the requirement of consent (Govt. Bill. 2017/18:177). On 1 July 2018,
the new legislation entered in force (SFS 2018:618).
Internationally, this legal shift coincides with an increased criticism the
last few decades towards the judicial procedure and the legal construction
of rape, and a great number of changes in sexual offences legislation
(Bumiller, 2008; McGlynn & Munroe, 2010; Spohn & Horney, 2013).
Nonetheless, it is surprising how little scope the legislative changes in
other countries, in particular the countries where consent-based legislation
has come into force far earlier than in Sweden, have been given in the
Swedish debate on sexual offences.
The main argument in this chapter is that in Sweden, this legal shift was the
result of a discursive process that since the mid-1990s, in particular, was taking
place in news reports and debate about the legal handling of a number of
hyper-medialised Swedish group rape cases (cf. Wennstam, 2002; Leijonhufvud,
2015; Nilsson, 2018). The aim is to highlight how a gradual change towards
voluntariness was reﬂected in, and largely pushed by, news reports and debate
about these cases.
Material
The chapter uses empirical material gathered as part of a larger study of
how rape is portrayed in Swedish news media from 1990 to 2015 (see
Andersson et al., 2016). Within the scope of this study, an initial search was
conducted of all newspaper articles about rape in the tabloid Expressen. In
the ﬁrst overview of these articles, it was apparent that a number of particu-
larly hyper-medialised cases of group rape seemed to work as starting points
and discursive arenas to debate legislation and call for legal changes (Nils-
son, 2018). These cases were in particular the so-called ‘Södertälje case’
(1995); the ‘Rissne case’ (2000); the ‘Tumba case’ (2003); the ‘Husby case’
(2004); the ‘Motala case’ (2004); the ‘Stureplan case’ (2007); the ‘Tensta
case’ (2013) and the ‘Bottle rape’ (2013).
An additional search was conducted where all newspaper articles concern-
ing these cases, both news reports, editorials and opinion pieces, published
mainly in the six largest Swedish morning papers and tabloids, were
retrieved. The articles were closely read focussing on how they had inﬂu-
enced a legislative change, including how new terms was introduced, dis-
cussed and implemented. In this chapter, the four cases that most clearly
illustrated the gradual change towards consent-based legislation have been
selected for the analysis. In the analysed articles, aside for the journalists
themselves, the voices from the courts are heard in the form of lawyers and
prosecutors involved in the cases, as well as is the voice of the legislature,
usually represented by the minister of justice.
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Analytical framework
The analytical starting point is a discourse theoretical perspective (Laclau &
Mouffe, 1985). Central to discourse theory is for the meaning of language to be
regarded as contingent. By relating different terms to one another in a certain
discourse, their meaning is (temporarily) ﬁxed. Accordingly, a discourse can be
described as a context in which the ambiguous meanings of the central terms,
what Laclau and Mouffe call nodal points, have been reduced for the purpose
of certainty and clarity. The legal discourse is one context in which the
certainty and clarity of the nodal points is particularly important, especially
from the perspective of legal certainty. In the legal discourse on rape, the nodal
points are general legal principles but also the speciﬁc terms stipulated in the
legislation, e.g. force and intent.
A discourse is inﬂuenced not only by the terms it includes, but also by the exclu-
sion of terms what Laclau and Mouffe describe as the discursive ﬁeld. As
a discourse such as the legal discourse is constituted in relation to the surrounding
discursive ﬁeld, it risks being undermined by the articulations taking place therein.
In this chapter, the news articles on rape are regarded as an arena where the discur-
sive ﬁeld took shape, e.g. by gradually introducing a debate about the alternative
terms ‘consent’ and ‘negligence’. The chapter will analyse the process of the legal
discourse being gradually inﬂuenced by articulations on the discursive ﬁeld.
The Södertälje case, 1995
At the time of the Södertälje case, the Swedish rape legislation was a gender-neutral
version of the Penal Code (PC) from 1965, implemented in 1984. The offence of
rape was regulated as follows:
A person who by violence or threat which involves or appears to the threatened
person to involve an imminent danger, forces another person to have sexual
intercourse or to engage in a comparable sexual act is guilty of rape […]. Caus-
ing incapacitation or a similar state shall be regarded as equivalent to violence.
(SFS, 1984:399, PC, Chapter 6, Section 1)
In this section of law, the terms ‘forces’, ‘violence’, ‘threat’ and ‘causing incap-
acitation’ appeared as nodal points for how the offence of rape was to be deﬁned.
The offence of sexual exploitation is also relevant and was laid down in law
as follows:
A person who induces another person to engage in a sexual act by gross
abuse of his or her dependent state or by improperly taking advantage of
the fact that the he or she is helpless or in some other state of incapacita-
tion […] is guilty of sexual exploitation.
(SFS, 1984:399, PC, Chapter 6, Section 3)
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The term ‘taking advantage’ and the wording ‘helpless or in some other state of
incapacitation’ here appear as nodal points in the legal discourse. At this point, it
is relevant to note the distinction between causing incapacitation (prerequisite for
the offence of rape) and exploiting someone who is helpless or already in some
other state of incapacitation (prerequisite for the offence of sexual exploitation).
It was in this speciﬁc legal context that the Södertälje rape was committed.
In July 1995, an 18-year-old woman, called Anna by the media, was at
a restaurant in Södertälje. She was very intoxicated. A 22-year-old man
offered her a lift home to the smaller town outside Södertälje where she
lived. Once inside the car, she discovered three other young men. Three of
the men had repeated sexual intercourse with the woman in the car. There-
after they took her to an apartment where further vaginal and oral sexual
intercourse was carried out. They then promised to take the woman home
but, on the way, they stopped the car and one of the men again demanded
that she have intercourse with him. The woman, who at this point had
sobered up, then bit him in the throat. After this the woman was left and
was able to call her step-father to be picked up.2
Almost two years later, Södertälje District Court, the lowest court in Sweden,
sentenced three of the men to imprisonment for sexual exploitation because
they, according to the newspaper Expressen, ‘had exploited the girl who, due to
her severe intoxication, had been helpless’ (24/4 1997). Another newspaper,
Aftonbladet, highlighted the term helpless and further developed the description
of what this condition means: ‘[The court] was of the opinion that Anna was
completely helpless. She was very intoxicated, she was petriﬁed, she was alone’
(24/4 1997). The term helpless was here deﬁned in the everyday sense of the
word in terms of feelings ‘Anna’ experienced. Being helpless meant feeling
petriﬁed and alone.
Despite the prosecutor choosing to classify the offence as sexual exploitation
rather than rape, the judgement does not seem to have made visible any discrep-
ancy between the legal interpretation of the assault and the general conception
of justice. However, the word the newspapers borrowed from the judgement to
describe Anna’s fear was not the colloquial ‘helpless’ but the legal term ‘help-
less state’ – one of the nodal points in the legal discourse. In this discourse, the
colloquial term’s potentially ambiguous meaning was presumed to be ﬁxed in
an unambiguous manner – not dependent on ‘Anna’s’ subjective experiences. It
would later become evident that the disagreement about the deﬁnition of the
term helpless state revealed the inherent contingency of the legal discourse and
thereby created scope for a struggle for precedence of interpretation.
An appeal against the judgement in the Södertälje case was made to the
higher court, the Svea Court of Appeal, which acquitted the three men. The
newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN) reported the Senior Judge of Appeal’s explan-
ation in which a distinction was made between the legal nodal point helpless
state and the colloquial word helpless: ‘The girl was not in a helpless state. Nor
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was she in a state of incapacitation. She could both walk and talk. The section
that concerns sexual exploitation is there to protect people who are unconscious
or passed out’ (DN, 30/4 1997a). This then was another deﬁnition of the word help-
less – to be unconscious or passed out. In the legal discourse, being able to ‘walk
and talk’ was the same as not being in a helpless state. The court of appeal’s
narrowing of the deﬁnition, which resulted in an acquittal, can be seen as an
attempt to ﬁxate the legal discourse by excluding the alternative interpretations.
In the discrepancy between the court of appeal’s deﬁnition and that of the
media, a dilemma arose. Could it really be possible to do what the three men
had done and walk free? (DN, 30/4 1997a)
Neither the court nor now [the senior judge of appeal] discuss the possibil-
ity that an even moderately intoxicated girl weighing 45 kg may have felt
completely helpless against three men, particularly considering that she said
she had been very afraid of them. What ability could she have had to ﬁght
off the three with any success?
(DN, 6/5 1997)
The newspaper here sought an interpretation of the term helpless state as both
a subjective experience (that she had ‘felt helpless’) and a physical fact (her
weight in relation to the number of men). The wording can be seen as
a critique of the fact that the legal deﬁnition of the term helpless state is not
consistent with the general conception of justice. It was asserted in an opinion
piece that ‘the perpetrators had been acquitted, not because the court was con-
vinced of their innocence, but because the lawyers, through their sacred law,
have turned the reality of what happened into something only they can under-
stand!’ (DN, 30/4 1997b). The hegemony of the legal discourse was questioned
here by talking sarcastically about the ‘sacred law’.
The Senior Judge of Appeal responded to this criticism by stressing that the
men may have committed an offence other than sexual exploitation, implying
rape, but that this had not been examined in the court of appeal as the prosecu-
tion only pertained to sexual exploitation (Svenska Dagbladet, SvD, 3/5 1997).
This statement caused some debaters to instead direct their criticism at the
public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute the men for rape:
It is obvious that the prosecutor made a misjudgement when he declared
himself satisﬁed with the alternative classiﬁcation of the offence as sexual
exploitation in eight of the nine assaults. In the appeal, the prosecutor
should have maintained that rape had taken place in these cases as well.
(SvD, 4/5 1997)
The prosecutor regretted this but revealed his justiﬁcation: ‘I knew that I would
have problems proving that there had been violence or the threat of violence.
That is why I assessed there to be more chance of them being convicted of
sexual exploitation’ (DN, 30/4, 1997a). The prosecutor here portrayed the
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choice of how to classify the offence as tactical in order to achieve any kind of
conviction. In another article, the prosecutor said it was a problem that the
offences rape and sexual exploitation function as each other’s opposites so that
cases like this ‘fall between the cracks’ (Expressen, 24/4 1997). With this state-
ment, the prosecutor revealed that he did not necessarily comply with the legal
understanding of what constitutes rape, which gave the media legitimacy in
their critique of the judgement.
It is the task of the highest court in Sweden, the Supreme Court, to clear up
this type of uncertainty around how the law is to be interpreted – to ﬁxate the
legal discourse – by establishing certainty and clarity through its judgements.
The Supreme Court can be seen as the actor that, in addition to the legislature,
formulates the content of the legal discourse by literally having precedence of
interpretation. In the Södertälje case, the Supreme Court decided to concur with
the district court and convict the men of sexual exploitation by, in the words of
the news service Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå (TT), ‘broadening the term “help-
less state”’ (TT 10/9, 1997). The Prosecutor-General, who lead the prosecution,
opened up the possibility of including a more empathetic assessment of what it
means to be helpless in the legal discourse:
The court of appeal made it too easy for itself when it dismissed the poten-
tial to interpret what the law means by helpless state. Anna was intoxicated
and surrounded by seven men, entirely unknown to her, in unknown loca-
tions. She was extremely vulnerable and thus in a helpless state.
(DN, 25/8 1997)
Here further examples were given of what it could mean to be helpless –
being ‘vulnerable’ to ‘unknown men’ in ‘unknown’ locations. Through the
Supreme Court’s precedence of interpretation, the meaning of the term
helpless was ﬁxated and it was determined that a ‘broadened term’ would
apply.
However, the Södertälje case also initiated a discussion about the need to
amend the sexual offences legislation. Even prior to the Supreme Court judge-
ment, the then minister of justice, Laila Freivalds, criticised the justice system
and threatened to amend the legislation if the judgement was not the one she
favoured: ‘If the Supreme Court decision was to indicate the criminal law has
shortcomings in terms of the protection it provides against sexual assault, I will
not hesitate to immediately ensure that those shortcomings are rectiﬁed’ (SvD
30/5 1997). Another actor, the legislature, thus stepped into the discursive ﬁeld.
From the legislature’s perspective, it is, in order to encourage compliance with
the law, key that the wording of legislation and its application are closely
aligned with the general public’s conception of justice. Ahead of the Supreme
Court hearings, there were seemingly two possible outcomes, a judgement that
set precedent consistent with the general conception of justice or a change of
the wording of the law.
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The Prosecutor-General indicated which direction she thought the legal discourse
should take when she described how the conviction opened up the possibility of
perpetrators being convicted even if the victim is passive. It is incumbent
upon the man to realise the woman’s situation, even if she does not express
her fear or try to get away. If a woman is intoxicated the man must realise
that she is perhaps not able to make adequate assessments.
(Göteborgs-Posten, GP, 9/9 1997)
This articulation opened up the possibility of placing the responsibility for the
situation on the person who performed the sexual act; that which in the sexual
offences legislation of 2018 would come to be laid down in a negligence
requirement.
The term consent was also mentioned in relation to the conviction in the
Supreme Court. Expressen predicted that
the judgment would have several positive effects. It will become easier for
prosecutors to bring prosecutions in similar cases. The responsibility is
transferred back from women to men, who must ensure that both or all par-
ties have given their consent prior to having sex. […] It is a partially new
but entirely reasonable interpretation of the term ‘helpless state’.
(Expressen, 11/9 1997)
The conviction thus opened for a discursive potential to connect consent and
negligence to rape and sexual exploitation. This set out two alternative nodal
points to force and helpless state.
Following the judgement, Freivalds said that it was a step in the right direc-
tion but that uncertainties remained ‘within the area of sexual offences’. She
announced that a government committee of inquiry would be appointed to ‘clar-
ify the terms’ (TT, 10/9 1997). The terms of reference for the committee, called
1998 års Sexualbrottskommitté [the Sexual Offences Committee of 1998], stated
that the alternative nodal point consent was to be investigated. The committee
was to explicitly examine whether the requirements for violence, threat or
a state of incapacitation could be replaced by a ‘consent construction’ (Leijon-
hufvud, 2015:44).
The Tumba case, 2003
A few years later, in 2001, the Sexual Offences Committee presented its report in
which the matter of consent had been investigated. This report pointed out that
the requirement for force could undeniably be seen as an obstacle to taking legal
action against what ‘rightfully should be punishable acts’ (SOU, 2001:14, pp.
89f.). However, the committee did not go all the way and propose consent-based
legislation, choosing instead to retain violence, threat or a state of incapacitation
as prerequisites for the offence of rape.
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One of the arguments was that a prerequisite of consent risked leading to
a ‘reversed burden of proof’, meaning that it was up to the man to prove that
the woman had consented and not the other way around. A consent regulation
was thus deemed to challenge another of the legal discourse’s central nodal
points – the principle of on whom the burden of proof lay (SOU, 2001:14,
p. 128). This left the terms consent and negligence hanging in the air, while the
terms violence, force and incapacitation were once again ﬁxated as nodal points
in the legal discourse through having been given new political legitimacy.
Nonetheless, other legislative changes were proposed, for example that the
prerequisite for sexual exploitation, exploiting someone who is already ‘helpless
or in some other state of incapacitation’, should be moved to the section on
rape. I will return to this, but because the amendment did not happen until
2005, the legal situation was unchanged at the time of the ‘Tumba case’.3
In February 2003, a 32-year-old mother of two was at a bar in Tumba,
a Suburb outside Stockholm, together with a female friend. She met three
younger men that she knew superﬁcially. The party left the bar together and
the men gave the woman a ride home. After that point, the woman has no
memory and she suspected that she had been drugged, however this could
not be proven. Once in the woman’s apartment, the men carried out repeated
oral and vaginal intercourse with the woman, sometimes several men at the
same time. Further men came to the apartment, and a total of seven different
men were suspected of having had intercourse with the woman over several
hours. Between the instances of intercourse, the woman walked around the
apartment, intoxicated and naked, smeared in semen.
Four men were prosecuted in Huddinge District Court for sexual exploitation.
The media appeared to have learned the legal terminology after the Södertälje
case and explained: ‘The fact that the offence is classiﬁed as sexual exploitation
is because the woman, by drinking alcohol, has contributed to being in what is
called a “helpless state”’ (TT, 9/4 2003). The choice to legitimise in this
instructive manner the court’s classiﬁcation of the offence suggests the hegem-
ony of the legal discourse. However, the fact that there is any need to explain
the court’s deﬁnition reveals that this is obviously deﬁned as rape outside of the
legal discourse. In other words, the wording makes it clear that there was
a discrepancy between the general conception of justice and the law.
As if to anticipate the criticism of the charges brought that was directed at the
prosecutor in the Södertälje case, the public prosecutor admitted in Aftonbladet that
‘because rape in colloquial terms is to have sex with someone who doesn’t want to,
I can see how it seems a bit odd that we lawyers classify it differently’ (17/4 2003).
The prosecutor here presumed that the general public, as opposed to the lawyers, had
a perspective on rape that did not assume force, meaning instead a lack of consent.
Both Huddinge District Court and the Svea Court of Appeal acquitted the
four men with the argument that the woman had not been in a helpless state.
The judgements sparked strong reactions in the newspapers’ editorial and
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opinion pages. ‘A lone woman against four men, how is she supposed to
defend herself regardless of whether she is sober or not? Can you be any more
helpless than that?’ (GP 29/4 2003). ‘Blind drunk women are every man’s prop-
erty in Sweden. The court of appeal judgment in the Tumba group rape trial
cannot be interpreted in any other way’ (GP 5/11 2003). The criminal law pro-
fessor Madeleine Leijonhufvud, who would become a leader in the political
struggle for consent-based legislation, warned in Aftonbladet of what could
happen unless there was change in how the law is applied: ‘I see great, great
anger emerging, not least among young women. […] They are becoming
a strong political force that are forcing a change to the law so that it actually
protects them’ (7/11 2003).
In addition to the term helpless state, the news reporting pinpointed
another nodal point in the legal discourse that had not been discussed in the
Södertälje case, that rape is a crime committed with intent. For a sexual act
to be an offence, the perpetrator must be aware that the act is committed
using force but chooses to carry on regardless. The district court’s justiﬁca-
tion for the acquittal, as it was reported in the media, questioned whether
there was intent:
The woman [had] voluntarily gone with the men in the car to the apartment.
One of them had previously danced with her at a restaurant. She had report-
edly behaved in a sexy manner. According to herself, she can be perceived as
ﬂirty. She was happy and giggly when she left the restaurant. ‘Even though it
may be difﬁcult to understand how anyone voluntarily wants to be part of
such activities as occurred in the apartment, this behaviour – from the men’s
point of view – cannot be considered so unnatural that it is proven that they
had exploited the state she was in’, the court writes.
(TT, 25/4 2003)
DN’s response to the acquittal in the court of appeal suggested that this hypoth-
esis was perceived as ridiculous:
The woman was helpless when she was sexually exploited by several men.
But they didn’t understand that she was helpless because she was active.
That was the court of appeal’s reasoning when it acquitted four men in the
much-discussed Tumba case.
(2/12 2003)
The leader writer Maria Carlshamre described how the requirement for intent,
combined with the lack of both a consent and a negligence prerequisite,
deprived women of their rights:
Swedish legislation has an implied prerequisite: women are basically available
for sexual intercourse – unless otherwise speciﬁed. On the other hand, men are
not being held responsible for ﬁnding out whether women consent to
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intercourse. And if a woman ﬁnds herself in a helpless state, it is sufﬁcient for
the men to be too dumb to realise that for them to walk completely free.
(DN 4/11 2003)
This summed up what was perceived to be the problem with the nodal points
that constituted the legal discourse on rape at that time – that in the legislation
and in practice women were, as a rule, available and men were relieved of
responsibility (cf. Andersson, 2004). At the same time, the possibility of an
alternative legal discourse was articulated, one that was based not on force and
intent but on consent and responsibility in a way that is similar to the sexual
offences legislation of 2018.
The debate came to encompass the change to the legislation that had been
announced in the debate concerning the Södertälje rape. As mentioned above,
the Sexual Offences Committee of 1998 had presented its report in 2001 (SOU,
2001:14), but by 2003, no legislative change had been proposed. In the debate
about the Tumba case, the social democrat government, represented by the new
Minister of Justice Tomas Bodström, took the opportunity to launch the forth-
coming proposal.
The question of whether it shall be possible to classify an assault as rape
when a severely intoxicated woman is sexually exploited is one of the
questions the Ministry of Justice is currently wrestling with. A new pro-
posal will be presented before the end of the year […]. Under this proposal,
sexual assaults against severely intoxicated, sleeping or disabled people
will in future be classiﬁed as rape.
(SvD, 14/10 2003)
It was evident here that the government had seized on the problem that in nei-
ther the Södertälje case nor the Tumba case had the prosecutor considered
themselves able to prosecute for rape, choosing instead to classify the offences
as sexual exploitation. Under this proposal, the solution was to allow more
experiences of assault to be classiﬁed as rape. Some described the forthcoming
legislative amendment as a solution to the legal dilemma. ‘If this proposed new
law had applied, the men would have been prosecuted for rape, not sexual
exploitation’ (Sydsvenskan, 5/11 2003).
However, many debaters were not satisﬁed. Instead, the demand for
a consent prerequisite was again brought to the fore. ‘“Amend the law so
that the woman’s consent it required!” is the new battle cry from all of those
who have already tired of Bodström’s legislative amendment before it has
even come into force’ reported Anna Dahlberg, leader writer at Expressen
(20/11 2003).
In modern sexual offences legislation, the starting point must be that the
person who wants to have sex is responsible for establishing whether this
desire is reciprocated. The woman’s duty to resist should be replaced by
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the man’s duty to ensure there is consent wrote DN’s leader writer Maria
Carlshamre (4/11 2003).
However, in his response to the newspapers’ critique, Bodström made it clear
that the new law would not contain a consent prerequisite: ‘Minister of Justice
Bodström has ﬁnished considering this point: he says that if we reverse the
burden of proof, Sweden risks ending up in the European Court of Justice’ (GP,
6/11 2003). It became clear at this point that the legislature not only had the
political duty to listen to the general public but was also forced to align with
the legal discourse. Arguing that Sweden risked ending up in the European
Court of Justice if the legislation was brought closer in line with the general
conception of justice, Bodström clearly marked the boundaries of what changes
to the legal discourse were possible. Rhetorically choosing to describe consent-
based legislation – a format for the legislation that had already been applied in
several countries – as a violation of one of the most important principles of the
legal discourse – to ‘reverse the burden of proof’ – further legitimised the legis-
lature’s decision on this issue. Stating that he had ‘ﬁnished considering this
point’ created a ﬁxation of the legal discourse.
Despite the announcement that new legislation, which, if it had been in
force when the Tumba case happened, could have resulted in a rape convic-
tion, was on the way, the case was brought before the Supreme Court. This
was interpreted by some to mean that the articulations of the discursive ﬁeld
had literally inﬁltrated the legal discourse. Expressen wrote that ‘the lawyers
for the accused claim that the Prosecutor-General had given in to popular
opinion and that is why the case had been brought before the Supreme
Court’ (30/3 2004).
However, the actual reason why the case was brought was to examine the
issue of intent. The Prosecutor-General said that:
It involves, among other things, making it clear what responsibility can be
demanded of the suspects, of the three men in this case. If it is as the men say,
that she was the instigator, it is still not OK to just go ahead. You may not take
advantage of someone who is in no ﬁt state to realise what she is offering.
(SvD, 31/3 2004)
In the Tumba case, just like in the Södertälje case, the Prosecutor-General opened
up the possibility of a more empathetic approach to the victim’s situation to be
included in the legal discourse; in the quote, it is worded in a way that is reminis-
cent of the reasoning concerning negligence in the legislation of 2018.
Nevertheless, this approach was absent when the Supreme Court also chose
to acquit the men. According to the media reporting, the argument was instead
based once more on the fact that the women had not been in a helpless state:
There is no doubt that she was drunk and had lost her sense of judge-
ment. However, this doesn’t mean that she was in a helpless state of the
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kind the law deﬁnes as grounds for it being an offence to have sexual
relations with her.
(Aftonbladet, 5/5 2004a)
The legal vacuum between rape and sexual exploitation was again highlighted
in the editorial pages of both Aftonbladet and Expressen: ‘Either you have been
forced to have sex or you have been so passed out that you have not been able
to notice any sexual advances whatsoever. In between those situations, nothing
criminal has occurred’ (Expressen, 5/5 2004). ‘In a legal sense, it is not possible
to convict the men. In principle, this proves that the law, as it is currently
worded, is based on a degrading view of mankind’ (Aftonbladet, 5/5 2004b). It
is ‘a hard day for Swedish gender equality’ is how Expressens leader writer
Anna Dahlberg summed up the situation (5/5 2004).
The Husby rape, 2006
The new sexual offences legislation came into force on 1 April 2005 (Govt.
Bill, 2004/05:45). The change that had the greatest relevance for the cases ana-
lysed here was the second paragraph of the section on rape where it was stipu-
lated that someone could be convicted of rape who, in addition to violence and
threat, performs sexual intercourse or a sexual act with a person:
[…] by unlawfully exploiting the fact that this person, due to being uncon-
scious, asleep, intoxicated or under the inﬂuence of drugs in some other way,
ill, injured or having some form of mental disorder, or, taking into account
the circumstances, is otherwise in a helpless state.
(SFS, 2005:90, PC, Chapter 6, Section 1)
Here, the prerequisite for sexual exploitation – exploiting someone who already
was in a helpless state – had been included in the prerequisite for the offence of
rape and had also been speciﬁed through a list of possible situations in which
a helpless state could exist. This change would make it possible to avoid the
dilemma the prosecutors faced in both the Södertälje case and the Tumba
case – the difﬁculty of prosecuting for rape. It was in this legal context that the
Husby case occurred.
The night of the 14 May 2006, a 25-year-old woman visited a disco in cen-
tral Stockholm. She drank alcohol and felt nauseous, which is why she
chose to leave the place. On her way home, she met three unknown men
who took her with them in an unlicensed taxi. The woman was taken to an
apartment in Husby, a Suburb to Stockholm. Once there she has vague
memories of two men having intercourse with her. In the morning, the
woman is thrown out of the apartment and is encouraged by a friend to
report the incident to the police.
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The Husby case was the ﬁrst group rape case with media attention that would
be tried under the new legislation. The prosecutor argued that the men had
exploited the woman’s helpless state and chose to prosecute them for aggra-
vated rape. SvD reminded the readers of why it was now possible to charge
the men with rape: ‘Under the new sexual offences legislation from 2005,
sexual assaults against victims who are severely intoxicated are to be classiﬁed
as rape rather than sexual exploitation’ (25/10 2006). However, despite the
amended legislation, Stockholm District Court acquitted the men. ‘Difﬁculty
with proof despite the new law’ was the headline in Aftonbladet following the
judgement (23/11 2006).
Again, it was the deﬁnition of the term helpless state that was the prob-
lem: ‘According to the district court, it is not possible to conclude that the
woman was in a helpless state and there are therefore no grounds on which
to examine whether she was the victim of rape’ (Expressen, 22/11 2006).
The acquittal showed that, more than ten years after the Supreme Court set
the precedent that a helpless state could mean ‘being vulnerable to unknown
men in unknown locations’ in its judgement in the Södertälje case, the legal
discourse could still use the level of intoxication as a measurement of help-
less state.
The victim’s lawyer expressed her surprise at the judgement, according to the
newspaper Metro:
Even though there is new sexual offences legislation that is supposed to
protect victims of crime who are under the inﬂuence of alcohol and drugs,
we are stuck in a situation where assessments are being made under the old
legislation. If we don’t change our viewpoint, we’ll never be able to take
legal action against this type of men’s violence against women.
(24/11 2006)
With this statement, the lawyer gave legal legitimacy to the new law and
instead directed her criticism inwards, towards the actors within the legal dis-
course and their inability to read the new law in the way the legislature
intended.
It is conceivable that the district court judgement in the Husby case was per-
ceived as problematic by the government that had pushed the legislation
through and put their faith in it working. Thus, it might have been a relief when
the Svea Court of Appeal sentenced the men to imprisonment for rape when the
judgement in the Husby case was appealed against the following year. Aftonbla-
det wrote that
The court of appeal is of the opinion, in contrast to the district court, that it
is beyond reasonable doubt that the men have raped the now 27-year-old
woman. According to the court of appeal, the men have exploited the
woman’s helpless state and they were also well aware of this.
(5/10 2007)
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The judgement conﬁrmed that the men had exploited the woman and that they
did this with intent. In that respect, the judgement can be seen as a defence of
the new legislation and as a reﬂection of the fact that the legal discourse and
the general conception of justice were in accord.
The Tensta rape, 2013
After the Husby rape, the sexual offences legislation was however still debated.
The government therefore decided to set up a special inquiry, the 2008 Sexual
Offences Inquiry, tasked with evaluating the application of the 2005 sexual
offences reform. This assignment included once more investigating and deter-
mining whether the current requirement for force as a basis for criminal liability
for rape should be replaced with a requirement for a lack of consent.
In its report, the inquiry argued that even though the protection of per-
sonal and sexual integrity as well as sexual self-determination had been
reinforced through the new legislation, the term helpless state was con-
sidered too limited to cover all acts where the perpetrator had exploited the
situation the victim was in (SOU, 2010:71). Following this inquiry, the
government however once again made the assessment that the disadvan-
tages that a consent regulation would entail were not outweighed by the
advantages (Leijonhufvud, 2015, p. 75). Instead, the result of the inquiry was
that the government proposed a minor amendment to the second paragraph of
the rape section, which meant that the term helpless state was replaced with the
broader term ‘particularly vulnerable situation’ (Govt. Bill, 2012/13:111). The
legislature argued that, by doing so, several of the acquittals covered heavily in
the media could be avoided in future. However, before the change came into
force on 1 July 2013, the Tensta case occurred.
On 2 March 2013, a 15-year-old girl went with two female friends to the
Stockholm suburb of Tensta to attend a private party. In the apartment were
eight similarly aged boys who the girl did not know. Later on, when one of
the friends had gone home and the other was very intoxicated, the girl was
in a bedroom where she had intercourse with one of the boys. Subsequently
a situation occurred where ﬁve other boys lined up to have intercourse with
the girl. The girl said that she did not want to, but the boys repeatedly had
intercourse with her. They had taken her jacket and phone and at times the
room was locked. When the boys were ﬁnished, the girl left the apartment
and reported the incident to the police.
In June 2013, Solna District Court found ﬁve boys guilty of aggravated rape.
‘In legal terms, the girl was in a helpless state. She was outnumbered, she did
not know the boys, they were obtrusive, and she was afraid of them beating her
up if she did not do as they said’ (TT 14/6, 2013). TT’s reporting of the judge-
ment indicates that the district court appears to have used the broader deﬁnition
of helpless state that had been applied by the Supreme Court in its assessment
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of the Södertälje case. Helpless state was described as being possible to deﬁne
as a subjective experience of fear, and not directly related to the level of intoxi-
cation not just in the general conception of justice but also in legal terms.
However, the judgement was appealed and the Svea Court of Appeal
acquitted the boys in September 2013. The judge explained to Aftonbladet
that ‘the intercourse that took place could very likely have occurred against
her expressed will, but if it is not exploitation of a helpless state, it is not
rape’ (28/9 2013). The court of appeal judge here defended the acquittal by
reminding us that the new legislation was not based on a consent prerequisite –
intercourse that took place against someone’s will was not by deﬁnition illegal.
However, critics argued that the judgement did not pertain to deﬁciencies in the
legislation, rather to lawyers’ ‘male perspective’ (Kvällsposten, 5/10 2013).
The fact that the court considers it possible that the boys would not be
aware of the imbalance of power in that room and would not be able to
understand that the girl was afraid shows a shockingly low faith in boys’
ability to be sympathetic and to assess reciprocity.
(Expressen, 27/9 2013a)
This problematises, once again, the term intent and what responsibility should
be demanded of the person who actively carried out the sexual act.
Between the conviction in the district court and the acquittal in the court of
appeal, the amendment from helpless state to particularly vulnerable situation
had entered into force, which is why the reporting of the Tensta case came, to
some extent, to be characterised by a sense of hope for the future. ‘You can
read between the lines of the court of appeal’s grounds for the judgement that if
it had been possible to apply the new law, they would have been convicted’
(Expressen, 27/9 2013b). However, the acquittal was not just debated in terms
of hope, the debate was also suffused with a resignation to the fact that the
legislation always seemed to be one step behind reality; that the legislature
acted reactively rather than proactively. Expressen’s Maria Rydhagen wrote that
‘when it comes to rape, the law is like a tone-deaf drunk […]. I think few
Swedes support or even understand the Svea Court of Appeal judgement that
was announced yesterday’ (28/9 2013). Instead, the judgement gave rise to new
demands for consent-based regulation:
One proposal that has been brought up again is a requirement for consent
for sex. […] After this judgment in the Svea Court of Appeal, this proposal
should be properly examined. In a democracy, courts cannot in the long run
go against people’s sense of justice.
(Aftonbladet, 1/10 2013)
Evidently, as the legal discourse had failed time and again to achieve convic-
tions in cases that seemed clear-cut in the general conception of justice, its
hegemony was weakened and alternative nodal points such as consent appeared
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increasingly attractive, even among members of parliament. There was now
a political ‘breeding ground’ for a change towards consent-based legislation
(Expressen, 6/10 2013).
On 28 August 2014, the government decided to set up a special inquiry with the
task of once again reviewing the offence of rape, an inquiry that was later reorgan-
ised into the 2014 Sexual Offences Committee. Two years later, on October 2016,
the Committee recommended a consent-based legislation (SOU, 2016:16). After
a long period of referral for consideration and comment, the government bill was
presented in parliament, which was adopted on 23 May 2018. Consent-based legis-
lation entered into force in Sweden on 1 July 2018.
Conclusion
I have shown how the amendment to the sexual offences legislation in 2018 is
the result of a discursive process in which the terms ‘consent’ and ‘negligence’
have been gradually introduced, heavily debated and slowly implemented in the
legal discourse over a period of more than twenty years. Theoretically, I have
shown how the legal shift from a force-based legislation to a consent-based con-
struction is the result of an ongoing interplay between challenging articulations
on the discursive ﬁeld and attempts to ﬁxate the meaning of terms on the legal
discourse. By deﬁnition, continuous attempts to ﬁxate nodal points is what con-
stitutes a discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).
Although a consent-based legislation has come into force in other countries far
earlier than in Sweden, this has not been utilised in the Swedish debate, neither as
an argument for nor against such a legal construction. Instead, the aim of this chap-
ter has been to show that the discursive ﬁeld where this legal process took shape
has been the news reports and debate about a number of hyper-medialised Swedish
group rape cases. News reports and debate about these cases have formed the arena
where the voices of the law have been both defending the legal discourse and high-
lighting its dilemmas, such as the various potential meanings of ‘helpless state’ and
the crack between the offences rape and sexual exploitation. The cases have also
formed the arena where representatives of the legislator have attempted to meet the
demands for a change expressed in the public opinion and bridge the discrepancy
between the general conception of justice and the law.
It is clear that in Sweden, the appointment of government committees of
inquiry plays a crucial part in the development and implementation of political
reform. In fact, Swedish historian Sara Edenheim has shown that appointing
a committee might be of greater political value than to actually implementing
its recommended change (2005). However, news media is central in this polit-
ical process, and speciﬁcally the news reports about group rape cases have
offered a sufﬁciently turbulent situation for the challenging articulations on the
discursive ﬁeld to have an impact (cf. Nilsson, 2018). The news reports of the
legal discourse failing time and again to achieve convictions in cases that
seemed clear-cut in the general conception of justice weakened its hegemony
and gradually made the alternative nodal point consent appear increasingly
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attractive, even among members of parliament. With the new legislation that
entered in force in July 2018 (SFS 2018:618), it remains to be seen how the
various potential meanings of consent, or voluntariness, and liability for negli-
gence will be interpreted.
Notes
1 All quotes from newspaper articles have been translated from Swedish by the author.
2 All summaries are made by the author and are based on the information given about
the cases in the news.
3 The law was unchanged apart from a minor amendment that was adopted as part of
the Kvinnofridspropositionen [the Women’s Peace Bill] (Govt. Bill, 1997/98:55).
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8 Rape law and coercive circumstances
Helena Jokila and Johanna Niemi
Introduction
Rape law has undergone several changes since the second-wave feminist move-
ment placed such legislation on the agenda in the 1970s (Brownmiller, 1974/
1993; Estrich, 1987). One central debate has been whether lack of consent or
use of force should be considered the basic element of rape (MacKinnon, 1996,
2006; McGlynn & Munro, 2010). Broadly speaking, the European continental
countries have historically relied on (and still rely on) use of force in their def-
initions of rape, while the Anglo-Saxon countries use lack of consent as the
central element of rape (European Court of Human Rights
[ECtHR] M. C. v Bulgaria, 2003, pp. 156–162; Munro, 2010). Alongside these
two legislative strategies, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY, respectively) have convicted as
rape any sex crimes committed under coercive circumstances, under which no
consent can be valid. Recent international documents and case law have again
emphasised lack of consent as the essential element of rape, and a similar trend
has occurred in the Nordic countries.
We argue in this chapter that the differences between the two main legal def-
initions of rape are more of a technical nature than about the underlying under-
standing of rape as a type of wrongdoing. We argue that, despite their
differences, the two strategies of rape law at a deeper level share the same onto-
logical and epistemological basis and offer insufﬁcient responses to rape under
coercive circumstances. At the ontological level, both deﬁnitions focus on
a certain criminal act and exclude context. In this chapter, we focus on the coer-
cive circumstances of rape and how the courts take such circumstances into
account.
Epistemologically, evidence in the courts is connected to physical signs of
violation, external observation by witnesses and, increasingly, expert testimony
of trauma. The purpose of evidence is to show that the individualised act hap-
pened, not to provide evidence of the surrounding circumstances.
Historically, the notion of the context of rape has broadened to show that the
victim had behaved in a way that demonstrated consent or lack of resistance by
drinking, ﬂirting or her manner of dressing (O’Donovan, 1997, p. 53). In this
chapter, we look at the context of rape from another perspective. We use the
concept of coercive circumstances (taken up by the ICTR and ICTY) and look
at the case law of the ECtHR and the Finnish courts to see how they have
noted elements of coercive circumstances. First, we brieﬂy present national
legislative discourses. While we focus on Finland, we also refer to develop-
ments in other Nordic countries and in Canada.
The concept of coercive conditions that the ICTR and ICTY used concerned
fairly extreme circumstances. Munro (2010) has argued that the coercive-
circumstances element is problematic in national contexts of rape (as opposed
to international or armed conﬂicts). She argues that there is a qualitative differ-
ence between rapes in these circumstances. During conﬂicts, rape is committed
in the context of other wrongful acts; the perpetrator and victim do not know
each other and belong to antagonistic ethnic or social groups. In peacetime,
many rapes are committed between people who are close to each other or know
each other, rapes are not always accompanied by other forms of physical vio-
lence and threats, and the power relations at play are more complex (Munro,
2010, p. 24). In addition, replacing consent with the idea of coercive circum-
stances would undermine women’s sexual autonomy (Munro, 2010, p. 26).
In this chapter we investigate what the consideration of coercive circum-
stances would mean in the adjudication of rape under normal, peacetime cir-
cumstances. Our empirical data are drawn from Finnish courts. We focus on
cases of rape in intimate partnerships and among youth – both of which illumin-
ate problems in the application of rape law – and analyse what kinds of coer-
cive circumstances are present in these types of rape and how the courts have
addressed these circumstances.
Theory, method, and data
Theoretically, law is a social construction, made in legislative processes and
legal practices. Relying on constructionist theory, we argue that facts are also
socially constructed during these processes (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Burr,
1995). Thus, the courts construct the facts of a given case, and criminal law
guides crime-investigation processes and interpretations (Bennet & Feldman,
1984; Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Honkatukia & Ruuskanen, 2007).
In criminal-law doctrine, sexual self-determination is the foremost value
protected by criminal law on sex crimes. Self-determination is a central aspect
of personal autonomy, which is the central tenet of the construction of legal
personhood. In legal doctrine, a ‘person’ is usually understood to be a uniﬁed,
pre-existing and stable entity who is morally immune to and isolated from the
inﬂuence of other people. We instead adhere to critical analysis of the legal
person and autonomy, according to which personality and autonomy develop
during social interactions with other people. Interaction makes the capacity to
self-determine possible. We draw on the relational concept of autonomy pro-
posed by several feminist legal theorists (Davies, 2001; Fineman, 2004; Naf-
ﬁne, 2011).
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The relational understanding of autonomy is linked to trust (Lacey, 1998, pp.
62–68; Nedelsky, 1989, p. 11), which can be deﬁned in different ways. Drawing
on Govier (1993) and Brothers (1982), we understand trust to be an affective
entity and an individual and social experience – as a feeling of being safe with
other people. In psychology and feminist philosophy, trust in other people and
self-trust are thought of as supporting people’s experiences of themselves as
autonomous people (Brothers, 1982) and as the precondition for acting as moral
people (Govier, 1993).
Psychological studies indicate that a breach of trust in a sexual relationship
has unique consequences for victims. A person’s self-trust and self-respect can
collapse (Brothers, 1982) and can severely shake someone’s belief system about
the world. The betrayal of trust can destroy the feeling of being safe in the
intimate private sphere and of having control over one’s life. Victims of sexual
violence in intimate relationships typically suffer from the psychological conse-
quences of the crime longer than victims of stranger rape do (Gidycz & Koss,
1991, p. 279; Katz, 1991, pp. 264–265; Näre, 2000).
In our reading of case law, we are interested in trust: What aspects of the
context indicate that a level of trust has existed between the victim and the per-
petrator? Do the courts address issues of trust in their decisions?
Today the debates about the elements of rape are international or trans-
national; we thus refer to discussions in other Nordic countries as the nearest
reference points for Finnish legislative processes. Canadian rape law has gone
the furthest in requiring afﬁrmative consent for sexual intercourse to proceed.
Because most of the pressure to introduce laws that criminalise non-consensual
sex has come from international law, we also look at central international docu-
ments and cases. Our empirical data consist of published Finnish court decisions
on rape (identiﬁed through Finlex and Edilex) from 2000 until 2018. In add-
ition, the data include all 98 cases from the Finnish courts of appeal in
1999–2002. From this sample, originally collected by Jokila (2010) for her doc-
toral thesis, we have analysed cases of intimate partner rape and rape among
young people between 16 and 19 years old.
Legal developments
National laws: from use of force towards lack of consent
Traditionally, the Nordic countries have relied on a model in which the basic
element of rape is use of force or threat of force. This basic deﬁnition has been
complemented by deﬁnitions of rape or sexual abuse that criminalise abuse of
a person who is unable to consent or resist because of unconsciousness, illness,
disability or similar conditions. Especially after 2004, debates about rape-law
reform have shifted towards the lack-of-consent model.
Swedish law included a distinction between rape with the use of force and
the sexual abuse of a person who was unable to express resistance until 2018.
Between these two sex crimes was an abyss that was debated while several
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cases – referred to by place names such as Jordbro, Rissne, Tumba, Södertälje
and Stureplan – were processed through the courts (see Nilsson’s chapter in this
volume). The facts in these cases had similarities: one victim, usually a young
woman, who was intoxicated but not passed out; several men; little to no phys-
ical violence; and no evidence of explicit threats and resistance in either words
or actions. In some of the cases, the defendants were convicted of rape, while
in others the courts dismissed the charges. The central problem was that the
victim had not passed out (which would have qualiﬁed as sexual abuse), nor
was there evidence to show use of force or resistance by the victim (which
would have qualiﬁed as rape). These cases then fed into a heated debate about
the construction of rape (Asp, 2010; Leijonhufvud, 2008). In 2018, the law was
changed, and intercourse or a comparable sexual act with someone who does
not participate voluntarily is now deﬁned as rape (Brottsbalk 6:1; as amended
by law, 2018:618).
Icelandic law has evolved to include both force and lack of consent (Iceland
Review, 2018). In Norway, rape is deﬁned as use of force, but the provision of
rape with grave negligence mitigates this position, even if this provision is very
rarely used. Lack of consent has also been discussed in Norway. Canadian law,
which emphasises the victim’s consent, requires afﬁrmative consent for sexual
intercourse to proceed. The legislation speciﬁcally mentions the abuse of trust
as an element of rape. Someone who is protected by the criminal provision is
constructed as a legal subject who actively and afﬁrmatively utters his or her
consent (or non-consent) with words or deeds. Canadian law requires that
a person take ‘reasonable steps’ to ﬁnd out whether or not a partner is consent-
ing. The use of the defence of ‘mistaken belief’ regarding the partner’s consent
is restricted (Gotell, 2010, p. 212). The Canadian model has been called the
‘communicative model’ of sexuality (Boyle, 1984; Pineau, 1996; critically,
Halley, 2016).
Consent is not and has never been a part of the legal deﬁnition in Finland. The
relevant Finnish legislation deﬁnes rape as a violent coercion to engage in sexual
intercourse:
A person who forces another into sexual intercourse by the use or threat of
violence directed against the person shall be sentenced for rape to imprison-
ment for at least one year and at most six years.1
(Criminal Code [CC] 20:1.1/1999)
Besides the use of force, a rape can be committed by taking advantage of
another person’s state of unconsciousness, illness, fear or helplessness, all of
which make this person incapable of formulating or expressing his or her will
to engage in sexual intercourse.2 According to the law:
Also a person who, by taking advantage of the fact that another person,
due to unconsciousness, illness, disability, state of fear or other state of
helplessness, is unable to defend himself or herself or to formulate or
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express his or her will, has sexual intercourse with him or her, shall be sen-
tenced for rape.
(CC 20:1.2/2014/509)
This paragraph was a reformulation of an outdated crime of sexual abuse of an
‘unconscious woman’. As a remnant of that previous law, the law still requires
the incapability of expressing resistance, but the widening of the scope of vulner-
able states brings the law closer to considering coercive circumstances. In add-
ition, the law also includes a less serious form of rape, which can be committed
by a less serious threat of force, abuse of a situation of helplessness, or other
kind of threat. In such situations, the punishment is meted out on a lower scale:
If the rape, taking into consideration the pettiness of the threat or the other
circumstances connected with the offence, is less serious when considered
as a whole than the acts referred to in subsections 1 or 2, the offender shall
be sentenced to imprisonment for at least four months and at most four
years. A person who forces another into sexual intercourse through other
than the threat referred to in subparagraph 1 shall be sentenced in a similar
manner. What is provided above in this subparagraph does not apply if vio-
lence has been used in the rape.
(CC 20:1.3/2014/509)
The deﬁnition of rape includes intercourse. Other sexual acts using force or the
abuse of helplessness and similar states constitute the crime of coercion to
engage in a sexual act (CC 20:4). The sexual abuse of people in dependent situ-
ations is also a crime (CC 20:5). Sex with someone who is 15 years old or
younger is considered child sexual abuse (CC 20:6), which we do not discuss in
this chapter.
When Finnish rape law was reviewed in 2013, the government discussed the
possibility of changing the basic element of rape to sexual non-consent (Ministry
of Justice, 2012; RP 216/2013). According to the Finnish government, those coun-
tries where a lack of consent is an essential element of rape also have additional
evidential rules concerning valid consent. Such evidentiary rules deﬁne the circum-
stances under which adequate consent can be given. The government concluded
that such evidentiary rules are not in line with the theoretical doctrines of evidence,
based on the free evaluation of evidence. According to the government, the idea
that sexual partners would take active steps to determine whether their partners had
consented to sex was unnatural (or ‘otherworldly’, according to RP 216/2013, 37).
Notwithstanding the legal deﬁnition, the core problem in the Finnish courts is
whether the complainant has consented to a sexual act (Ylikulju, 2017). The
Supreme Court (KKO, from the Finnish Korkein Oikeus) has interpreted the
elements of force, fear and helplessness:
Because A had said no to the [defendant] …, the groping and pushing to
the bedroom as well as the sitting on top of A, as described in the
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indictment, fulﬁl the element of violence. Due to the violence and fear and
helplessness caused by it, A had been forced to [have] intercourse.
(KKO:2013:96, 46)
According to the Supreme Court, the complainant was proved to have tried to
push the defendant away before the rape and that she had forbidden the defend-
ant to continue. The defendant had admitted that he had heard the complainant’s
refusal. The Supreme Court considered the question of consent:
The Supreme Court states as a point of departure that one cannot derive
a consent to [have] intercourse solely on the basis of ending physical or even
verbal resistance after having ﬁrst denied it. The intent or criminal liability is
not avoided just because one assumes that the other has changed her mind if
the change of mind has not been verbally or otherwise clearly expressed.
(KKO:2013:96, 48)
While the Supreme Court does not explicitly discuss trust in this case, the situ-
ation had evolved such that ‘A’ – who knew ‘K’ as an employer of a friend and
wished to be hired at K’s bar – had invited K to her apartment. These circum-
stances indicated some degree of trust in K. The case shows how the interpret-
ation of the use-of-force construction has come close to the lack-of-consent
construction, as required by international law instruments. The judgement does
not include an explicit reference to the ECtHR decision in M. C. v Bulgaria
(2003) nor to the Istanbul Convention,3 but the interpretation that use of force
actually means lack of consent provides reason to assume that the Supreme
Court is aware of the case and the Convention.
International law: from coercive circumstances to consent
Rape arrived on the agenda of international law under cruel circumstances.
Both the ICTR and the ICTY had to consider the elements of rape. The ICTR
in Akayesu (1998) and the ICTY in Kunarac (2002) held that the circumstances
of the cases were coercive and that consent was therefore irrelevant.4 Rape was
deﬁned in international law for the ﬁrst time in the Akayesu case (Munro,
2010); soon after, the statute of the International Criminal Court recognised
rape as a war crime and as a crime against humanity (art. 4[c] and 7[1]g; Cole,
2010; Walby et al., 2015, pp. 115–118).
The coercive-circumstances formulation highlights, among other things, the
power relationship between parties (MacKinnon, 2006, p. 941). In these cases,
the power imbalance was extreme, but the cases raise the question of what kind
of coercive circumstances would generally make consent irrelevant. MacKinnon
(2006, p. 951) criticised the tribunals for binding the coercive circumstances too
closely with the lack-of-consent deﬁnition of rape. The use-of-force construction
of rape in the Akayesu and Kunarac cases would not solve the issue, because in
these cases, the rapes had not been preceded by immediate force or threat.
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Rape remained on the international-law agenda after the Akayesu case, but with
an emphasis on lack of consent (UNDAW, 2010, p. 26). The ECtHR stated
in M. C. v Bulgaria (2003) that rape should be deﬁned as a crime committed
against one’s consent. After a review of the deﬁnitions of rape in the Council of
Europe member states, the ECtHR stated that most continental European deﬁnitions
of rape are based on violence or threat of violence, whereas in common law, rape is
usually constructed as lack of consent (M. C. v Bulgaria, pp. 156–162). The
ECtHR ruled that the central question of rape is whether the complainant has con-
sented to engage in sexual activity, and that laws should be interpreted accordingly.
The suitability of the lack-of-consent approach in M. C. v Bulgaria can be
questioned. The complainant in the case, a 14-year-old girl, was just above the
age of consent, which in Bulgaria was 14 years at the time. She was in the com-
pany of three 20- to 21-year-old men in a lonely place when the alleged rape
took place. No evidence was found of explicit violence, nor of resistance. The
police and the prosecutor closed the case. The ECtHR referred to the coercive
circumstances but did not deliberate on them:
The prosecutors forwent the possibility of proving the perpetrators’ mens
rea by assessing all the surrounding circumstances, such as evidence that
they had deliberately misled the applicant in order to take her to a deserted
area, thus creating an environment of coercion, and also by judging the
credibility of the versions of the facts proposed by the three men and wit-
nesses called by them.
(ECtHR M. C. v Bulgaria, p. 180; emphasis added)
The ECtHR has also examined other cases of the rape of young women in which
the court could have considered the legal relevance of the circumstances more
broadly (X & Y v the Netherlands, 1985; Aydin v Turkey, 1997; Maslova & Nalban-
dov v Russia, 2008, p. 91; I. G. v Moldova, 2012). In M. C. v Bulgaria, the legal
analysis and conclusions were focussed on the interpretation of the use-of-force
element in Bulgarian law to include lack of consent. Thus, the crucial moment to
develop an interpretation of coercive circumstances was lost. Subsequent analyses
of the case have not paid sufﬁcient attention to the coercive circumstances the
court mentioned but emphasise consent as the element of rape.
With the judgement of M. C. v Bulgaria, the lack of sexual consent became the
core element of European rape laws. The European Convention on preventing and
combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention
2011) conﬁrms this notion in article 36, which says that the parties to the Conven-
tion must take necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that engaging in
non-consensual penetrative or other acts of sexual nature will be criminalised. In
addition, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (the
CEDAW Committee), in its concluding observations on various country reports,
urged the states to set lack of consent as the core element of rape.5 As we discuss
in the following section, both the lack-of-consent and use-of-force constructions
deﬁne the context of rape narrowly – in our opinion too narrowly.
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Consent versus force – a false controversy?
Act-oriented criminal law
The protected good or interest of rape law is usually deﬁned as sexual self-
determination. In law drafting and case law, the basic tenets of self-determination
are seldom explicated. Self-determination (or ‘individual autonomy’) is the liberal
conception of free sexual choice based on rational decision-making and the under-
lying mind–body distinction (Lacey, 1998). Both lack of consent and use of force
are connected to the concept of autonomy, as feminist researchers have
pointed out (Lacey, 1998). In the lack-of-consent construction, the focus is
on the expression of opinion by a victim, thus emphasising a complainant’s
response to actions (earlier conceptualised as seduction) of a perpetrator
(MacKinnon, 2016). In the use-of-force construction, the focus is on the
denial of the will of the victim. Both constructions focus on the complain-
ant’s expression of determination (or the impossibility of expressing one)
and exclude the context.
In criminal law, the ontology of a crime is act-oriented. The concrete acts
must correspond to the elements as deﬁned in criminal law according to the
nullum crimen sine lege or legality principle, that all crimes must be prescribed
in law. The level of concretisation of the elements varies. While deﬁnitions of
crimes against property and the person are narrow in both time and space, in
the deﬁnitions of economic and environmental crimes, the actions, causality and
violations are deﬁned abstractly, and the time span may be long. In the deﬁn-
ition of a criminal act, the relevant context is constructed and to some degree
contingent (Kelman, 1981; Lacey, Wells & Quick, 2003; Smart, 1991). In add-
ition to the concrete and objective elements of crime, the criminal responsibility
requires a subjective element, usually intent (mens rea), which often is induced
from the concrete actions (evidence of facts).
The evidential considerations seem to be similar, notwithstanding the deﬁn-
ition of rape. In legal practice, rape is usually established evidentially by virtue
of physical signs (physical marks and injuries) as a result of violence and resist-
ance (Jokila, 2010). A complainant’s state of mind and behaviour after an
alleged rape has occurred are typically used as supporting evidence for the pro-
secutor’s case.
Andersson (2004) concluded in her empirical study that the victims were not
thought of as legal actors, except in response to the advances by the perpetrator.
According to Jokila’s study (2010), the defendants often argued that the com-
plainant had consented. The reporting of facts by the defendants and their lawyers
during pre-trial investigations and in written pleadings in that study demonstrated
discriminating attitudes towards women and prejudice about male and female
sexuality. Pejorative attitudes by the defence have been a widespread problem in
criminal justice, regardless of whether the use-of-violence or lack-of-consent
models are used (Adler, 1987; Estrich, 1987; Lees, 1996). In two Finnish studies,
such prejudicial language was not observed in the verdicts (Jokila, 2010; Ylikulju,
Rape law and coercive circumstances 127
2017), but the language of the defendants and their lawyers reﬂected prejudice
about the victim, such as interpreting paralysing fear as voluntariness, sexual fore-
play and tacit consent (Jokila, 2010).6
Rape in intimate relationships
Historically, rape in marriage was not a crime before the mid-20th century (Bur-
gess-Jackson, 1996; Kotanen’s chapter in this volume). Rape in marriage was
criminalised in Sweden in 1965, in Canada in 1983, in the UK in the early
1990s (ECtHR, R. C. v UK, 1995) and in Finland in 1994. Already in 1990,
Russell found that rape in marriage was more common than previously assumed
(Russell, 1990). Intimate partnerships take many forms today, as cohabitation is
commonplace. In court cases it is not always clear what the status of
a relationship is; on-and-off relationships are not uncommon.
In the Finnish appeal courts in 1999–2002, 18% of rapes were found to have
taken place in intimate partnerships (Jokila, 2010, p. 160). Typically, violence
in these cases had been physical, psychological and sexual, repeated and con-
tinued over long periods of time. The acts included in the indictment were only
a snapshot of long-lasting violence that in some cases continued after the inves-
tigation and prosecution had commenced. In these cases, the defendants were
usually convicted (Jokila, 2010, p. 171), but in some cases, the type of relation-
ship alleviated the sentence. In some cases, the court dismissed the charges with
some of several rapes, and in others the conviction was of rape of a lesser
grade (CC 20:1.3).
The courts were willing to stretch the context in these cases, but they
obviously had to struggle with the elements of rape. When the victim had
not resisted, the courts were sometimes willing to take previous violence
into account:
The victim had not dared to resist the defendant because she feared that
resistance would lead to violence as had happened before. According to the
victim the defendant had not threatened her verbally.
(District Court, 11)
The court discussed how the capacity to self-determination was broken and how
this lack could affect the ability of the victim to provide a coherent testimony:
Imprecision (in testimony) can be explained by the nature of crimes against
sexual self-determination. An indecent crime takes place by breaking the will
of the victim and it always has an effect on the state of mind of the victim.
(District Court, 11)
The defendant was convicted of lesser grade rape (CC 20:1.3). In another case,
in which violence preceding the actual rape had also occurred, the defendant
was convicted of rape. According to the complainant’s appeal in that case:
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The defendant has threatened and assaulted her physically for many years.
The complainant has been traumatized, and she is so afraid of her husband,
that she doesn’t dare to resist his wishes and orders. The complainant has
told in the court, that if she somehow resists the defendant, the defendant
usually begins to threaten her life. (The complainant’s appeal to the Court
of Appeal, Court of Appeal 64.)
In this and similar cases, the courts encountered problems in understanding why
the victim had let the estranged spouse into the apartment in the ﬁrst place. The
victims had tried to use different strategies to avoid violence and disturbance:
When the defendant shows up at her home, the complainant doesn’t always
dare to ask the defendant to leave, because she is afraid that he would
become violent.
(Court of Appeal, 64)
A discourse of involuntary consent appears in these cases:
Even though the victim testimony as such is credible, the evaluation of evi-
dence about the number of rapes is difﬁcult because the parties have also
had several times intercourse that the victim has not wanted but that she
nevertheless has consented to.
(Court of Appeal, 2)
In these cases, the core problem was whether or not a complainant had con-
sented to a sexual act – even if consent is not a deﬁnitional element of rape in
Finland. Thus, it is unlikely that problems at the level of legal application and
evaluation of evidence would be solved solely by adapting consent as part of
the deﬁnition of rape. Problems often originate from difﬁculties in distinguish-
ing freely given consent from submission, paralysing fear or a complainant’s
strategic inaction (Ehrlich, 2001).
In some judgements, the courts have focussed on fear and coercion. In one
case, the perpetrator did not use immediate violence to break the complainant’s
resistance but held the complainant against her will in an apartment for six hours.
He threatened her, assaulted her, tried to strangle her and ﬁnally raped her. She
was so afraid that she was unable to defend herself. The defendant argued that
there was a time gap between the violence and the sexual intercourse and that the
parties had solved their previous conﬂict before having sex. When sentencing,
the courts evaluated the totality of the defendant’s separate crimes in sentencing
the punishment (Kouvola Court of Appeal 22.11.2011, no. 1082).
A complainant who, paralysed by fear, submits to intercourse can be held as
consenting, albeit against her will. In one judgement, the core problem was how
to adjudicate sexual acts that ‘the complainant had not wanted, but that she
nevertheless had consented [to]’. In such situations, fear and passivity were
often a consequence of the perpetrator’s previous violence:
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When the defendant shows up to her home, the complainant doesn’t always
dare to ask the defendant to leave, because she is afraid that he would
become violent. The complainant has also told in court that sexual [inter-
course has] happened in situations, which, according to the complainant’s
previous experience, would have resulted in rape, if the complainant
wouldn’t [voluntarily] agree to sexual intercourse.
(Court of Appeal, 64)
Intimate partner rape, the complainant’s incapacity to form or utter her will, and
the problem of ‘involuntary consent’ are all connected to coercive circum-
stances in violent relationships that have broken the autonomy and trust of the
victim. In Appeal Court cases, the autonomy of the victims looks especially
weak and fragile if the perpetrator is a family member or otherwise close. In
these cases, trust has been destroyed a long time before the rape trial com-
mences. The typical descriptions of facts in legal documents indicate that such
victims have great difﬁculties in setting boundaries, taking care of themselves,
and trusting their own experiences and interpretations of events. Many of these
victims seem mentally fragile or mentally broken, and they seem to lack self-
conﬁdence and self-respect.
Rape and youth
Rape cases involving young parties may cause even more trouble to the courts
than rapes in intimate partnerships due to problems of autonomy and the cir-
cumstances of rape. In cases of child sexual abuse, trust in the relationship
between the perpetrator and the victim is a standard factor that the Supreme
Court refers to, which indicates that the abuse of trust is an aggravating circum-
stance (KKO:2018:35; 2018:30; 2017:51; 2017:50; 2017:31; 2011:102). In this
part, we analyse cases in which the victim has been above the legal age of con-
sent but nevertheless young: 16–19 years old.
The Supreme Court has provided only a few verdicts in rape cases, and
trust was not considered to be a central element in those cases. In district
and appeal courts, discourse on trust has circulated in some trials, thus shap-
ing the ways in which knowledge of the events was constructed. Jokila
(2010) found that a trust discourse was present in explanations of why
a complainant had spent time with the defendant before the alleged crime
took place or why she had let him into or gone with him to an apartment.
The question of whether a complainant had voluntarily entered or had been
forced into an apartment played a central role in the evaluation of evidence
in one Supreme Court case (KKO:2004:60).
The courts do not always take an explicit ‘no’ by a young woman for a ‘no’.
In one case, the defendant had already come on to her by the time they were
going to the apartment of the defendant’s sister. They were lying on a bed when
the defendant continued his sexual approaches. The defendant’s sister testiﬁed
that the complainant had told the defendant to stop several times; she did not
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intervene, however, because it did not sound like the complainant needed help.
After the sexual act, the complainant smoked a cigarette together with the
defendant and the sister. They talked about contraception, not about violence.
The complainant returned to the apartment, where the defendant came on to her
once more. The complainant now pushed him away and hit him in the face.
The Court of Appeal (106) dismissed the charge of lower degree rape. The
court stated that the complainant’s behaviour after the sexual act supported the
defendant’s version of events.
This case could be interpreted differently. Understood in the context of anx-
iety and confusion, the girl’s behaviour is understandable. She was young. She
tried to tell him to stop. Her behaviour afterwards could tell of agony, confusion
and breach of trust by the defendant. Afterwards, she hung out for a while with
the defendant and the witness, likely to preserve her honour in the eyes of her
friends and to try to avoid the stigma of being a rape victim. She may have
been ashamed of not having asserted herself against the defendant and not con-
trolling the situation.
Another case, this one between dating teenagers, showed evidence of the
complainant having complained and cried after intercourse. According to the
reasoning in the verdict of the District Court, the complainant had described
how she had tried to persuade the defendant to stop, but she did it in such
a way that other people in the house would not be awakened. She had told him
that she did not approve of premarital sex and tried to get up from the bed. She
had tried to negotiate. She had trusted him and had been conﬁdent that he
would listen to her and respect her will. Afterwards, she was confused and in
shock. The Court of Appeal was not convinced that she had resisted earlier, so
the charge of lower grade rape was dismissed (Court of Appeal, 90).
Jokila’s study (2010) showed that it is often difﬁcult for courts to understand
young women. She found that if the complainant went with the defendant vol-
untarily to an apartment, tried to tell him to stop (instead of resisting physically
and ﬁghting back) and ﬁnally stayed in the apartment afterwards, then charges
were sometimes dismissed due to lack of evidence (e.g. Court of Appeal, 90
and 106).
Such complainants do not ﬁt in with the idea of the autonomous rational
decision-maker who assertively expresses her non-consent and ﬁghts against her
attacker. But if trust is taken into account in the interpretation of events, then
some of these behaviours can be understood. For example, girls are traditionally
brought up to behave nicely and to negotiate themselves out of difﬁcult situ-
ations. When in the company of someone whom the girl trusts, these tactics
should succeed. When confused by the breach of trust, however, the girl might
behave, from a judge’s perspective, in a strange manner.
In one case (Court of Appeal, 5), rape was committed against a teenage
boy. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeal considered the breach of
trust to be a relevant element. The boy had met the defendant in a mall. They
knew each other, since they were from the same country. Therefore, the boy
trusted the defendant and accepted his invitation to his apartment, where the
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defendant gave him alcohol. He then got drunk, lost consciousness and was
anally raped.
In Jokila’s study (2010), breach of trust was sometimes a relevant factor. One
court called rape ‘the price for the misplaced trust’ (District Court verdict, 53).
The lawyers sometimes used the trust discourse to explain why a complainant
had spent time with the defendant before the crime. The complainant might
explain that she had gone to his place because she trusted him (complainant’s
statement, 66). In one case, the complainant’s lawyer argued with the trust
notion and depicted the defendant as someone who had created a feeling of
trust between the victim and himself, only to abuse it (written statement, Dis-
trict Court, 56). Further, the court argued for the betrayal of trust over the
relevance of mental damage in a case where a disabled girl had trusted the per-
petrator (District Court, 88).
Conclusion
International courts and the Istanbul Convention emphasise that sexual acts
should take place with the consent of both parties. This preference for lack of
consent over use of force as the central element of rape in criminal law reﬂects
the value of sexual self-determination and autonomy and the protection of the
privacy and integrity of the person. In national jurisdictions, the interpretation
of use of force in legal deﬁnitions has approached the lack-of-consent
formulation.
The international tribunals discussed in this chapter have also underlined
that cases of sexual intercourse under coercive circumstances should be con-
victed as rape, even if no immediate violence and force have been used, no
direct threats have been given, nor explicit consent has been expressed.
Some have argued that coercive circumstances are relevant for situations of
war and violent conﬂict, and that such circumstances would not need to be
considered as much during normal states of affairs. Our empirical data sug-
gest otherwise.
In this chapter, we have looked at rape in intimate partnerships and rape
among youth. Both the lack-of-consent and the use-of-force constructions focus
on the events immediately before and during the rape, whereas in our cases the
broader context of coercion was what led to involuntary intercourse. In the
cases of intimate partner rape, the victim’s autonomy seems to have been
restrained to start with; a long history of violence and control formed coercive
circumstances in these cases. These victims could not set boundaries, nor did
they trust the adequacy of their own experience and interpretation of what had
happened between the couple.
The behaviour of the young victims (between the ages of 16 and 19)
seemed to be very difﬁcult for the courts to understand. They appeared to
have acted illogically. The courts paid attention to how the victim had ended
up in the apartment, whether voluntarily or by force – not that the courts
reasoned that the speciﬁcs of the situation would be part of the elements of
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rape, but that they could be concrete evidentiary facts to rely on. The victims
often had not explicitly resisted, and the courts did not value their attempts to
negotiate their way out of the situation as evidence. In these cases, the courts
reasoned using the trust argument, as they also typically do in cases of child
sexual abuse. Thus, trust can be used as a strategy to counter prejudicial
assumptions about a complainant’s personality and behaviour before, during
and after rape.
Trust is essential for autonomy. Trust in human relationships promotes and
enables the development of personal autonomy. Trust can also be situational.
Our analysis of case law suggests that trust should be analysed in rape cases, in
terms of how it is built and how it is broken. Using trust as a central concept,
the courts could be more understanding towards young people and could avoid
making prejudicial assumptions about a victim’s personality and behaviour.
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Notes
1 Criminal Code, chapter 20, L 563/1998. Available in English at www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ/en/laki/
kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf.
2 The 1999 law, reforming Chapter 20 of the CC, included a difference between abus-
ing a victim’s state of mind (the crime of sexual abuse) and inducing a person into
such a state of mind and then committing abuse, which fell under the rape category.
In 2011, both actions were placed under the rape category.
3 The 2011 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence
against women and domestic violence, European Treaty Series (ETS) 201. Finland
ratiﬁed the Convention in 2015.
4 The 1994 Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi minority at the hands of the Hutus included,
in addition to the widespread systematic killing of Tutsis, the rampant rape of Tutsi
women. Kunarac refers to a case about a group of Muslim women held in sexual
enslavement in the city of Foça, Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Serb forces during the
Bosnian war of 1992–1995.
5 Such as CEDAW Committee, 7th periodic report of Finland (2014).
6 Susan Ehrlich (2001) found similar interpretations of fear as consent in her Canadian,
discourse-analytical study on rape. Ehrlich studied the ways in which legal facts were
constructed in two rape cases against young female students, in a university campus.
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9 Empowered or protected?
The ‘problem’ of complainants’ rights
in Danish and Norwegian preparatory
works on criminal procedure
Hildur Fjóla Antonsdóttir
Introduction
The demand for and move towards improved rights and legal representation for
complainants in criminal cases in the Nordic countries may be traced back to
the efforts of the 1970s women’s movement. Concerns over the mistreatment of
complainants within the criminal justice system, particularly in cases of rape,
led to the introduction of the complainant’s lawyer (CL). In 1980, Denmark
became the ﬁrst country to introduce the CL model, whereby complainants in
cases of rape were afforded the right to have a state-paid lawyer appointed to
guard their interests. The right to a CL was later expanded to include other
types of sexual violence cases, cases of physical violence and other serious
crimes directed against the person (Brienen and Hoegen, 2000, pp. 218–219).
The CL model was subsequently taken up by the other Nordic countries.1 How-
ever, as I will discuss in more detail in the next section of this chapter, com-
plainants’ legal status and rights are signiﬁcantly stronger in Finland and
Sweden than they are in Norway, Denmark or Iceland.
In the mid-2000s, both Norway and Denmark enacted legislative amendments
to strengthen the position of the complainant in the two countries’ laws on crim-
inal procedure. While Norwegian complainants were afforded participatory rights
and stronger legal representation in court, this was largely not the case in Den-
mark. In this chapter, I will conduct a comparative analysis of the Norwegian and
Danish legal policies that underpin the legislative changes in the two respective
countries, using Carol Bacchi’s (Bacchi, 2009; Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016)
‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ (WPR) approach. I will explore how the
‘problem’ of complainants’ participatory rights and stronger legal representation
in the criminal procedure is constructed, shaped and represented in policy docu-
ments, and how complainants in cases of sexual violence are construed.
Complainants’ status and rights in Nordic criminal procedures
The legal status and rights of complainants in criminal procedural law are con-
sidered to be stronger in civil law countries than they are in common law coun-
tries, although these rights can vary between different jurisdictions (Brienen &
Hoegen, 2000; Doak, 2005). While the term ‘Nordic law’ is widely used when
emphasising the considerable similarities between the laws, legal systems and
legal cultures of the Nordic countries (Husa, Nuotio, & Pihlajamäki, 2008),
complainants’ legal status and rights in criminal cases have historically been
signiﬁcantly stronger in Finland and Sweden than in Denmark, Norway or Ice-
land (Robberstad, 2002).
Today it is possible to discern three different models on the status and rights
of complainants in the Nordic countries: (1) the Finnish/Swedish model, where
complainants have the right to obtain party status, with the accompanying
rights; (2) the Danish/Icelandic model, where complainants have the legal status
of witnesses, with certain special but limited rights; and (3) the Norwegian
model, which falls between the other two, where complainants have the status
of witnesses but with more extensive rights, including certain participatory
rights (Ertzeid, 2007).
Since the publication of Anne Robberstad’s PhD thesis in law titled Between
Duel and Inquisition: The Basic Structure of Criminal Procedure in Light of the
Role of the Complainant (1999), Norway has led recent Nordic discussions on
the legal status and rights of complainants. Robberstad, a former CL herself,
presents an historical analysis that reveals how the status and rights of com-
plainants in Norwegian law have weakened over the centuries and she makes
a forceful argument for strengthening their rights. In 2001, the Norwegian gov-
ernment commissioned Robberstad to conduct a comparative legal analysis of
the status and rights of complainants in the Nordic countries with a view to pro-
pose legislative approaches to strengthening their positions in procedural law. In
November 2002, Robberstad presented her report, titled ‘Contradiction and Dig-
nity’ (2002), at a seminar organised by the Nordic Council of Ministers. At the
seminar, which was attended by legal practitioners from the Nordic countries,
Robberstad proposed that complainants should be afforded the right to become
parties to criminal cases if they so wish (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2004).
Her work has subsequently informed legislative deliberations in Norway and
Denmark. These deliberations are the focus of analysis in this chapter.
Method
I analyse the legal policy documents using Bacchi’s (2009) WPR approach, which is
a Foucault-inspired poststructural method of analysing policies in an effort to make
politics visible. This approach relies on the notion that by asking how ‘problems’ are
represented in policies ‘it becomes possible to probe underlying assumptions that
render these representations intelligible and the implications that follow for how
lives are imagined and lived’ (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 6). Following Bacchi’s
(2009) guiding questions for analysis, I focus on how the problem of complainants’
participatory rights is represented, and particularly how these problem representa-
tions are possible, by identifying which assumptions underpin them and which dis-
courses shape them. In addition, I will analyse what remains unproblematised in the
problem representations. Using a comparative approach is helpful for this purpose,
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as doing so enables the identiﬁcation of the production of contrasting problematisa-
tions (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, p. 23).
Finally, I will pay attention to the effects of particular problem representa-
tions. Bacchi and Goodwin (2016) have identiﬁed three different types of
effects: discursive effects draw our attention to how particular problem represen-
tations limit what can be thought and said, while subjectiﬁcation effects high-
light how ‘subjects’ are implicated in problem representations and how they are
speciﬁcally produced; ﬁnally, lived effects refer to how discursive and subjectiﬁ-
cation effects translate into people’s lives.
I analyse the preparatory works that have accompanied the legislative
amendments pertaining to the status and rights of complainants in Norway and
Denmark, including early and later stages of preparatory works. The later
stages of preparatory works are the actual explanatory texts accompanying the
legislation. The early stages are reports based on deliberations and legislative
recommendations by (1) the Standing Committee on Administration of
Criminal Justice (SCACJ) of the Danish Ministry of Justice (Justitsministeriets
Strafferetsplejeudvalg), and (2) an ad hoc commission (henceforth ‘the
Commission’) appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public
Security. The legislation enacted (or not) in both countries is closely based on
the recommendations found in the reports published by the SCACJ and the
Commission; these reports are thus the main focus of my analysis. In the case
of Denmark, two separate reports were produced: the ﬁrst addresses the legal
position of complainants in rape cases, while the second addresses the position
of complainants more generally (see Betænkning, 2005, 2006). In Norway,
only one report was produced to address the position of complainants more
generally (see NOU, 2006).
The reports are generally structured to include the following: an introduction,
with the committees’ mandates; a detailed overview of the current legislation;
a review of what is considered relevant material, such as the outcome of consult-
ations/hearings, previous reports and legislation in other Nordic countries; the com-
mittees’ deliberations, considerations and suggestions; and ﬁnally legislative
proposals. As will be discussed in more detail below, the Norwegian report is more
expansive, as it also includes a discussion of the practical experiences of criminal
justice procedures from the other Nordic countries, the outcomes of consultations
with complainants and their next of kin, and a discussion of EU and UN policy and
legislative developments.
Finally, the report excerpts presented in the following analysis have been
translated from Danish and Norwegian to English.
Backgrounds to Norwegian/Danish legal policy procedures
The Norwegian and Danish policy processes have both similarities and differ-
ences. As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the legislative develop-
ments to date to strengthen complainants’ rights in Norway are largely based on
Robberstad’s work (1999; 2002). Robberstad (1999) has shown how the main
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obstacle for strengthening complainants’ procedural rights, particularly their par-
ticipatory rights, in the west Nordic context has been the interpretation of the
equality of arms principle, which is related to the notion of fairness enshrined
in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to
a fair trial. Equality of arms is often broadly deﬁned as ‘the requirement that
a balance of fairness is maintained between parties’ (Summers, 2007, p. 105).
Robberstad (1999) has shown how, in the Norwegian context, the equality of
arms principle has been interpreted to mean a requirement of equality between
parties, without explaining what is actually meant by equality in this context.
This interpretation has led to the common assumption that the two parties, the
state and the accused, have to be equally strong – a scenario that has been
partly exasperated by the conceptualisation of the trial as a form of battle or
a sporting game in Norwegian legal discourse (similarly to the Anglo-American
legal discourse) and that the two teams must have the same number of players.
She critically notes that this conceptualisation is also encouraged by the meta-
phorical term ‘equality of arms’ in reference to military battle. Robberstad
(1999) coined the term the ‘balance illusion’ to critique the notion that affording
complainants party status in the criminal case, along with accompanying partici-
patory rights, is equivalent to a ‘two against one’ scenario, thus jeopardising the
equality of arms principle. Based on her review of the interpretation of this
principle in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Robberstad
concludes that the equality of arms principle does not preclude the strengthen-
ing of the rights of complainants, as long as the defendant’s rights, for example
to be heard and to raise objections, are upheld.
Niemi-Kiesiläinen (2001) has argued that although Robberstad’s (1999) work
was not presented in a feminist theoretical framework, it is underpinned by
a feminist understanding of the subject matter. Niemi-Kiesiläinen points out that
the metaphor of the trial as a duel or a game has obvious gendered connotations
when analysed against the backdrop of the traditional roles and attributes assigned
to men. She further notes that the use of such gendered metaphors makes the
system more outlandish to ordinary people, and particularly women, even though
the legal arrangement of the criminal justice system itself might not be gendered.
And, since women are more likely to enter the criminal justice system as com-
plainants than as accused, they are the ones who become excluded from the
‘game’. Finally, the legal status of a witness implies a more passive role, which
can easily be associated with traditionally ascribed ‘feminine’ attributes (Niemi-
Kiesiläinen, 2001).
In that sense, the strengthening of the legal position of complainants in the
Norwegian and Danish contexts is informed by feminist knowledge practices.
Indeed, the legislative amendments in Norway were enacted on 7 March 2008
and were presented as a gift to women from the Norwegian government on
8 March, International Women’s Day (Robberstad, 2014). In the case of
Denmark, the impetus for initiating the policy process may be traced back to
September 2003, when the Danish Association for Women’s Rights (Dansk
Forening for Kvinderet) held a conference on rape where the question of how
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to strengthen the legal status of complainants in rape cases was debated. Fol-
lowing that conference, the parliament asked the Ministry of Justice to suggest
measures to improve the position of complainants in rape cases (Betænkning,
2005). The Danish policy process was informed by Robberstad’s work via the
Nordic Council of Ministers.
Now let us turn to the composition of the committees charged with reviewing
complainants’ legal positions. While the Danish Minister of Justice charged the
ministry’s SCACJ with conducting the review (Betænkning, 2005; 2006), the
Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security appointed the ad hoc Com-
mission noted earlier to do the same (NOU, 2006). The composition of these
committees was fairly similar, however, as they both comprised seven legal
practitioners from the criminal justice system, including judges, prosecutors,
practising lawyers and police representatives. In terms of the differences, the
Danish SCACJ additionally included a legal scholar and a ministry representa-
tive, while the Norwegian Commission included one representative from an
NGO who is well known in Norway for advocating for increased procedural
rights for complainants and their next of kin. Nordic ad hoc commissions have
traditionally been characterised by broad interest representation, although
a recent analysis has shown that academics increasingly make up a substantial
proportion of commission members (Christensen & Holst, 2017). In this case,
however, there was not much difference between the member composition of
the Danish SCACJ and the Norwegian Commission, which indicates that crim-
inal procedural law in these countries is largely understood to be the domain of
expert legal practitioners in the criminal justice system, with only minimal, if
any, representation from extra-legal stakeholders.
The mandate of the committees was similar, in that both were charged with
reviewing the legal position of complainants in procedural law, with a view to
improving their position; however, there were also some differences. The Nor-
wegian Commission’s mandate was to suggest ‘how’ the procedural position of
complainants could be strengthened (NOU, 2006, p. 13), and if increased rights
should apply generally to all complainants or only complainants in certain
cases, such as cases of sexual violence and other cases of violence. The Danish
SCACJ was charged with assessing ‘if’ there was a ‘need’ for legislative
improvements (Betænkning, 2005, p. 11). The SCACJ’s mandate was based on
a parliamentary decision, the primary concern of which was to strengthen the
position of complainants in cases of rape. The Minister of Justice also asked the
SCACJ to assess the need for improvements in the context of criminal cases
more generally. In comparing the mandates, one could argue that a clearer polit-
ical will existed in Norway to enact meaningful legislative changes in order to
strengthen complainants’ legal position than was the case in Denmark.
That said, both policy processes were informed by external consultations. Previ-
ous to the appointment of the Norwegian Commission, a hearing had been con-
ducted on Robberstad’s (2002) report in which she had suggested affording
complainants party status in criminal cases. A total of 64 responses were received.
Of those who took a clear position on the issue of affording complainants full party
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status, 23 were against and 21 supported the suggestion. The responses showed
a clear dividing line between victims’ organisations and other interest groups, who
supported the proposal, versus members of the criminal justice system, in particular
the courts and the prosecution authorities, who did not (NOU, 2006).
Prior to the work of the Danish SCACJ, the Ministry of Justice sent
a detailed questionnaire to 42 institutions and organisations. The questionnaire
included questions both on how the then-current procedural laws worked in
practice for complainants in rape cases and on whether a need existed to
improve their rights, including the active rights of their CLs. The ministry
received a total of 38 responses, the majority of which were from courts and
police precincts and three lawyers’ associations; the ministry also received
responses from a rape crisis centre and two NGOs that provide support to
victim-survivors of rape and other crimes (Betænkning, 2005). In short, the
responses from the criminal justice system generally did not recommend
strengthening complainants’ participatory rights, and only one NGO suggested
that complainants should be able to join the criminal case and thereby obtain
party status (Betænkning, 2006). Based on the results from both the Danish and
Norwegian consultation processes, it is clear that the main resistance to afford-
ing complainants and their CLs increased rights to participate in the court pro-
cedure primarily comes from the majority legal community within the criminal
justice system. These results also indicate that the community of victims’ organ-
isations and other interests groups in Norway is larger and more robust than it
is in Denmark.
Finally, several additional differences between the policy procedures should
be mentioned. The Norwegian Commission was also mandated with assessing
the needs of complainants for party rights. The Commission therefore con-
ducted 15 meetings with complainants (and their next of kin) about their
experiences with the criminal justice system. The mandate also requested that
the Commission conduct country visits to Finland and Sweden to assess how
complainants’ party rights functioned in practice in those countries. The Nor-
wegian Commission also drew on international and domestic legal and extra-
legal sources in its report, including EU and UN laws and policies, as well
as socio-legal and victimological research (NOU, 2006). The Danish SCACJ,
in contrast, did not conduct any consultations with complainants and did not
conduct country visits to Finland or Sweden; instead, the group largely relied
on domestic legal sources.
Legislative results of the Norwegian and Danish policy processes
Given the varied and detailed legislative amendments resulting from these
policy processes, it is impossible to provide a full account of them in this
chapter. Instead, I will endeavour to summarise some of the main changes,
with an emphasis on complainants’ participatory rights and the rights of their
lawyers in court.
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In the case of Norway, the legislative changes included the following: (1) the
clariﬁcation and spelling out of certain rights that were previously only implied
by the complainants’ legal standing in terms of civil claims, such as access to
case documents during police investigations; (2) the right to comment on evi-
dence presented in court (via their lawyers), as well as to provide ﬁnal com-
ments in court; and (3) the provision of additional rights unrelated to party
status, such as the right to be informed about how the case is progressing in the
criminal justice system. The order in which the complainant and the accused
give their testimony in court was also changed. Before, defendants gave their
testimony ﬁrst, and so complainants were not permitted to sit in court and listen
to their testimony, as doing so could affect their own testimony. Now, complain-
ants give their testimony ﬁrst, and they can therefore sit in court for the dur-
ation of the whole trial (Robberstad, 2014).
Some rights were only afforded to complainants to be exercised by their law-
yers, such as the right to submit supplementary evidence and to ask supplemen-
tary questions of defendants, witnesses and experts in court once the prosecutor
and the defence lawyer have concluded their questioning (Robberstad, 2014).
But complainants were not afforded full party rights, such as the right to
appeal. In this case, the majority of the Commission members found that com-
plainants should not be given rights that would allow them to inﬂuence the
question of guilt and the question of penalties, as they felt that such rights
should solely be in the hands of the state (NOU, 2016).
In an effort to evaluate the effects of these legislative changes, Dullum
(2016) recently interviewed 18 people who work within, or in relation to, the
criminal justice system in Norway and asked them about their views on the
matter. According to the research participants, complainants are now better rep-
resented and better prepared for criminal cases than before. In addition, they
felt that the new participatory rights also seemed to aid in the restoration of
self-respect and healing among complainants and that criminal cases themselves
had acquired a more humane character. Participants’ opinions differed on the
question of whether complainants’ rights had come into conﬂict with the rights
of the accused, depending on their position within the criminal justice system.
The majority of the participants, however, felt that complainants’ increased
rights had contributed to solving cases and had not been detrimental to the legal
certainty of the accused. Exceptions included when the CL had taken on the
role of an additional prosecutor and in cases with several complainants (and
therefore several CLs) and one accused.
While the SCACJ did take note of the more progressive legislative develop-
ments in Norway, as well as the extensive rights complainants have in Finland
and Sweden, the committee’s suggestions were considerably more limited.
When considering the rights of complainants in rape cases and other cases of
sexual violence, the SCACJ’s main point of departure was to ensure that com-
plainants were ‘better protected’ (Betænkning, 2005, p. 13). The legislative
amendments did include additional informational rights to ensure that complain-
ants would receive guidance on their rights, especially in terms of their rights to
Empowered or protected? 143
legal representation, when reporting a case to the police. The amendments also
included increased access for the CL to view case documents pertaining to their
clients during the investigation stage, which now not only included their clients’
police testimonies but also their medical records (Amendment to the Danish
Administration of Justice Act, no. 558, 24 June 2005). This access is still more
limited than in Norway, where CLs have more general access to case docu-
ments. The SCACJ considered whether the CL should have the right to object
to questions about a complainant’s previous sexual history but decided against
this idea to ensure that the CL would not be involved in any questions regard-
ing the evidence in the case. In the bill, however, which was passed in 2005,
CLs were given the right to object to such questions, based on recommenda-
tions from the Ministry of Justice.
The question of whether complainants should have the right to give testimony
in court before the accused – and thereby be able to observe the court proceed-
ings – has been discussed extensively in Denmark (see Betænkning, 2006, 2010,
2014). Although the SCACJ has now provided draft legislation where complain-
ants are afforded the right to give their testimony before the accused, the group
did not endorse it (Betænkning, 2014); no such amendments have been enacted
to date. In 2010, the Danish Standing Committee on Procedural Law (Retsplejer-
ådet) also ﬁnalised a report that included legislative amendments to strengthen
the legal position of complainants on the basis of their civil claims (Betænkning,
2010), but those proposals have also not been enacted to date.
The legislative changes proposed by the SCACJ are considerably more
limited than those proposed by the Norwegian Commission and are primarily
composed of small adjustments, with the aim of providing more protection for
complainants. Unlike the case in Norway, the SCACJ thus did not propose the
affording of complainants (via their lawyers) the right to submit and comment
on evidence; nor the right to ask questions of the accused and witnesses in
court. In the analysis below, I will explore the different problem representations
and underlying assumptions that underpin these different legislative outcomes.
Norway: Empowering rationally motivated female citizens and
ensuring the rule of law
In the Norwegian report, the ‘problem’ of complainants’ participatory rights in
court and stronger legal representation is typically represented in the form of
such rights being lacking, in particular for certain groups of complainants. For
the case of increasing complainants’ rights, the underlying assumptions ﬁrst
include that such amendments would ensure the ongoing rule of law, which
would otherwise be in jeopardy, and second that such rights would empower
complainants and counteract their experiences of secondary victimisation.
The excerpts below highlight the ﬁrst assumption underpinning the problem
of complainants’ lack of rights, i.e. that this lack jeopardises the rule of law.
The discourses of citizenship, modernisation and social change are all evoked,
thus shaping the problem representation.
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In a modern society, the individual’s right to receive information about
cases that concern them, to be able to object to information submitted by
others and be able to express their views, is considered a basic condition
for a good case procedure that provides a sense of security.
(p. 16)
Social conditions, legal thinking, and people’s expectations and education
levels have changed signiﬁcantly. … Today, citizens have higher demands
than before to receive information and have something to say in cases that
affect them. Criminal cases are no exception.
(p. 124)
If complainants’ rights are not strengthened, the legal system can become
out of step with people’s understanding of the law. Over time, this will lead
to a weakening of the trust that the legal system depends on.
(p. 16 and 124)
Nested within the problem representation is the notion that the criminal justice
system is somehow exempt from the processes of modernisation and social change.
Given that the results of the consultation process in Robberstad’s (2002) report
showed that resistance to affording complainants party rights overwhelmingly
came from the majority community of legal practitioners within the criminal justice
system, there is reason to assume that they are the ones who are primarily being
addressed here. The discursive effects of this problem representation serve to warn
the majority legal community that not strengthening complainants’ rights will
undermine citizens’ trust in the legal system, which can be understood as a threat
to the rule of law. These processes of modernisation and social change are also typ-
ically represented as entailing a set of changing factors, including social conditions
and education levels. Although it is not entirely clear how these factors are quali-
ﬁed, the implication seems to be that they have improved.
In relation to these social changes, coupled with recent legal thinking and
legislation, citizens are typically represented as having higher expectations
vis-à-vis their relationship with the state. One of the subjectiﬁcation effects
produced by this problem representation is that complainants are represented
as citizens ﬁrst – as opposed to only victims of crime – and that the state has
certain duties towards its citizens, such as ensuring that citizens’ are able to
have a say in matters that affect them in order for them to feel secure. Argu-
ably, the implicit subjectiﬁcation effects also include that these increased
rights are primarily understood to be for the beneﬁt of those citizen-
complainants who enjoy good social conditions and higher education levels,
as opposed to those who live in poorer social conditions with lower education
levels.
Another example of the problem representation is also related to the notions
held by the majority community of legal practitioners within the criminal justice
system. The report states:
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The complainants’ legitimate interests in having the state solve the case
and assign punishment to the guilty person cannot be confused with a wish
for revenge. The Committee’s investigation shows that the complainant has
interests in the case on completely different grounds than
revenge. … (Besides, doing so would be rather illogical, as having stronger
rights does not increase complainants’ possibilities for revenge.).
(p. 126)
The Commission’s report refers to Ertzeid (2005), who analysed the responses
the Ministry of Justice received on the hearing process conducted on Robber-
stad’s (2002) suggestions. In analysing the responses against affording com-
plainants full party status, Ertzeid found that the responses were often grounded
in the notion that affording complainants increased rights would entail ‘an
illegitimate legal acceptance of revenge’, since complainants’ motivations for
participating in criminal trials are understood as being informed by feelings of
revenge (Ertzeid, 2005, p. 110). The problem represented in the report excerpt
above is the notion that strengthening complainants’ rights could be used as
a vessel for complainants’ illegitimate feelings of revenge. In counteracting this
argument, the Norwegian Commission emphasised the representation of the
complainant as having legitimate factual and legal interests in the case. The
subjectiﬁcation effects of this argumentation entails that the complainant is rep-
resented as being guided by rational (as opposed to emotional) motivations. In
the legal realm, emotions have long been understood as being subjective, partial
and impervious to reason and therefore of having a destabilising effect on the
rule of law (Bandes & Blumenthal, 2012). This construction of the rational
complainant motivated by factual and legal interest thus has the discursive
effect of rendering complainants as legitimate actors in the eyes of the law.
Conversely, those who might want to deny complainants increased rights on the
basis that they might be able to exert their feelings of revenge through the crim-
inal justice system are represented as harbouring illogical thoughts.
Another assumption underpinning the problem representation is that of com-
plainants’ secondary victimisation within the criminal justice system, as cap-
tured in the following excerpt from the report:
For complainants, [strengthening their rights] can also be of great import-
ance for their sense of self-esteem. In cases concerning serious integrity
violations, the strengthening of the complainant’s status can be necessary to
avoid that the criminal case is experienced as a new violation or
a continuation of the violation.
(p. 125)
Here, secondary victimisation is, partially or at least for some complainants,
represented as being caused by a lack of rights or lack of empowerment; rights
are also arguably represented to be equal to empowerment. This discursive rea-
soning is in line with certain knowledge strands within victimology, where
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some have argued that an important component in preventing or minimising
secondary victimisation and in empowering complainants is to increase their
procedural rights, particularly in cases of sexual violence and other serious
integrity violations (Wolhuter, Olley, & Denham, 2009).
So what are the lived effects of these policy suggestions? While all complain-
ants are recognised as having legitimate interests in criminal cases, these interests
are only converted into rights for speciﬁc groups of complainants, largely based
on efﬁciency and cost arguments. Those represented as being most in ‘need’ of
such rights are those who have suffered serious ‘integrity violations’, which
‘cause major physical, mental and social harms’ (p. 130). Per the recommenda-
tion of the Committee, complainants in the following crimes were afforded these
new rights: sexual offences, serious physical violations, violations of restriction
orders, forced marriage, violence in close relationships, human trafﬁcking and
genital mutilation (Norwegian Government Bill no. 11 [2007–2008], pp. 29–30).
The lived effects of these laws hence affect complainants differently based on the
type of crime they have been subjected to. Other than cases of serious physical
violations, most complainants in these types of crimes are women and girls,
sometimes with a foreign background and sometimes victimised by someone they
know or are related to. The subjects produced, therefore, are largely women who
have been subjected to sexual and other gender-based violence and who are to be
empowered through these legislative amendments. As noted earlier, however, the
majority of the Commission’s members did not recommend giving complainants
full party status. The report states that one member of the Commission, and the
only representative from an NGO, thought that for her part, complainants should
be afforded full party status. The report quotes her as saying that, despite this
opinion, she is ‘in doubt whether the Norwegian legal community is ready for
such comprehensive reform’ (NOU, 2006, p. 132).
Denmark: Protecting vulnerable rape victims and preserving the
rule of law
In the Danish reports, contrary to the Norwegian report, the ‘problem’ is repre-
sented to be affording complainants participatory rights in court and stronger
legal representation – particularly complainants in cases of rape and other
sexual offences. The underlying assumptions are ﬁrst that such rights would
only serve to further victimise complainants, and second that such rights would
jeopardise the rule of law.
The predominant representation of complainants in the Danish reports is that
of traumatised rape victims (Betænkning, 2005, p. 51), which is also the main
reference point in considerations of increased rights for complainants in general
(Betænkning, 2006, p. 73; 2014, p. 66). This view is captured in the following
excerpt:
[It should be] acknowledged that complainants in rape cases are in a very
vulnerable position. This is because the rape victim, by the nature of the
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case, has to give testimony and be examined in relation to a very sensitive
matter. … Complainants in rape cases, who in principle are witnesses like
any other witnesses, can easily come to feel that they are the ones being
prosecuted. As a complainant in a rape case, it can therefore be particularly
traumatising to go through the procedure.
(Betænkning, 2005, p. 51)
The crime of rape in this case is construed as particularly sensitive, and the criminal
justice procedure is assumed to unavoidably retraumatise complainants. Arguably,
both complainants and the crime of rape are implicitly construed as being incom-
patible with the criminal justice procedure. The effect produced by this problem
representation is that complainants’ subject positions become ﬁrmly rooted in both
their primary and secondary victimhood. They are even described as easily taking
on the subject position of the accused, which, in relation to the state, is considered
to be in a very vulnerable position.
In the following excerpt, the SCACJ considers what might happen if CLs should
have the right to ask complainants, and/or defendants and other witnesses, ques-
tions in court about other aspects of the case than only the compensation claim:
… this could inﬂuence the role of the CL in the process in an unfortunate
way. This could – also unintentionally – lead to a more aggressive approach
by the defence lawyer towards the complainant and their credibility.
According to the Committee’s opinion, it is against this background that
there is good reason to exclude the CL from tasks that pertain to the evi-
dence of the accused’s guilt.
(Betænkning, 2005, p. 71)
Something like this would not be in the real interests of the complainant.
(Betænkning, 2006, pp. 73–74)
The discursive effect of this hypothetical scenario serves to warn against strength-
ening complainants’ legal representation, as the assumption is that doing so
would only lead to the further traumatisation of complainants, particularly in
cases of rape. These subjectiﬁcation effects construct defence lawyers as aggres-
sive, and, given that this aggressive approach might also be unintentional, it also
indicates that their aggression is unpreventable and, in a sense, uncontrollable. In
turn, the complainants, and their credibility, are represented as the main targets
for this aggressiveness. Given that rape cases are generally understood to be char-
acterised by a lack of evidence, complainants’ credibility is often understood to
be their most important asset in a case. While one of the Danish reports states
that complainants can have legitimate factual and legal interests in criminal cases
(2006, pp. 68–69), indicating that complainants might therefore have a need for
increased rights to protect those interests, the report introduces a new concept of
complainants’ ‘real interests’, as noted in the excerpt. The problem representation
in this case is thus shaped by a paternalistic discourse in which complainants’
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real interests are to be protected from stronger legal representation, as such repre-
sentation would only lead to the undermining of their credibility and them being
subjected to further victimisation.
At least two factors are left unproblematised in this problem representation.
First, as noted earlier, complainants’ subject positions are represented as being
akin to those of the accused in terms of their vulnerability in the criminal pro-
cedure. But while accused persons are afforded full party rights in criminal
cases to defend themselves throughout the criminal justice procedure, that is not
the solution presented for complainants. On the contrary, they are represented as
being better protected if they lack such rights. Second, the defence lawyer’s
aggressive approach is represented as being uncontrollable but there is no men-
tion of the role of the judge in this context in ensuring a fair court process.
Therefore, the courtroom, which is a public place presided over by a judge, is
represented as an uncontrollably hostile place for the complainant.
The second assumption underpinning the problem representation is that com-
plainants’ participatory rights and stronger legal representation could jeopardise
the rule of law. In the Danish reports, one of the main obstacles to strengthen-
ing complainants’ positions concerns the objectivity principle, according to
which the prosecution authorities and the police are duty-bound to be impartial
in their work, and that charges should only be issued if the prosecution author-
ities ﬁnd that the charges will lead to a conviction (Betænkning, 2005, p. 64).
The argument is that CLs cannot be expected to adhere to the objectivity prin-
ciple, as their role is not to be impartial but rather to guard the individual inter-
ests of their clients (Betænkning, 2006, p. 72). The report further states that,
according to the law, the prosecution authorities must make sure that:
… those who are guilty are held to account and [that] those who are inno-
cent are not prosecuted. This principle applies to all aspects of the case,
including when exercising particular party rights such as questioning wit-
nesses. This arrangement is a central part of the rule of law and of society’s
protection against vigilantism.
(Betænkning, 2006, p. 72)
In this case, an implicit connection is effectively established between complainants’
stronger legal representation and vigilantism (i.e. the objectivity principle serves to
protect society against vigilantism), and affording complainants party rights is rep-
resented to be in conﬂict with the objectivity principle. One could argue that com-
plainants’ party rights hence are represented to possibly entail the undermining of
the rule of law. The way in which increasing complainants’ active rights is thought
to jeopardise this fundamental principle of objectivity is portrayed as follows:
Such an arrangement could create lack of clarity in relation to the roles of
the prosecutor and the defence lawyer, in that the complainant, or the CL,
could appear as an additional prosecutor.
(Betænkning, 2006, p. 72)
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This can partly be perceived as a form of disparity, where there are ‘two
against one’, and partly as a complication of the process where there would
be two parties who would each in their own way pursue the same case.
Such an arrangement could also, in the absence of the objectivity principle
on the part of the complainant, lead to a shift in focus in terms of the pres-
entation of evidence, whereby information that is not necessarily relevant
for the criminal case will be sought or introduced.
(Betænkning, 2006, p. 73)
There is a nebulous and suggestive quality in the way in which a warning dis-
course is used to represent complainants’ stronger legal representation as posing
a potential threat to the objectivity principle. First, stronger legal representation
for complainants is represented to possibly lead to lack of clarity in terms of
the roles of legal actors, it could be perceived as a complication of the process,
and it could lead to the submission of unnecessary evidence. Second, the equal-
ity/balance discourse is used to represent complainants’ participatory rights as
a destabilising agent – hence giving the appearance that there are two
against one.
One of the beneﬁts of conducting a comparative policy analysis is that such
an analysis can reveal what remains unproblematised in a given problem repre-
sentation. In the Norwegian report, for example, having stronger legal represen-
tation for complainants is not represented as going against the objectivity
principle. In short, the objectivity principle is represented to be better protected
if the prosecutor does not have to both pursue the case on behalf of the state
and safeguard the interests of the complainant but can leave the latter to the CL
(NOU, 2006, p. 103). In addition, the Norwegian report, drawing on Robber-
stad’s (1999) critique of the ‘balance illusion’ discussed earlier, also does not
represent complainants’ participatory rights as undermining the accused rights,
as the accused still has the same rights as before. The equality discourse is thus
used to argue in favour of affording complainants’ rights, since this is a matter
of affording complainants some of the rights that accused people already have
(NOU, 2006, p. 17 and 128).
To conclude, the Danish report notes that, given the ongoing developments in
relation to strengthening complainants’ positions, including the more progres-
sive legislative developments in Norway, there is ‘no reason to believe that the
developments pertaining to the complainant have reached an end point’
(Betænkning, 2006, p. 69). Arguably, this view indicates the committee’s effort
to hold on to a traditional legal arrangement while simultaneously realising that
they are likely ﬁghting a losing battle.
Concluding remarks
As I have shown in this chapter, a stark contrast is notable between the prob-
lem representations in the respective jurisdictions of Norway and Denmark. In
Norway, the ‘problem’ is represented to be that complainants, particularly in
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cases of gender-based violence, lack participatory rights and stronger legal
representation. In Denmark, the ‘problem’ is represented to be affording com-
plainants such rights, particularly complainants in cases of rape and other
sexual offences.
In Norway, the Commission’s mandate indicated more clearly that political
will existed to enact meaningful legislative changes to strengthen the position
of complainants (and their next of kin) in criminal procedures. In Denmark,
however, expert legal practitioners, largely representing the criminal justice
system, were asked to assess if such changes were needed. The Norwegian
Commission also included a representative from the NGO community and
relied to a much larger extent on multiple knowledge sources, including inter-
national and extra-legal knowledge. Therefore, while the policy process in Den-
mark was largely shaped by traditional domestic legal knowledge practices, the
Norwegian policy process also introduced ‘subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault,
1980, in Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016), or knowledge types that challenge the cen-
trality of traditional legal knowledge, including feminist-informed legal analysis,
victimological knowledge and knowledge practices from other countries.
In both sets of policy texts, the main assumptions underpinning the problem
representations are premised on the notions of secondary victimisation and the
rule of law. But while these premises are similar, the reasoning draws on polar
opposite conceptualisations, thus creating contrasting discursive, subjectiﬁcation,
and lived effects. Using a somewhat paternalistic discourse of protection, the
Danish reports warn against affording complainants participatory rights and
stronger legal representation, assuming that doing so would lead to the further
victimisation of complainants and would undermine the rule of law. The Norwe-
gian report, in contrast, includes an empowerment discourse, based on the
assumption that having increased rights will counteract complainants’ experi-
ences of secondary victimisation and will ensure the ongoing rule of law, which
otherwise might be at risk.
These markedly different problem representations produce two different sub-
ject positions for the complainant. The Danish reports represent complainants’
subject positions as being rooted in their primary victimhood, where having
increased rights, in a hostile courtroom, will only lead to their further victimisa-
tion. The only subject position offered for complainants is therefore that of the
‘victim’. The discursive effects of the way in which the Danish reports repre-
sent increased rights for complainants as the ‘problem’ also produce a certain
contradiction: complainants are represented as being too vulnerable to have
stronger legal representation, while they would simultaneously pose a threat to
the rule of law if such rights were afforded to them. The lived effects of these
representations are that neither complainants nor their lawyers are allowed to
become active agents during court procedures.
In the Norwegian report, by contrast, complainants are represented as being
citizens ﬁrst – rational yet vulnerable citizens who have been subjected to
a crime and are in need of empowerment through having the right to guard
their legal and factual interests during the criminal procedure. This subject
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position is therefore more nuanced and is, arguably, better captured by the
notion of the ‘victim-survivor’. It should be noted that the notion of the ‘citi-
zen-victim’ has been problematised on the basis that many of those who have
been subjected to crimes in society are people who are not citizens and are
therefore particularly vulnerable and marginalised (Goodey, 2005, p. 139).
However, when looking at which groups of complainants were afforded these
increased participatory rights and stronger legal representation in Norway,
then it is on the basis of the type of crime but not on the basis of complain-
ants’ citizenship status. Therefore, the lived effects of this problem representa-
tions does take this scenario into account. Arguably, however, the way in
which the Norwegian report ties together social conditions, education levels
and expectations for increased rights raises the question of whether these new
rights are primarily conceptualised for certain groups of complainants, i.e.
people living in good social conditions with higher education levels. We
hence have reason to ask if and how these rights beneﬁt people of lower edu-
cational and socio-economic status.
As noted above, in both Denmark and Norway, the main resistance to
increasing the rights of complainants has come from the majority legal commu-
nity within the criminal justice system. In Norway, the Commission stopped
short of affording complainants full party rights in criminal cases, which the
Commission’s only NGO representative explained to mean that the Norwegian
legal community was not ready for such reform. The resistance to complainants’
rights in Norway is ongoing and is currently being shaped by the metadis-
courses of ‘effectivity’ and ‘legal certainty’.2 In 2014, the Ministry of Justice
and Public Security appointed a commission to design a new Code for Criminal
Procedure in order to address changes in the area of criminality, with a view to
‘meet these challenges and facilitate an effective and legally certain settlement
of criminal cases’ (NOU, 2016, p. 93). The commission’s mandate noted that,
since the legal status and rights of complainants had recently been reviewed,
the ministry assumed that there was no great need to revise those sections of
the law. In their legislative proposal, however, the commission recommended
several legislative changes to the rights of the complainant (NOU, 2016).
During the hearing procedure following the publication of the commission’s
report, these changes were criticised for weakening the status and rights of com-
plainants (e.g. Robberstad, 2017). The new code on criminal procedure has not
been enacted to date.
Notes
1 The CL model was taken up in Norway in 1981, Sweden in 1988, Finland in 1997,
and Iceland in 1999.
2 Legal certainty (rettssikkerhet) refers to the demand that court decisions be fair and
predictable. Legal certainty is considered to be a central requirement for the rule
of law.
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10 Othering the rapist
Rurality, sexual violence and the
Bjästa case
Lucas Gottzén and Anna G. Franzén
Introduction
Sweden has undertaken major efforts to combat sexual violence, particularly
since the 1990s, when society came to view such violence as an expression of
lack of gender equality. Since that time, the judicial protection of rape victims
has strengthened, and society’s condemnation of men’s sexual abuse has tough-
ened. Today, Sweden enjoys relative political consensus on the issue and, as
part of gender-based violence, sexual violence has been central to several gov-
ernments’ gender-equality policies, regardless of political colour. For instance,
the commission report that served as the basis for new sexual offences legisla-
tion described ending sexual violence as pivotal for gender equality: ‘Our pro-
posal to change the sexual offences legislation … is an important step to
a more gender-equal society’ (Statens offentliga utredningar, 2016, p. 419). The
commissioners argued that stricter laws and preventive work in schools were
key in combatting sexual abuse:
If the proposal is implemented and followed by educational interventions
and information campaigns in schools and in society, we estimate that the
proposal – at least in the long run – may plausibly lead to changes in
norms and behaviour related to sexuality and sex so that sexual offences
will decrease. … Our proposal to change the crime designation from rape
to sexual assault may also improve equality between men and women.
(pp. 419–420)1
While sexual violence has long been targeted through legislation and victim sup-
port, gender-based violence policies have recently started to endorse universal
prevention: that is, health-enhancing activities that address a general population
or a speciﬁc age group and in which the activities are carried out prior to the
violence. Sweden’s Minister of Gender Equality has particularly promoted pre-
ventive work that involves men and boys and that targets gendered norms that
justify violence (Government Ofﬁces of Sweden, 2016), including the Mentors in
Violence Prevention (MVP) programme, which was developed in the United
States and has recently been implemented in many Swedish secondary schools.
Such legislative and interventive efforts in combating sexual violence are
part of a longstanding tradition of progressive politics and social engineering
that have been decisive in moving Sweden from being a poor, unmodern and
primarily rural country on the global periphery to becoming something of
a beacon of modernity. Along with parental-leave legislation, gender-based
violence policies have been particularly central in presenting Sweden as ‘a
gender-equal paradise’ and Swedish men as the most gender-equal men in the
world (Gottzén, 2016, p. 165). As a result, the prevalence of the abuse of
women appears as ‘an anachronistic remnant’ of traditional Swedish society
and ‘an obstacle for the modern regime we already live in’ (Wendt Höjer,
2002, p. 179).
While combating sexual violence is a positive goal, the nation’s gender-
equality policies have had a few unintended exclusionary consequences. Since
gender equality is typically seen as being more or less ingrained in the Swedish
character, acts of sexual violence committed by ethnic minority groups are often
considered cultural traits and signs of a lack of Swedish values (Bredström,
2002). In contrast, acts of sexual violence committed by ethnic majority men
tend to be regarded as either a consequence of individual psychopathology or of
socioeconomic circumstances (Gottzén & Jonsson, 2012).
We analyse in this chapter how sexual violence is discussed in the school-
based MVP programme. In classroom discussions about rape and bystanders’
responses to sexual violence, people recurrently distinguished between ‘us’ and
the other. Rather than noting a primary connecting of rape to ethnic minorities,
however, we identiﬁed several othering processes in relation to rurality, includ-
ing both the male perpetrator (in this particular case) and the community in
which he resided. Such othering, we argue, is related to a history of thinking of
the countryside as a peripheral place excluded from the modern urban Swedish
project; this outlook then enables the projection of negative affect towards
rurality.
In the following sections, we provide a brief overview of current academic
debates about rural violence; we then discuss a documentary ﬁlm about a rape
case in a town in northern Sweden and the media debate about the case, both of
which MVP uses in the classroom. We detail how, when students and teachers
discussed the case in the classroom, they distanced themselves from the com-
munity’s responses to sexual violence. We then discuss how the othering works
through an affective politics of disgust.
Sexual violence and rurality
Rural violence has emerged as an important ﬁeld of inquiry over the last few
decades (for overviews, see Edwards, 2015; Hall-Sanchez, 2016; Sandberg,
2013). This research has shown that physical and sexual violence is just as
common – if not more common – in rural areas as it is in urban areas
(Edwards, 2015), and that such violence has speciﬁc rurality-based character-
istics. For instance, studies have demonstrated that women in rural areas are
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particularly affected by socioeconomic disadvantage and spatial and social iso-
lation, that small communities have a lack of anonymity, and that the country-
side is characterised by ‘rural patriarchies’ that provide social and emotional
support to men who are violent towards their partners; all these circumstances
may exacerbate the victims’ vulnerability (DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2009). By
highlighting the speciﬁc problems rurality imposes on victims of violence,
such research has questioned notions of the countryside as an idyllic and
peaceful place.
While acknowledging the importance of this scholarship, Sandberg (2013)
has pointed out that this work tends to reproduce stereotypes of rurality and
rural gender relations. In particular, such studies reinforce perceptions of rural
localities and inhabitants as deviant, which may further marginalise rural
victims of violence. This ‘othering of rurality’ corresponds with a common por-
trayal of the countryside that co-exists with the notion of the rural idyll: the
countryside as a risky place characterised by racism, sexism, poverty and social
problems (Stenbacka, 2011). Within this discourse, the countryside is often con-
ceptualised as an unmodern and stagnant place. Similarly to sexual violence in
Swedish gender-equality policies, the countryside becomes tied to the past and
differentiated from a progressive urban centre. The north of Sweden in particu-
lar is often portrayed as a ‘space of exception’, a traditional and undeveloped
space, in contrast to an otherwise modern nation (Eriksson, 2008).
In order to avoid reinforcing stereotypes of rural inhabitants, exploring the
speciﬁc intersections between rurality and gender that may cause violence and
produce place-speciﬁc vulnerability is insufﬁcient; it is also necessary to decon-
struct these categories, in particular clichés about rurality (Sandberg, 2013). Fol-
lowing this intersectional approach, in this chapter, we argue that simply
highlighting the particularities of a place or group may enhance stereotypes and
support the belief that sexual violence is only to be found among certain
groups, or that certain groups support such violence more than others. Sexual
violence could thus lead to hierarchy reproduction when people argue that such
violence is an essential expression of particular groups and places. This notion
is particularly important when discussing rural violence, given how both the
countryside and violence are frequently tied to notions of unmodern and deviant
masculinity. Sexual-violence prevention policies that are unconnected to the
intersectional challenges of rape may reproduce ethnic, spatial and other hier-
archies that continuously place rape as a crime only committed by other men in
other places.
Method
This chapter draws on a larger ethnographic study of the Swedish implementa-
tion of the MVP programme that was conducted in 2016–2017.2 The goal of
MVP is to prevent violence among boys and men. The programme was origin-
ally developed in the United States (Katz, 1995) and has recently been
reworked to ﬁt a Swedish setting.3 Central in the prevention programme are
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(1) the use of a bystander approach, which entails a focus on witnesses or
bystanders of violence, rather than primarily the offender; (2) the existence of
gender and masculinity norms and how they relate to violence; and (3)
a focus on the continuum of violence, a perspective that illustrates how ‘mild’
violence is connected with, and might lead to, severe violence. The pro-
gramme thus aims to prevent violence among boys by supporting bystanders
in recognising violence at an early stage and intervening before it escalates
into severe violence, and to alter problematic gender norms that enable men’s
violence, with a focus especially on sexual violence. School teachers undergo
a three-day leadership training course and then conduct the programme with
students at their schools, using a detailed MVP manual. The programme con-
sists of seven two-hour lessons focussed on different subjects regarding the
bystander perspective and issues related to gender and violence, speciﬁcally
sexual violence. The lessons consist of teacher-led discussions and exercises
centred on gender and violence, including storytelling about leaders’ experi-
ences with violence, hypothetical examples of violence, lessons on how to
intervene safely as a bystander, and discussions about well-known cases of
violence, such as the Bjästa case (the subject of this chapter).
The data consist of participant observations of leadership training and
supervision as well as group interviews with teachers and students. In total,
we interviewed 14 teachers and 26 students from ﬁve different schools, all in
medium-size cities in Sweden. In addition, we conducted video-based obser-
vations of interactions in two classrooms throughout one semester (approxi-
mately 25 hours): one in a lower secondary school and one in an upper
secondary school. The present study may be understood as an ethnographic
case study in which we aim to ‘follow the thing’ (Marcus, 1998, p. 91). The
‘thing’ in this case is not so much a material object or a geographic location
as a case of sexual assault in Bjästa, a town in the north of Sweden where
a teenage boy who was convicted of rape received the support of his commu-
nity. We therefore explore how people have discussed and felt about this
‘thing’ in a variety of settings, including a documentary, a motion picture
and the media debate about the Bjästa case; we also examine how MVP used
parts of the documentary about the rape to discuss sexual violence, gender
and bystander responses.
The interviews and observations have been transcribed and coded, which
helped us to identify recurrent themes in the talk about violence in general,
sexual violence and gender. One such recurrent theme that we found throughout
the whole corpus of the data was that of othering when discussing violence, and
especially men’s sexual violence. In the following section, we focus on the spe-
ciﬁc type of othering that we found to have occurred during classroom discus-
sions about the Bjästa case. We have chosen this case since it is a particularly
clear example of the recurring phenomenon of othering. We have also chosen
the Bjästa case since it emerged as a recurring topic during the interviews; both
teachers and students described the case as being particularly useful and inter-
esting for discussion.
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The documentary and the debate
In the spring of 2009, a 15-year-old boy raped a 14-year-old girl in a school
bathroom in the town of Bjästa in northern Sweden. The boy admitted to the
assault and was sentenced in the district court and later in the court of appeal.
A documentary titled The Second Rape (Swedish: Den andra våldtäkten), which
aired on Swedish national public television (Sveriges Television, 2010) the
following year, tells of how the community turned against the girl and
supported the offender. Few believed the victim, who is called Linnea in the
documentary, even though her story was conﬁrmed in court.
In the documentary, the boy, called Oskar, is portrayed as popular. Because
he is well liked, most people around him argue that he could not have commit-
ted the sexual assault. According to the reporter in the documentary, ‘Everybody
describes Oskar as a social boy who doesn’t have any problems getting girls.
Nobody understands why he’d commit a rape in the school bathroom’. In inter-
views with youths and adults from the town, few believe Linnea but rather
argue that she is lying or distorting the truth. They contend that she has reported
him because she wanted revenge, as she was disappointed that she had been
unable to have a relationship with him. The locals who are interviewed claim
that her information is fuzzy and contradictory. In general, her picture of Oskar
is incongruent with theirs.
The events seem to have engaged large parts of the town. ‘Rumours about
what happened spread like wildﬁre in the community, and nobody believed
Linnea’, the reporter says. Bjästa’s small size is self-evident background in the
documentary. The town is repeatedly described as a small community, for
instance, when the journalist introduces the town in the documentary as ‘the
small town of Bjästa, outside Örnsköldsvik’. Later he portrays the town as gos-
sipy and comments that ‘the tittle-tattle in Bjästa has grown to truths online’. In
the documentary, the rumours are said to have been caused by the combination
of a small town and the power of social media. Many people joined social
media groups whose aim was to free Oskar from guilt, while they depicted
Linnea as being promiscuous: ‘She’s called a tramp and a whore on the inter-
net’. Her friends turned against her, and she felt increasingly threatened.
The climax of the documentary is the school graduation held in the local
church, where the priest allows Oskar – who is under a restraining order at this
point and has been moved to another school – not only to participate but also to
hand out roses on stage to his old classmates and teachers. The attendees
applaud him for what they consider a gesture of reconciliation. (Linnea dared
not participate in the graduation, however.) The same night, Oskar goes on to
rape another girl, a crime that he was later also convicted of. When the journal-
ist confronts the priest about the graduation, he argues that ‘it was really strong
that he managed to’ appear at the ceremony and that his doing so ‘was
a demonstration for human dignity’. The priest does not appear to think about
Oskar’s restraining order but argues that he is always welcome, sentenced or
not. When asked if he has reﬂected on Linnea’s situation, he falls silent. As
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a consequence of the bullying and the rumours, Linnea is then forced to move
from the small town to the larger city of Stockholm.
After the documentary, the events in Bjästa became national news. The priest
and the school were criticised for not supporting the assaulted girls. But the
town itself was also denounced. While the documentary had highlighted
the hate and the threats the victims of sexual violence had experienced from the
people of Bjästa, the perpetrator and the town now became targets of hate and
disgust. Oskar and his family were threatened, which caused the police to have
to provide special protection. Another boy in the same school was also threat-
ened, since he happened to have the same ﬁrst name as the perpetrator’s ﬁc-
tional name, Oskar.
A newspaper article published a few days after the documentary’s airing
described the responses from the town:
The inhabitants of Bjästa agree: they don’t deserve the hate the entire coun-
try has addressed to the community. … People are angry at the media; they
think the media has turned Sweden against the village. The harassments
have not ended, just taken a new course. ‘Shame on you, Bjästa’, ‘Burn
down Bjästa’. Every day, new protest groups against Bjästa are started on
Facebook. The hate mail and the threats never seem to stop. Hell broke
loose for many villagers when the documentary was shown last Wednesday.
(Sundén Jelmini, Paulin, Nilsson & Baltscheffsky, 2010, p. 6)
In the article, youth from Bjästa argued that the town had become a ‘disgrace’
but that it did not deserve its bad reputation. ‘They tar everyone from Bjästa
with the same brush’, one boy told the newspaper.
At the end of each year, the Swedish Language Council presents its list of
the ‘Words of the Year’, a list of words that are either new or have emerged
in the last year and have become popular. In December 2010, one of the coun-
cil’s new words was ‘bjästa’, or rather ‘doing a bjästa’, which the council
deﬁned as ‘siding with a perpetrator of a crime and bullying the victim [after
the events in Bjästa, where many supported a rapist and bullied the victim]’
(Swedish Language Council, 2010). Following this announcement of the new
word, regional radio channel P4 Västernorrland asked, ‘What does it mean for
a small community to get such a deprecatory label?’ Municipal commissioner
Glenn Nordlund argued that ‘for us, the event is serious, as it is troublesome
in itself – for the parties, of course, but also for the community. We don’t
need a word to remember [us by]’. The reporter asked him, ‘Do you think
Bjästa will ever get rid of this label?’ Nordlund responded, ‘It’s been difﬁcult
all the same. Now we’ll get a label that will probably follow us for a long
time’ (Sveriges Radio, 2010).
Bjästa continued to be a deterrent example of how a community could turn
against a rape victim (e.g. Wennstam, 2015). The motion picture Flocking
(Flocken in Swedish), which was based on the events, premiered in 2015; the
ﬁlm won several Guldbagge awards (Sweden’s highest award for ﬁlmmaking)
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as well as a Crystal Bear at the Berlin Film Festival. The ﬁlm’s director, Beata
Gårdeler, saw the ﬁlm as an example of how ‘regular guys’ could use sexual
violence: ‘We’ve created a picture of what a rapist looks like – he’s either an
ugly geezer in the woods or a gang of migrants – but the most common is that
it’s a young guy without a criminal record’ (Bendjelloul, 2015, p. 4).
Gårdeler argued that what happens in the ﬁlm could happen anywhere: ‘I
don’t think that it could only happen in a small village or that [the townspeople]
in any way are more stupid or evil [than others], but that it can happen any-
where’ (Sveriges Radio, 2015). Yet she also emphasised that there was some-
thing speciﬁc to small towns such as Bjästa. She saw the town’s strong
community bonds – its herd mentality – as crucial for the events to have
happened:
I grew up in a small community in the north of Sweden, where
I experienced that the social patterns felt old-fashioned, and norms were
strong. Together with the growing importance of social media, this could
make [the risk of] assaults against a person become even greater today.
(Gårdeler, 2015)
The ﬁlm created controversy. But this time it was not the stereotypical portrayal of
Bjästa that people discussed, but rather the director’s moral responsibility when
making a movie based on a true story. Linnea’s family was critical of the ﬁlm,
arguing that it resembled the original events too much, while it portrayed the raped
girl’s mother as an alcoholic and her father as incestuous. The family argued that
these ﬁctive parts could be perceived as real. ‘It’s like a third rape’, the mother
wrote in an op-ed piece in the newspaper Aftonbladet (Granlund, 2015).
The Bjästa case in the classroom
According to the MVP programme manual, the rationale behind using the
Bjästa case in the Swedish adaptation of the programme was to provide an
example of severe sexual violence that everybody can take a stand against. The
aim was also to give the participants insights into what rape could look like and
to realise that it is easy to contribute to spreading rumours. Another goal was to
clarify bystanders’ responsibility by showing how ‘easy it is to do something,
good or bad’ (Men for Gender Equality, 2014, p. 49). The manual further
describes the Bjästa case as potentially fruitful since it highlights the role of
social media:
… ﬁrst, [the case includes] a girl people don’t believe. People use Face-
book to spread hatred of her. The boy gets support from his friends and the
community. Then he commits another rape, and eventually people turn their
hatred towards him. All these components are interesting, but Facebook’s
role in the case is relevant, considering young people’s use of social media.
(p. 49)
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In the interviews, the teachers recurrently pointed out that Bjästa was an inter-
esting and useful case. They said the case was immensely popular among the
students, as it affected them and spurred much discussion in the classroom.
They considered the case to be among the exercises in the entire programme
that went particularly well:
I’m thinking that what can be difﬁcult sometimes is … to get the discus-
sion going: breaking the ice and getting everyone to start talking. But when
it came to [talking] about the Bjästa rape, that really got the whole class
going.
(Male teacher)
The other teachers in this focus group agreed that the ﬁlm clippings were cap-
tivating and said that the students wanted to see the entire documentary. The
students were critical of how the town had responded to the rape, and they par-
ticularly considered the priest to be ‘crazy’. The teachers recalled some of the
students’ reactions: ‘It was almost as if they were a mob themselves’; ‘They
were thinking, “Oh my god, such idiots!”’; ‘That priest!’; ‘That’s how they are
in Bjästa?’; and ‘Everyone in Bjästa must be an idiot’.
During an in-service training day, a female teacher from another school also
discussed the Bjästa case:
I was also thinking about those video clips about Bjästa: our students really
got wound up. Then you really would’ve wanted to be able to show the
whole documentary, and I really wish we could’ve had those extra 40 min-
utes to keep discussing.
A male teacher responded:
They made so many mistakes [in Bjästa]. You want to explain to them
[when the students say things like] ‘But it’s because they’re totally crazy in
Bjästa’, and you’re just like, ‘No, that’s not how it is’.
In our classroom observations, the students were clearly intrigued and liked
to discuss the case, but the stereotypical descriptions of the town found in
the media after the documentary had obviously surfaced in the classroom as
well. In the following paragraphs, we analyse the interactions in the upper
secondary school, where the Bjästa case was discussed during the second
lesson of the programme. During the introduction of the case, one of the
two teachers immediately brought the students’ attention to the size of the
town: ‘Has anyone heard about the Bjästa case?’ Several of the students
pointed out that they had not heard about it. The teacher therefore started
what could be described as a collaboratively built narrative by accounting
for the events after the rape by emphasising that Bjästa was a small and
remote town:
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… [The town] was very hyped up at the time. A whole lot was written in
the papers about what happened there. Then there was this documentary.
There was a fourteen-year-old girl, and Bjästa is located up in … wait,
where is it now? In Övik, right?4
Not completely sure of where the town was located, the teacher sought conﬁrm-
ation from the other teacher and then emphasised the size of the community.
‘Yeah, so a small town, yeah. Örnsköldsvik is small’, the teacher said, smiling.
‘Bjästa is located [near Örnsköldsvik], so you can imagine [what] a tiny, tiny
place that is’. Framing the Bjästa case as taking place in a small town is not
suggested in the MVP manual, which does not mention the size of the town;
this discussion was rather something that emerged in the classroom when the
participants engaged in the subject and, as one teacher put it, got ‘wound up’ in
their discussions.
After the teacher had provided some more context to the case, speciﬁcally
about Oskar being taken in for interrogation, they moved on to describe how
rumours about Linnea had begun to spread in the community. Again, the teacher
emphasised how small the town was and related its size to how the rumours
had begun to spread:
And now the rumours begin to spread. Just imagine, a small community,
and the rumours start going around. And the rumours are that Linnea is
lying and that Oskar is innocent, and they say that Linnea is, so to speak,
promiscuous and that she’s reported the rape because she wanted to get
back at this guy because he didn’t what to be in a relationship with her.
The teacher’s continued narrative of the events built on how unlikely it was that
this could have happened in the ﬁrst place: ‘And the adults in Bjästa as well –
that’s what you think is so strange in this documentary, that the adults also
were on his side’. A girl in the class raised her hand and asked about when this
had all taken place; a recurrent theme was how people described Bjästa as
unmodern, which was something the class returned to later in the discussion.
The teacher answered, ‘It was 2010, so it was six years ago’.
At this point of the introduction, the teachers (following the instructions in
the manual) showed two short video clips from the documentary about the
rumours that spread after the initial report and Oskar’s hearings, and then how
Oskar admitted to the rape in his third interrogation – and how people in the
town still did not believe him to be guilty. The students’ questions homed in on
how incredible it was that they would not have believed Linnea at this point.
The other teacher continued to explain how the rumours spread, saying that
they ‘spread like crazy online as well’. And again, the size of the town and
what was unique to small towns appeared in the account: ‘Even if it’s a small
town where you might also hang out like’ this, they said, gesturing with their
arms in what seemed to be a display of physical proximity. One of the teachers
continued:
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Since it’s a small community, you see each other [frequently]. But so, so, so
much hatred started to spread towards this Linnea online as well. And groups
started to form that really were, like, against her and that believed in him.
The teachers went on to describe how Oskar raped another girl after the school
graduation and that, unbelievably, the people of Bjästa still did not turn against
him. They showed a video clip of the priest in Bjästa who talked about how
great he thought it was when Oskar showed up at the graduation and brought
ﬂowers to the other students, and how he felt sorry for Oskar under the circum-
stances. At this point in the video, many of the students in the classroom burst
into loud guffaws, particularly when the priest said ‘poor guy – and the girl
too’. The teacher commented:
Exactly: this is the reaction you get, ’cause of course you think he’s totally
crazy, this priest; he doesn’t seem to know anything, you know. Then we
might not know exactly how the journalists have cut and angled it, and you
know how it is … but this wasn’t good, plainly put. This was a big failure
on the priest’s part.
The students’ disbelieving laughter, together with the teacher’s conﬁrmation of
how ‘totally crazy’ the priest seemed, continued to present the events of Bjästa as
beyond belief and the townspeople, speciﬁcally the priest, as irrational and even
pathological. Building on this notion, a girl in the class returned to the question
of when this had all actually happened: ‘Was this really 2010? “Cause it seems
as if they were more old-fashiony?”’ The teacher answered, ‘Yeah, but it was
more old-fashioned then, you know’. Again, the girl pointed out that the events
seemed old: ‘Yeah, but still, it feels kinda like the ‘90s when you see them’.
The students were then asked to discuss in small groups and were given
a few questions to guide their discussions: their general thoughts about the case,
how cases such as this could have happened and how people could have
become ﬁxed on the idea that Oskar was innocent and that the two girls were
lying. After several minutes, the teachers encouraged the students to share their
thoughts with the whole class. The ﬁrst student to speak returned to the descrip-
tion of the priest: ‘The priest seems to be totally stupid, but really, he interprets
[the case] in the same way as the whole village does anyway, so I mean, it’s
not just him … it’s the whole village in that case’.
After some more discussion, the students returned to the small groups and
talked about the role of social media in the spreading of rumours, as well as
how the online bullying of the girls could have been stopped. The students
had a lively debate for a while and then shared their thoughts with the class.
At ﬁrst, their comments centred on Facebook being a channel for bullying
and allowing large numbers of people to join in, and on how strange they
found it that adults would participate in the bullying as well. Then, as this
section of the class was beginning to near its end, their attention was once
again directed towards the size of the town, this time by a female student.
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‘But in such a small town it’s also easy for everyone to follow the trend,
that no one dares …’ She then turned to the class and asked, ‘But how small
was the municipality?’ As a response, the teachers introduced the town’s tini-
ness as a laughing matter, saying that Bjästa was located outside of Övik,
and that perhaps 20,000 people lived in Övik; the other agreed: ‘And Övik is
pretty small, you know’, and laughed. The girl did not appear satisﬁed with
this answer, however, and asked for more detailed information about the size
of the town. ‘We’ll have to google it’, one of the teachers responded.
Moments later, a boy in the class googled the question and soon proclaimed
that in ‘2010, one thousand eight hundred and eight people lived in Bjästa’.
One of the teachers asked, ‘In Bjästa?’ as if in disbelief. At this point, the
entire class burst into loud laughter. The students and the teachers laughed
together, and many talked excitedly to each other, repeating the numbers of
thousands of people, seemingly discussing the size of Bjästa and other towns.
Someone loudly exclaimed, ‘One thousand and eight!?’ and was corrected by
one of the teachers (‘one thousand eight hundred and eight – almost two
thousand’). The teacher exclaimed, ‘Yeah, get that!’, conﬁrming how incred-
ibly tiny Bjästa is.
The chatter and laughter in the room continued for a few moments before
the two teachers suggested that they take a ten-minute break. On this note, the
class ended – one where the entire class together had enjoyed laughter about
how tiny Bjästa is. The laughter in this situation might be understood as
another way to increase the distance between the ‘us’ in the classroom and the
‘other’ in Bjästa and to provide an implicit, yet clear, answer to the question
of how events such as those that took place in Bjästa could have happened. In
a sense, the case was now closed, the students asked no more questions about
the events (or the reasons they occurred) and the class moved on to a different
subject after recess.
While the intention with the exercise was to make the students reﬂect on the
role of social media, students and teachers alike primarily focussed on the small
size of Bjästa, which they characterised as a place where ‘everybody knows
each other’ and where rumours spread quickly. They argued that social media
enhanced the gossip, but any comparisons between Bjästa and how hearsay may
function in the school or the city where the participating students lived were
absent in the classroom interactions. Instead, the participants repeatedly por-
trayed Bjästa as a different place, a space of exception (cf. Eriksson, 2008).
While discussing the case, they did not consider sexual violence to be some-
thing that characterised rurality, but they did make the townspeople’s responses
to the rapes intelligible by Bjästa’s tininess and by its community bonds, which
they assumed to be strong.
Discussion
Until now we have discussed how Bjästa became a space of exception by its
rural qualities, both in the media and in the classroom, particularly its reputation
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as a small town with a strong sense of community. In the following, we will
add a further perspective in order to understand why the case discussions ended
up focussing almost solely on rural deviance rather than on the role of social
media. We will do this by focussing on the affectivity of othering processes,
particularly by arguing that the Bjästa case is instructive of how negative affect
circulates.
Cultural theorists such as Ahmed (2004), Anderson (2014) and Brennan
(2004) have posited that affect is completely cultural while also being experi-
enced in our bodies. We discern feelings in our bodies, but affect is also some-
thing in between us, as a relational experience. We get angry at somebody, we
feel guilty for someone. We are ashamed when we see ourselves through the
eyes of others. We sense the atmosphere when entering a room, or the hope in
a political rally (Anderson, 2014). Affect ‘transmits’ (Brennan, 2004). We are
affected by others’ feelings, we are moved and the affective expressions of
others cause us to feel and act in different ways. Another way to put this is to
say that affect ‘circulates’ (Ahmed, 2004); it is contagious and moves between
bodies. But as it circulates and comes in contact with certain bodies, affect may
be channelled into speciﬁc emotions and – due to these emotions’ history of
associations – stick more easily to certain bodies; some ﬁgures may cause more
disgust and revulsion than others (Ahmed, 2004). It follows that rapists and bat-
terers of women are ‘sticky’ ﬁgures that may be attached to the men in their
proximity. If someone has used physical or sexual violence, there is a greater
risk that he will be regarded as an undesirable or ‘shady’ ﬁgure and hence
becomes the target of hate and loathing (Gottzén, 2016, 2017), just as Oskar
faced disgust after the documentary.
Bjästa is an interesting case, as it demonstrates how negative affect may
spread and get stuck to different bodies. The case shows that affect is not
simply something we experience in our bodies, but that it also transmits
between us. We ﬁrst ﬁnd affective transmission between the perpetrator and
the victim in the school bathroom: an event that, according to the documen-
tary, was ﬁlled with both sexual arousal and fear. What initially seemed to be
mutual desire changed as Oskar used force to get sex; his assaultive bodily
confrontation made Linnea afraid and inﬂuenced her immobility. This scenario
speaks to how encounters between bodies not only enable different affective
states – thus making us feel something – but also channel our capacities to act
(Deleuze, 1988). This situation also became evident when rumours later
started to spread and the community became disgusted with the victim, which
restricted her and ﬁnally forced her to move from the town. Meanwhile, the
community supported and cared for the offender. Oskar seemed too nice and
too popular to have been able to commit such a sexual offence. According to
the community, rape was not something that happened there, or something
that ‘our’ boys did. This outlook corresponds with the work of Wennstam
(2015), who has pointed out that in cases where perpetrators of sexual vio-
lence receive social support, their relatives and friends have difﬁculty believ-
ing that ‘their boy’ is capable of such a crime.
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Affect also transcends beyond the human and appears through digital spaces
and their speciﬁc affordances. In the Bjästa case, the screening of the docu-
mentary enabled somewhat of an affective twist. While people had at ﬁrst dir-
ected their disgust towards Linnea, Oskar later became the target of online
hate. People also projected their contempt onto others, particularly the priest.
But what is perhaps most distinctive is that the abhorrence became attached to
the town itself once Bjästa became a metonym for defective responses to
sexual violence and the community the exemplar par excellence of a ‘herd
mentality’ that then enabled derisive comments about the place. Affect may
thus not only stick to bodies but may also envelop speciﬁc places, as affect is
an encounter between both human and non-human bodies and materialities
(Anderson, 2014; Deleuze, 1988). It seems reasonable to see that the disgust
stuck to Bjästa in light of cultural perceptions about rurality and small villages
in northern Sweden and its inhabitants (Eriksson, 2008; Stenbacka, 2011).
People explained the villagers’ handling of the rapes by Bjästa’s small size
and its strong sense of community. In all these affective moves, sexual vio-
lence was considered as something that happened elsewhere. Notions about
rurality served as a backdrop in the documentary, as articulated in the news
coverage and in the reactions on social media afterwards; such notions were
also a theme in the ﬁlm Flocking.
Disgust and negative affect circulated further. While MVP’s intentions of
using the Bjästa case was to cause students to reﬂect on social media usage,
both the students and their teachers were occupied with the fact that Bjästa is
a small community where everyone knows each other and rumours spread
quickly. People argued that social media platforms such as Facebook contrib-
uted to this situation, but they made few comparisons between Bjästa and the
students’ own schools and cities. Even though the MVP manual emphasises that
the violence and responses to the violence in Bjästa could have happened any-
where, those in the classroom portrayed the rapes and the bystanders’ responses
to the sexual violence as exceptional. To them, such violence simply could not
have happened in their suburb, in their school, in their city, but only in the ‘tiny
village’ out there, distinguished by its herd mentality.
Distance thus seems to be a crucial factor in affective responses to rape, as
responses to violence in general include both relational and spatial positions
(Gottzén & Sandberg, 2019). When perpetrators are close to us, when they are
familiar, we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to believe that they could do any harm. When
they are more distant – for instance when we learn about them through news
and documentaries – they become unintelligible strangers who are radically
different from us (Gottzén, 2013). They, and those who support them, evoke
disgust. This scenario reﬂects a more general tendency in Sweden’s policies
and media debates on violence, where people tend to view sexual violence as
something that characterises other men (Gottzén & Jonsson, 2012). In the
classroom discussions examined in this chapter, sexual violence – and particu-
larly the ‘negative’ bystander responses to abuse, where the community gave
the perpetrator social and emotional support and bullied the victim – not only
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appeared to be an unsolicited reaction but also was something that character-
ised rurality: a rurality that in many ways seems to be stuck in an unmodern
and uncivilised culture.
In this chapter, we have shown that discussing sexual violence is a matter of
affect. The designers of the MVP programme appeared to have been aware of
this notion when they addressed participants as bystanders rather than possible
victims or perpetrators. This approach is generally thought to avoid making
boys feel collectively blamed for sexism and abuse and thus reluctant to engage
in interventions. Yet, our ﬁndings from this case suggest that sexual violence
still became a hot topic that had an impact on the participants. In delicate
situations such as these, clichés about rapists and rural towns, and the negative
affect that coalesces with such ﬁgures and places, become resources that
teachers and students can use to approach the conundrum of violence by placing
both sexual violence and problematic bystander responses in a rural space of
exception.
Notes
1 The translations in this chapter (all from Swedish to English) have been slightly
edited for clarity in English.
2 The study was part of an evaluation of the MVP programme ﬁnanced by the Swedish
National Agency for Education. The study has been approved by the Regional Ethical
Review Board in Uppsala (ref. no. 2016/067).
3 The US version of the programme was originally aimed at young men in sports pro-
grammes. The Swedish version of the programme has been transformed for use with
all students in school, and the connection to youth sports has been removed.
4 ‘Övik’ is a colloquial abbreviation for Örnsköldsvik. Örnsköldsvik is a city, but also
the name of the municipality that includes Bjästa. The term ‘municipality’ (Swedish:
‘kommun’) is widely used in Sweden.
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11 Sexual transgressing
Situational and narrative perspectives
Laura Marie Schierff and Marie Bruvik Heinskou
Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate accounts of sexual transgressions provided by the
individuals who committed them. Following the proposition of Bernasco (2011),
this chapter posits that talking to individuals involved in transgressive behav-
iours ‘is vital to knowing and understanding’ the transgressions in question
(p. 3). In this chapter, we use qualitative interviews with individuals who, in
their own words, committed a sexual transgression but were not reported to the
police. We use the term ‘sexual transgression’ rather than ‘rape’ or ‘sexual
offence’ in this chapter because the participants in our study were not reported
nor convicted for their actions.
In sociology and related disciplines, sexual transgressions have long been
the subject of inquiry (Cahill, 2001). In a Danish context, research has investi-
gated the situational characteristics of sexual transgressions and the personal
characteristics of the individuals reported to the police for committing them
(Balvig et al., 2009; Heinskou, 2010, 2015; Laursen et al., 2009). Addition-
ally, large-scale victimisation surveys have provided information on the preva-
lence and characteristics of sexual transgressions not reported to the police
(Deen et al., 2018; Heinskou et al., 2017; Helweg-Larsen, 2012; Pedersen
et al., 2017). Whilst there is nothing new in interviewing individuals involved
in transgressive behaviours, the ﬁeld of research on sexual transgressions is
characterised by a lack of knowledge on the situational characteristics of these
transgressions and the explanations provided for them by the individuals
committing them. Speciﬁcally, this is the case amongst the understudied popu-
lation of individuals who have committed sexual transgressions but who were
not reported to the police.
Historically and contemporarily, qualitative interviews with individuals
committing transgressions of varying kinds have been used commonly within
both sociological and criminological research (Bernasco, 2011; Copes &
Hochstetler, 2011; Katz, 1988; Presser, 2004, 2008, 2009; Presser & Sandberg,
2015; Tonry, 2011). Consequently, the epistemological status of accounts of
transgressions amongst the people committing them has been the subject of
considerable scientiﬁc debate (Bernasco, 2011; Copes & Hochstetler, 2011;
Elffers, 2011; Maruna & Copes, 2005; Presser & Sandberg, 2015). In these research
contributions, it has been argued that although we cannot render the accounts of
transgressions amongst the people committing them ‘truths’, they arguably represent
‘unmistakable sources of evidence’ (Presser & Sandberg, 2015, p. ix).
In the literature, the descriptions of the circumstances in accounts of
sexual transgressions have been argued to serve as stigma management tools
(Farmer et al., 2016) and it has been argued that engaging with the individ-
uals whose actions we consider transgressive risk mitigating the possibilities
for condemning such actions (Baumeister, 2012). In this chapter, we acknow-
ledge that the accounts and explanations for sexual transgressions provided
by the individuals committing them constitute speciﬁc self-conceptions. In
this respect, we render such accounts biased and consequently emphasise
that our analysis concerns the situational characteristics of sexual transgres-
sions from the perspectives of the individuals committing them. We also con-
tend, however, that the accounts of the situations in which the sexual
transgressions were committed hold unique possibilities for contributing with
knowledge on the experiential properties of sexual transgressions from an
overlooked perspective.
We investigate the accounts of sexual transgressions provided by three
young men who, in their own words, committed sexual transgressions but
who were not reported to the police. Because of the risk of disclosure and
fear of stigmatisation, the participants can be understood as a hard-to-reach
population (Bonevski et al., 2014; Ireland & Craig, 2015). The participants
were recruited in the wake of a national sexual victimisation survey carried
out in 2017 (Heinskou et al., 2017). Through extensive news media and
social media coverage of the ﬁndings from the victimisation survey, we
asked for stories of committing sexual transgressions (Heinskou, 2017). Only
three individuals responded, underlining the difﬁculties in recruiting partici-
pants for research projects that inquire into the topic of sexual transgres-
sions. We conducted semi-structured qualitative research interviews ranging
from one and a half to two hours’ duration in Danish university campus set-
tings. All interviews were conducted, transcribed and anonymised in Danish.
The excerpts presented in this chapter were translated into English. We
began all interviews with a careful explanation of the aim of the research
and that the intention of the inquiry was not to deem the participants or
their actions right or wrong, good or bad, but to nuance the prevailing
understanding of sexual transgressions. Given the sensitive nature of the
topic, as well as the therapeutic resemblances of the qualitative interview,
we asked questions and followed up on themes brought forward by the parti-
cipants in order to not leave the participants more exposed or vulnerable
than they were before the interviews. The interviews covered the following
topics: general information of the participants (such as their age and nation-
ality), the situation in which the transgression was committed, the aftermath
of the sexual transgression, perspectives on the present and future, reﬂections
on potential formal and informal punishment and reﬂections on Danish
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sexual culture. The interviews were conducted as semi-structured qualitative
research interviews, and the participants were not interrupted if they did not
reﬂect upon the topics in the intended sequential order. We ended all inter-
views by asking the participants for potential additional topics or reﬂections
they wished to discuss.
In this chapter, we view the participants’ accounts of their transgressions in
a situational perspective and identify and discuss the situational characteristics
of the three transgressions described. In this investigation, we identify two core
characteristics upon which the participants placed emphasis: alcohol intoxication
and misunderstanding signals of consent and the absence of consent. Hereafter,
drawing on the narrative tradition within qualitative research, we view the
accounts of the situations as epistemological resources of social signiﬁcance
because they combine perspectives the past, present and future (Bengtsson &
Andersen, 2017; Riessman, 2008, 2017). We combine this view with the widely
used concepts for analysing explanations for transgressive behaviours from
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) Techniques of neutralization, Scott and Lyman’s
(1968) Accounts and Scully and Marolla’s (1984) Vocabulary of motive. In
doing so, we aim to understand the relationship between the situational charac-
teristics, the explanations these characteristics make possible and the possibil-
ities in these explanations for constituting speciﬁc self-conceptions amongst the
participants. In the following, we begin by looking at the three accounts of
sexual transgressions.
Three accounts of sexual transgressions
David’s transgression
David is a man in his mid-20s who, a couple of years before the interview, had,
in his own words, attempted to rape his female friend during a sleepover after
a private party whilst he was under the inﬂuence of alcohol. In the interview,
David described the situation as follows:
DAVID: ‘Well, (…) I just had a lot of alcohol, and I had trouble distinguishing
black from white, I mean – and I sensed that the other guest, she was – she
was interested in me from the moment she arrived. She asked a lot about
me. We talked and we talked – I don’t remember what we talked about to
be honest. But at some point, we all fell asleep, and I’m on the futon with
her and we have sex and I just think – I mean – we were so drunk – the
thing about contraception – we didn’t think about that and … – I think she
was a bit like, ‘Are you sure you can manage?’ And I was just like, ‘Yeah,
yeah, let’s just do it’. But I couldn’t keep an erection. It wasn’t – it wasn’t
possible, I think. But I think we had sex. And then she left to smoke
a cigarette at four in the morning, and I woke up and she was just sort of
gone, and then she had apparently locked herself out of the apartment and
didn’t want to wake up the rest of us by ringing the door bell, so. Luckily
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for her, she was dressed and could just go home. But I guess I felt a bit
anxious about the fact that suddenly she was gone because I just wanted
to – to have more sex or something erotic, so – then, I just see my friend
who is lying naked on the ﬂoor and (…) It was quite weird because
I didn’t feel drunk. It was like I had a clear vision in that exact moment
when I stood there in the morning and – – but it was a phase of transition,
I guess. When it burns – and when the alcohol begins to set in because
I couldn’t remember it when I woke up again after I had slept the second
time. It is like – I don’t know whether you can call it an alcohol psychosis
or something like delirium, which I have read about. It just felt unreal …
You feel clear headed, but you’re not at all. Your blood alcohol level is 3
point something’
(…)
INTERVIEWER: ‘Yes’.
DAVID: ‘When it went wrong. But then I just saw her lying there naked on
a mattress on the ﬂoor next to her boyfriend and just thought, “Okay, if
the other one has left, I’ll have sex with this one. We’ve had sex before”.
Not that it justiﬁes anything’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘No, but it was that logic?’
DAVID: ‘It was that vulgar logic one has’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Okay’.
DAVID: ‘And then I lay down beside her and sort of tried to put my penis inside
her, but it didn’t really work because I was so drunk – so [I] sort of gave
up, I think’.
David committed his transgression in his own apartment after a private party.
Considering the locality of the incident, David’s transgression resembles that of
the most frequently occurring type of sexual transgression involving successful
or attempted forced intercourse (Heinskou et al., 2017). In Denmark, most
sexual transgressions are committed at private residences and happen during
night time after a private party. Moreover, the majority of sexual transgressions
occur between people who know each other prior to the transgression (Heinskou
et al., 2017). Considering this, we can understand David’s account of the trans-
gression as a typical example of situations of sexual transgressions according to
its spatial, circumstantial and relational characteristics. However, most sexual
transgressions involve verbal interaction prior to the transgression between the
individual committing the transgression and the individual against whom the
transgression is committed (Balvig et al., 2009; Heinskou et al., 2017). David’s
account, however, involves no verbal contact with the woman against whom he
committed his transgression, and, consequently, his account is devoid of
descriptions of potential signals of consent. Besides the spatial and circumstan-
tial characteristics, we also see how notions of emotional factors are present in
David’s account of the situation, as well as how alcohol intoxication is
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emphasised in his account. After presenting the accounts of the two other parti-
cipants, we discuss how alcohol as a situational factor simultaneously shapes
the possibilities for mitigating concepts of responsibility and identity in David’s
explanation of his transgression. Next, we turn to the accounts of the situations
in which the two other participants, Jasper and William, committed their
transgressions.
Jasper’s transgression
The second participant, Jasper, is a man in his mid-20s who, in his own words,
sexually transgressed against a man he had met on an online dating platform.
Jasper and the man had agreed to meet in a meeting room at a public library and
had exchanged messages prior to the physical encounter. The two men had dis-
cussed Jasper performing oral sex on the man, but when they entered the room in
which they had agreed to meet, the man voiced concerns about the circumstances
of the encounter. Jasper and the man began kissing, but then the man again hesi-
tated. In the interview, Jasper described that the man was ‘uneasy’:
INTERVIEWER: ‘And he verbalises concerns about the place and being discovered?’
JASPER: ‘Yes, at this point. That’s what he says. “What if –”, and then I say like,
“Nothing will happen. For sure nothing will happen. There is time enough
to –” – and then … then I begin opening his pants – I mean – and begin
to – I mean – begin giving him a blowjob where – I mean – it goes … it
goes very fast from that – I mean – I mean, he comes very fast … so the
duration of the blowjob might be a minute or something like that. It goes
very fast’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Okay’.
JASPER: ‘But to begin with, he sort of … he moans – and again – that doesn’t
mean he thinks – but he – then that’s what he says – still quite uneasy –
er –, and then … and then at some point, [he] begins saying like, “No,
stop’”.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Before he comes?’
JASPER: ‘Before he comes. During that minute. Then, there’s like 30 seconds or
twenty seconds where he like – I mean – where he’s in my mouth and
where he moans and is uneasy but the last 30 seconds, he says, “No,
stop” – and tries to push me away’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Pushes you away? Physically?’
JASPER: ‘Yes, he pushes my shoulders – er – I mean – ’
INTERVIEWER: ‘Do you look at him?’
JASPER: ‘Yes, I look at him, but I continue’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Do you remember what you see? Is he looking at you too?’
JASPER: ‘I think he looks away actually. Err – and – and says that thing – deﬁnitely
says “stop” – multiple times and also says “no” and like – pushes my
shoulders – but then he comes – the way I remember it – very fast after
that – and then – then I get up fast and – I mean – and yes – I think … at
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that time, I was super horny so I might have seen things differently. So,
I don’t think, I think so much about it – don’t think a lot about it. Not
until afterwards. And probably not until he’s gone. So yes, he said no.
I think I closed his pants’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Yes’.
JASPER: ‘And then … he says … that thing. I mean, I think – I don’t remember it
so clearly. I think it was like – yes what does he say? I think maybe –
I thought a lot about that thing … that he says “stop” and “no”, so
I remember that clearly’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Do you remember what it feels like when he said that?’
JASPER: ‘At that time, I’ve been … horny and very “at it’”.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Yes’.
JASPER: ‘So, to be honest, I’m quite sure that I didn’t think – I’m pretty sure
that I didn’t think so much about … about it. Because then
I wouldn’t have … fought against it, when he fought against it’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘Yes’.
JASPER: ‘But then I stand up, and he avoids my gaze and sort of looks … in other
directions and says “okay” and that he needs to leave; I think that’s what
he says’.
Jasper’s account of the situation involves a semi-public locality in the form
of a meeting room at a public library during daytime. It involves two men. In
this sense, Jasper’s account contrasts the common perception of sexual trans-
gressions as a phenomenon occurring between men and women (Heinskou
et al., 2017; Laursen et al., 2009). Moreover, Jasper had contacted the man on
an online platform, which means that the two were neither strangers nor well
acquainted in a traditional sense. On the one hand, the two men had not met
prior to the transgression, considering which we can understand the man as
a stranger to Jasper prior to their encounter. On the other hand, the two men
had exchanged messages prior to the encounter through an online dating plat-
form. In this sense, the relational distance between Jasper and the man is best
characterised using the deﬁnition of relational distance found in the term con-
tact rape, which is commonly used to denote scenarios in which interaction
takes place prior to the rape or, as in the present case, prior to the sexual trans-
gression (Heinskou et al., 2017). Later in this chapter, we investigate how the
interactions preluding the transgression shape the possibilities for explaining
what happened and for constituting speciﬁc self-conceptions. Below, we turn to
the account provided by William, who similarly described both verbal and phys-
ical interactions prior to his transgression.
William’s transgression
The third participant, William, is a man in his early 30s who, in his own words,
transgressed against a woman he met at a private party six years before the
interview. In the interview, William described the situation as follows:
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WILLIAM: ‘I mean, we had – you know – we hung out all night, and then at some
point, I think we’re in the kitchen and we kiss – err – it’s a bit difﬁcult
to remember my exact moves – it’s a bit difﬁcult to recall. But I recall
that suddenly, it’s 2 AM, and at some point, the party dies out. Err – and
my friend lived in a relatively large house, so there was space for us to
sleep in a guest room. And we do that – her and I, and I – err – there
was a single bed, and – you know, like – totally polite I say, “Hey,
wouldn’t you like to sleep in the bed, then I’ll sleep on the ﬂoor?” And
it stays like that for – like – ﬁve or ten minutes, right? – while we’re
talking – and then, “Ah, okay, I could also get up on the bed, right?”.
And then we’re there making out’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘And that’s okay with her?’
WILLIAM: ‘And, that’s totally okay – and err – you know – then we begin touching
each other a bit, and I remember that as being quite mutual, as well. And
then at some point, I think, “Yes, then we’re good to go. Let’s take each
other’s clothes off”. Err, and at that point, I believe I can feel that she
begins pulling out and says, “Ah, okay. Maybe we should slow – slow
down” – I don’t remember which words she used’.
INTERVIEWER: ‘But she says something?’
WILLIAM: ‘Yes, or she’s like (William makes a sound indicating hesitation). Maybe
not with those – with those exact ….’
INTERVIEWER: ‘Can you see each other?’
WILLIAM: ‘It’s pretty dark … And I can’t recall the words or gesticulations she
uses, but it’s not that I think that “Ah, she’s not into this”. I actually
think that she’s in on it, and that’s my impression the whole way through
it – err – and we have sex, and afterwards, I think “Okay, she was” – “it
was sex”, but it wasn’t that I thought “Wow, that was great”, or that it
was nice. There was something wrong, and I think I had trouble under-
standing it in the situation – what it was – and then when we woke up
the day after, the atmosphere was “sort of gloomy”. And I think at that
point, I’m probably still – unable to understand why the atmosphere is
gloomy. Because I thought, “Hey, that was just a fun night” – err – and
it actually – doesn’t take many days before I talk to my friend who
threw the party – where he – err – confronts me and says, “What have
you done? Because I hear that that girl – that she wasn’t that happy
about what happened”’.
William’s account of his transgression resembles the accounts provided by
both David and Jasper. As in David’s account of his transgression, the spatial
and circumstantial characteristics in William’s account resemble the most fre-
quently identiﬁed form of sexual transgression: one that takes place at a private
residence after a private party and the person committing the transgression and
the person against whom the transgression was committed being acquainted
prior to the transgression (Heinskou et al., 2017). William also described that
his transgression took place in a post-party context and noted that he was under
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the inﬂuence of alcohol. Contrary to David’s account and similar to Jasper’s,
William’s account involved descriptions of interactions between him and the
woman against whom he committed his transgression. Subsequently, we further
investigate these characteristics.
Sexual transgressions and alcohol intoxication
While criminological research has traditionally used rational choice-based models
of decision-making in understanding sexually transgressive behaviour (Abbey
et al., 1996; Balemba & Beauregard, 2012; Beauregard et al., 2005; Wilson et al.,
2002), the accounts of both David and William pose challenges to models founded
on such assumptions. Newer criminological perspectives have argued that these
challenges implicitly downplay the seductive nature of transgressions (Ferrell,
1997, 2004; Hayward, 2007, 2012; Katz, 1988), but the challenge to this assump-
tion appears different in the present case. Both the accounts of David and William
involved descriptions of alcohol intoxication, a characteristic which research has
linked to sexually coercive behaviour (Demant & Heinskou, 2011). Looking at
David’s account, we see that he said, ‘Okay, if the other one has left, I’ll have sex
with this one. We’ve had sex before’, to describe how he makes the decision to
commit his transgression, which he describes as his ‘vulgar logic’. In this sense,
David described a decision-making process, but the persistent references to the
inﬂuence of alcohol intoxication in his description introduced alcohol as the back-
drop of this decision. This inference resembles the ﬁnding that an individual’s pro-
pensity to use sexually coercive tactics and both verbal and physical means of
force increases with the consumption of alcohol (Abbey & Harnish, 1995). From
William’s account, however, such an inference resting on the assumption of con-
scious decision-making appears troublesome. William committed his transgression
in the aftermath of a private party, but contrary to David, William described think-
ing that ‘she’s in on it, and that’s my impression the whole way through it’ and that
it was not until the next day that he realised ‘the atmosphere’ was ‘sort of gloomy’.
This reasoning poses challenges to an understanding of alcohol intoxication facili-
tating decisions to use coercive tactics. Instead, it allows for an understanding of
alcohol intoxication as the reason for difﬁculties in perceiving and responding to
signals of consent and the absence of consent. As such, David’s and William’s
transgressions thematise the role of alcohol as a situational characteristic of sexual
transgressions in two distinct manners. In the following interviews with both David
and William, drawing on perspectives from narrative criminology (Presser & Sand-
berg, 2015) and vocabularies for analysing explanations for transgressive behav-
iours (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Scully & Marolla, 1984; Sykes & Matza, 1957), we
investigate alcohol as an explanation for the sexual transgressions as they occurred.
In the interview, William described:
WILLIAM: “I think that … ﬁrstly, I don’t think it would have happened if I hadn’t
been drunk. But that’s also – you know … I was pretty shy at that time –
err – so for me, at that time, I think that maybe – also the thing about
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when alcohol was introduced, it was easier to talk to – er – the girls in
the group, right? Err – but then, at the same time, more difﬁcult to
understand ‘Hey, if I like you, then why don’t you like me?’”
William’s descriptions resemble the ﬁnding that alcohol intoxication has been
found to hamper an individual’s ability to perceive and respond to signals of
consent and non-consent (Steele & Josephs, 1990). William’s statement contains
the underlying assumption that sober-me would not have committed the trans-
gression. Through this, William described a change of self in which his intoxi-
cated self was contrasted to his normal self. However, in the interview, William
mitigated his initial absolute statement:
WILLIAM: ‘I won’t use alcohol as an excuse, but – it might be an enabler in some
ways, and for me, it was a lot about that thing that … the conversation
just ﬂows easier when you’re drunk, right? But – but it wasn’t –
I mean – in that way, I don’t think it would’ve happened, if we hadn’t
been drunk that day, but – but that doesn’t mean it’s the alcohol’s fault’.
Thus, we see how William appeared conﬂicted over the degree of explanatory
power that could be attributed to his alcohol intoxication. In this way, the
explanation resembles the chaotic explanations found within the narrative ana-
lytical perspective (Bengtsson & Andersen, 2017) in which the events and fac-
tors are linked in a non-consistent manner. In sum, we see how alcohol as an
explanation in the case of William enabled social interaction: ‘the conversation
just ﬂows easier when you’re drunk, right?’ and that, to William, it ‘doesn’t
mean it’s the alcohol’s fault’. William’s description can be understood as
a reference to what research has termed the social grey zone,1 which arises
when young people engage in alcohol consumption and sexual interactions
(Demant & Heinskou, 2011). As evident from above, the inﬂuence of alcohol
was persistently noted by David in his account of the situation in which he
committed his transgression. However, as we shall see, David also appeared
conﬂicted over the inﬂuence of alcohol. Describing the situation as ‘unreal’,
David placed heavy emphasis on the distorting qualities of his intoxication. He
emphasised this by using vocabulary derived from established conceptions of
intense alcohol intoxication. Through the description of a ‘phase of transition’
and ‘when it burns – and when the alcohol begins to set in’, David established
the impact of alcohol, referring to its physiological qualities. In doing so, he
drew on medicalised language, such as having an ‘alcohol psychosis’ and the
description ‘delirium’. David’s explanation resembles ﬁndings from research
amongst criminal sex offenders using medicalised language as a means to
understand their own actions and, consequently, themselves (Rickard, 2015). In
the interview, David described the following:
DAVID: ‘That was sort of the ﬁrst time I realised that I had rape-like behaviour
when I was very drunk. Because – because it sort of took away my – my
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guard and my ﬁlter. I mean, then it became something like – almost like
almost survival. Then you just act instinctively’.
While David previously described alcohol as changing his perception of the
situation, David here described a change of ‘self’. David’s description of acting
‘instinctively’ and in: of ‘survival’ alluded to an understanding of alcohol as
causing the surfacing of his degenerated self. Though David formulated this
change as a negative change, it simultaneously allowed for a sharp distinction
between David’s normal self and his intoxicated self.
In sum, David and William both placed emphasis on the inﬂuence of alcohol
in explaining their sexual transgressions. In the case of David, alcohol was intro-
duced as a material, yet intra-individual driver causing both distortions of the
situation and himself, the backdrop of his decision to transgress. William simi-
larly placed emphasis on his intoxication and conceptualised the inﬂuence of
alcohol as causing difﬁculties in understanding potential signals of absence of
consent. From a situational outlook, the participants’ persistence in describing
changes in the self or in the ability to perceive and respond to signals of consent
and the absence of consent emphasises alcohol as a situational factor that can
viably illuminate the complexities in sexual transgressing and the difﬁculties in
viewing them as results of cool-headed, rational decision-making.
According to Sykes and Matza (1957), individuals who transgress the moral
boundaries of society feel guilt and shame for their actions (Sykes & Matza,
1957). As such, this theory posits that moral transgressors are conscious of the
wrongfulness of their actions and defend these in accordance with the norms of
the majority, as has been extensively argued in the criminological literature
(Copes & Hochstetler, 2011; Farmer et al., 2016; Maruna & Copes, 2005;
Maruna & Mann, 2006). Here, the main assertion is that by explaining trans-
gressive behaviours through Techniques of neutralisation, the individual does
not challenge the conventional values of society. Instead, the excuse functions
as a simultaneous afﬁrmation of such values and a protection of the individual’s
self-conception (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Following this, we view the explan-
ations provided by the participants not only as descriptions of their perspectives
on what happened but also as meaning-making tools of both their transgressions
and themselves.
In the vocabulary of Scott and Lyman (1968), justiﬁcations are distinguished
from excuses: ‘Justiﬁcations are accounts in which one accepts responsibility
for the act in question, but denies the pejorative quality associated with it’
(Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 47) and ‘Excuses are accounts in which one admits
that the act in question is bad, wrong, or inappropriate but denies full responsi-
bility’ (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 47). In this perspective, we can understand the
accounts of alcohol intoxication as explanations for the sexual transgressions
through which the participants do not challenge the wrongfulness of the trans-
gressions, yet, at least partly, omit themselves from responsibility. Consequently,
the explanations function as excuses rather than justiﬁcations (Scott & Lyman,
1968; Scully & Marolla, 1984; Sykes & Matza, 1957). In this sense, they
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function as tools for separating the act from the individual. The participants
therefore implicitly morally condemn their actions, yet maintain a sense of self
that is within the moral boundaries of society.
Considering alcohol intoxication as an explanation for the sexual transgres-
sions, the ideal typical excuse identiﬁed by Scott and Lyman (1968) within
their vocabulary of Accounts, appeal to defeasibility can assist our understand-
ing; in this concept, an individual describes not being fully informed or that
his/her ‘will’ was not completely ‘free’ (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 48). William
described the inﬂuence of alcohol as making it ‘difﬁcult to understand’, and
David referred to ‘instincts’ and ‘survival’. The explanation can therefore be
argued to implicitly challenge the question of free will, as posited by Scott
and Lyman (1968). As such, responsibility is, if not denied, then mitigated
(Sykes & Matza, 1957).
The descriptions of alcohol intoxication also resemble that by Scully and Mar-
olla (1984), who developed ideal typical excuses for criminal sex offending.
According to these authors, the use of alcohol and drugs is deﬁned as an explan-
ation for sexual transgressions caused by intoxication, which ‘brought out what
was already there’ and that things ‘rose to the surface’ (Scully & Marolla, 1984,
p. 538). Recognising the cultural context of the explanation (Phoenix, 2016) and
its formulation in accordance with implicit maxims (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 53),
we can understand the explanation as one in which alcohol is introduced as
a culturally recognised explanation for changes in behaviour (Scott & Lyman,
1968). The emphasis on alcohol intoxication therefore offers possibilities for the
participants to provide accounts that partly contest their responsibility for the
transgressions. Through this, we see how the accounts of circumstantial factors
function as means through which speciﬁc self-conceptions can be constituted
amongst individuals who have committed sexual transgressions.
Through a close reading of the experiential properties of the situations in
which the sexual transgressions were committed, we see how the descriptions
of the inﬂuence of alcohol intoxication pose challenges to rational choice-based
models of sexually transgressive decision-making. In this sense, the accounts
illuminate the complexities in scientiﬁc investigations of sexual transgressions
and the need to develop new theoretical and analytical models that can account
for the ambiguities, complexities and latencies associated with the phenomenon.
Simultaneously, we see how such explanations can assist our understanding of
how individuals who have committed sexual transgressions view the relation-
ship between what they did and who they are. Subsequently, we look at how
the participants described misunderstandings and introduced them as explan-
ations for their transgressions.
Sexual transgressions as misunderstandings
Both Jasper and William described the situations in which they committed their
transgressions as characterised by difﬁculties in understanding the signals sent
by the individuals against whom they committed their transgressions. They both
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described that they did not realise until afterwards that what had happened had
not been consensual. As we see below, the participants explained these misun-
derstandings through references to previous sexual experiences and common-
place depictions of what constitutes stereotypic male sexuality, as well as what
constitutes a sexual transgression. In the interview, William described:
WILLIAM: ‘I actually think that it wasn’t until the next day that I realised that there
was – there had been something where she had said or done something
where I probably had – yes – basically ignored it’.
William described noticing hesitations from the woman against whom he
committed a transgression, but he also stated that he thought she was ‘in on it’.
William described experiencing the intimate interaction as ‘quite mutual’, yet
the next day, he sensed that ‘the atmosphere was sort of gloomy’. In the litera-
ture, verbal and physical interactions are argued to cause grey zones because
they blur the demarcation of consensual and non-consensual interactions and
the transition between them (Hanser, 2016; Heinskou et al., 2017; Stefansen &
Smette, 2006). In a Danish context, research has demonstrated how young
people hold strict deﬁnitions of what constitutes a proper rejection (Johansen,
2016). Considering this, we can view the convergence of William’s description
of the sound indicating potential hesitation from the woman against whom he
committed his transgression and the existence of cultural standards for proper
rejections as cultivating the possibility for his misunderstanding. However, it
should be noted that such difﬁculties and grey zones have also been argued to
be amongst the rape myths that make up the commonplace depictions of both
non-reported sexual transgressions and criminal sex offending (Ryan, 2011).
Similarly, Jasper explained his misunderstanding through descriptions of the dif-
ﬁculty in perceiving and responding to potential signals of the absence of con-
sent. Jasper explained the occurrence of his misunderstanding through
references to the resemblances between the situation and his previous (consen-
sual) sexual experiences:
JASPER: ‘So, I probably project my – I mean when I am in this kind of situation,
I also think about what might happen … but that’s the part of it that cre-
ates a bit of excitement which … I think is super titillating in all sorts of
ways. Er – and then I think that I can recognise what situation he ﬁnds
himself in. But I never know – I cannot know. So, I think that’s how
I interpret his – I mean – uneasiness’.
In explaining his transgression, Jasper described thinking that he could recog-
nise consent because he was accustomed to similar experiences with casual
sexual encounters in semi-public settings. In this manner, Jasper explained the
misunderstanding as caused by projections of his own experiences, distorting
his ability to perceive the man’s hesitation as a signal of the absence of consent.
In the interview, Jasper elaborated:
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JASPER: ‘I think that the image I have, and most people have, of rape is that it is –
you know – the sort of – that it sort of is the extrovert masculine sexuality
that is related to rape. I mean – and that it’s easier to relate that to a sexual
transgression which is like – which is … related to violence. Because you
sort of think that the extrovert masculine – you know – masculine sexual-
ity is typically stronger. In all the porn movies of male homosexuals, the
male has the lead role and is generally taller and broader and so on – so in
that way, it mirrors the male–female relationship where you’re also used
to think that is … the male role that’s the one that can primarily rape’.
In the above, Jasper described how he perceives the ‘male role that’s the one
that can primarily rape’. In the literature, such culturally derived perceptions of
masculine sexuality have been argued to contribute to the persistent rape myths
that surround commonplace depictions of sexual transgressions (Edwards et al.,
2014; Hanser, 2016; Ryan, 2011; Stefansen & Smette, 2006). Considering this,
we can view Jasper’s explanation of his misunderstanding leading to his trans-
gression as a thematisation of the close relationship between cultural images
and the possibilities for making sense of oneself and one’s actions. The litera-
ture has established how cultural images of rape scenarios bear implications for
the ability to deﬁne sexual transgressions amongst victims (Edwards et al.,
2014; Stefansen & Smette, 2006). Jasper’s description suggests that this might
also be the case in understanding one’s own behaviours as transgressive. More-
over, we can understand Jasper’s explanation as one that thematises the widely
disputed relationship between the cultural images offered in the porn industry
and sexually transgressive behaviour. However, while research has conceptual-
ised this relationship as one in which exposure to pornographic images
increases rape proclivity (Cahill, 2001; Wright et al., 2016), the inﬂuence of
pornographic images is given a different status in Jasper’s explanation. Rather
than explaining his transgression as resulting from perceptions of the legitimacy
of using coercive tactics in the pursuit of obtaining sexual interactions, Jasper
described how these images hampered his ability to perceive both himself as
the transgressor and the signals of the absence of consent. Consequently, Jas-
per’s explanation illustrates not only how cultural images and the possibilities
for making sense of transgressive behaviours are interwoven but also how these
cultural images permeate the very situations in which determining signals of
consent and signals of the absence of consent is vital.
As in the case of alcohol intoxication as an explanation for sexual transgres-
sions, the combination of the perspectives of Sykes and Matza (1957), Scott
and Lyman (1968) and Scully and Marolla (1984) allows for an understanding
of the explanation as simultaneously constituting speciﬁc self-conceptions
amongst the participants. Explaining the sexual transgressions as resulting from
misunderstandings caused by inabilities to distinguish signals of consent from
signals of absence of consent does not challenge the wrongfulness of the trans-
gression. Yet, it at least partly omits both William and Jasper from responsibil-
ity (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Scully & Marolla, 1984; Sykes & Matza, 1957). In
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the terminology of Scott and Lyman (1968), we can view this explanation as an
appeal to accident, through which the transgression is explained as non-
intentional (p. 47f). Through this explanation, the participants explain their
actions, yet retain what Scully and Marolla (1984) refer to as nice guy images
(p. 537ff). In this respect, especially Jasper’s statement that his perspective on
the stereotypical images of sexual transgressions causing his misunderstanding
is what ‘most people have’ illustrates the relationship between the explanation
and the cultural context in which it is embedded. Through this, the transgression
is not just explained as an ‘accident’ (Scott & Lyman, 1968, p. 48) but as an
accident that could have happened to anyone. It can be asserted that the recent
enhanced attentiveness to grey zone characterisations of sexual transgressions,
which are brought about by, for example, the #MeToo movement, has simultan-
eously constituted a vocabulary of recognisable excuses for transgressive behav-
iours. The same enhanced attentiveness, however, can be argued to have
constituted such misunderstandings as less culturally recognised legitimate
explanations for sexual transgressions.
As in the case of alcohol intoxication, explaining sexual transgressions as
resulting from misunderstandings allows for a contestation of responsibility
amongst the participants and thus thematises how accounts of circumstantial
factors allow for the constitution of speciﬁc self-conceptions. Explaining sexual
transgressions as resulting from misunderstandings draws attention to the difﬁ-
culties in strictly demarcating consent from non-consent and thematises how the
perception of consent may vary across individuals, time and context.
Concluding remarks
None of the participants in our study were reported to the police, but all three
participants described their actions as sexual transgressions. First, this can be
argued to strengthen the participants’ possibilities for deﬁning what happened
in the situations in which they committed their transgressions. Second, it
means that the veracity of their accounts cannot be investigated through com-
parisons with, for instance, police reports through data triangulation (Linde-
gaard, 2011). Considering the situational characteristics described by the
participants, an analysis based on interviews with the individuals against
whom the transgressions were committed would likely produce other, and
potentially, conﬂicting ﬁndings than the ones presented. Such ﬁndings
obtained through ‘actor triangulation’ (Lindegaard, 2011, p. 117f) could be
relevant to the understanding of the interactional dynamics of sexual transgres-
sions in a situational perspective.
It can be argued that analysing alcohol intoxication and misunderstandings of
signals of consent and the absence of consent as situational characteristics of
sexual transgressions, as well as giving voice to the individuals committing
sexual transgressions rather than the individuals against whom these actions are
committed, is an unethical venture (see Baumeister, 2012). In this sense, this
chapter can be accused of contributing to the substantiation ‘rape myths’ or
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‘rape-supportive beliefs’ (Ryan, 2011, p. 777). However, it is not the aim of this
chapter to discuss the pathology or normality of the explanations provided by
the participants (Maruna & Mann, 2006). Rather, our ﬁndings suggest that
research on sexual transgressions could possibly generate information on both
the situational and experiential characteristics of sexual transgressing and of the
self-constitutive functions of providing these accounts.
Note
1 Our use of the term ‘grey zone’ does not signify a downplaying of the severity of the
act inﬂicted. Rather, our usage emphasises the described difﬁculties in perceiving and
responding to signals of consent and the absence of consent.
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12 Rape in the age of the Internet
Elisabeth Fransson, Trond Martinsen and Elisabeth
Staksrud
Introduction
‘We who are young today have the whole world in our pockets. The pros-
ecutor didn’t understand this. There’s something about the words people
use, such as “child pornography” and “rape”. Perhaps the law lacks words
to describe reality. The new reality. This may be a reality that you, who are
a bit older, don’t understand. There’s a new way of communicating. There
are other rules’.
– Alex, a young man sentenced to prison for digital rape
A few years ago, Alex, a young Norwegian male, was sentenced to prison
for more than one hundred counts of rape. One of these rapes occurred while
he was eating dinner with his family. He was accused according to §192 of
the general civil penal code of 1902, which deﬁnes rape as, ‘through violence
or threatening behaviour, making someone have sexual intercourse with
someone else, or to perform acts that correspond to sexual intercourse with
oneself’.1,2
Rape is commonly understood as involving physical, synchronous contact
between two or more people: victims and perpetrators. But with the introduction
of the Internet in general, and especially social media through the use of direct
communication services, several possibilities have emerged for using this tech-
nology for rape remotely, either synchronously or asynchronously. At the same
time, understanding these crimes has proved challenging, whether in court, in
law, or in the development of legislation. While international studies of online
sexual crimes have been conducted (e.g. Handyside & Ringrose, 2017; Henry &
Powell, 2015; Renfrow & Rollo, 2014; Klettke, Hallford & Mellor, 2014),
researchers have paid little attention to the perpetrators and their stories. In this
chapter, we help to ﬁll this gap by analysing the case of Alex, a young man
sentenced to several years in a high-security prison after committing a large
number of rapes online. We seek to explore how Internet-mediated rape is
understood, both by perpetrators and by the court. This understanding includes,
but is not limited to, the intrinsic paradox of digital rape: that people can be
found guilty of raping someone they have never met, and who may be at
a location far away. We draw on interviews with Alex and use his story, per-
spectives and reﬂections as a starting point. Our hope is to uncover some of the
rationales, motivations and complexities that digital technologies have added to
sexual abuse and rape situations.
Our analysis is conducted against the theoretical background of computer-
mediated communication (CMC). We discuss how both group and individual
interactions differ between face-to-face (F2F) meetings and CMC, and how this
situation can contribute to our understanding of digital rape and related sexual
crimes. By choosing this theoretical approach, we seek to increase the under-
standing of rape as a contemporary, mediated phenomenon that transcends spa-
tial and temporal boundaries.
Background: Internet-related sexual crimes
A large body of international research has contributed to the understanding of
Internet-related sexual crimes against children and youths, including the so-
called grooming (e.g. Choo, 2009; Finkelhor, Mitchell & Wolak, 2000;
Gottschalk, 2011; Kierkegaard, 2008; Peter, Valkenburg & Schouten, 2006;
Staksrud, 2013; Taylor, 2011; Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell & Ybarra, 2008).
Research on sexting – sending or receiving sexually suggestive texts or images
via mobile phones and messenger services – has also contributed to a wider
understanding of the differences between wanted and unwanted sexual contact
and content (e.g. Badenhorst, 2011; Drouin, Ross & Tobin, 2015; Klettke et al.,
2014; Mascheroni, Vincent & Jimenez, 2015; Van Ouytsel, Walrave, Ponnet &
Heirman, 2015; Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell, 2012). What remains less known
is how young people use techniques of persuasion, deception and threats
towards children and youths online, as well as young perpetrators’ own perspec-
tives on their conduct.
The way in which society views sexual offences in general, and speciﬁcally
those committed via the Internet, is inﬂuenced by the media and how politi-
cians, the police and court systems respond to these crimes. Various national
legal systems around the globe are now struggling to establish legislative sys-
tems and policy provisions that will ensure universal access to the Internet,
manage the international and borderless character of online information and
communication, and protect and safeguard users. One of the few areas where
international legislative efforts have been motivated and acted upon is the pro-
tection of children from online sexual abuse. Relevant key legal international
instruments include the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
(United Nations, 1989); the CRC’s Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; and the Council of Europe’s Conven-
tion on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 2001). These instruments, and other
examples, represent a moral and political consensus to protect children from
abusive adult practices, including those pursued online.
But previous studies have also argued that these systems, especially national
legislation, fall short of understanding and differentiating between various
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online sexual practices. A gap exists in legislation to protect against images of
child sexual abuse (i.e. child pornography) and consensual sexual practices,
including the sharing of sexual images, between teens (Bulger, Burton, O’Neill &
Staksrud, 2017). For instance, in the US case of A. H. v. the State of Florida
(2007), a 16-year-old girl and her 17-year-old boyfriend were charged as juven-
iles under child pornography laws and sentenced to probation for taking photos
of themselves engaging in sexual behaviour and then sharing these images with
each other only. Thus,
… despite over a decade of policies related to online child protection,
issues of fragmentation, unevenness in implementation and penalties
intended for adults applied to minors indicate that the complex nature of
the Internet and children’s use of it require better informed and holistic
approaches to policy and provision.
(Bulger et al., 2017, p. 758)
Underlying this concern is an understanding that online sexual engagement,
exploration and even violations among youths are perhaps regrettable, yet very
common, practices. For instance, a 2018 study with a representative sample of
Norwegian children and youths (age 11–17 years) found that 30% had received
sexual messages (sexting) in the previous year, including half (49%) of the
15–17-year olds. When asked about how they felt after receiving sexual mes-
sages, 35% expressed that they felt happy, 41% did not feel anything in particu-
lar (neither happy nor upset) and 14% were a bit upset; 11% (mostly girls) said
they were very upset (Staksrud & Ólafsson, 2019).
These ﬁndings mean that, to many teens today, the use of Internet content
and contact is acceptable for gaining information about and engaging in sexual
activities. While there is of course a substantial difference between these often
pubescent explorative and exploitative engagements and illegal activities (such
as rape and child pornography), such situations do not provide a contextual
backdrop to the case we will analyse in this chapter, which is that online sexual
engagement among young people is quite common (albeit sometimes illegal)
and can result from deception and pressure. When the sexual encounter happens
online via the written word or still or moving pictures, the question becomes
this: What difference does the technological mediation make? A better-informed
and more holistic approach, as Bulger et al. (2017) have called for, needs to
include the perspective and stories of perpetrators.
Computer-mediated communication
Research into CMC has enabled theorisation into how individual and group
interactions differ between F2F and computer-mediated meetings (Kiesler,
Siegel & McGuire, 1984; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler & McGuire, 1986). The
differences that CMC makes may be summarised brieﬂy as a reduction in
social-context information and shared norms of how to communicate (Kiesler
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et al., 1984). These factors may include asynchronous communication, reduced
social cues, time- and information-processing pressures, the absence of regulat-
ing feedback, dramaturgical weaknesses, a general lack of status and positional
cues, social anonymity, varying computing norms and immature senses of
etiquette (Staksrud, Ólafsson & Livingstone, 2013). Another relevant factor is
what Walther (1996) describes as hyper-personal communication: a more intim-
ate and desirable communication than one would be able to establish face-to-
face, combined with anonymity (or even deceit) in online interactions. Such
hyper-personal communication is often seen to enhance intimacy in the
exchange of information, combined with feelings of close group unity. These
factors can produce deindividuation, or ‘a weakened ability for an individual to
regulate his or her own behavior, reduced ability to engage in rational, long-
term planning, and a tendency to react to immediate cues based largely on his
or her current emotional state’ (McKenna & Bargh, 2000, p. 61).
Thus, when compared to F2F interaction, anonymity in online interactions
is linked to both positive and creative forms of self-expression (e.g. Back,
Schmukle & Egloff, 2008; Derks, Bos & von Grumbkow, 2008) and to
increased testing and displays of non-conforming behaviour and verbal
aggression (e.g. Parks & Floyd, 1996; Ybarra, Espelage & Mitchell, 2007).
Such non-conforming aggressive behaviour can also be sexual, including
sexual violence and rape, as is the situation in the case that provides the
empirical basis for this chapter.
Digital rape studied through one case
Methodological approach
The empirical material we have used in this case study is drawn from an ethno-
graphic prison study on young men in prison (see Martinsen, 2016).3 The study
included 25 young men between the ages of 18 and 23 who, over a period of
three months, had been in custody in a high-security prison in Norway. One of
these young men, Alex, was later sentenced to prison for multiple digital rapes.
The project was extended for the purposes of this chapter and was focussed
only on Alex’s case. Three types of empirical material pertinent to his case
inform the analysis: (1) interviews with Alex, (2) Alex’s diary and (3) court
judgements related to his case.
We have had 15 conversations with Alex over a period of three years.4 The
interviews took place while Alex was in custody, both during the court trial and
after his conviction. They were open conversations (Widerberg, 2001) that usu-
ally lasted an hour and a half. Notes were taken and checked with Alex during
the interviews. After each interview, the ﬁeld notes were written out in full.
Alex has read some of the written transcripts of the interviews. He has also
been consulted on earlier drafts of this chapter; this consultation has allowed
him to correct any mistakes and to provide feedback and complementary infor-
mation. He has also read the latest version of the chapter.
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Alex started to write his diary when he was taken into custody. The diary has
been used as background information and has provided the co-authors with con-
textual knowledge. Direct quotes from the diary are not provided in this article.
The court judgements, which consist of the sentences related to Alex’s case,
were provided by Alex himself and were also downloaded from domstol.no,
with the permission of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security.
The interview quotes and judgement extracts in this chapter have been trans-
lated and were later edited for maximum clarity in English.
While this chapter is based, to a substantial extent, on Alex’s own
accounts (as presented in the interviews), combined with the ofﬁcial court
judgements, it is not possible to understand these accounts as direct repre-
sentations of reality (Game, 1991). Alex’s accounts, the court judgements
and the diary must be analysed as texts produced within a speciﬁc culture –
in relation to a speciﬁc law at a certain moment – and from Alex’s speciﬁc
subject position. Thus, the work is in part inspired by a narrative tradition
within criminology that focusses on how we construct stories to understand
and explain our actions, who we are and our subject position (Sandberg,
2013). We have analysed the interviews, the court judgements, the diary and
the texts as culturally embedded texts in an attempt to understand the logic
of online sexual activity, and how Alex himself and the courts have made
sense of his actions.
Ethical considerations
As researchers in the social sciences, we adhere to Norwegian national guide-
lines for research ethics in the social sciences, humanities, law and theology,
as described by Norway’s national ethics committees (see www.etikkom.no).
The use of Alex as the only case demands that we as researchers follow the
national guidelines for research ethics on free and informed consent and conﬁ-
dentiality, and that we ensure that the relationship between the researcher and
the research subject will be built on human dignity and privacy, as stated in
the guidelines.
Before we conducted the analysis, we5 applied to the Norwegian Centre for
Research Data (NSD, from Norsk senter for forskningsdata) to extend the research
project. The change involved inviting one of the already-participating informants,
Alex, becoming a key informant in the chapter. NSD approved the extension, pro-
vided that new informed consent would be secured from the informant. An
informed consent requires that informants understand what they are asked to par-
ticipate in, what types of issues and questions they will be asked, and the potential
consequences of their participation, including questions of anonymity. The consent
must also be given freely, and in an informed and explicit manner.
In Alex’s case, the extended part of the research represented a new topic.
We provided Alex with explicit information about the intention of the work
described in this chapter, and speciﬁcally how we wanted to work with his
particular case. We informed Alex that we wanted to use his story as the only
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narrative in an article, and that the second co-author would continue to inter-
view him, with a focus on the digital rapes he had been convicted of. He was
also informed that the ﬁrst co-author would read and analyse the transcripts
from the interviews together with the second co-author. Alex was later
informed when the third co-author was invited to join the research project,
and he accepted the new authorship situation.
In order to be ethically sound, consent must also be given freely, which
means that the consent must be obtained without external pressure or constraints
on one’s individual freedom. What constitutes freely given consent in Alex’s
particular case is found in the extension of the former research project. To par-
ticipate in the extended project, Alex had to provide new and informed consent.
Alex gave his consent with the understanding that only the second co-author
would be in contact with him. To allow for the correction of any mistakes and
for Alex to further understand the type of research we were conducting, he was
given the opportunity to read earlier drafts of this article, in particular the writ-
ten representations of his story. The ethical consideration of this scenario was
that Alex thus became a research subject more than an object of research. On
several occasions, Alex has been informed that if he changes his mind, he may
withdraw his consent at any time, without suffering any negative consequences.
As researchers, we have done what we can to secure anonymity by excluding
a great deal of information and by anonymising the names of prisons, places
and court levels. Alex cannot be guaranteed full anonymity, however.6 He
understands that he might be identiﬁable.
Another ethical concern we have considered in the development of this pro-
ject is researchers’ responsibility to include marginal voices in their research.
According to Norway’s national ethical guidelines for research (Hvinden et al.,
2016), we as researchers have a special responsibility to respect the interests of
vulnerable and marginalised groups throughout the entire research process. As
a prisoner and perpetrator, Alex by deﬁnition belongs to a stigmatised group. It
is important for prisoners to be able to tell their stories, and it is equally import-
ant for researchers to inject newly acquired information into the existing body
of knowledge. In our case, we must ask critical questions related to CMC in
order to inform our understanding of digital rape and other Internet-related
sexual crimes by relevant stakeholders, such as the courts.
In the context of research projects, being ethical means to be aware of what
happens on the way during a given project or task (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987),
and every research position implies ethical questions and considerations. The
particular ethical dilemmas in this research, from our point of view, has been
Alex’s position as a prisoner. Being closed up in a prison with little contact
with the outside world, prisoners such as Alex often welcome researchers
because they provide a break, represent the outside world and allow the possi-
bility to talk openly. The substantial and long-term contact between the second
co-author and Alex, including access to his personal diary and his court judge-
ments, could mean that the relationship may have taken on a more ‘therapeutic’
or ‘friend-based’ nature that would then make it difﬁcult for Alex to withdraw
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from the project. We have discussed this possibility openly and explicitly with
Alex, who has assured us several times of his wish to participate. We are aware
that this chapter poses an ethical dilemma related to anonymity, but as long as
Alex continues to provide his free and informed consent, we will choose to
publish the chapter.
Alex’s story
Alex was under 18 when he started to, as described in the verdict, ‘abuse others’
(Court judgement). Several of the victims were his own age. The abuses went on
for several years. After a while, some of the victims reported him to the police,
and a year later, he was arrested for rape. The interviews with Alex and the infor-
mation from Alex’s court judgements display how a typical procedure for this
activity took place. First, he created different proﬁles by posing as a girl on
different social media platforms, such as Kik, Snapchat, Instagram, Facebook and
Skype, among others. In the following dialogue, Alex describes the process:
INTERVIEWER: How did you ﬁrst get started with the threats?
ALEX: The ﬁrst guy I got in touch with had a girlfriend. In court, he denied ever
sending anything to my faked proﬁle. I threatened to send a picture to her.
That was the ﬁrst threat; I was 16 at the time. I created my ﬁrst proﬁle
when I was 15. The threats started with disagreements, then escalated from
there. The disagreements ended, and new contacts were established.
The court judgement refers, in a similar way, to how Alex initially contacted
other youths and how the contact changed:
… he then contacted random boys he found on different social media, and,
pretending to be a girl, he established contact. Fairly quickly, he and the
individual boys started having sexualised conversations online, and pictures
were exchanged, including nude photographs and pictures and ﬁlms depict-
ing sexual acts. The defendant sent pictures of girls he had found online,
and, in return, the individual boys sent nude photographs of themselves.
(Court judgement)
The court understood the initial contact as ‘quite innocent’ and ‘normal’, but it
quickly turned into ‘sexualised talk’ and the exchange of pictures before devel-
oping into threats and pressure to send more photos/ﬁlm and then perform acts
on Skype (Court judgement).
The court noted the pace of the online communication as one factor to con-
sider; another factor was how Alex as the perpetrator had given orders via the
Internet to the victims, combined with threats. Alex explained that these orders
would also typically include demands to send pictures and/or videos depicting
masturbation. Similarly, he asked for live-action masturbation, such as by for-
cing the victim, through threats of public exposure, to masturbate or ‘put on
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a show’ in front of him via a camera on Skype. Sometimes such shows included
having to follow the perpetrator’s continuous written and detailed instructions
as to what actions, positions, angles and attire were required and, in some
cases, the use of physical objects. For most of the victims, the rapes continued
for a long time, as detailed in the court judgements:
Among other things, the victims have been forced to perform degrading
sexual acts live on camera, in part by being recorded and watched by
[name redacted], who was unknown to them, and by sending sexualised
photographs without being in control of what the offender would do with
the videos and pictures. Most of the victims endured repeated acts of abuse
over a long period: up to a year and a half in some cases. Further, the pres-
entation of evidence has shown that some of the acts lasted for a long time:
upwards of an hour and a half. The convicted person … demanded that the
victims make themselves available whenever he wanted them to, including
at night.
(Court judgement)
Through the court judgements, we can read how the victims were affected by
this behaviour:
[Name redacted] stated that he was gloomy during this period. He found it
difﬁcult to go to school and was absent a lot, as he was afraid something
might have been published or that his friends might ﬁnd out about what had
happened. As a result, he received a poor grade in conduct and orderliness,
and his homework, assignments, and tests were affected. … There is no
doubt that the victims have perceived the defendant’s threatening behaviour
as frightening and upsetting. Where a rape is committed face to face, the
victim has the possibility to react to the attack. In this case, the defendant
has appeared as a hidden offender who keeps returning. The victims did not
know whether the risk of new acts of abuse was over. The defendant has
been an unknown offender; the victims did not know who he was, where he
was, or when he might contact them again. They have been living in fear
that photographs and ﬁlms might be published and have had no control over
whether new acts with similar threats might be posed again.
(Court judgement)
The court judgement in Alex’s case indicates that the court viewed this type of
rape, where the victim is coerced by threatening behaviour into performing
sexual acts on themselves, as being equal to other instances of rape; in other
words, offenders need not be physically present with their victims when the
latter perform sexual acts on themselves; there only has to be a causal link
between the threatening behaviour and the sexual acts the victims perform on
themselves. The Court of Appeal later upheld the sentence, conﬁrming the ori-
ginal court’s assessment of the case.
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Becoming a sexual person
Alex himself has explained his role as an online sexual abuser in the context of
becoming a sexual person. For him, his homosexual identity explains this
development:
ALEX: I was desperate for contact but didn’t know how to [go about it]. I created
a proﬁle on an online site for gay men. The site had an 18-plus age limit, but
I changed my age back to 15 once I was on the site. I got a lot of responses
and chose the youngest one, but he was still much older than me. I went to
meet him, and we went to his ﬂat. We watched a ﬁlm and had sex. He had to
tell me what to do, since I hadn’t done that before.
INTERVIEWER: Did you feel used?
ALEX: I can’t answer that. I felt that I got what I wanted, but at the same time I felt
that it wasn’t right. But, I felt as if I had to hurry. Something had to happen!
INTERVIEWER: So, then you started to fake proﬁles?
ALEX: Yes, the online site became a textbook for how I could present myself on
my proﬁles. And [the site] became a way of getting in touch with people
the same age. (Alex, in interview)
Alex was 15 years and under the age of sexual consent (which is 16 in
Norway) when he created his ﬁrst proﬁle on the online site. He went on to
create additional online proﬁles with different representations of himself. The
rationale was, as he says, ‘about sexuality’. For Alex, this rationale provides the
full explanation of why things happened as they did:
ALEX: I didn’t have the one thing I wanted the most. If I’d been a straight 15-year-
old, none of this would’ve happened. I was young, curious, and ignorant
and didn’t understand consequences. I don’t deﬁne myself as a criminal.
I have, however, done criminal acts. … I didn’t know what I liked. The
web became somewhere I could explore sexuality; [the victims] did that as
well. The web becomes a place where you don’t have to make a fool of
yourself. And everyone’s faking. (Alex, in interview)
The online sexual engagement, exploration and offences that Alex became
involved with became for him a way to become a sexual person. Like many
other youths, he used the Internet as a tool to both gain information about and to
engage in sexual activities. One of the key features of online communication is
the absence of social cues, which leads to potential deindividuation, where people
have difﬁculty regulating their own behaviour and instead react to immediate
cues based on their current emotional state, such as sexual arousal or excitement:
INTERVIEWER: To what extent do you perceive the people you meet online as
individuals?
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ALEX: They are individuals, but not unique individuals. They don’t really stand
out from each other; they’re just a bunch of people. There’s distance – in
both directions. Who initiates the conversation is irrelevant; 90% want
nudes. You don’t really get to know each other; you’re just curious …
INTERVIEWER: But what makes you send photos to strangers?
ALEX: It’s thrilling with a stranger. You’ll never see him again yet are exposed to
nudity. It’s a trigger. Snapchat was a breakthrough; it’s what started this
trend. And anyone can respond to it. (Alex, in interview)
Alex’s explanation helps to show how, for him, the social context becomes
reduced. Everything comes down to one issue: sexual activity on an Internet scene.
There is no ﬂirtation, no time to get to know each other, no curiosity about who the
other person is; the other person’s thoughts, feelings and dreams are irrelevant.
Alex perceives the rules as being different from those of the ofﬂine world:
INTERVIEWER: Are there different rules for interactions online?
ALEX: There are different rules. You don’t ﬂash your dick in the physical world.
You don’t do that on the street. In the real world there’s etiquette. The
worst that can happen online is that you get blocked. That goes for how
you write, as well. It’s insanely upfront. You become less and less polite
towards strangers. You get used to interacting with strangers. Everything
that happens out there [in the ofﬂine world] can be multiplied by ten
online. Of course, there’s chaos when you stick all sorts of people on one
platform – healthy or ill, anything. Chatting for a day or two was enough.
You should be well into the online world. It’s a lot about excitement.
INTERVIEWER: What do you get in return?
ALEX: It progresses from one piece of clothing to another, really. You take step
after step and keep going further. Pushing limits. It gradually becomes less
of a big deal. The worst that could happen is that you get a no or get
deleted. (Alex, in interview)
As described in CMC theory, the different rules that are acceptable online
may not reﬂect those in the ofﬂine world. Any vulnerability or differences asso-
ciated with class and other social aspects are ﬁltered or absent when transmitted
through CMC. These differences may be greater when the recipients are vulner-
able children and youths. As described in the court judgements, some boys
switched off their computers, while others did not.
As often referred to in theoretical works, CMC also creates the opportunity
for selective, or even dreamt up, self-representation. In Alex’s case, his proﬁles
were a substantial misrepresentation of his ofﬂine self. Most notably, he made
the boys he contacted believe that he was a girl:
ALEX: As to my own story, I developed different proﬁles, which developed over
time. Became a part of me. I now see that I had criminal intent. Didn’t real-
ise that at the time. I was tricking people. Tricking people into believing
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I was ‘her’. And then I saved the photographs. Had images without asking.
(Alex, in interview)
According to Alex, he used the Internet to become a young gay man. His
online relations became an integral part of his adult sexuality. This way of
using the Internet became like a game, with its own logic: ‘You lose control,
and the inner logic takes over’ (Alex, in interview). In his reasoning, living as
he was in a sexualised world as a young gay man, but with few known possibil-
ities to explore his sexuality in the ofﬂine world, the virtual world became an
opportunity more than a criminal activity.
ALEX: To me it wasn’t dangerous. We went in and out of situations all the time. What
was presented as abuse in the court judgements disappeared when switched to
another situation. The police said, ‘We’re arresting you for rape’. That went
over my head. I didn’t understand. The media uses the term ‘internet abuse’.
That makes a distinction between the physical and what is not physical.
I believe that makes sense to people. (Alex, in interview)
Thus, what Alex experienced in front of his computer differed from what the
court classiﬁed as abuse and rape: a situation not dangerous nor illegal, but
rather a situation that he could enter and leave as he wished. In addition, the
virtual world inﬂuenced the way he understood his relationships with the boys
he met on various social media platforms. The way he understood and described
the situation, power, free will and the victims’ feelings all point to deindividua-
tion. As Alex understood the situation, his victims could have simply logged
off, but only a few did. He thus ‘played’ a social game and did not problematise
or reﬂect upon whether or not the boys he met on the Internet shared his under-
standing of the situation and of communication, despite the fact that he was
misrepresenting himself by using fake proﬁles and posting as a girl.
In addition, the difference in temporal and spatial presence contributed to the
blurring of social cues. There is a synchronicity when the offender and the
victim have physical contact in a physical rape situation, whereas digital rapes
are more often asynchronous. In Alex’s case, he would send a request for sexu-
alised pictures to a victim when that person was doing something else, such as
sleeping or doing homework. Alex himself would then receive the photos or
videos at another time, thus making the de facto rape occur asynchronously in
time. Once, he got a ‘Snap’ (i.e. from the Snapchat platform) while he was
eating dinner with his parents:
INTERVIEWER: You told me once that one of the rapes took place while you were
having dinner with your parents; can you explain that?
ALEX: That had to do with time. I’d sent the threat an hour earlier, before I got the
reply. I got a notiﬁcation that I’d received a Snap. The rape is complete the
moment the response arrives. The fact that a threat was sent deﬁnes it as an
attempted rape. (Alex, in interview)
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Alex found it strange that some of the young people seemed interested in con-
tinuing to have contact with him on the Internet. This made him question if they all
felt they had been raped, or if rape was also a construction that was made in court.
INTERVIEWER: You once told me that one of the victims in the case, after complaints
had been ﬁled, friended you on Facebook?
ALEX: The ﬁrst guy I threatened, after a couple of years I sent him an apology.
This was after the ﬁrst police interview – about six months before I was
remanded in custody. He immediately replied that he was okay and wanted
to be friends on Facebook. [He didn’t take any time] to consider. No hesita-
tion. And he proceeded [to send me] some rather sexualised stuff. The guy
was awarded a lot of money in court. The log detailing what I’m telling
you was presented in court, but I don’t feel they made much of a point of
it. I think that some people [when they were questioned] were told that
a conviction could entitle them to damages. I was convicted of several
instances of raping the guy I’m telling you about now. (Alex, in interview)
Court logics
Previous studies on CMC have shown how communicating via a screen, as
compared to F2F, can increase the testing and display of non-conforming behav-
iour and verbal aggression (e.g. Parks & Floyd, 1996; Ybarra et al., 2007). Con-
trasting with Alex’s views and descriptions, as presented above, are descriptions
of his modus operandi as found in the court judgements. These texts make clear
how the court and the victims understood Alex’s behaviour as being planned
and aggressive sexual behaviour:
The defendant has systematically and cynically taken advantage of each of
the victims for his own sexual gratiﬁcation. During each session, he has pre-
sented the individual victims with detailed instructions for participating in
humiliating actions, and he has been the one in a position to end the event,
or ‘approve’ it. He tricked the victims by saying it would be the last time,
only to return multiple times and demand more. He ignored any plea not to
have to do it; nor did he let comments about pain and blood grant the vic-
tims reprieve. He made all obey his orders, regarding when, where, and how.
He paid no regard to individual boys’ needs for sleep or homework, nor to
their reluctance. He did not display any sign of empathy towards any of the
boys while this was going on …. In their statements, many of the victims
have talked about a feeling of powerlessness and of having no choice. They
did not know who the offender was, when he might contact them again, or
whether he would carry out his threats. Several of the victims even had their
images published online. All of the victims expressed fear, difﬁculty sleep-
ing, social isolation, and poorer school performance.
(Court judgement)
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From Alex’s point of view, the sexual interactions were ‘like a game’. The
court saw this differently. According to the court judgements, the victims read
Alex’s behaviour as persuasion, deception and coercion:
The abuse of the underage boys has happened in their own homes and in
their own private sphere. The victims experienced a situation of overhang-
ing threat that for some lasted up to a year and a half, for others less.
Either way, they have all lived with the continued fear of publication since
the time of the ﬁrst threat. He exerted his power over each of the victims,
and he has taken advantage of their highly vulnerable age.
(Court judgement)
The concept of rape has become extended in recent years, and both law and
court practice now view rape more seriously (Ryltoft Terjesen, 2016). In the
introduction to this chapter, we assessed how rape is commonly understood as
occurring through physical contact and temporal proximity of two or more
people: one or more victims and perpetrators. Throughout history, rape has been
linked to the actual physical meeting between victim and perpetrator. While
other sexual crimes have been mediated – for instance, the unwanted depiction
of nudity through photographs and ﬁlms – rape as a particular category of
sexual crime has been conﬁned to F2F meetings. Against this background, it is
interesting to note how one underlying conﬂict that arises from Alex’s court
case is the difference in understanding of whether online and ofﬂine forms of
communication have different embedded qualities and affordances, which again
inﬂuence how these interactions are understood across generations, structures
and texts.
Conclusion
As previously discussed in this chapter, various studies have shown how online
sexual engagement and exploration and even criminal offences among youth are
a very common practice, and the borders between pubescent explorative engage-
ments and illegal activities such as digital rape are often blurred. At the same
time, digital rape is a serious sexual, often violent, crime that can have devastat-
ing and long-lasting consequences for its victims. Alex’s case highlights some
of the core challenges involved when digital, often generation-speciﬁc, trans-
gressive practices cross boundaries, become illegal and encounter the world of
courtrooms and legal provisions.
We can see how the courts, Alex and – if we accept the premises of Alex’s
own story – perhaps the victims themselves perceive the same situations as
being serious crimes, but as different types of serious crimes. Thus, rather than
offering a conclusion about rape by CMC, as illustrated by the overlapping and
contrasting narratives from Alex and the courts, we point to the challenges of
providing a research-based approach to policy interventions, legal initiatives and
the need to accept the complex nature of CMC. We must also develop a legal
Rape in the age of the Internet 201
vocabulary that can be understood and legitimised, both by the Internet gener-
ation and beyond.
Notes
1 Unofﬁcial translation of the Norwegian version of the act, as provided for information
purposes by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. See https://lovdata.no/doku
ment/NLE/lov/2005-05-20-28 for the full version of the penal code.
2 In the new Norwegian Penal Code §291, rape is deﬁned as (a) having sexual inter-
course through violence or threatening behaviour; (b) having sexual relations with
someone who is unconscious or for other reasons is unable to oppose the action; or
(c), through violence or threatening behaviour, making somebody have sexual inter-
course with another, or to perform acts that correspond to sexual intercourse with one-
self. The crime is punishable by up to 10 years in prison.
3 This research project has been conducted and ﬁnanced by the University College of
Norwegian Correctional Service (KRUS, for Kriminalomsorgens høgskole og
utdanningssenter).
4 One of the co-authors (Martinsen) conducted the interviews.
5 One of the co-authors (Staksrud) was not involved in the application to NSD or in the
collection of the empirical data.
6 Going into details on his situation would weaken his anonymity.
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13 Digital sexual violence
Image-based sexual abuse among
Danish youth
Sidsel Kirstine Harder, Kathrine Elmose Jørgensen,
Jonathan Priesholm Gårdshus and Jakob Demant
Introduction
Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers within the Nordic countries and else-
where are currently addressing the non-consensual distribution of digital sexual
images among young people. Studies have shown that previous campaigns against
this new offence have created fear, rather than leading to ‘safe sexting’ as intended
(Albury, Hasinoff & Senft, 2017; Powell & Henry, 2014). The ﬁeld has a dire need
for research on the characteristics of the young people who commit these crimes in
order to better prevent image-based sexual abuse. In this chapter, we investigate
such abuse by analysing its correlation with self-control and risk-oriented opportun-
ities; the latter include variables that are relevant to establishing frameworks for
prevention efforts.
To date, the emerging international body of research on the consensual digital
sharing of sexual images has been focussed within the English-speaking world,
with a majority of studies examining the risks of images being forwarded without
the depicted person’s consent. Powell and Henry (2016, 2017) have investigated
the victimisation prevalence of technology-facilitated sexual violence and have
stressed the importance of studying the prevalence of offending. With important
exceptions, such as the work of Langlois and Slane (2017) and DeKeseredy and
Schwartz (2016), few studies have looked into the causes and enablers of offend-
ing, and neither of these two studies sought to measure prevalence quantitatively
(Henry & Powell, 2018). The lack of knowledge about what drives offenders
could pathologise this group; it could also mean that practitioners risk missing
out on important intervention points for the prevention of sexual violence in the
digital sphere (Jørgensen, 2017).
Criminological researchers have underscored the importance of investigating
levels of self-control among offenders of different forms of crime and have
shown that poor self-control correlates with criminal behaviour (Grasmick, Tittle,
Bursik & Arneklev, 1993; Reyns, Henson & Fisher, 2014). The aim of this paper
is to investigate what characterises image-based sexual abuse offenders by exam-
ining the inﬂuence of self-control in conjunction with opportunities. We use quan-
titative survey data drawn from a Danish youth population to analyse some of the
factors that predict the probability of sharing sexual images non-consensually. By
doing so, we seek a better sense of both the individual and social factors linked
to committing this new form of crime.
Deﬁning image-based sexual abuse
The digital sharing of sexual images is an emerging practice, and researchers are
still deﬁning and debating the concepts necessary for studying this new form of
digital sexual behaviour (Barrense-Dias, Berchtold, Surís & Akre, 2017). Generally,
‘sexting’ refers to the consensual sharing of sexual images (or text messages) digi-
tally; Drouin, Vogel, Surbey and Stills (2013, p. 25) deﬁne this practice as the
‘transmission of sexual material’ via phone or the Internet. But different scholars
use different speciﬁcations of terms (Döring, 2014; Renfrow, Kucewicz, Mouradian
& Schweigert, 2017; Walker & Sleath, 2017) regarding consent (to receive, send,
distribute), content (nudity, or a lack of underwear or the wearing of intimate
apparel), form (images, videos, text), activity (sharing, receiving, sending/posting,
exchanging) and media/sharing tools (digital media/social network sites [SNS],
phones, the Internet).
For the non-consensual sharing of sexual images, several unifying concepts
for describing this new type of crime are consolidating presently. We use
‘image-based sexual abuse’ because the concept focusses concretely on the
activity of images being shared without consent; this concept has recently
become consolidated and is now among the most used concepts in the ﬁeld
(Maddocks, 2018).
McGlynn, Rackley and Houghton (2017, p. 28) developed the notion of
image-based sexual abuse by drawing on Kelly’s (2013) development of
a continuum for sexual violence. Kelly deﬁnes sexual violence as including
any physical, visual, verbal or sexual act that is experienced by the woman
or girl, at the time or later, as a threat, invasion or assault, that has the
effect of hurting her or degrading her and/or takes away her ability to con-
trol intimate contact.
(2013, p. 41).
Kelly expands the deﬁnition of sexual violence beyond the use of physical
power and links different kinds of sexual violence to one another. By deﬁning
image-based sexual abuse as the ‘non-consensual creation and/or distribution
of private sexual images’, McGlynn and colleagues (2017, p. 27) conceptual-
ise a continuum of different kinds of sexual violence related to digital images
while also linking such violence to other kinds of sexual violence. The term
‘abuse’ conveys harm to victims/survivors rather than evoking connections to
child exploitation, as found in Henry and Powell’s closely related deﬁnition of
‘image-based sexual exploitation’ (Henry & Powell, 2015; Powell & Henry,
2017).
Henry and Powell’s deﬁnition (2018) is a sub-concept under the term ‘technol-
ogy-facilitated violence’. They link their concept to the World Health Organization’s
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(2012, p. 2) deﬁnition of sexual violence as encompassing ‘unwanted sexual
comments or advances […] against a person’s sexuality using coercion’. By
sharing personal sexual images without consent, depicted people lose their abil-
ity to control for whom they appear in intimate circumstances. Previous
research has shown that being exposed to image-based sexual abuse can lead to
a range of harmful consequences, ranging from ‘trust issues, post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, suicidal thoughts, and several other
health effects’ (Bates, 2017, p. 22); some of these other effects include negative
coping mechanisms related to alcohol or drugs and victim blaming (Korenis &
Billick, 2014; Walker & Sleath, 2017; Wolak & Finkelhor, 2011). We can com-
pare these consequences to those of other forms of sexual violence, which fur-
ther underlines the relevance of using the concept of image-based sexual abuse
to place the non-consensual sharing of sexual images within this terminology.
The common purpose behind the numerous and synonymous concepts of
image-based sexual abuse is to resist the popular term ‘revenge porn’. Mad-
docks (2018) argues that this renaming is itself an activist practice: by resist-
ing the word ‘revenge’, one can counter victim blaming by pointing to the
variety of motives behind the non-consensual sharing of digital sexual images
(see also Bates, 2017). Those in the ﬁeld resist the vocabulary of ‘pornog-
raphy’ because the use of terms for legal sexual material risks legitimising
non-consensual image sharing. Activists’ use of the term ‘digital rape’ instead
problematises the online/ofﬂine distinction between types of sexual violence.
While the use of the word ‘pornography’ risks equating different kinds of
sexual activities, the use of the term ‘rape’ risks conﬂating image sharing with
physical abuse. The intention is instead to link different abusive behaviors
together as sexual violence; that linkage thus becomes another common
denominator for the different concepts that currently designate non-consensual
image sharing (Maddocks, 2018).
Previous research and scope of analysis
While non-consensual image sharing is illegal, researchers to date have primar-
ily explored such sharing as a cultural and everyday phenomenon (e.g. Cooper,
Quayle, Jonsson & Svedin, 2016; Handyside & Ringrose, 2017; Richards &
Calvert, 2009; Ringrose, Harvey, Gill & Livingstone, 2013) rather than as
a criminological research area. We address this research gap by drawing on
criminological self-control theory combined with an opportunity perspective
that includes the role of situational factors. We assume that engaging in certain
practices – such as sending/receiving nude photos, having unprotected sex, and
binge drinking – can lead to increased opportunities to commit image-based
sexual abuse.
To investigate the inﬂuence of self-control on such abuse, we apply the clas-
sical framework within Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime
(1990). According to this theory, crime is motivated by self-interests. Those
who have little self-control are thus more likely to commit crime because they
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fail to consider what negative consequences their actions might have, as the
attainment of personal gain overshadows any considerations of the possible jur-
idical, social and personal consequences. In Gottfredson and Hirschi’s under-
standing (1990), self-control is hence not simply related to deviant acts that
lead to consequences in a juridical context. As Grasmick et al. (1993, p. 9)
argue, ‘Criminality, therefore, is subsumed under the personality trait [of] low
self-control, but low self-control also predisposes people to engage in certain
other kinds of irresponsible behaviors’.
Support for this approach to image-based sexual abuse may be found in
a study of consensual sexting among college students conducted by Reyns and
colleagues (2014), who argue that poor self-control is a predictor of consensual
sexting, because people with poor self-control will be less likely to consider
possible negative consequences. We extend their argument to imply that self-
control is even more relevant to the criminal act of forwarding sexual images of
others against their consent than to sexting images of oneself. People with little
self-control may be more likely to sext, and their lack of self-control will also
make them more likely to offend. We thus hypothesise that poor self-control
will make the offense of image-based sexual abuse more likely to happen out of
a need for instant gratiﬁcation and personal interests and a lack of consideration
of the negative consequences.
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), poor self-control is caused by
speciﬁc early-childhood experiences, mainly within the context of the family,
but Reyns and colleagues (2014) also stress integration with a more opportun-
ity-oriented framework that goes back to the classic work of Cohen and Felson
(1979). Drawing on victimisation research, Reyns and colleagues (2014, p. 279)
state that poor ‘self-control should directly inﬂuence participation in sexting,
but […] lifestyles and routine activities should mediate some of this effect’.
They stress that not only someone’s personal makeup, but also everyday risk
routines, will make criminal behaviour more likely to occur. Inspired by Reyns
and colleagues (2014), we draw on a more sociological deﬁnition of self-control
that also takes into account those situational and social factors that can mediate
the association between self-control and offending. Even when self-control is
a stable trait, everyday lifestyles and routines are important supplements in
explaining both consensual and non-consensual image sharing.
The situational and social factors incorporated into our study consist of two
types of risk behaviours: online and ofﬂine. The ﬁrst pertains to other sexting
behaviours, namely the sending of consensual sexual imagery of oneself and the
receiving of sexual images of others without their consent. The second form of
risk behaviour includes ofﬂine risks pertaining to binge drinking and unsafe
sexual activity. Previous studies have shown that (1) alcohol use is connected to
sexual image sharing (Dake, Price, Maziarz & Ward, 2012), (2) offending is
likely to happen during drunken situations and (3) offenders tend to get drunk
more often than non-offenders (Klettke, Hallford & Mellor, 2014). These ﬁnd-
ings are especially interesting in the Danish cultural context, where alcohol has
a central place in youth leisure activities (Demant & Østergaard, 2007).
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Previous research has unanimously shown that being sexually active increases
the probability of sexting and that unsafe sex and other types of sexual risk-
taking are connected to sexting (Klettke et al., 2014), all of which leads to our
hypothesis that sexual activity both online and ofﬂine will increase the probabil-
ity of engaging in image-based sexual abuse. We thus assume that non-digital
risk behaviours such as heavy alcohol consumption and sexual activity can
likely increase the probability for image-based sexual abuse, as these are situ-
ations where sexual images can be produced and shared.
Hypotheses
Figure 13.1 schematically illustrates the relationships between self-control,
opportunities and offending. As shown in the ﬁgure, we assume that self-control
is linked to offending both independently and through opportunity variables,
and that all variables are linked to age and gender.
We expect self-control to vary with demographic characteristics such as age
and gender, as will the proportion of people who offend. Given the theoretical
considerations on opportunities noted above, we also control for variables that
measure drinking, consensual online/ofﬂine sexual activity and the non-
consensual receipt of sexual images. Following Reyns and colleagues’ (2014)
model, we use sexting consensually and receiving non-consensually as two of
our opportunity measures.
We expect people with poor self-control to more often be involved in activ-
ities that will give them opportunities to become offenders, which would result
in a negative raw correlation between self-control and offending. In controlling
for mediating opportunity variables, we ask whether self-control still has an
inﬂuence even when people have been in opportune offending situations.
Empirical strategy
Our main research question asks about the inﬂuence of self-control, mediated
by opportunities, on one’s propensity to become an offender of image-based
sexual abuse. We employ a logistic regression model in order to estimate the
probabilities of sexting, given a score on the Brief Self-Control Scale, or BSCS
Self-control Offending
Age and gender Opportunities
Figure 13.1 Model showing the relation between independent, dependent, background and
mediating variables.
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(Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004), with standard errors clustered by institu-
tion. Regression estimates are presented in an odds ratio (OR). Figure 13.2
shows the predicted probabilities at selected values.
To assess the interplay of the relationship between self-control while control-
ling for demographic confounders and allowing for possibly mediating oppor-
tunity variables, we include control variables in two steps, as discussed by
Aneshensel (2013). First, we estimate the relationship between self-control and
offending, controlling for gender and age; second, we add the four opportunity
variables to the model. The full model should provide an estimate of a direct
effect of self-control independently of the other explanatory variables.
A coefﬁcient of self-control that changes between the two models would indi-
cate mediation.
Data
Our data is drawn from a survey conducted and administrated by a partnership
between several municipalities, research institutions and universities in Denmark
(Dahl, Henze-Pedersen, Østergaard & Østergaard, 2018). In 2017, more than
60,000 young Danes responded to a survey on various health and social issues.
The survey was collected by individual municipalities; since the process and
selection varied between municipalities, properly investigating the representivity
of the sample is impossible (Svendsen, 2018). Our sample consists of 61,289
Danes between the ages of 12 and 25, enrolled in either lower secondary school
or secondary school,1 who responded to every item used in the regression. Of
the whole sample, the proportion who did not respond to the question about the
non-consensual sharing of sexual images varied only slightly between educa-
tional status, with the lowest being 4.3% in common upper secondary schools
and the highest being 5.9% among technical upper secondary schools. Of those
aged 14 (the most frequent age in our sample), 51.3% were male. While this
percentage was not signiﬁcantly different from the 51.4% of all Danes aged 14
who are male, there were most likely numerous non-responses, which may have
caused unaccounted-for bias.
Primary variables
Table 13.1 lists the range, average and standard deviations (SDs) of the vari-
ables included in our analysis.
The dependent variable measures image-based sexual abuse by asking
whether the respondent had ‘shared a sexual image/video of others within the
last 12 months, e.g. in their underwear or nude, without their consent’
(emphasis by italics and underlining in the questionnaire). Response options
were ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘don’t know’. In our sample, 3.4% of the respondents
were image-based sexual abuse offenders.
The primary independent variable is a psychometric scale that measures self-
control. In our survey, self-control was measured by the BSCS (Tangney et al.,
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2004). We use a reduced version of the scale with 13 items, an example of
which is ‘Sometimes I take a risk, because it’s fun’. All items were answered
on the same four-point Likert-type scale of ‘completely agree’, ‘slightly agree’,
‘slightly disagree’, and ‘completely disagree’. In our measurement, we used
Gelman’s scaling for regressions, where the standardised measure is divided by
two SDs (instead of the usual one) in order to make the coefﬁcients’ directly
comparable to untransformed binary predictors’ (2008, p. 2865) such as gender.
The comparability only applies to binary variables with a mean of around 0.5
and thus does not apply to our opportunity variables, which are very skewed
(Gelman, 2008). The scaling means that a one-unit change (e.g. from 0 to 1) of
two SDs is approximately equivalent to answering each of the 13 questions that
measure self-control by one step either higher or lower (e.g. from ‘slightly
agree’ to ‘slightly disagree’). Our measure is approximately normally distributed
and includes very few respondents with either extremely high or extremely low
self-control values.
Background and opportunity variables
Our model controls for the inﬂuences of sex and age. Age and gender were
self-reported, and the sample consists of 47.3% boys and men. While the age
ranges from 12 to 25, most respondents were between 13 and 19 years old,
with an average of 15.7 years (SD = 2.2). Slightly over half (51%) of our
respondents were in elementary school.
Often binge drinking
The respondents were asked: ‘Think about the past 30 days. How many times
have you been drunk from drinking alcoholt? E.g. had difﬁculties walking
Table 13.1 Summary statistics of all variables included in the models.
Count Min Max Mean SD
Shared image of others without their consent
(offender)
61,289 0 1 0.03 0.18
Self-control 61,289 −2.11 1.26 0.00 0.50
Male 61,289 0 1 0.47 0.50
Age 61,289 12 25 15.74 2.19
Safe sex 61,289 0 1 0.28 0.45
Unsafe sex 61,289 0 1 0.05 0.23
Shared image of one self (sexter) 61,289 0 1 0.13 0.33
Drunk 3+ times 61,289 0 1 0.09 0.28
Received image 61,289 0 1 0.14 0.35
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straight, not been able to talk clearly, vomited, or had difﬁculties remembering
what went on?’ They were given six response options, ranging from none to
more than ten times. To measure binge drinkers, we chose those respondents
who reported to have been drunk three or more times during the past month,
which encompasses 9% of the sample.
Sexual activity
The respondents were asked if they ‘had ever had intercourse’, with response
options of ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The 44% who had had sexual experiences were asked
which kind of contraception (if any) they had used during their most recent
intercourse, with the following response options:
• ‘no contraception’, ‘safe periods’, or ‘interrupted intercourse’ (these three
options were coded as ‘unsafe sex’ and included 5% of the population);
• ‘condoms’ or ‘birth-control pills’ (these two options were coded as ‘safe
sex’ and included 28% of the population); or
• ‘other’ (not included).
We hypothesise that being sexually active – in particular having unsafe sex
during the most recent intercourse – will increase the risk of committing image-
based sexual abuse.
Sexting
The respondents were asked, ‘Within the last 12 months, have you shared
a sexual image/video of yourself, for example in your underwear or nude?’
(emphasis in the questionnaire). The response options were ‘yes’, ‘no’ and
‘don’t know’. The 12.5% of both genders who answered ‘yes’ were coded as
sexters.
Receiving digital sexual images
The respondents were asked, ‘Within the last 12 months, have you received
a sexual image/video of someone else, for example nude or only wearing under-
wear, where the other person did not give his or her permission?’ The response
options were ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘don’t know’; 14% answered that they had
received images without the consent of the pictured person.
Results
Descriptive results
We found signiﬁcant differences between offenders and non-offenders for both
self-control and every situational variable. Among binge-drinking respondents,
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10% were offenders of image-based sexual abuse, which was signiﬁcantly more
than the ﬁgure of 3% among those who did not binge drink often. At the same
time, the binge drinkers had signiﬁcantly poorer average self-control (−0.23
compared with 0.02). The differences in distributions for offending and self-
control for those who had had unsafe sex were very similar to the patterns for
binge drinkers, which indicates that the offenders were characterised by differ-
ent ofﬂine sexual and social activities as well as lower levels of self-control
compared to the rest of the population.
These differences were even more striking when we move from ofﬂine
behaviours to looking at offenders’ digital sexual activities. Among people who
had sexted, 14% had also committed image-based sexual abuse, compared to
2% of those who did not sext. Sexters also had poorer self-control (−0.17 com-
pared with 0.02). The difference was even more signiﬁcant for receiving non-
consensual images, which was highly correlated with offending through image-
based sexual abuse: of those who received images, almost one-ﬁfth had also
offended, whereas only 1% of the youth who did not receive images non-
consensually had offended. Image receivers also had poorer self-control (−0.23
compared with 0.04). The descriptive analysis of our sample of the Danish
youth population agrees with previous ﬁndings on self-control from sexting
research.
Before turning to estimating models, we will ﬁrst present a descriptive over-
view of the relationships between all the variables we included in the analysis.
Table 13.2 below presents the pairwise correlations of the variables in
a correlation matrix; as the table shows, most of the pairwise correlation coefﬁ-
cients range between 0.10 and 0.25 (in absolute values). The strongest correl-
ations are between age and safe sex and between receiving images and sharing
images without consent. For gender, all correlations with opportunity variables
are less than 0.10; other very weak correlations are safe sex, with both offend-
ing and self-control. The correlation between offending and self-control is
Table 13.2 Pairwise correlation coefﬁcients of all the variables included in the study.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Offender -
2. Self-control −0.16 -
3. Male 0.11 −0.18 -
4. Age 0.03 0.04 −0.01 -
5. Safe sex 0.05 −0.05 −0.05 0.49 -
6. Unsafe sex 0.12 −0.11 0.08 0.22 −0.15 -
7. Sexter 0.23 −0.13 −0.00 0.16 0.27 0.13 -
8. Drunk 3+ times 0.12 −0.14 0.03 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.13 -
9. Received image 0.34 −0.19 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.13 -
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−0.16. When we move on to the multiple regression analysis, we will primarily
focus on the relationship of these two variables while controlling for the correl-
ations of the others.
Regression models
Table 13.3 presents estimates of the two models. Our key ﬁnding is that offend-
ing covaries negatively with self-control, and although some of the effect is
mediated by opportunity variables, self-control also has an effect independently
of these variables.
We now look at the coefﬁcients and inﬂuences of the other explanatory vari-
ables in the model. Model 1 shows that the effect of self-control is smaller than
the effect of gender, as the odds of offending are almost three times higher for
men than for women. Our ﬁndings show that male respondents on average are
more likely to become offenders, which is also true when controlling for the
gendered differences in self-control, drinking behaviour and online/ofﬂine
sexual activity in model 2.
Age is highly signiﬁcant when modelled without opportunity variables, so
although the OR is low, the probability of committing image-based sexual
Table 13.3 Regression table presenting estimates in odds ratios for the two models. Stand-
ard errors are clustered by institution
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Shared sexual images
non-consensually
Shared sexual images
non-consensually
OR CI 95% OR CI 95%
Standardised values of Brief
Self-control
0.22*** [0.21, 0.24] 0.42*** [0.38, 0.46]
Male 2.90*** [2.57, 3.27] 2.96*** [2.64, 3.32]
Age 1.10*** [1.07, 1.13] 0.97* [0.94, 1.00]
Safe sex 1.06 [0.92, 1.22]
Unsafe sex 1.88*** [1.58, 2.24]
Send own sexual images 3.95*** [3.53, 4.42]
Drunk 3+ times 1.60*** [1.41, 1.83]
Received images
non-consensually
12.72*** [11.33, 14.27]
Constant 0.00 0.00
Observations 61,289 61,289
Pseudo R2 0.109 0.342
* p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001
214 Sidsel Kirstine Harder et al.
abuse increases throughout adolescence. In model 2, however, the OR of age is
slightly lower than 1 and is only just signiﬁcant, at the 5% level. Hence, it is
not the effect of age alone that heightens the probability of offending; rather,
the more important predictor is that people will have more opportunities to
offend the older they get.
Adding the opportunity variables lowers the effect of self-control sub-
stantially: from an OR of 0.22 in model 1 to 0.42 in model 2. The 95%
conﬁdence intervals of self-control in models 1 and 2 do not overlap, so
we may conclude that the drop in effect is statistically signiﬁcant. This
ﬁnding suggests that opportunities mediate a considerable part of self-
control’s effect on the probability of offending, in that some of the effect
of self-control on sexting has to do with the way in which poor self-
control brings about opportunities for committing image-based sexual abuse
in the sexual or social sense. Receiving images in particular is a very
strong predictor, but the other opportunity variables also show signiﬁcant
effects. Receiving images increases the odds of offending by 13 times,
sexting increases the odds by four times and having unsafe sex increases
the odds by 1.9 times (while having safe sex rather than not having sex
does not increase the risk of offending); ﬁnally, being drunk often increases
the odds by 1.6 times. The full model explains around a third of the vari-
ation in offending, but most of the explanatory power comes from the
‘receiving images’ variable.
Figure 13.2 shows the predicted probabilities for offending, dependent on
self-control and based on the full model. We have chosen values for the
other independent variables to be these variables’ modal values (female,
age 14, sexually inexperienced, not binge drinking, not sexting), except
that we chose ‘did receive images non-consensually’, since very few
people offend if they have not received images.2 Other than the ‘having
received images’ variable, these values are also those associated with a low
probability of offending. Even though self-control on its own explains very
little of the variation of offending – for example, including only this vari-
able yielded a very low pseudo R2 of 0.08 – when we looked at averages,
we found a signiﬁcant and substantial difference: the risk of offending was
much higher for those with poor self-control compared to those with better
self-control. As Figure 13.2 shows, when we look across the young people
in our sample, those with very poor self-control (−1) had a predicted prob-
ability of offending of around 10%, compared to around 2% for those with
very good self-control (1).
Variables are held at their modal values (female, age 14, sexually inex-
perienced, not bingedrinking, not sexting) except received (has received).
The line is the expected probability, and the area is the 95% conﬁdence
interval.
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Discussion
This chapter builds on a distinction between consensual and non-consensual forms of
digital sexual interaction and the conceptualisation of image-based sexual abuse as
a type of sexual violence. The study contributes to the ﬁeld’s understanding of these
connections by investigating image-based sexual abuse in a criminological framework
of self-control and by analysing the covariations with consensual forms of sexting
and online/ofﬂine risk behaviours.
As Albury and Crawford have shown, consensual sexting, or ‘the act of taking and
transmitting naked or semi-naked pictures via mobile phones’ (2012, p. 463), and
non-consensual sharing too often become conﬂated under the headline of ‘child porn-
ography’, thus leaving no space for young people to consent to or express and enjoy
their own sexuality digitally. Lack of consent is key to the deﬁnition of image-based
sexual abuse and is what separates such abuse from mainstream non-violent sexual
practices. Although the term ‘image-based sexual abuse’ emphasises that the non-
consensual exchange of sexual images is conceptually different from sexting, our
empirical model shows that the two practices are correlated, as it is more common to
offend if one is also a sexter. While other studies have examined the relationships
between different kinds of sexting behaviour (Mitchell, Finkelhor, Jones & Wolak,
2012; Patrick, Heywood, Pitts & Mitchell, 2015), our analysis shows that receiving
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Figure 13.2 The predicted probabilities for offending dependent on self-control, based on
regression estimates of the full model.
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images is strongly correlated with offending via image-based sexual abuse: of those
who had received images, almost a quarter had also offended. In contrast, only 1% of
the youth who had not received images had offended.
One characteristic that the offenders, sexters and receivers in our sample have in
common is that on average they had poorer self-control compared to the other
respondents. We have shown that self-control has a moderate effect on image-based
sexual abuse, and we compared this effect to the effects of gender, age and opportun-
ity variables. Our ﬁndings are in accordance with the general theory of crime as well
as research that has linked self-control to criminal and deviant practices. Qualitative
studies of the normalisation of sexual-image exchange have described this practice as
being embedded in the everyday lives of young people. In addition to this insight,
our contribution to the literature is to emphasise that image-based sexual abuse
offenders may be characterised by one or more of the various important personality
traits that mark other types of deviance. Our analysis has extended Reyns and col-
leagues’ (2014) work on self-control and sexting by emphasising that self-control is
not only linked to consensual sexting practices but also has a signiﬁcant effect on the
propensity of committing image-based sexual abuse, and that poor self-control fur-
ther heightens the probability of offending in itself.
The few studies that have been conducted on image-based sexual abuse offenses to
date have focussed on the affordances of technology (Langlois & Slane, 2017) or on
the problematics of masculinity (DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2016) as having impacts
on men who share digital sexual images non-consensually. Technological and gen-
dered dynamics are often seen to work together to exaggerate the tendencies of online
rape culture (Powell & Henry, 2017). Our study contributes to this discussion by
emphasising that although offenders are predominantly male, self-control and situ-
ational factors are relevant in explaining who commits image-based sexual abuse.
Besides looking at offenders as parts of legitimising homo-social male groups, we
should also consider that non-consensual sharers of sexual images are also young
men, who are both at risk and risk takers.
Further research and prevention campaigns
The strong predictive effect of receiving images draws our attention to the role of the
receipt of sexual images without consent. Previous research has measured the receipt
of images and has explored the meaning of this receipt qualitatively (Mitchell et al.,
2012). Receiving images might be considered a form of digital by-standing, but we
still know very little about which experiences are connected to young people’s receipt
of images that they know have been shared without the consent of those who are
depicted. Some of these bystanders are most likely consensual parties (for instance if
they asked for the pictures), while others may be offended by receiving illegal mater-
ials if they have received them involuntarily. Conceptually, the bystander plays
a crucial role, because the violation that occurs within image-based sexual abuse
entails that an image must be non-consensually shared with a third party, but our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that this role is also very important in quantitative terms. In our data, we
found that receiving images without consent was as common as sexting (with
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consent), but we noted signiﬁcant overlaps between these activities and offending.
We suggest these overlaps as a new focus area for research.
In our data, four-ﬁfths of the receivers did not offend, and thus we may
think of the majority of receivers as intervening in image-based sexual abuse
by not forwarding received images. Offending is hence not an automatic reac-
tion among receivers, as self-control does have a substantial effect on offend-
ing within this group. This ﬁnding points to the importance of looking at both
psychological personality traits and social/sexual situational factors within the
last ﬁfth of receivers who are also offenders: a group that includes three times
more people than the offending group of those who share non-consensually
without being receivers. We would encourage researchers to conduct qualita-
tive explorations of these issues in order to form the basis for informed and
knowledge-based prevention campaigns.
A successful campaign and dialogue against image-based sexual abuse should
discern between sexting, receiving and offending in a manner well suited to
include those who exhibit poor self-control, because these young people are
more likely to give in to the temptation of offending through image-based
sexual abuse. One way of exercising their self-control capabilities in this area
could be to connect digital sexual risks to ofﬂine sexual risks (Albury et al.,
2017). While the sharing of sexual images, either consensually or non-
consensually, is a new practice, the offenders share some of the same character-
istics that young people at risk in other spheres of life do. Instead of inventing
new models of prevention, it might make sense to draw on some of the same
risk-management strategies that we know from other everyday practices in
young people’s lives. Having unsafe sex is more or less as common among
young people as offending through image-based sexual abuse is, and in accord-
ance with previous research on consensual sexting (Klettke et al., 2014), we
have found signiﬁcant overlaps between the young people who engage in the
two sexual activities. We thus suggest that qualitative researchers should explore
these connections more thoroughly in order to help design prevention cam-
paigns that will combine the different areas.
Limitations and strengths
Along with practitioners and politicians, sociologists are currently working on
deﬁnitions to conceptualise sexual image sharing with or without consent. In
order to develop adequate and concise concepts, we see a dire need for more
qualitative research on the overlaps between the different forms of activities and
young people’s accounts of image-based sexual abuse. Such abuse is a new phe-
nomenon in which social research is trying to catch up with young people’s
everyday and criminal practices. This scenario means that our ﬁndings still have
numerous limitations, which might lead to more questions than the ﬁndings
have answered.
Among the limitations of our data is that the sample is biased, in that the
survey was only distributed in 31 out of 98 Danish municipalities. The
218 Sidsel Kirstine Harder et al.
survey only included young people within the education system, and we
cannot know who had entirely opted out of answering the voluntary survey.
The results hence cannot be generalised to young people who are outside the
educational system (at least after the mandatory education years); such
youths are often marginalised within a society that expects young people to
receive secondary education. The data is also drawn from self-reported
responses, which carry biases related to reports of delinquent practices and
personal issues, in that respondents are likely to be unwilling to admit to
offending. That bias might be smaller in our survey, where all questionnaires
were answered anonymously, and thus the survey might reveal more offend-
ing than crime statistics would. That being said, several factors apply to our
study: (1) the survey is one of the only quantitative datasets available on
image-based sexual abuse in Denmark, (2) the sample size is very large and
(3) the questions are quite detailed, so the survey includes a range of differ-
ent ways in which people can be involved in an activity: as offender, sexter,
bystander and victim.
Within a quantitative framework, we believe that our most important limita-
tion concerns the reliability and validity issues pertinent to the measurement
scale we used for self-control. Tangney and colleagues (2004) developed the
Brief Self-Control Scale as an instrument with 36 questions that measure vari-
ous dimensions of task performance, impulse control, psychological adjust-
ment, interpersonal relationships and moral dimensions. The authors found
that a reduced version with 13 questions performed nearly as well, and the
BSCS has since become ‘one of the most widely used instruments for measur-
ing general trait self-control’ (Lindner, Nagy & Retelsdorf, 2015, p. 465). Pre-
vious studies in the literature have measured self-control using everything
from 24 items (Grasmick et al., 1993) to three items (Lee, Moak & Walker,
2016); in light of the different possibilities, our use of 13 items thus falls
within this range. The BSCS is not without its limitations, according to how
the scale was developed, how it has been translated since then and how
researchers use it. For example, we used a four-point Likert scale in the cur-
rent study, whereas most other studies have used a ﬁve-point scale. This dif-
ference could affect how the variable is distributed; for example, we found
that respondents typically ranked themselves as having more rather than less
self-control. As for the reliability of our measure, it has internal consistency at
the lowest acceptable level (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72). Whether these imper-
fections have resulted in less precise estimates or have skewed them in one
direction or the other we cannot say. Finally, the low pseudo R2 in our model
(as shown in Table 13.3) suggests that many other factors beyond those that
we have used in this study could be related to sexual digital violence, and we
would especially encourage researchers to look into how other kinds of
online/ofﬂine youth crime are associated with the non-consensual sharing of
sexual imagery (Goldsmith & Brewer, 2015).
To bridge the gap between the online and ofﬂine contexts, future quantitative
explorations of image-based sexual abuse could also include the associations
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between ofﬂine peers and online crime. The opportunity structures could include
the social dimensions of sexting, such as having friends who offend. Such an
approach would be in line with Marganski’s (2017, p. 188) ﬁndings; her work
includes the normalisation of intimate behaviour that occurs through technol-
ogy, and she argues that, especially in relation to youth, ‘people may be more
important in understanding behaviour than other measures of deterrence’.
Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts tested this correlation vis-à-vis the sending of
sexual images of oneself without the consent of the receiver and concluded
that people who ‘associate with deviant peers are more likely to engage in
sexting’ and that ‘as self-control levels go down, the likelihood of sexting
increases’ (2014, p. 75).
In our design, we were unable to include variables for friends who engage in
the non-consensual sharing of sexual images, but we have included other social
opportunity structure variables. By measuring engagement in unsafe sex, binge
drinking and sexting, we go beyond the individual and account for speciﬁc
sexual and social interactions with or without digital means.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented one of the ﬁrst quantitative explorations of digital
sexual violence in the Nordic countries. We have used the general theory of crime
to explore the occurrence and correlates of image-based sexual abuse among
a large sample of young Danes. We found self-control to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of this type of digital sexual violence, even though a substantial part of the effect
was mediated by opportunity variables, such as unsafe sexual practices, sexting
and binge drinking. Image-based sexual abuse offenders tend to be boys and
young men whose poor self-control and risky choices in their sexual and social
behaviours characterise them as both at risk and as risk seekers.
Receiving images without the consent of those who are pictured is the stron-
gest predictor for sharing images non-consensually, which points to the future tar-
geting of preventive measures to reduce image-based sexual abuse by addressing
bystanders. The connection between different mainstream, deviant and criminal
practices within sexual image sharing is a complex issue related to consent, social
behaviours and individual characteristics. We suggest that researchers should fur-
ther explore the relationships between risky social, sexual and digital behaviours
in a qualitative manner in order to generate new knowledge about image-based
sexual abuse offenders.
Notes
1 Danish elementary school grades 7–9, or upper secondary school.
2 A total of 434 observations ﬁt these criteria among the sample of 61,289, which was
a sufﬁciently high number that statistical calculations were viable; while this number
is a very small proportion of the whole sample, such low percentages are unavoidable
in practice when looking at combinations of six variables.
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Social media disclosures of sexual
violence in Iceland
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Introduction
Sexual violence victimisation is common across the Nordic countries (Kloppen,
Haugland, Svedin, Mæhle, & Breivik, 2016). This type of victimisation relates to
a range of maladaptive outcomes, including high levels of depressed mood, anger
and anxiety (Asgeirsdottir, Gudjonsson, Sigurdsson, & Sigfusdottir, 2010; Peleikis,
Mykletum, & Dahl, 2004; Sigurvinsdottir, Asgeirsdottir, Ullman, & Sigfusdottir,
2017) and greater risk for suicidal and otherwise self-injurious behaviour, delin-
quency and substance use (Asgeirsdottir, Sigfusdottir, Gudjonsson, & Sigurdsson,
2011; Sigfusdottir, Asgeirsdottir, Gudjonsson, & Sigurdsson, 2008, 2013). Sexual
violence is therefore an important public health problem with potentially life-
altering effects. Disclosures of sexual violence are a vital part of the recovery and
well-being of survivors of sexual violence.
Evidence from the United States suggests that disclosures of violence have
important implications for survivors, both in terms of the decision to disclose and
the reactions people receive from others (Tener & Murphy, 2015; Ullman, 1996a).
Little is known about disclosures and social reactions in the Nordic countries, how-
ever. The introduction of social media has also given survivors a new way of shar-
ing their experiences, such as traumatic events; these developments have yet to be
explored adequately in the literature. In this chapter we examine Icelandic social
media disclosures of sexual violence as well as explore the disclosure process,
including determining why survivors disclose and studying the reactions they
receive from others. Our ﬁndings from this study are exempliﬁed from this post
from a survivor: ‘The day I talked about it, not just with those closest to me, but
with the entire internet, was the day I ﬁnally became free’.
We have chosen to employ the term ‘survivor’ of sexual violence, rather than
‘victim’, because several authors have noted in the literature that this distinction is
important to those involved, as well as to the surrounding community. A large
body of literature has been devoted to this topic, from which we will provide a few
examples in this chapter. In many cases, those who have experienced sexual vio-
lence reject the term ‘victim’ because they feel the word invokes stereotypes of
someone who is weak and passive, which does not ﬁt with their experience or
sense of self (Donovan & Hester, 2010). One example includes rape survivors in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, who prefer to be called ‘survivors’ because, in their view, sur-
vivors can get family support, avoid personal guilt and seek justice against perpet-
rators. Victims, on the other hand, try to hide violence and feel guilt, shame and
bodily pain (Skjelsbæk, 2006).
Other community members also distinguish between these terms: An experimen-
tal study of rape vignettes showed that participants perceived a raped woman more
positively when she was termed a ‘survivor’ rather than a ‘victim’ (Papendick &
Bohner, 2017). The English-speaking participants in the study (which also included
speakers of other languages) also found the term ‘survivor’ to be appropriate, espe-
cially when raped women applied this term to themselves. Given that we wish to
emphasise the agency of survivors in disclosing their experiences on social media,
and we do not wish to shame and blame them, we prefer the term ‘survivor’, even
though we recognise that some may feel the word unnecessarily invokes ideas of
life-threatening violence.
Disclosure of sexual violence
Disclosing sexual violence means to tell another person about an event or events,
either formally or informally, and to do so either by self-motivation or following an
invitation to tell (Ullman, 2003). Disclosures are crucial because without them, vio-
lence remains hidden, which makes it impossible to mobilise resources to help sur-
vivors and perpetrators. Survivors are more likely to disclose if they feel that doing
so will beneﬁt themselves or others and if they believe that societal norms would
characterise the event as abusive (Tener & Murphy, 2015). Survivors are most
likely to disclose to those they trust, such as friends and family members (Tener &
Murphy, 2015). For example, one study found that young female rape survivors
most commonly disclosed to friends ﬁrst, followed by parents, other adults, part-
ners and family members. Only 5.8% of the women told a professional about the
event ﬁrst, although slightly over half did at some point receive post-rape services
(Bicanic, Hehenkamp, van de Putte, van Wijk, & de Jong, 2015).
Numerous barriers to disclosure exist, including gender. For example, male sur-
vivors are less likely to disclose than female survivors (Bicanic et al., 2015;
Hébert, Tourigny, Cyr, McDuff, & Joly, 2009). Age is another barrier; children
may wait months or even years to disclose after the ﬁrst abusive event (Hébert
et al., 2009; Jonzon & Lindblad, 2004). In a Swedish study on female survivors of
childhood sexual abuse, for instance, two-thirds of the respondents only disclosed
in adulthood (Jonzon & Lindblad, 2004). Adult disclosures can be self-motivated
or prompted by others (Tener & Murphy, 2015), such as by being asked or encour-
aged by a therapist (Alaggia, 2004) or other people in a relevant social network.
Hence, the decision to disclose in adulthood is usually intentional, and survivors
may go through times of self-dialogue about if, when and how it is best to disclose
(Del Castillo & Wright, 2009; Tener & Murphy, 2015). Survivors’ age therefore
affects whether and how they decide to disclose.
Another barrier to disclosure is the survivor’s fear of other people’s negative
reactions, as well as negative consequences following disclosure. For example,
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survivors may fear not being believed, hurting others or being rejected by family
or friends (Tener & Murphy, 2015). Survivors can also see disclosing violence as
‘coming out’, or admitting to having a concealable stigmatised identity –
information that is typically devalued by society but that is not obvious from
one’s appearance. To assume this type of identity can be a complex decision,
because it may result in either receiving social support or being rejected by
others (Pachankis, 2007). Ullman’s (2000) social reactions framework, which
we draw on in this chapter, examines how others react to disclosure and categorises
those reactions into positive and negative reactions. Positive reactions include pro-
viding emotional support and tangible aid, while negative reactions involve blam-
ing the survivor for the violence, taking control away, distracting the person (for
example by drawing attention away from the violent event), treating the person dif-
ferently than before the disclosure or acting in an egocentric manner. Research
from the United States (Ullman, 1996a, 1999) has shown that relationships affect
reactions, as friends, relatives and rape-crisis counsellors are the most likely to pro-
vide positive reactions, but negative reactions are more common among physicians
and police ofﬁcers. Reactions to disclosures (especially negative ones) relate to
a range of maladaptive outcomes, such as depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), the abuse of alcohol and substances and negative well-being (Orchowski,
Untied, & Gidycz, 2013; Sylaska & Edwards, 2014; Ullman, 1996b). Survivors are
therefore most likely to disclose to those they predict will be supportive, and they
may be justiﬁed in fearing social reactions, because they can signiﬁcantly affect
their well-being.
Disclosing violence is a challenging process that involves gradual steps towards
a comprehensive disclosure (Draucker & Martsolf, 2008; Hébert et al., 2009). The
ﬁrst reaction may determine whether the survivor decides to continue disclosing.
Some scholars also believe that the ﬁnal stage of disclosing involves sharing the
story with a wider audience, such as the media (Draucker & Martsolf, 2008).
Despite the prevalence of disclosures and the reported deleterious consequences
of negative reactions for individuals and society, very limited Nordic research
has been conducted on disclosures and their social reactions. The exception is
a qualitative study from Norway in which both survivors and professionals
were interviewed; the results conﬁrmed the importance of the social context and
the current lack of understanding of that context (Østby & Stefansen, 2017).
Social media disclosure of sexual violence and social reactions
Disclosure researchers to date have focussed on in-person disclosures, where
a survivor discloses to one person (or a small group), who then reacts in some way.
This disclosure can happen once or multiple times. Recent digital advances, how-
ever, have opened new ways of disclosing violence by allowing survivors to do so
on the Internet, for example using social media. Sharing one’s story with a wider
audience has become easier than ever before (Draucker & Martsolf, 2008). The
online context may therefore shape the process of disclosing. Disclosing online
may have unique characteristics because of the medium itself, such as being able to
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instantly communicate with large groups, thus making the disclosure more public
than traditional disclosures (Andalibi, Haimson, De Choudhury, & Forte, 2016).
Online disclosures may also allow for survivor anonymity, which is not possible
with in-person disclosures. Online disclosures more readily allow for social reac-
tions from strangers, which before the onset of social media were mostly made pos-
sible in very speciﬁc contexts, such as in court cases.
Telling others about one’s experiences of sexual violence on social media may
therefore be different from traditional in-person disclosures, but little is known
about the characteristics of such disclosures of sexual violence. One study, how-
ever (Bogen, Bleiweiss, & Orchowski, 2019), has examined social reactions on
Twitter under the hashtag #notokay in which women shared their experiences
with violence. Bogen et al. (2019) examined comments made on sexual-violence
disclosures and categorised them using Ullman’s social reactions framework. The
most common reaction was advocacy, where users challenged misinformation
about sexual violence, as well as those who posted negative comments. Advocacy
(which could also be termed ‘activism’) was not part of the original social reac-
tions framework and may therefore be a key way in which disclosures differ
online and in person.
Most of the available literature on social reactions was developed before
social media emerged, so research is lacking on disclosing in that context. In
this chapter, we explore and aim to further understand social media disclosures
of sexual violence among Icelandic survivors. We will examine posts where sur-
vivors have self-disclosed sexual violence on social media. The goal is to under-
stand these disclosures: when and how they happened, what they contain and how
similar they are to traditional, in-person disclosures. We will also examine reactions
to disclosures in a quantitative and qualitative manner to better understand what
impact they may have had on survivors. We have used the social reactions frame-
work to categorise reactions as either positive or negative. Other researchers will
then be able to use this information to further study disclosures in other Nordic
contexts, and in a more detailed way, in order to better understand how they shape
the well-being of survivors and communities as a whole.
Method
Data collection
The data set for this project includes 397 self-disclosure posts collected from public
social media sites posted between April 2015 and March 2017 (data collected in
May and June 2017). All posts were written in Icelandic on either Twitter (166
posts) or Facebook (231 posts). The search strategy for Twitter posts was the use of
keywords and hashtags associated with sexual violence in public accounts (ofbeldi,
kynferðisofbeldi, #daginneftir, #konurtala, and #þöggun1). Facebook data were
drawn from a group called ‘Beauty tips’, which is a semi-public group for women
(which had over 34,000 members as of June 2018) where all women who request
to join are accepted. The group was originally formed for women to share
Breaking the silence 227
information on fashion, hair, and makeup, but in May 2015, it spontaneously
became a venue for women to disclose sexual victimisation, with the number of
members in the group subsequently exploding. The same keywords that were
used in the Twitter search were used when searching the group’s page. Once
posts had been identiﬁed that contained any of these keywords, they were
reviewed to determine if they contained the inclusion criterion, which was a
self-disclosure of sexual violence (and not a general discussion of violence or
a disclosure of someone else’s experiences).
Data
Basic descriptive information was gathered from the posts. Most survivors were
female (94.5%, when gender could be determined). When the timing of violence
was mentioned, most were found to have taken place in childhood (84.5%);
timing was mentioned in one-third of the posts. When perpetrator information
was provided (as occurred in the majority of cases), most mentioned one perpet-
rator (97.3%), who was male in 97.5% of cases and most commonly was
a current/former romantic partner (23.2%) or family member (15.6%). Examples
of sexual violence ranged from harassment, being forced to watch pornography
and being touched on the outside of one’s clothes to more serious acts, such as
rape, attempted rape, exploitation of intoxication or sleep or forcing the survivor
to have sex with others.
In addition to sexual violence, some posts also contained experiences of physical
violence (such as slapping, beating, choking, ripping hair and more) and psycho-
logical violence (breaking survivors down with name calling, mocking, brainwash-
ing and jealousy, among other actions). Repeated incidents of violence were
observed in 14.4% of cases. About one-third of the participants had previously dis-
closed to someone in person; many of these had been delayed disclosures (close to
half the disclosures involved events in the past three years). The longest time that
had elapsed since victimisation was 35 years, and the shortest was a few days.
Methodology
When studying social media, it is important to realise the characteristics of the
medium and how it can be approached. Our project has been informed by
Rogers’s (2013) notion of digital methodology; we believe that the Internet is
not a realm inherently separate from the world. Rather, the online world acts as an
extension of the ‘real’ world and exhibits continual interactions with traditional,
in-person spaces. In this way, digital interactions can extend other types of com-
munication and stimulate further interactions between members and networks
of people (Rogers, 2013). We think this situation applies to online disclosures
of sexual violence as well. Because the digital world can act as an extension of
in-person spaces, disclosing on social media and in person can be thought of as
intersecting circles, with certain commonalities and certain differences. For
example, both involve telling one’s own experiences and obtaining some form
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of reaction from others. Disclosing in person, however, can allow one to attain
richer reactions, such as non-verbal cues, that are usually unavailable online.
Social media disclosures, on the other hand, take place in a more public venue
and could therefore be thought of not only as personal expression but also as
a way of making a statement on the topic. The identities of those who use social
media can also be formed in both the online and ofﬂine worlds simultaneously
(Rogers, 2013) – a situation with potential implications for how survivors see
themselves and other survivors who are part of the same movement.
Because the data were collected from social media sites, the data have unique
characteristics that differ from those used in traditional social-science approaches.
This scenario creates both advantages and challenges. For example, one particular
beneﬁt for research is that, rather than relying on self-reported experiences and dis-
closures, researchers can examine how and when disclosures happen. In addition,
the data may more closely present the viewpoint of survivors, as the disclosures are
self-motivated and presented in their own words, rather than being framed by
researchers. Using survivors’ words directly can be an empowering act that priori-
tises the lived experiences of survivors and their view of themselves. Having said
that, online spaces also have informal social rules that will also shape the disclosure
process and the language that is used.
Different online platforms may also shape what survivors want to share with
others and what they feel is contextually appropriate. The level of detail in posts
will differ on the platforms we have included in this chapter, as Twitter only allows
posts to be a maximum of 140 characters, but Facebook does not have a length
limit. We treat all the posts as one type of material in our analyses, however,
because we found powerful disclosures and descriptions on both platforms. Other
limitations also include focussing only on public sites, as well as the users of these
sites being more likely to be young and female. The data set may therefore under-
represent the narratives of older women and of men, which reﬂects a generational
norm in the use of technology and the disclosing of sexual violence, as well as
a gendered norm in terms of self-disclosing sexual violence. When reading the ana-
lysis, it is important to keep in mind that the sample of disclosures is not represen-
tative of online disclosures in general. They offer an initial snapshot of what online
disclosures include, as almost no information is available on this topic to date. Des-
pite the characteristics and limitations of the data, we expect that these posts will
tell us a great deal about online disclosures of sexual violence and how this topic
could be studied in the future.
Ethical considerations
Social media research is developing quickly, so scholars have yet to agree on
one single ethical standard or practice. The British Psychological Society
(BSP), however, has published guidelines that we have followed in our work,
called the ‘Ethics Guidelines for Internet-Mediated Research’. The BPS explains
that the four main principles for ethical conduct of research are: ‘1) Respect for
autonomy, privacy and dignity of individuals and communities, 2) Scientiﬁc
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integrity, 3) Social responsibility and 4) Maximising beneﬁts and minimising
harm’ (British Psychological Society, 2017, p. 2). These principles apply to the
use of Internet data in multiple ways, such as (1) the question of whether
public or private data is used and whether identiﬁable data is collected, (2) the
informing of participants about data collection and (3) the gaining of consent
for collecting data, when appropriate.
In addition to the BPS, the study was designed with guidance from the Icelandic
Data Protection Authority (IDPA). We have taken measures to conduct this study
ethically, for example by limiting our analyses to public data. On Twitter, this
meant only ﬁnding posts from public accounts, but on Facebook, we sought content
from the semi-public Facebook group Beauty tips, which the IDPA has ruled may
be considered public content because of the group’s large number of members.
Before we collected data from the group, we posted information on the site to say
that we were planning to conduct this study; we gave survivors a week to remove
their posts or asked them to contact us if they did not wish to be included (which
no one did). The posts were then collected without any identifying information.
The purpose of the analysis is to examine broad themes about disclosure, so there
should be no risk to individual participants. When we have wished to anonym-
ously quote speciﬁc survivors, however – such as in this chapter and in previous
presentations – we have sought explicit permission from survivors. Those we
have contacted have all given their permission, and some have speciﬁcally
remarked that they felt respected and empowered by their words being presented
and discussed publicly.
Analysis
The analytical strategy for this project consists of coding and thematic analysis,
which is an accessible and ﬂexible method of identifying and organising themes
in a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The process involves familiarising oneself
with the data, generating initial codes and searching for, reviewing and naming
themes. The ﬁnal step involves generating a narrative summary of the results
(Riger & Sigurvinsdottir, 2015). First, we used deductive provisional coding, in
which we gathered descriptive information from the posts based on previously
deﬁned categories (Saldaña, 2015). Examples of codes we used were whether
an in-person disclosure was mentioned, what types of social reactions were
given (both in-person and online) and what violence characteristics were men-
tioned, such as types of violence and severity. The authors created the coding
scheme after reviewing the data set, and then the third author applied the
scheme to each post. Second, we used inductive provisional coding to identify
themes that emerged from the data set. For example, survivors who had experi-
enced a sense of community very clearly emerged from the data. Once these
codes were applied, we created broader themes by aggregating codes on similar
topics that reﬂected similar meanings. The themes presented in this chapter
were formed in both an inductive and deductive manner and are related to dis-
closure (i.e. they are facilitators to disclosure and reactions).
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The results section below broadly follows the process of disclosing violence.
First, we focus on when the disclosures took place, then on what survivors described
as facilitators and barriers, and ﬁnally on the reactions the disclosures elicited.
Results
Societal discussions of sexual violence: an opportunity for disclosure
One initial impression when examining the social media disclosures in the data set
is that they occurred at very speciﬁc times, when a broader societal discussion of
sexual violence was taking place. Figure 14.1 shows the number of posts over the
time period of the study, from April 2015 to March 2017.
Figure 14.1 shows that the disclosures came in waves, with three clear spikes
that coincided with public acts of activism. The ﬁrst spike occurred in the summer
of 2015, when the ‘Beauty tips revolution’ took place in May and June. These dis-
closures may have been motivated by seeing other survivors disclose, although the
spike in disclosures also continued throughout July 2015. The Reykjavik ‘Slut
Walk’, an event in which people protest sexual violence and shift the blame for
violence from survivors to perpetrators, was held on 25 July 2015 for the ﬁfth time.
This type of survivor-positive event may therefore have facilitated some disclos-
ures. The second spike in disclosures took place in November 2015, when large
crowds gathered outside the main building of the Reykjavik Metropolitan Police to
protest perceived leniency within a speciﬁc sexual assault case. The third spike
took place in July 2016, when the Slut Walk was held for the sixth time. Between
these time points, very few disclosure posts were published. These social media
disclosures therefore seem connected to societal discussions of sexual violence and
possibly by seeing other survivors leading by example.
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Figure 14.1 Number of self-disclosure posts of sexual violence over time.
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Disclosures
Survivors commonly explained in their posts why they had decided to disclose
their experiences with sexual violence. The most common facilitator to disclos-
ure was seeing others talk about their experiences, which was a major motivat-
ing factor to coming forward with their own stories. Here is one example (all
translations in this chapter, from Icelandic to English, have been slightly edited
for clarity and punctuation):
I’m so proud of you girls for telling your stories, because they’ve helped
me get mine out and ﬁnally talking about it, and I encourage all women
who’ve had to carry such a heavy burden to talk about it!
Another example illustrates that the survivor felt especially compelled to disclose
after having seen a disclosure from a friend. It therefore seems important not just
that survivors see someone else disclose but also that they feel some kind of per-
sonal connection (such as knowing the person or having had a similar kind of
experience):
I’ve been looking at posts here from girls after this amazing revolution
started and have been thinking how amazing it is for them!! I also thought
that I’d never tell my story! Then I saw a post from one of my best friends,
and it touched me, so I thought, why the hell am I keeping something secret
and being ashamed for something that’s not my fault?? So this is my story.
Survivors thus inﬂuenced others by telling their story in such a public manner,
which they saw as a positive development. Another facilitator to disclosure was
not only seeing others disclose but also feeling some kind of shared sense of
community about the issue, which could reﬂect the fact that survivors saw how
common violence is and that disclosures are typically met with understanding
and support. Public discussions may therefore have contributed to an empower-
ing sense of community between survivors:
I can barely describe how thankful I am for all of you. Countless stories have
appeared on this site. These stories have helped me so much in the past few
days. You are so strong, and now I’m going to be strong as well.
I’m sitting here with tears in my eyes after reading the stories here. Dearest
girls, we need to stick together and bring attention to this very serious and
important topic. You are heroes!
Some survivors even described that this sense of community had helped them
disclose in person:
I’ve never been so proud to be an Icelandic woman as I am today. Because
of you, I ﬁnally had the guts to tell my parents the whole truth.
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This sense of community was also reﬂected in the vocabulary people used in the
posts, with the Icelandic equivalent of words such as ‘bravery’, ‘pride’ and ‘hero’
featuring prominently; in these descriptions, brave survivors were those who were
willing to talk about their experience publicly. The group therefore saw some indi-
viduals as leading by example and being positive role models to others. This is
a new dimension to disclosing that may be unique to disclosing online:
Thank you, girls, for beginning to talk and sharing. You are incredibly
brave. I’m going to be brave like you.
This sense of community and solidarity in some cases even assumed an almost mili-
tary-style language, which may have reﬂected the activism inherent in disclosing
online:
I’m so proud of this revolution and will stand with this revolution and
everyone who’s told their story here until the bitter end.
These facilitators were very salient to the survivors, but the survivors also men-
tioned that they no longer experienced the barriers to disclosure that had previ-
ously held them back from telling their stories. Shame was the most signiﬁcant
barrier to disclosing and had signiﬁcantly affected the lives of many survivors.
This shame had kept survivors from talking about violence, but the fact that they
no longer felt that way was one of the strongest themes found in the data set.
They hence felt that talking about violence could counteract the negative effects
of shame, especially when done in a way that would not blame survivors:
My whole life I’ve thought that it was my fault that it happened, because
I got myself into the situation, but I know that that’s not true.
I’ve never talked about it, because I always thought that the guilt and shame
were mine, but today I know better!
Many survivors also stated that the survivor sense of community had helped
them ‘give the shame back’ to the perpetrator:
Thank you for sharing your stories. It’s great to feel this solidarity in break-
ing the silence and giving back the shame.
Reactions to disclosures
As shown previously, survivors reported experiencing a sense of community when
they disclosed sexual violence. These stories are powerful, but the use of social media
platforms also allows us to examine and even quantify the survivors’ reactions to dis-
closures. At the time the posts were made, Facebook and Twitter only had the click
option of ‘liking’ a post (today the options on Facebook represent a variety of
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feelings, such as anger, sadness, and more). The number of likes per post can be used
as an indicator of how many people want to show the survivor some kind of support.
The number of likes for the posts ranged from 0 to 2,300, with a median number of
likes of 98. The number of comments ranged from 0 to 256, with a median number
of reactions of 11. This was a much higher number of reactions than could be
expected when disclosing in person. The comments to the posts were over-
whelmingly positive, if superﬁcial. For example, many of the comments simply
included a heart emoji or a few positive words about the survivor. In our mater-
ial, we did not ﬁnd a single negative reaction (although it is possible that some-
one could have made and then deleted a negative comment).
To provide some context for these reactions, we also examined the posts for reac-
tions that survivors reported receiving in person from others. The positive in-person
reactions were diverse, such as the rejection of the perpetrator by friends and family
as well as romantic partners being patient with survivors who struggled with sexual
activity following acts of violence. In fact, some survivors reported that reactions
from others had helped the survivors deﬁne and frame the violent event itself and to
seek help:
I immediately called my friend crying my eyes out and then hadn’t fully real-
ised that I’d been raped. I just felt terrible – felt dirty and completely broken
down – but thankfully she realised straight away that I’d been raped, helped
me see that, and told me to go straight to the emergency room.
Although the online reactions found in this data set were only positive, survivors
generally receive a mixture of positive and negative reactions when they disclose
in person (Sigurvinsdottir & Ullman, 2015). In line with previous studies, the sur-
vivors examined in our material who had received negative reactions to in-person
disclosure described how these reactions had affected them negatively:
When I talked about it [the violence] a few years later, others called me a
liar because I hadn’t fought back…I decided to just shut up and try to pro-
tect my reputation.
Negative reactions can also affect the seeking of help following violence:
I was going to press charges, but the ﬁrst police ofﬁcer I talked to said,
‘But he is, after all, your boyfriend’. I walked out and never again tried to
press charges – my soul was completely broken.
It is difﬁcult to say whether getting online reactions may serve the same pur-
pose as in-person reactions, with the latter seeming deeper and more meaningful
to the survivor. At the same time, harmful negative reactions did not seem to
have taken place in the online context of this study. Another possibility is that
disclosing online had prompted some in-person reactions that could have been
either positive or negative; whether these online disclosures had also prompted
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in-person reactions as well remains unclear. On the whole, online reactions’
impacts on survivors require further examination.
Discussion
This study was an initial effort to examine social media disclosures of sexual
violence, which are similar to in-person disclosures in that delayed disclosures
are prominent (Bicanic et al., 2015; Hébert et al., 2009; Jonzon & Lindblad,
2004). Seeing others disclose on social media is a powerful motivator for
people to disclose. This scenario may be unique to the online context because
of the public nature of the disclosure. These participants presented disclosing on
social media as a crucial part of rejecting the shame they had felt and that
others had projected onto them.
Social media disclosures can also serve to build social support and a sense of
community among survivors, both of which affect survivor well-being (Tener &
Murphy, 2015; Ullman, 1999). Little is known about online communities of sexual
violence survivors, although researchers have examined this issue for other topics.
For example, receiving social support when self-disclosing mental health issues
online is connected with fewer depressive symptoms and an increased quality of
life (Rains & Young, 2009). In addition, online support groups for breast cancer
patients have been effective in reducing perceived stress, depression and cancer-
related trauma (Winzelberg et al., 2003). From the posts we examined, we cannot
conclude that the survivors were positively affected by disclosing, but the salience
of the social-support theme among the survivors is promising.
Societal discussions of violence may also facilitate online disclosures, which
was visible from the timing of the disclosures. These time points, however,
were characterised not only by discussions of sexual violence but also by very
speciﬁc survivor-centred discussions that focussed on explicitly shifting blame
from survivor to perpetrator. Discussing in this particular way, rather than
having discussions of sexual violence in general, may therefore be the key
ingredient to facilitate disclosure. The disclosure themes are also likely to con-
verge. For example, societal discussions may be enough to motivate some sur-
vivors to come forward, while others will be motivated both by general
discussions and by seeing others disclose. This situation is in line with previous
research on in-person disclosures, where social norms regarding disclosure and
violence are an important factor (Tener & Murphy, 2015).
The social media themes can be placed in a theoretical context by using the dis-
closure process model, where individuals self-disclose some kind of a concealable
stigmatised identity to others (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010). Being a sexual-
violence survivor is such an identity, as the label is stigmatised and not obvious
from one’s appearance; in fact, many of the survivors in our study talked about
online disclosures as a kind of ‘coming out’ process. The disclosure process
model states that disclosing a concealable stigmatised identity may positively
affect individuals and communities in the long term through three processes.
First, not feeling able to share the experience with others can be taxing to the
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individual and can claim cognitive resources; indeed, our data show that sur-
vivors felt relief associated with sharing their experiences. Second, disclosure
can have positive effects because it can lead to social support, which was very
much the case with the survivors in our study; they reported feeling strong
online social support from others. Finally, disclosure can have positive effects
because people who have disclosed have now changed the social information
now available about them to the world, which can then allow for people to
change their behaviour accordingly, for example by seeking out communities
of support among those with the same identity. The survivors in our study
seemed to have entered this kind of community simply by disclosing in this
way (Chaudoir & Fisher, 2010). Even though the design of this study has not
allowed for the health or well-being of the survivors to be assessed, the fact
that the disclosure themes ﬁt so well with previous research on positive out-
comes is promising.
Reactions from others have an impact on survivors. This study has shown that
online reactions were only positive, either as likes or positive comments, which is
in accordance with the only other published study on online social reactions to
date, where the majority of comments were positive, and the online community
actively challenged negative comments (Bogen et al., 2019). Previous studies on
in-person disclosures have shown that negative reactions are common, such as
accusing the survivor of lying or blaming the survivor. Negative in-person reac-
tions relate to overall well-being and poorer mental health, such as depressive
symptoms, PTSD and the abuse of alcohol and substances (Orchowski et al.,
2013; Sylaska & Edwards, 2014; Ullman, 1996b). Positive in-person reactions are
typically beneﬁcial, but this effect is more modest than for negative reactions
(Sigurvinsdottir & Ullman, 2015). The in-person reactions presented in this study
tended to fall into extreme positive and negative categories, which could reﬂect
that extreme reactions (either good or bad) were the most salient to survivors
and were therefore what they included in their posts. Reactions can signiﬁ-
cantly affect survivors in many ways, for example by deﬁning the experience
itself and from the closest community taking a stance (or not) about the sur-
vivor and perpetrator. This situation speaks to the importance of contextual
factors in survivors’ recovery.
When we compared online and in-person reactions, we found that online dis-
closures received a greater number of reactions than those in person (Dworkin,
Pittenger, & Allen, 2016; Littleton, Axsom, Breitkopf, & Berenson, 2006). In
addition, we found all the online social reactions to have been positive, although
many of the comments seemed superﬁcial. When survivors disclose in person,
they typically receive both positive and negative reactions (Sigurvinsdottir &
Ullman, 2015). Researchers should thus focus on ﬁnding very detailed informa-
tion about online reactions and how disclosures have shaped subsequent in-
person reactions.
The dataset clearly displayed cultural narratives and norms about sexual vio-
lence. In some cases, survivors mentioned these narratives so that they could
explicitly challenge them. For example, some survivors described that others
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had ‘slut-shamed’ them for their victimisation, and some had internalised their feel-
ings of shame. The survivors mentioned these situations to point out how unfair
and damaging this idea is, both in general and to individual survivors. In many
cases, the survivors noted that the violence was not their fault, regardless of the
circumstances. The survivors rejected the perceived cultural norm that survivors
whose behaviour has not been impeccable were in some way ‘asking for it’. We
may think of this overt rejection of victim-blaming and other destructive cul-
tural narratives as taking an activist stance against sexual violence. For
example, Keller (2012) has argued that young people increasingly use various
online spaces for political purposes. Not only does this create diverse communi-
ties and content, but it also opens up the possibility of non-traditional activism.
In this way, survivors can organise themselves around the survivor identity,
rather than using traditional divides of gender, race, class and other groupings.
This element of activism also differentiates between traditional and social
media disclosures, as in-person disclosures rarely contain such clear rejections
of stereotypes and narratives about violence.
The posts also reinforced other potentially detrimental cultural narratives, how-
ever. For example, the language of the posts was very gendered, with repeated use
of the word ‘girls’ and one survivor being ‘proud to be an Icelandic woman’. Impli-
cit in this language is the assumption that survivors of sexual violence are always
female. Although statistics show that females are more likely to be victimised
(Asgeirsdottir et al., 2011; Rajan et al., 2017), male survivors do exist, and they are
somewhat excluded from this community of survivors. The digital aspect may also
exclude older adults. The space that a community creates can therefore be very
empowering for those within it, but such space does not seem to be available to
everyone.
Because this research topic is so new, studies need to be conducted in the future
to understand online disclosures and their impact; for example, the mental health
implications of online disclosures and reactions remain poorly understood. In
addition, no studies to date have examined how in-person and online disclosures
and reactions shape each other, and whether people who disclose online will also
disclose in person. In order to address these questions, a large longitudinal research
project is planned in Iceland during the years 2018–2021 (Asgeirsdottir &
Sigurvinsdottir, 2018).
Conclusion
This study has been an initial effort to examine online disclosures of sexual vio-
lence. Given the profound impact that survivors have described in terms of the
importance of disclosing, and the impact of the reactions survivors have received,
we believe that the results highlight how important the social context is to sur-
vivors. Since the time the data were collected for this study, online disclosures have
exploded worldwide with the #metoo movement. We believe that gathering and
analysing this type of information from Iceland may be useful to researchers in
other Nordic countries who wish to study digital disclosure and supportive online
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communities. Even though the details of the disclosures will vary between coun-
tries and cultures, we think that researchers may use the broad themes developed in
this study as a guide for future studies on this topic.
Note
1 Translations of search terms: violence, sexual violence, #thenextday, #womentalk,
#silencing.
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